2104142 (Refugee)
[2025] ARTA 1444
•13 March 2025
2104142 (Refugee) [2025] ARTA 1444 (13 March 2025)
Decision and
Reasons for Decision
Respondent:
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
Tribunal Number:
2104142
Tribunal:
General Member F Robertson
Date:
13 March 2025
Place:
Perth
Decision:
The Tribunal affirms the decision under review
Statement made on 13 March 2025 at 2:21pm
CATCHWORDS
REFUGEE – protection visa – Egypt – political opinion – participation in protests – arrested, interrogated, tortured, forced to confess, threatened, extorted and places of business destroyed – sentenced in absentia and travel ban – vague and inconsistent claims and evidence unsupported or contradicted by other evidence – late claims of being targeted by one police officer, paying bribe to depart, and persecution of wife and children – new passport and unhindered departure – rental income from properties disclosed in previous visa applications – uncooperative and evasive explanations – decision under review affirmedLEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5AAA, 5H(1)(a), 5J(1), (4)(b), (c), (5), 36(2)(a), (aa), (2A), 65
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 2
CASES
ASB17 v MHA [2019] FCAFC 38; (2019) 268 FCR 271
AVQ15 v MIBP [2018] FCAFC 133; (2018) 266 FCR 83; 361 ALR 227
CQG15 v MIBP [2016] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 496
DQU16 v MHA [2021] HCA 10; 273 CLR 1
EIG17 v MICMA [2023] FedCFamC2G 804
Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; 214 CLR 118
MIAC v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; 210 FCR 505
MIEA v Guo [1997] HCA 22; 1997 CLR 559
Randhawa v MILGEA (1994) 52 FCR 437
Selvadurai v MIEA [1994] FCA 301; 34 ALR 347
Sundararaj v MIMA [1999] FCA 76
SZLVZ v MIAC [2008] FCA 1816
W375/01A v MIMA [2002] FCAFC 89; 67 ALD 757
Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 369 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information.
Statement of reasons
INTRODUCTION
This is an application for review of a decision to refuse to grant the applicant a Subclass 866 Protection (Class XA) visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the 'Act').
The applicant is a [Age]-year-old male who is a national of Egypt. The applicant arrived in Australia in September 2019 as the holder of a visitor visa. He applied for a protection visa in October 2019. Following an interview in October 2020, the application was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs in March 2021.
The applicant has applied for review of that decision. The application was heard on 12 March 2025. Following that hearing, I have determined that the decision under review should be affirmed. These are my reasons.
CRITERIA FOR THE GRANT OF A PROTECTION VISA
The criteria for a protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is either, they are a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds or are a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies either s 36(2)(a) or (aa).
Refugee criterion
Section 36(2)(a) of the Act provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the decision‑maker is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee. A person is a refugee if, in the case of a person who has a nationality, they are outside the country of their nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.[1]
[1] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 5H(1)(a).
A person has a well-founded fear of persecution if they fear being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, there is a real chance they would be persecuted for one or more of those reasons, and the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of the relevant country.[2] Among other things, persecution must involve serious harm[3] and systematic and discriminatory conduct.[4]
[2] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 5J(1); DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; 273 CLR 1 [10] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ).
[3] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 5J(4)(b). Section 5J(5) of the Act contains a non-exhaustive list of examples of harm that involve serious harm, without otherwise limiting the nature or type of harm that might come within s 5J(4)(b).
[4] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 5J(4)(c).
A fear of persecution will be 'well‑founded' if there is a 'real chance' that the person will suffer the feared persecution if returned to the receiving country and the real chance relates to all areas of that country.[5] A 'real chance' is a prospect that is not 'remote' or 'far‑fetched', it does not require a likelihood of persecution on the balance of probabilities.[6]
[5] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5J(1)(b)-(c); DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; 273 CLR 1 [10] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ).
[6] DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; 273 CLR 1 [10] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ) citing Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 at 389, 398, 407, 429.
Complementary protection criterion
A person who does not satisfy the ‘refugee criterion’ in s 36(2)(a) of the Act, may satisfy the 'complementary protection criterion' under s 36(2)(aa). That criterion is prospective and asks whether there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm as a 'necessary and foreseeable consequence' of return to the receiving country.[7]
[7] DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; 273 CLR 1 [13] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ).
