FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
CVD22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 44
File number: PEG 156 of 2022 Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL Date of judgment: 25 January 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Safe Haven Enterprise visa – decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether a claim arose on the material before the IAA or from the IAA’s own findings – whether the IAA properly considered that claim – jurisdictional error established – writs issued. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5J, 5AAA, 36, 46A, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DB, 476 and Part 7AA Cases cited: ASJ22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 476
AYY17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 89
DWN042 v The Republic of Nauru [2017] HCA 56
DWP17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 160
EVA17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 214
EZC18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2143
Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo [2018] FCAFC 151
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16
Price v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 335
Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3
SZDCD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 326
WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 61 Date of hearing: 7 August 2023 Place: Perth Counsel for the Applicant: Mr H Glenister Solicitor for the Applicant: William Gerard Legal Pty Ltd Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Taggart Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
PEG 156 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: CVD22
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE KENDALL
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JANUARY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the second respondent dated 7 July 2022.
2.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to reconsider and determine the matter according to law.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE KENDALL:
BACKGROUND
The applicant…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 44
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the IAA made a jurisdictional error in its assessment of the economic conditions in Afghanistan and their potential impact on the applicant. The applicant argued that the IAA failed to properly consider whether the general economic conditions in Afghanistan could result in the applicant being arbitrarily deprived of their life, which would constitute a relevant risk of significant harm. Conversely, the Minister contended that the IAA's decision was correct as the general economic situation in Afghanistan did not meet the statutory definition of significant harm, and thus, the IAA did not need to consider any specific subset of the definition.
The court evaluated the IAA's decision, particularly focusing on whether the IAA had properly considered the economic conditions in Afghanistan and whether these conditions amounted to significant harm under the Migration Act. The court found that the IAA had acknowledged the dire economic situation in Afghanistan, including the scarcity of essential services and resources, but concluded that this did not amount to a risk of significant harm as defined by the Act. The IAA reasoned that the general economic situation did not indicate that people were denied access to basic services or the capacity to earn a livelihood for any of the specified reasons in the Act. The court further noted that the IAA's conclusion that the general economic situation did not meet the definition of significant harm was sufficient and did not demonstrate any jurisdictional error.
Consequently, the court determined that the IAA did not make a jurisdictional error in its decision. The applicant's claim regarding the general economic situation in Afghanistan did not meet the statutory definition of significant harm, and the IAA's succinct conclusion that the general economic situation did not amount to significant harm was appropriate. The court held that it was not open to it to conduct a merits assessment or to suggest that the IAA may have come to a different conclusion if it had considered the matter differently. The writs were issued in favour of the Minister.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In oral submissions before this Court, Ms Taggart submitted as follows (on behalf of the Minister):(a)the claim as articulated (being that there was a risk of arbitrary deprivation of life amounting to a relevant risk of significant harm arising from the general economic situation) was not a claim that was specifically made;(b)the height the materials reach is that there was a general economic situation which was capable of being considered as amounting to a relevant risk of significant harm;(c)the general economic situation does not meet the definition of significant harm, ergo the IAA need not go on and consider further any particular subset of the definition of significant harm because its finding that it just did not meet the definition covered the issue;(d)it cannot be said that the finding made by the IAA was not open to it. Instead, the argument seems to reach no higher than saying that there was another conclusion that the authority could have come to;(e)when one has regard to the definition of significant harm (including that the relevant risk cannot be one faced by the general population as a whole), the applicant’s case simply does not meet the onus he needs to establish to persuade the Court as to relevant error;(f)section 36(2A) of the Act identifies when a non-citizen will suffer significant harm and, significantly, s 36(2B) of the Act identifies a “carve out” or exceptions where a person will not be at relevant risk. Of particular relevance in this matter is s 36(2B)(c) of the Act which states that there is taken not to be a real risk if the risk is one faced by the population of the country generally and is not faced by the non-citizen personally;(g)the applicant does not identify how a claim relating to the general economic situation was said to somehow be something other than the general risk faced by the population;(h)the IAA’s reasons discuss that the definition of significant harm cannot be a general risk faced by the population more generally;(i)arbitrary deprivation of life does still require some act by a third party which is “capricious or unreasonable”, essentially an act or something which gives it a quality of arbitrariness;(j)the IAA here was firstly considering the general economic situation and whether there was a relevant risk arising under the refugee criterion (and concluded that the general economic situation would not have resulted in persecution of a relevant kind);(k)the IAA then specifically considered the general economic risk separately to consider whether, having found that it did not amount to persecution, was there some other reason to conclude that it in any event amounted to significant harm;(l)the conclusion the IAA came to in that regard was that it simply did not meet the definition;(m)the fact that the IAA’s reasons are succinct in their conclusion is not demonstrative of error on any level as it was clear that the IAA found the general claim did not meet the definition;(n)paragraph [101] of the IAA’s reasons, on the whole, simply consider the miserable reality for people returning to Afghanistan on the basis of the situation that generally exists in Afghanistan;(o)it is not open to the Court to conduct a merits assessment, even insofar as to say “if the IAA had considered it, it may have come to a different conclusion”. That is only relevant in a materiality context but that only arises where jurisdictional error is established; and(p)it is not surprising that the IAA did not consider a claim that was not made.CONSIDERATION