CVD22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

CVD22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 44

File number: PEG 156 of 2022
Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL
Date of judgment: 25 January 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Safe Haven Enterprise visa – decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether a claim arose on the material before the IAA or from the IAA’s own findings – whether the IAA properly considered that claim – jurisdictional error established – writs issued.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5J, 5AAA, 36, 46A, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DB, 476 and Part 7AA
Cases cited:

ASJ22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 476

AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89

DNQ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 72

DWN042 v The Republic of Nauru [2017] HCA 56

DWP17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 160

EVA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 214

EZC18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2143

Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo [2018] FCAFC 151

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16

Price v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 335

Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3

SZDCD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 326

WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 61
Date of hearing: 7 August 2023
Place: Perth
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr H Glenister
Solicitor for the Applicant: William Gerard Legal Pty Ltd
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Taggart
Second Respondent:  Submitting appearance, save as to costs
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

PEG 156 of 2022

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

CVD22

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE KENDALL

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JANUARY 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 7 July 2022.

2.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE KENDALL:

BACKGROUND

  1. The applicant…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 44
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of CVD22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs pertains to a judicial review application by the applicant, seeking to overturn the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) regarding their Safe Haven Enterprise visa application. The crux of the dispute centres on whether the IAA erred in its consideration of the economic conditions in Afghanistan and whether these conditions could result in the applicant being arbitrarily deprived of their life. The case was heard and determined by the Federal Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the IAA made a jurisdictional error in its assessment of the economic conditions in Afghanistan and their potential impact on the applicant. The applicant argued that the IAA failed to properly consider whether the general economic conditions in Afghanistan could result in the applicant being arbitrarily deprived of their life, which would constitute a relevant risk of significant harm. Conversely, the Minister contended that the IAA's decision was correct as the general economic situation in Afghanistan did not meet the statutory definition of significant harm, and thus, the IAA did not need to consider any specific subset of the definition.

The court evaluated the IAA's decision, particularly focusing on whether the IAA had properly considered the economic conditions in Afghanistan and whether these conditions amounted to significant harm under the Migration Act. The court found that the IAA had acknowledged the dire economic situation in Afghanistan, including the scarcity of essential services and resources, but concluded that this did not amount to a risk of significant harm as defined by the Act. The IAA reasoned that the general economic situation did not indicate that people were denied access to basic services or the capacity to earn a livelihood for any of the specified reasons in the Act. The court further noted that the IAA's conclusion that the general economic situation did not meet the definition of significant harm was sufficient and did not demonstrate any jurisdictional error.

Consequently, the court determined that the IAA did not make a jurisdictional error in its decision. The applicant's claim regarding the general economic situation in Afghanistan did not meet the statutory definition of significant harm, and the IAA's succinct conclusion that the general economic situation did not amount to significant harm was appropriate. The court held that it was not open to it to conduct a merits assessment or to suggest that the IAA may have come to a different conclusion if it had considered the matter differently. The writs were issued in favour of the Minister.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The materials before the Court include the application for judicial review filed in this Court on 10 August 2022, a Court Book numbering 894 pages (marked as Exhibit 1), written submissions filed on behalf of the applicant on 19 July 2023 and written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 3 August 2023.THE IAA’S THIRD DECISION The applicant’s judicial review application is brought pursuant to s 476 of the Act. To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the IAA fell into jurisdictional error. The applicant’s judicial review application contains one ground of review, as follows:The Second Respondent (Authority) made a jurisdictional error by failing to consider whether the economic conditions in Afghanistan were such that they could cause the Applicant to be arbitrarily deprived of his life. Given the confined issues raised by the parties in this matter (discussed further below), and the limited portions of the IAA’s reasons referenced by the parties before this Court, it is unnecessary for the Court to set out the IAA’s reasons in any great detail. The Court will, instead, include the paragraphs of the IAA’s decision referenced by the parties in this matter in full. Those paragraphs are as follows (footnotes omitted):101.I have had regard to the general economic situation in Afghanistan and the scarcity and meagerness of essential services and resources and submissions to the IAA note the “miserable reality” for returnees is they experience severe difficulties rebuilding their lives in Afghanistan and the contraction in the economy post the Taliban takeover has had a major impact on employment, accommodation, medical care and basic essential services such as water and power. In large part the economy, and therefore the provision of health and other services, was supported by the foreign agencies present in the country and by international donors but these agencies and donors have now withdrawn leading to widespread shortages and further compounded the freeze on assets.102.The World Bank has outlined the “complex economic crisis” resulting from the events of August 2021 and the sharp fiscal contraction largely as the result of the cessation of foreign aid, together with other disruptions to services and trade and currency flow. The World Bank described Afghanistan as experiencing “a severe deterioration in household living standards”. Although the World Bank reported incoming humanitarian supplies in 2022 as supporting some economic stablisation it regards the economic outlook as “stark” and foreshadows a smaller economy and higher rates of poverty. The World Bank’s concerns about limited employment opportunities is shared by the International Labour Organisation and the 2022 IAA submission expressed concern as to the applicant’s ability to obtain employment.103.The UK Home Office has reported concern about basics such as food security, access to accommodation, sanitation, and healthcare. The World Bank which had previously funded health services being delivered across most of the country has withdrawn. The ability to provide/access health services is further hampered by erratic power supply, border closures slowing the flow of medicines and supplies, and the Covid-19 pandemic.104.The country information also reports large numbers of internally displaced people in Afghanistan; the UK Home Office estimates around 10 to 15% of the population being displaced. Displacement has been historically endemic with most of the displacement taking place before the events of August 2021. In the context of post-August 2021 displacement, and specifically relevant to Kandahar, the article from Foreign Policy reported the Taliban seizing property resulting in thousands becoming homeless. But it is apparent that houses at the centre of the dispute were allotted to members of various security departments under previous governments, indicating a very specific issue relevant to 3,000 families rather than a wholesale or widespread attack on the citizens of Kandahar. I also note the article indicated that following protest by those affected the governor of Kandahar stated those affected could stay in their homes “until further notice” while the authorities tried to find the “best possible solution”. There is no indication that the family property or his wife’s property have been seized.105.Noting the dire economic situation and limited employment opportunities and other services, together with the applicant’s now more mature age I accept he may experience significant difficulties establishing himself in Afghanistan. But a well-founded fear of persecution involves a number of components as specified in s.5J. Serious harm as defined includes significant economic hardship or denial of access to basic services or denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, that threatens the person’s capacity to subsist. The feared harm must be for a s.5J reason, being race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Furthermore, the harm must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.106.While the general economic situation is of course concerning, the information before me does not indicate that people are denied access to basic services or denied the capacity to earn a livelihood for any of the reasons specified in s.5J(1) of the Act. I find that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution on this basis. 107.I note the concerns expressed in the 2022 IAA submission about conditions in Afghanistan for the applicant’s daughters and I have had regard to the disturbing reporting regarding the diminution of women’s rights in Afghanistan, particularly access to education. Should the applicant’s daughters and/or his wife may choose not to join him in Afghanistan should he return I accept that this may be upsetting for him but I am not satisfied that any upset he may experience would amount to serious harm or that it falls within the refugee criterion.…Real risk of significant harm 116.Under s.36(2A), a person will suffer ‘significant harm’ if:•the person will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life•the death penalty will be carried out on the person•the person will be subjected to torture•the person will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment, or•the person will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.117.The expressions ‘torture’, ‘cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’ and ‘degrading treatment or punishment’ are in turn defined in s.5(1) of the Act.118.I have accepted that the applicant may experience significant problems returning to Afghanistan and I have noted the very difficult problems being faced in the country as a result of the general economic situation. But I am not satisfied this would amount to significant harm as defined.THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONSApplicant’s written submissions

