SZDCD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZDCD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 326

Appeal from: SZDCD v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1029
File number: NSD 743 of 2018
Judge: GLEESON J
Date of judgment: 13 March 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – complementary protection – where appellant suffers from serious medical condition – whether lack of adequate access to medical treatment constitutes ‘significant harm’ and is ‘arbitrary’ – whether an actual subjective intent to arbitrarily deprive life required by s 36(2A)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 36(2), 36(2A), 36(2B)

Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2011 (Cth)

Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Federal Commission of Taxation v Applegate [1979] FCA 66; (1979) 38 FLR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVCH [2016] FCAFC 127; (2016) 244 FCR 366

MZAAJv Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 151

MZAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 478

MZAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCATrans 236 (15 September 2015)

SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 71; (2013) 212 FCR 235

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 91 ALJR 936

SZTEQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 39; (2015) 229 FCR 497

Joseph S and Castan M, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 2013)

Date of hearing: 16 August 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 52
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr SEJ Prince (pro bono)
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms E Cheesman of Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 743 of 2018
BETWEEN:

SZDCD

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

GLEESON J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 MARCH 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GLEESON J:

  1. The appellant appeals from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”), dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”): SZDCD v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 1029. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa (“protection visa”) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Act”).

  2. The issue on the appeal is the proper construction of ss 36(2)(aa) and 36(2A)(a) of the Act and, in particular, the scope of the concept of arbitrary deprivation of life in relation to complementary protection.

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 326
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the appellant, Mr Prince, a citizen of Bangladesh, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (FCCA) dismissing his application for judicial review of the Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider whether his return to Bangladesh would result in the arbitrary deprivation of his life due to inadequate access to medical treatment. The central legal issue was whether the Tribunal had erred in law by not considering that the appellant's return to Bangladesh would result in the arbitrary deprivation of his life due to the lack of adequate medical treatment. The court needed to determine if the statutory term "arbitrary deprivation of life" required actual subjective intent to arbitrarily deprive life, and whether the Tribunal had applied the correct legal test in determining whether the appellant would suffer significant harm if returned to Bangladesh.

The court held that the FCCA judge did not err in her interpretation of the law. The judge had correctly identified the test for significant harm under s 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and found that the Tribunal had adopted the correct approach in determining whether the appellant would suffer significant harm if returned to Bangladesh. The judge had also properly distinguished between the concept of "arbitrary deprivation of life" and other forms of significant harm, such as torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, and degrading treatment, which explicitly require an intention element. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error, as the relevant findings did not depend upon a finding of "actual subjective intent." The court concluded that the Tribunal had properly applied the law in finding that the appellant would not be "arbitrarily deprived of his or her life" in the absence of evidence that the Government of Bangladesh arbitrarily limited medical treatment of people with similar health problems to the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal. The court emphasised that while the appellant's circumstances warranted sympathy, the appeal had to be dismissed due to the correctness of the FCCA judge's findings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