The ‘real risk’ test imposes the same standard as the ‘real chance’ test applicable to the assessment of ‘well-founded fear’.[8] As to what amounts to 'significant harm’, that term is exhaustively defined in s 36(2A) of the Act.[9]
[8] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; 210 FCR 505 [246] (Lander and Gordon JJ), [296] (Besanko and Jagot JJ), [342] (Flick J).
[9] DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; 273 CLR 1 [14] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ); see also Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 5 in respect of the definitions of 'torture', 'cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment' and 'degrading treatment or punishment'.
BACKGROUND
The applicant was born in [Year] in Al-Gharbia, Egypt. He is married with [children], aged [Ages]. I accept these matters.
Protection visa application and protection claims
The applicant's protection visa application was lodged in October 2019. In support of the application, the applicant provided a written statement styled 'Personal Narrative of [the applicant]', in which he claimed to be unable to return to Egypt due to persecution by state authorities. In that document, the applicant claimed he was arrested three times, tortured, and threatened because of his activity in Egypt.
Additionally, the applicant also provided the following in support of his application for the protection visa:
(a)a document styled 'Personal Narrative' statement dated 23 September 2019;
(b)a translated statement from the applicant's wife;
(c)a translated statement from [A];
(d)a translated statement from [B];
(e)a copy of the applicant's resume, marriage certificate, family register, national ID card and passport;
(f)copies of birth certificates for the applicant's children;
(g)various photographs which the applicant claims depict damage caused by the authorities to the applicant's home and business premises;
(h)a construction permit dated April 2016 and an English translation of that document;
(i)an undated medical report in relation to the period 21 November 2016 – 23 November 2016;
(j)a lease contract dated 15 December 2016;
(k)a police clearance together with an English translation dated 3 May 2019;
(l)a 'certificate of criminal docket' dated 23 May 2019; and
(m)an undated arrest warrant together with an English translation of that document.
On or around 26 October 2019, the applicant provided English translations of documents which were in Arabic.
The applicant claims his first arrest occurred in September 2015 after he saw his friends participating in a protest in Cairo.[10] He claims that after participating for about two hours, he was detained, blindfolded, and taken to a police station where he was stripped naked, interrogated and beaten for refusing to admit membership in the Muslim Brotherhood.[11] He claims that his detention occurred over five days and he was instructed to sign a document admitting his membership in the Muslim Brotherhood on three separate occasions.[12]
[10] Personal Narrative of [the applicant] dated 23 September 2019, [5].
[11] Personal Narrative of [the applicant] dated 23 September 2019, [6]-[11].
[12] Personal Narrative of [the applicant] dated 23 September 2019, [6]-[11].
The applicant claims that following his release, he discussed with others matters relating to his mistreatment by the Egyptian authorities, criticised the government for inhumane treatment and accused the Egyptian government of corruption.[13] He claims that following this, in February 2016, police attended his work and accused him of criticising the government.[14] He claims that police damaged his truck and destroyed the [business 1]. He further claims he was arrested and detained for three days between 9 and 12 February 2016.[15]
[13] Personal Narrative of [the applicant] dated 23 September 2019, [12]-[13].
[14] Personal Narrative of [the applicant] dated 23 September 2019, [13]-[14].
[15] Personal Narrative of [the applicant] dated 23 September 2019, [13]-[14].
He claims that following his release, he established a small [business 2] in Al-Gharbia. He started the [business 2] in September 2016 but was only able to work there for about twenty days before the same police officer destroyed that business with a bulldozer.[16]
[16] Personal Narrative of [the applicant] dated 23 September 2019, [15].
In November 2016, he participated in another protest known as the “Movement of the Poor,” after which he was detained for ten days.[17] He describes being tortured, stripped, and forced to sign a confession admitting to membership in the Muslim Brotherhood.[18] Upon release, he was warned that further defiance would lead to his death.[19]
[17] Personal Narrative of [the applicant] dated 23 September 2019, [17]-[18].
[18] Personal Narrative of [the applicant] dated 23 September 2019, [18].
[19] Personal Narrative of [the applicant] dated 23 September 2019, [19]
Fearing for his safety, he went into hiding, moving to Asyut.[20] However, he states that police continued to seek him out, even extorting money from him in exchange for leaving him alone.[21] Eventually, unable to sustain himself and under continuous pressure from authorities, he returned to Al-Gharbia, where police continued their harassment until he fled the country.[22]
[20] Personal Narrative of [the applicant] dated 23 September 2019, [20]-[22].
