FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZDCD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 326
Appeal from: SZDCD v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1029 File number: NSD 743 of 2018 Judge: GLEESON J Date of judgment: 13 March 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – complementary protection – where appellant suffers from serious medical condition – whether lack of adequate access to medical treatment constitutes ‘significant harm’ and is ‘arbitrary’ – whether an actual subjective intent to arbitrarily deprive life required by s 36(2A)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 36(2), 36(2A), 36(2B)
Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Act 2011 (Cth)
Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration Amendment (Complementary Protection) Bill 2011 (Cth)
Cases cited: Federal Commission of Taxation v Applegate [1979] FCA 66; (1979) 38 FLR 1
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVCH [2016] FCAFC 127; (2016) 244 FCR 366
MZAAJv Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 151
MZAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 478
MZAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCATrans 236 (15 September 2015)
SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 71; (2013) 212 FCR 235
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 91 ALJR 936
SZTEQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 39; (2015) 229 FCR 497
Joseph S and Castan M, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 2013)
Date of hearing: 16 August 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 52 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr SEJ Prince (pro bono) Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms E Cheesman of Clayton Utz ORDERS
NSD 743 of 2018 BETWEEN: SZDCD
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
13 MARCH 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GLEESON J:
The appellant appeals from a decision of a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“FCCA”), dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal”): SZDCD v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCCA 1029. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“Minister”) not to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa (“protection visa”) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Act”).
The issue on the appeal is the proper construction of ss 36(2)(aa) and 36(2A)(a) of the Act and, in particular, the scope of the concept of arbitrary deprivation of life in relation to complementary protection.
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read SZDCD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2019] FCA 326
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the FCCA judge did not err in her interpretation of the law. The judge had correctly identified the test for significant harm under s 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and found that the Tribunal had adopted the correct approach in determining whether the appellant would suffer significant harm if returned to Bangladesh. The judge had also properly distinguished between the concept of "arbitrary deprivation of life" and other forms of significant harm, such as torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, and degrading treatment, which explicitly require an intention element. The court found that the Tribunal's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error, as the relevant findings did not depend upon a finding of "actual subjective intent." The court concluded that the Tribunal had properly applied the law in finding that the appellant would not be "arbitrarily deprived of his or her life" in the absence of evidence that the Government of Bangladesh arbitrarily limited medical treatment of people with similar health problems to the appellant.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal. The court emphasised that while the appellant's circumstances warranted sympathy, the appeal had to be dismissed due to the correctness of the FCCA judge's findings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: NYU J
In relation to the second ground of appeal, the Minister submitted:(1)The FCCA judge did not purport to imply into “arbitrary deprivation of life” an element of actual subjective intention. This is apparent from [59]-[61] of her Honour’s reasons, wherein the FCCA judge confined the discussion of relevant intent to the concepts of “torture”, “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” and “degrading treatment or punishment” – that is, those types of significant harm set out in s 36(2A) of the Act whose statutory definition (in s 5(1) of the Act) expressly includes an intention element. In particular, the primary judge:(a)set out what will constitute “significant harm” for the purposes of s 36(2A) of the Act at [60] of her Honour’s reasons; and(b)made a clear distinction between the question of “arbitrary deprivation of life”, and that of “torture”, “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment”, and “degrading treatment or punishment”.(i)As to the former, the FCCA judge found that the Tribunal had properly applied the law in respect of whether the appellant would be “arbitrarily deprived of his or her life” for the purposes of s 36(2A)(a) of the Act, by finding that this test was not met in the absence of any evidence that suggested that the Government of Bangladesh arbitrarily limited medical treatment of people with similar health problems to the appellant.(ii)As to the latter, the FCCA judge identified that the Tribunal had proper regard to the definitions of “torture” and “cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment” and “degrading treatment or punishment” as set out in s 5(1) of the Act, each of which involves an intention element. The primary judge found that it was open to the Tribunal to find that the evidence did not disclose any intention to inflict pain or suffering, or cause extreme humiliation, to people suffering from the sort of health problems of the appellant.(2)The FCCA judge correctly identified the test for significant harm for the purposes of s 36(2A) of the Act, and properly found that the Tribunal adopted the correct approach and reached findings open to it on the question of whether the appellant would suffer significant harm if returned to Bangladesh due to his medical issues. (3)To the extent that the FCCA judge included “arbitrary deprivation of life” in the discussion of subjective intention as outlined in SZTAL at [26], the appellant has not demonstrated that this constitutes an error. The phrase “arbitrarily deprived of his or her life” is not defined further in the Act, but the words “arbitrarily deprived” are to be given their ordinary meaning.(4)Furthermore, case law indicates that arbitrary deprivation of life concerns such things as extrajudicial killing and the excessive use of police force, and does not concern the consequences of scarce medical resources in developing countries.ConsiderationFirst ground of appeal: interpretation of ss 36(2)(aa) and 36(2A)(a)