DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL CJ,
KEANE, GORDON, EDELMAN AND STEWARD JJ

DQU16 & ORS  APPELLANTS

AND

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs

[2021] HCA 10

Date of Hearing: 4 February 2021
Date of Judgment: 7 April 2021

S169/2020

ORDER

Appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation

C A Webster SC with I J King and E C Graham for the appellants (instructed by Clifford Chance)

A M Mitchelmore SC with G J Johnson for the first respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

Submitting appearance for the second respondent

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. KIEFEL CJ, KEANE, GORDON, EDELMAN AND STEWARD JJ. Section 36(2) of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) relevantly provides two criteria for the grant of a protection visa: that the applicant is a non‑citizen in Australia "in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee" under s 36(2)(a); and, if the applicant does not satisfy that criterion, that the applicant meets the complementary protection criterion under s 36(2)(aa), which gives effect to some of Australia's non‑refoulement obligations under international instruments.

  2. The first appellant, an Iraqi national, sought a protection visa relying on s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. The first appellant said he feared persecution[1], and would suffer significant harm[2], if returned to Iraq because, while in Iraq, he sold alcohol, which is banned by local law in some parts of Iraq and considered "immoral" and "un-Islamic" by Sunni and Shi'ite extremists. The claims of the second and third appellants, the first appellant's wife and child, depended on the claims of the first appellant. The Immigration Assessment Authority ("the Authority") found that the first appellant had not been personally targeted for reasons relating to the sale of alcohol, that he did not face a real risk of harm if returned to Iraq because he had sold alcohol previously, and, critically for this appeal, that if the first appellant returned to Iraq he would not continue to sell alcohol. The Authority affirmed the decision of the delegate of the then Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[3] ("the Minister") not to grant the appellants protection visas. The Authority's approach to, and determination of, the first appellant's claim under s 36(2)(a) was not in issue in this Court.

    [1]Migration Act, s 36(2)(a).

    [2]Migration Act, s 36(2)(aa).

    [3]Now the Minister for Home Affairs.

  3. This Court held in Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[4] that, in assessing the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), an asylum seeker cannot be expected to hide or change behaviour that is the manifestation of a protected characteristic under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as modified by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees ("the Convention") in order to avoid persecution[5]. Appellant S395

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Details
Case
[2021] HCA 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs concerned applications for protection visas made by Iraqi nationals. The first appellant claimed protection as a refugee under s 36(2)(a) of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa). The second and third appellants, his wife and child, applied as members of his family unit. The Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) had refused to grant the visas, finding that the first appellant would modify his behaviour upon return to Iraq. The matter came before the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Authority's failure to consider the principle established in *Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs* (2003) 216 CLR 473, which held that an asylum seeker cannot be expected to hide or change behaviour manifesting a protected characteristic for the purposes of assessing a claim under s 36(2)(a), constituted a jurisdictional error when assessing the complementary protection criterion under s 36(2)(aa). The complementary protection criterion requires an assessment of whether "significant harm" is a "necessary and foreseeable consequence" of the applicant's return to their receiving country.

The High Court held that while the statutory questions posed by s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) are distinct, a decision-maker assessing the complementary protection criterion under s 36(2)(aa) is entitled to refer to and rely on relevant findings made when considering the refugee criterion under s 36(2)(a), particularly where the factual bases overlap. The Court found that the question under s 36(2)(aa) is whether, in light of all relevant findings, there is a real risk of significant harm as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen's removal. The Court concluded that the Authority had indeed conducted this assessment in the present case.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL CJ, KEANE, GORDON, EDELMAN AND STEWARD JJ
Although the statutory questions posed by s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) are different, it has long been recognised[40] that, to the extent that the factual bases for claims under s 36(2)(a) and s 36(2)(aa) overlap, a decision-maker, when considering the complementary protection criterion under s 36(2)(aa), is entitled to refer to and rely on any relevant findings the decision-maker made when considering the refugee criterion under s 36(2)(a). The question under s 36(2)(aa) then is whether, in light of those and any other relevant findings, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non‑citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non‑citizen will suffer significant harm of the kind prescribed in s 36(2A), subject to s 36(2B) and (2C). And, as will be seen, that is what the Authority did in this case.[40]See, eg, SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774 at [56]; SZSQG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 136 ALD 360 at 375‑377 [84]‑[93]; SZSHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 138 ALD 26 at 34 [31]; BCX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 164 ALD 313 at 318 [23].Appellants' claims and the decision of the Authority The appellants are Iraqi nationals and Shia Muslims from Nasiriya, Dhi Qar, Iraq. The second and third appellants are the wife and child of the first appellant. The first and second appellants arrived in Australia as "unauthorised maritime arrivals" within the meaning of s 5AA of the Migration Act on 23 August 2012. The third appellant was born in Australia. Subsequently, on 3 September 2015, the appellants lodged applications for temporary protection visas. The first appellant claimed protection as a refugee under s 36(2)(a) and complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa). The second and third appellants did not apply for protection in their own rights, but as members of the first appellant's family unit under s 36(2)(b)(i) and (c)(i) of the Migration Act. On 9 September 2016, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the appellants protection visas. That decision was referred to the Authority for review under the fast track review scheme provided by Pt 7AA of the Migration Act. The basis of the first appellant's claims for protection were summarised in the Authority's reasons. The first appellant worked as a private alcohol seller in Nasiriya between 2010 and 2012, selling liquor obtained from Baghdad from his car at various locations and arranging sales by phone. In 2012, he discovered that the "Mahdi Army", or "JAM", as it was referred to in the Authority's reasons, a "strong militant group", was planning to kill him because of his work as an alcohol seller. Around this time, he reported being shot at and chased by a vehicle or motorbike. He subsequently arranged to leave Iraq due to his fear of harm.Authority's consideration of s 36(2)(a) The Authority commenced by considering the first appellant's claim for protection as a refugee under s 36(2)(a). The Authority accepted the first appellant's claim that he worked as an alcohol seller in Iraq, noting that he had consistently made this claim since arriving in Australia. The Authority referred to reports, from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, that in primarily conservative Shi'ite communities alcohol shops are banned by local law, while in the major cities of Baghdad, Basrah, Kirkuk and Mosul, shops and bars are severely restricted by the "conservative political and social atmosphere" because the consumption of alcohol is considered "un-Islamic" or "immoral behaviour". The Authority also accepted that alcohol sellers and those consuming alcohol have been targets of violence inflicted by militia groups in the past and that Sunni and Shi'ite extremists have in the past reportedly attacked liquor shops "with impunity".

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL CJ, KEANE, GORDON, EDELMAN AND STEWARD JJ

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