[21] Personal Narrative of [the applicant] dated 23 September 2019, [22].
[22] Personal Narrative of [the applicant] dated 23 September 2019, [24].
The applicant claimed that the Egyptian authorities have consistently targeted him destroying his livelihood, physically abusing him, and coercing him into a false confession. He asserts that returning to Egypt would put his life and family in danger, and on these grounds, he seeks protection in Australia.
Delegate's decision
The applicant was interviewed in relation to the application on 15 October 2020 with the assistance of an Arabic interpreter. The interview is referred to in the delegate's decision.[23] I have listened to that interview and aspects of the applicant's evidence at the interview is referred to in the delegate's decision.
[23] Delegate's decision, p 3.
The delegate refused to grant the applicant a protection visa on 31 March 2021. In so refusing, the delegate weighed concerns about the credibility of the applicant's claims, particularly what the delegate considered to be multiple inconsistencies.
The delegate noted that the applicant claimed he was arrested three times between 2015 and 2016 for participating in protests and was tortured while in detention, that he was accused of being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and coerced into signing a false confession. The delegate also noted the applicant further claimed that after his release, police continued to target him, seeking bribes and destroying his businesses.
The delegate did not accept that the applicant had been arrested or detained for attending political demonstrations. It was noted that while Egypt monitors and detects individuals affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, the applicant admitted that he was neither a member nor a supporter of the group. Additionally, the delegate found the applicant’s explanations, namely that he joined demonstrations in Cairo in 2015 without knowing their purpose and later attended the “Movement of the Poor” protests in 2016 despite acknowledging the risks, unconvincing. The delegate also relied on country information that the protests were minor, heavily policed, and resulted in only a small number of arrests, which the delegate considered raised doubt about the applicant’s claim that he was detained for ten days.
The delegate also considered that the medical evidence provided by the applicant did not support his claims. That was because the applicant claimed he was hospitalised for dehydration, yet the medical report did not support that fact.
A significant element of the applicant’s case was his assertion that a police officer named [Mr A] had persistently targeted him. He alleged that this officer arrested him, destroyed his businesses, and later extorted him for bribes. He also claimed that the officer harboured an inappropriate sexual interest in his wife and sought to force him to divorce her.
The delegate found this claim vague, inconsistent, and unconvincing. The delegate noted, and placed weight upon, the applicant's failure to mention the officer’s alleged interest in his wife during his interview for the first time and that aspect not being present in his written claims. The delegate did not accept the applicant's explanation for why that claim was not made earlier. Additionally, he could not explain why this particular officer would have targeted him over several years when he was neither politically active nor of significant interest to the authorities.
The applicant claimed that police destroyed both his [businesses 1 and 2], leaving him financially destitute. However, the delegate found inconsistencies in his statements about his economic situation. Documents from his earlier visitor visa application indicated that he earned income from leasing properties in Egypt, contradicting his claim that his businesses had been destroyed and he had no source of income.
When questioned about this discrepancy, the applicant responded that he had submitted the rental documents to the Australian Embassy only to “escape oppression.” The delegate found this response unpersuasive and concluded that the applicant had not been truthful about his financial difficulties.
The applicant claimed that he had been sentenced to five years in absentia and that his name had been on a travel ban list. However, he obtained a new Egyptian passport in 2019 and departed the country without any reported issues. The delegate considered this implausible, given that Egyptian authorities maintain strict travel restrictions on individuals with outstanding legal cases. The applicant alleged that he had bribed officials to facilitate his departure, something the delegate noted he had not mentioned in his initial claims, raising further doubts about the credibility of his account.
The delegate concluded that the applicant’s claims were internally inconsistent, lacked credible supporting evidence and were not supported by official records. The delegate did not accept that the applicant had been arrested for political reasons, that a specific police officer targeted him, or that the government destroyed his businesses. Given the applicant’s ability to depart Egypt legally, the delegate found no basis to conclude that he was of adverse interest to the Egyptian authorities. Consequently, the applicant’s claims were rejected on factual grounds, and his protection visa application was refused.
Review application
Following the hearing being adjourned, the applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 12 March 2025 to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal hearing was conducted with the assistance of an Arabic interpreter.