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In oral submissions before this Court, Ms Taggart submitted as follows (on behalf of the Minister):(a)the claim as articulated (being that there was a risk of arbitrary deprivation of life amounting to a relevant risk of significant harm arising from the general economic situation) was not a claim that was specifically made;(b)the height the materials reach is that there was a general economic situation which was capable of being considered as amounting to a relevant risk of significant harm;(c)the general economic situation does not meet the definition of significant harm, ergo the IAA need not go on and consider further any particular subset of the definition of significant harm because its finding that it just did not meet the definition covered the issue;(d)it cannot be said that the finding made by the IAA was not open to it. Instead, the argument seems to reach no higher than saying that there was another conclusion that the authority could have come to;(e)when one has regard to the definition of significant harm (including that the relevant risk cannot be one faced by the general population as a whole), the applicant’s case simply does not meet the onus he needs to establish to persuade the Court as to relevant error;(f)section 36(2A) of the Act identifies when a non-citizen will suffer significant harm and, significantly, s 36(2B) of the Act identifies a “carve out” or exceptions where a person will not be at relevant risk. Of particular relevance in this matter is s 36(2B)(c) of the Act which states that there is taken not to be a real risk if the risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non-citizen personally;(g)the applicant does not identify how a claim relating to the general economic situation was said to somehow be something other than the general risk faced by the population;(h)the IAA’s reasons discuss that the definition of significant harm cannot be a general risk faced by the population more generally;(i)arbitrary deprivation of life does still require some act by a third party which is “capricious or unreasonable”, essentially an act or something which gives it a quality of arbitrariness;(j)the IAA here was firstly considering the general economic situation and whether there was a relevant risk arising under the refugee criterion (and concluded that the general economic situation would not have resulted in persecution of a relevant kind);(k)the IAA then specifically considered the general economic risk separately to consider whether, having found that it did not amount to persecution, was there some other reason to conclude that it in any event amounted to significant harm;(l)the conclusion the IAA came to in that regard was that it simply did not meet the definition;(m)the fact that the IAA’s reasons are succinct in their conclusion is not demonstrative of error on any level as it was clear that the IAA found the general claim did not meet the definition;(n)paragraph [101] of the IAA’s reasons, on the whole, simply consider the miserable reality for people returning to Afghanistan on the basis of the situation that generally exists in Afghanistan;(o)it is not open to the Court to conduct a merits assessment, even insofar as to say “if the IAA had considered it, it may have come to a different conclusion”. That is only relevant in a materiality context but that only arises where jurisdictional error is established; and(p)it is not surprising that the IAA did not consider a claim that was not made.CONSIDERATION