On the appeal, pro bono counsel for the appellant, Mr Prince, contended that the Tribunal had failed to ask itself the correct question, being whether the removal of the appellant from Australia to Bangladesh would have the prescribed consequence, namely, the arbitrary deprivation of life.BACKGROUND FACTS The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh, who arrived in Australia in July 1999. On 31 August 1999, he applied for a protection visa. That application, containing no claims, was found to be invalid. On 20 July 2000, the appellant made a second application for a protection visa. This application was refused by a delegate of the Minister on 22 August 2000. The delegate’s decision was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal on 21 August 2002. The appellant unsuccessfully sought judicial review of the Refugee Review Tribunal’s decision. On 19 November 2012, the appellant lodged a third application for a protection visa. This lodgement followed the commencement of the “complementary protection criterion” for the grant of a protection visa in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act on 24 March 2012. An application for a protection visa in these circumstances was permitted, despite the prohibition in s 48A of the Act, on the authority of SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 71; (2013) 212 FCR 235. However, it was confined to consideration of the complementary protection criterion only: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVCH [2016] FCAFC 127; (2016) 244 FCR 366. The appellant’s claims for complementary protection are set out in detail in the judgment of the FCCA judge. They included claims concerning the appellant’s political opinion and activities; and his political opinion and wealth, which were rejected by the Tribunal. They are not relevant to the appeal. Of relevance to this appeal, the appellant claimed that medical care in Bangladesh would not meet his critical health needs, described above.FCCA PROCEEDING The application to the FCCA contained two grounds of judicial review. The first, that the Tribunal erred when it disregarded certain documents, was rejected by the FCCA judge and is not the subject of this appeal. The second ground of review was: [T]he tribunal erred in law when he failed to consider that I would not be able to get adequate treatment for my health conditions were I returned to Bangladesh. He failed to consider that as a result of lack of treatment that I may end up dead. The relevant passages of the judgment of the FCCA judge are the following:[58] Ground 2 does not reflect the Tribunal’s reasoning. The Tribunal adverted to the medical treatment available to the Applicant in Bangladesh, but did not accept that the Applicant’s health problems could found a claim to require protection under the complementary protection criterion of the Act.[59] There was no evidence before the Tribunal, as the Tribunal states in its decision, and the Applicant has not pointed to any evidence, to suggest that the government of Bangladesh has limited treatment on an arbitrary basis for people with the sort of health problems the Applicant [has]. What the Tribunal did was look at the medical evidence and apply the provisions of the Act, namely s.36(2)(aa), the definition of significant harm in s.36(2A), and the definitions in s.5(1) of the Act as to the various terms used within s.36(2A). As the First Respondent’s legal representative put it, the prospect of dying of a health condition that the Applicant suffers from is not, “without more”, a subject matter than enlivens the application of the criterion for complementary protection under the Act. [60] Under s.36(2A), and the definition in s.5(1) of the Act, a non-citizen would suffer significant harm, in the present case, in Bangladesh, if, among other things, they would be “arbitrarily deprived of life”, or subject to “torture” or “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment”. There is no evidence that the Applicant would be denied medical treatment on an arbitrary basis if he was returned to Bangladesh. It is also apparent in [51] of the Tribunal’s decision, that the Tribunal had regard to the definitions of “torture”, and “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” which requires that pain or suffering be “intentionally inflicted”, and the definition of “degrading treatment or punishment”, which requires the act or omission be “intended to cause” extreme humiliation. Having regard to the definitions of “torture”, and “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” in s.5(1), there is no evidence that the Applicant would be intentionally subjected to these sorts of harm if he was returned to Bangladesh.[61] Given that lack of evidence I have referred to, it was open to the Tribunal to find that the evidence did not disclose any intention to inflict pain or suffering, or cause extreme humiliation to people suffering from the sort of health problems which the Applicant has, and, I note, which the Tribunal accepted that the Applicant has.[62] In short, the findings of the Tribunal in relation to ground 2 were findings that were open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it, and I so find. The application of the requirement for a relevant intention by the Tribunal is consistent with SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) HCA 34; (2017) 347 ALR 405 at [26], which is to the natural and ordinary meaning of the word “intends”, and therefore to actual subjective intent, to achieve, in the present case, the relevant harm, cruel or inhuman treatment, or punishment, or to arbitrarily deprive the Applicant of life:[26]The reference in the Act to “intentionally inflicting” and “intentionally causing” is to the natural and ordinary meaning of the word “intends” and therefore to actual, subjective, intent. As Zaburoni confirms, a person intends a result when they have the result in question as their purpose.[63] I find that the Tribunal approached the claim of the Applicant as to his health concerns correctly, and applied the correct test. Ground 2 otherwise seeks a merit review. That is not a review available in this Court on this application for judicial review.[64] In conclusion, I find that ground 2 is not made out, and I dismiss it.APPEAL TO THIS COURT

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

NYU J
However, this error does not affect the correctness of her Honour’s ultimate conclusion, namely, that the Tribunal’s decision was not affected by jurisdictional error because the Tribunal’s relevant findings did not depend upon a finding of “actual subjective intent”.CONCLUSION The appellant’s circumstances warrant a great deal of sympathy. However, the appeal must be dismissed. Costs should follow the event.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NYU J

In relation to the second ground of appeal, the Minister submitted:(1)The FCCA judge did not purport to imply into “arbitrary deprivation of life” an element of actual subjective intention. This is apparent from [59]-[61] of her Honour’s reasons, wherein the FCCA judge confined the discussion of relevant intent to the concepts of “torture”, “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” and “degrading treatment or punishment” – that is, those types of significant harm set out in s 36(2A) of the Act whose statutory definition (in s 5(1) of the Act) expressly includes an intention element. In particular, the primary judge:(a)set out what will constitute “significant harm” for the purposes of s 36(2A) of the Act at [60] of her Honour’s reasons; and(b)made a clear distinction between the question of “arbitrary deprivation of life”, and that of “torture”, “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment”, and “degrading treatment or punishment”.(i)As to the former, the FCCA judge found that the Tribunal had properly applied the law in respect of whether the appellant would be “arbitrarily deprived of his or her life” for the purposes of s 36(2A)(a) of the Act, by finding that this test was not met in the absence of any evidence that suggested that the Government of Bangladesh arbitrarily limited medical treatment of people with similar health problems to the appellant.(ii)As to the latter, the FCCA judge identified that the Tribunal had proper regard to the definitions of “torture” and “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” and “degrading treatment or punishment” as set out in s 5(1) of the Act, each of which involves an intention element. The primary judge found that it was open to the Tribunal to find that the evidence did not disclose any intention to inflict pain or suffering, or cause extreme humiliation, to people suffering from the sort of health problems of the appellant.(2)The FCCA judge correctly identified the test for significant harm for the purposes of s 36(2A) of the Act, and properly found that the Tribunal adopted the correct approach and reached findings open to it on the question of whether the appellant would suffer significant harm if returned to Bangladesh due to his medical issues. (3)To the extent that the FCCA judge included “arbitrary deprivation of life” in the discussion of subjective intention as outlined in SZTAL at [26], the appellant has not demonstrated that this constitutes an error. The phrase “arbitrarily deprived of his or her life” is not defined further in the Act, but the words “arbitrarily deprived” are to be given their ordinary meaning.(4)Furthermore, case law indicates that arbitrary deprivation of life concerns such things as extrajudicial killing and the excessive use of police force, and does not concern the consequences of scarce medical resources in developing countries.ConsiderationFirst ground of appeal: interpretation of ss 36(2)(aa) and 36(2A)(a)