At the hearing the applicant suggested that I could contact his witnesses if I wanted to but was vague about whether he wanted them to give evidence. The applicant also suggested that contacting them might be difficult because of the time difference. Moreover, the applicant had not previously requested the Tribunal contact witnesses in Egypt or provided contact information for those witnesses.
I indicated to the applicant I would hear his evidence first and then make a decision about the witnesses. By the conclusion of the hearing, my concerns about the applicant's evidence were so varied and many that I was not satisfied that hearing from the witnesses would assist me.
ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND REASONS
An applicant is responsible for providing sufficient evidence to establish their claim to be a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations.[24] When assessing the claims made, I am not required to uncritically accept any or all the allegations.[25] I do not need rebutting evidence before finding that a particular factual assertion is not made out.[26]
[24] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 5AAA; AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; 361 ALR 227 [43] (Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ); EIG17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 804 [148] (Ladhams J).
[25] SZLVZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1816 (Middleton J).
[26] CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 496 [65] (McKerracher, Griffiths and Rangiah JJ); Selvadurai v Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs and J Good (Member of the Refugee Review Tribunal) [1994] FCA 301; 34 ALR 347 [7] (Heerey J).
I have considered the 'Refugee Law Guidelines' and 'Complementary Protection Guidelines' prepared by the Department of Home Affairs and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade ('DFAT') Country Information Report[27] to the extent relevant and material to the disposition of this review application.
[27] 'DFAT Country Information Report Egypt (17 June 2019)', Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 17 June 2019, 20190617130817 ('2019 DFAT Report').
Credibility
The assessment of credibility is a difficult task,[28] which should be careful, thoughtful, and conducted fairly and reasonably.[29] Inconsistencies in an account may or may not be significant[30] and allowances may be required where an account is given through an interpreter.[31] I should usually give the benefit of the doubt to those who are generally credible but cannot substantiate their claims.[32]
[28] See Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; 214 CLR 118 [31] citing Samuels JA in Trawl Industries v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 27 NSWLR 326, 348.
[29] See AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; 361 ALR 227 [22]–[28] (Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ).
[30] ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38; (2019) 268 FCR 271 [39]–[45] (Griffiths, Mortimer and Steward JJ).
[31] See, for example, Sundararaj v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 76 [5] (Burchett J), W375/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 89; 67 ALD 757 [15]–[19] (Lee, Carr and Finkelstein JJ); AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; 266 FCR 83 [22]–[28] (Kenny, Griffiths and Mortimer JJ) and ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38; 268 FCR 271 [39]–[45] (Griffiths, Mortimer and Steward JJ).
[32] Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437; see also Department of Home Affairs, ‘Policy – Refugee and Humanitarian – The Protection Visa Processing Guidelines’, section 15.6, as re-issued 1 January 2023 (Protection Visa Processing Guidelines); UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, April 2019, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV 4 [203]-[204].
Country of nationality
The applicant claims to be a national of Egypt. The applicant travelled to Australia on a passport which appears to have been regularly issued by that country. I am satisfied that Egypt is the applicant’s country of nationality and the receiving country.
Country information
Egypt is a presidential republic[33] that experienced a major decline in law and order after the 2011 Revolution.[34]
[33] 2019 DFAT Report, [2.25].
[34] 2019 DFAT Report, [2.38].
The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamist religious, political, and social movement founded in 1928.[35] It was designated a ‘terrorist organisation’ in December 2013, and since then, tens of thousands of its members have been arrested.[36] The environment in Egypt is such that any affiliation or connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, or any attempt to express political dissent, is equated with supporting terrorism.[37] DFAT assesses that:[38]
DFAT assesses that Muslim Brotherhood leadership figures and members who continue to pursue political activities actively either within or outside the party structure are highly likely to be arrested and prosecuted. Ordinary inactive members, party supporters and those with family links to members are less likely to be personally targeted, but still face a risk of arrest, prosecution, or dismissal from state employment should their affiliations become known to authorities. All persons with MB links are likely to be subjected to surveillance and monitoring of their activities.
[35] 2019 DFAT Report, [3.52].
[36] 2019 DFAT Report, [2.3]; [3.53].
[37] 2019 DFAT Report, [3.56].
[38] 2019 DFAT Report, [3.58]; see also Delegate's decision, pp 8-9 and the information there cited.
DOES THE APPLICANT SATISFY THE REFUGEE CRITERION?
The mere fact that a person claims fear of persecution for a particular reason does not establish either the genuineness of the asserted fear or that it is ‘well-founded’ or is for the reason claimed.[39]
[39] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; 1997 CLR 559 [124] (Brennan CJ; Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow JJ).
The applicant’s credibility and reliability
I share the delegate's concerns about the applicant's credibility.[40] I have concluded that the applicant is neither a credible nor reliable witness for various reasons. I do not consider it necessary to set out every concern that I had about the applicant’s evidence.
[40] As to which see Delegate's decision, p 4-7.
Yet, I found the applicant’s evidence inconsistent, unsupported by credible corroborating evidence and, in many respects, objectively implausible. His account contains shifting explanations, gaps in detail where specificity would be expected, and inconsistencies between his account and the available documentary evidence.
A key inconsistency lies in the applicant’s explanation of his treatment while in detention and his eventual decision to sign a confession admitting to membership in the Muslim Brotherhood. In September 2015, he claimed that he refused to sign a similar confession because he believed doing so would lead to severe consequences, including indefinite detention and a lengthy prison sentence. However, in November 2016, he states that he relented and signed the confession under duress. The problem is that, according to his reasoning, he should have understood that signing the confession would lead to harsher punishment rather than release. He failed to reconcile this contradiction, nor did he provide any logical explanation for why the authorities would detain him for ten days, force him to sign a document implicating himself in a terrorist organisation, and then, according to the applicant, simply release him rather than prosecute him further.
When asked why he was released after signing a confession admitting to being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation that the Egyptian government regards as linked to terrorism, the applicant’s responses were inconsistent and speculative. Initially, he claimed that authorities had no prior evidence against him, implying that this justified his release. Later, he shifted to a completely different explanation, stating that his detention facility was overcrowded, people were dying from lack of oxygen, and officers were fabricating causes of death for prisoners. This sequence of justifications seems reactive rather than a coherent narrative. I was concerned that the applicant was trying to construct an explanation only when faced with the logical flaw in his claim.
Additionally, the applicant repeatedly asserted that he was subjected to torture and abuse while detained but was unable to provide any meaningful elaboration when asked for details. His descriptions remained vague and largely restated his written statement without additional specificity. Even allowing for the impact that past traumatic events might have on a person, I would have expected a person recounting a traumatic lived experience to typically be expected to recall key aspects.
Moreover, a medical report he provided as evidence of his detention and hospitalisation due to dehydration does not support the duration the applicant initially claimed he was hospitalised for. The absence of a clear connection between his medical records, his assertions, and the alleged mistreatment further diminishes his credibility.
In my opinion, the applicant’s assertion that a certain police officer, [Mr A], consistently targeted him over several years is both unsupported by evidence and internally inconsistent. Initially, he claimed he was pursued due to his political activities, but later introduced a new allegation that this officer had personal motivations, specifically a sexual interest in his wife. Notably, this claim was absent from his written statement and was first raised during his protection visa interview. The applicant maintained personal motivations during the hearing before the Tribunal. He was evasive about why such a claim was not made in his initial written submissions, although he vaguely mentioned having used Google Translate to prepare his statement. I do not accept that using Google Translate would lead to omitting what was a critical aspect of his claims. This explanation does not clarify why, when detailing serious alleged abuses, including unlawful detention and the destruction of his livelihood, he would choose to omit what he later asserted was a key reason for his persecution.
I was also concerned by the applicant’s evidence at the hearing before the Tribunal that he was detained and taken away by Officer [A] in September 2016. That claim was made for the first time at the hearing before the Tribunal. Moreover, no such claim was made in the written statements provided in support of the applicant’s protection visa application. The applicant was particularly vague and uncertain when giving this evidence. He claimed variously that he was detained for a short time; a night or potentially for a number of days. I found the applicant’s evidence unconvincing.
Moreover, his assertions about being extorted by this officer lack independent corroboration. He claims that the officer repeatedly sought bribes and harassed his family. Yet, he has not provided any credible supporting evidence, such as formal complaints, witness statements, or documentation of the alleged payments. His shifting explanations as to whether he feared government persecution for political reasons or private extortion further dilute the credibility of his account.
The applicant’s claim that Egyptian authorities destroyed his businesses and that he had no financial means contradicts the documentation he submitted in prior visa applications. Records indicate that he was earning rental income from properties in Egypt, including when he claimed to be destitute. When confronted with this inconsistency, he said he submitted these documents solely to “escape oppression”, a vague and unconvincing explanation. His failure to reconcile this contradiction suggests that he tailored his financial narrative to fit his protection claim rather than providing a truthful account.
Another issue undermining the applicant’s credibility is that he managed to leave Egypt in 2019 with a legally issued passport, despite his claims of being subject to a five-year prison sentence and a travel ban. Initially, he asserted that he was only able to obtain his passport and depart because he bribed officials. However, this claim was not included in his original written statements and only emerged when he was confronted with the contradiction. During the hearing, he changed his narrative, asserting that a Member of Parliament facilitated his exit from Egypt and drove him in a car that had ‘immunity.’ No evidence was adduced, or sought to be adduced, from this Member of Parliament despite the fact that such evidence, if available, could have provided significant support for the applicant’s assertions. Furthermore, I note that country information indicates Egyptian authorities maintain strict records of individuals on travel ban lists, making it unlikely that he could have left the country without trouble if he genuinely faced adverse interest from the state.[41] His varying explanations regarding his departure, initially citing a travel ban, then a bribe, and ultimately an administrative oversight, leads me to find that he has adapted his story to resolve inconsistencies rather than offer a coherent account of genuine events.
[41] See Delegate's decision, p 7; 2019 DFAT Report, [3.65], [5.33]-[5.35]; [5.51].
During his interview, the applicant presented new claims that were missing from his initial protection application, including that his children could not attend school due to government oppression and that his wife was in danger. When asked why these claims were not mentioned earlier, he did not provide a satisfactory explanation. Introducing new, serious allegations later in the proceedings suggests an attempt to strengthen his case in response to perceived weaknesses rather than a genuine oversight.
The applicant gave evidence regarding the documents he submitted, which indicated his involvement in an export and import business. He stated that these matters were included in his documents to create the impression that he was engaged in a respectable job while applying for travel to [Countries 1 and 2] and Australia.
Finally, the applicant’s responses to questions during the Tribunal hearing raised concerns. When asked about elements of his claims that seemed implausible or about issues the delegate mentioned in their decision, the applicant often avoided direct answers and shifted the conversation to entirely different events or topics. His responses were uncooperative and evasive during the Tribunal hearing.
I have considered the applicant’s attempts to explain the concerns about his case, including that his memory was poor, that he had diabetes and other health concerns and that he was fasting whilst giving evidence to the Tribunal. However, I consider how the applicant answered questions at the interview with the delegate and before the Tribunal were similar. In my view, I do not accept that the applicant’s claims involve a consistent, plausible, or credible account of events. His testimony contains logical contradictions, shifting explanations, and omissions undermining his credibility. Key aspects of his claim, such as the severity of his alleged persecution, his financial hardship, his ability to exit Egypt, and his claims about targeted harassment, are either unsupported or contradicted by other evidence. His introduction of new claims at later stages of the process further suggests that he has adjusted his account to fit his circumstances rather than truthfully recounting his experiences.
For these reasons, I do not accept that the applicant is a credible or reliable witness. Based on my concerns about the applicant’s credibility, I make the following findings.
I do not accept that the applicant was arrested in September 2015. It follows that I do not accept that he was detained for five days, subjected to torture, or pressured to sign a false confession of being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. I consider that the applicant's account is inconsistent with his later claim that he eventually signed such a confession in 2016 despite previously believing that doing so would lead to indefinite imprisonment. Furthermore, his release in 2015 without charge or further consequence undermines the credibility of his claim that he was of significant interest to the authorities then.
I do not accept that the applicant was arrested in February 2016 at his [business 1]. It follows that I do not accept that police accused him of criticizing the government, destroyed his [business 1] and truck, or detained him for three days. Based on my concerns about the applicant’s credibility and reliability, I am concerned about the credibility of the photographs that he has submitted as evidence in support of the damage caused to his business and home.
Despite having significant reservations, I will proceed on the basis that I accept the applicant participated in the “Movement of the Poor” protest, I do not accept that the applicant was arrested in November 2016. Therefore, I do not accept that he was detained for ten days, tortured, or coerced into signing a confession. While I am prepared to accept that the applicant was hospitalised on 21 November 2016, I do not accept that this was related to any arrest or period of detention.
I do not accept that the applicant was specifically targeted by a police officer named [Mr A]. It follows that I do not accept that this officer persistently harassed him, sought to force him to divorce his wife, or repeatedly extorted him for bribes.
I do not accept that the Egyptian authorities destroyed the applicant’s businesses. It follows that I do not accept that his [business 1] was demolished in February 2016 or that his [business 2] was destroyed in September 2016. Regarding the occupation listed on his passport and national identity card, I do not accept that the applicant was involved in [business sector]. I am prepared to accept that he had some involvement in a [business 2], but I do not accept that it was destroyed in September 2016.
I do not accept that the applicant was subject to ongoing harassment or threats from Egyptian authorities after 2016. It follows that while I am prepared to accept that the applicant relocated to Asyut for around two years, I do not accept that he was forced to relocate to Asyut on account of any fear of harm or persecution, that his wife and children were at risk, or that his children were unable to attend school due to government oppression. I further do not accept that he was located in Asyut by a police officer, threatened or that he had to pay a bribe to remain safe in Asyut.
I do not accept that the applicant was subject to a travel ban or that he was sentenced in absentia to five years in prison. My concerns about the applicant’s evidence are such that I do not accept that these documents are credible or reliable. No cogent explanation was advanced for why the conviction occurred shortly after the applicant was otherwise given a ‘clear’ criminal record check by Egyptian authorities. It follows that I do not accept that he was placed on a no-travel list, that he had to (or did) bribe anyone to obtain a passport or bribe anyone to facilitate his departure from Egypt.
I do not accept that the applicant attempted to seek protection in other countries due to a genuine fear of persecution. I also do not accept that his failed visa applications to [Countries 1 and 2] were motivated by a need for asylum. The applicant’s ability to legally travel to Australia on a visitor visa and immediately apply for protection suggests that his primary objective was migration rather than fleeing immediate danger.
I do not accept that the applicant’s new claims about his family’s ongoing persecution are credible. I also do not accept that his wife and children remain in danger or that police continue to seek bribes in exchange for their safety. These allegations were not raised in his initial application and appear to have been introduced later to bolster his case. The absence of independent evidence supporting these claims further diminishes their reliability.
Does the applicant have a well-founded fear of persecution?
Having regard to all the evidence and material before me, I do not accept that the applicant is viewed as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood or that he has a profile in Egypt as a political activist or as a person opposed to the government. Whilst I have accepted that the applicant has participated in some protests, I am not satisfied that the applicant has any particular profile in Egypt, let alone an adverse profile.
Considering my findings above and the applicant’s claims individually and collectively, I do not accept that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm now or in the reasonably foreseeable future if he were to return to Egypt.
For these reasons, I am not satisfied the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution within the meaning of s 5J(1) of the Act or that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of the Act. The applicant does not satisfy the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
DOES THE APPLICANT SATISFY THE COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION CRITERION?
To satisfy s 36(2)(aa) of the Act there must be substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Egypt, there is a real risk that they will suffer significant harm.[42]
[42] Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36(2)(aa); DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; 273 CLR 1 [13] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ).
Where claims overlap, I am permitted to refer to and rely on my relevant findings when considering the refugee criterion under s 36(2)(a) when assessing whether the applicant satisfied s 36(2)(aa).[43] For the same reasons that I have found that the applicant does not face a real chance of serious harm, I find the applicant does not face a real risk of significant harm. On that basis, I am not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Egypt, there is a real risk that they will suffer significant harm.
[43] See DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2021] HCA 10; 273 CLR 1 [27] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ) and the authorities there cited.
I am not satisfied that the applicant will face a real risk of significant harm for any other reason, including on a cumulative consideration the claims raised.
For the above reasons, I find the applicant does not satisfy the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.
CONCLUSION
The applicant is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a). I have also considered the alternative criterion in s 36(2)(aa) and find that the applicant is not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa).
There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s 36(2) based on being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s 36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2). I am satisfied that the decision of the delegate is correct. The decision under review should be affirmed.
DECISION
The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
Date of hearing:
12 March 2025
Representative for the Applicant:
Not applicable
0
12
0