DWN042 v Republic of Nauru

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KEANE, NETTLE AND EDELMAN JJ

DWN042  APPELLANT

AND

THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU  RESPONDENT

DWN042 v The Republic of Nauru

[2017] HCA 56

13 December 2017

M20/2017

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside the order made by the Supreme Court of Nauru on 7 February 2017.

3.Remit the matter to the Supreme Court of Nauru, to a judge other than Judge Khan, for reconsideration according to law.

4.The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of Nauru

Representation

P R D Gray QC with M L L Albert for the appellant (instructed by Maddocks)

G R Kennett SC with A Aleksov for the respondent (instructed by Republic of Nauru)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. KEANE, NETTLE AND EDELMAN JJ. This is an appeal as of right from the Supreme Court of Nauru. The appellant is a Sunni Muslim of Pashtun ethnicity from a village in Pakistan. In August 2013, he arrived by boat at Christmas Island and in September 2013 was transferred to the Republic of Nauru ("the Republic") under a Memorandum of Understanding reached between Australia and the Republic. He applied for refugee status under s 5 of the Refugees Convention Act 2012 (Nr) ("the Refugees Act").  The Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control ("the Secretary") and the Refugee Status Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") dismissed the appellant's application.  The Supreme Court of Nauru, on an appeal in the nature of judicial review, struck out two of the appellant's grounds of appeal for reasons that, the respondent accepts, were incorrect.  Very shortly before final judgment on the remaining grounds was delivered the appellant filed a notice of motion to reinstate those grounds.  Final judgment was delivered without hearing that motion.  The primary issue on this appeal is whether, in all the circumstances of the case, this involved a denial of procedural fairness to the appellant.  For the reasons below, it did involve such a denial and the matter should be remitted to the Supreme Court of Nauru for determination according to law.   

    Background

    The appellant's application for refugee status

  2. On 31 July 2014, after the Secretary determined that the appellant was not a refugee and was not owed complementary protection under the Refugees Act, the appellant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the Secretary's determination.  The Tribunal invited the appellant to appear before it at a hearing on 25 September 2014.  Prior to the Tribunal hearing, the appellant's solicitors provided the Tribunal with materials, including lengthy written submissions and a statement from the appellant.  The appellant attended the Tribunal hearing on 25 September 2014. 

  3. On 29 December 2014, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Secretary that the appellant was not a refugee and was not owed complementary protection under the Refugees Act.  The Tribunal concluded that there were many flaws and…

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Details
Case
[2017] HCA 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia heard an appeal as of right from the Supreme Court of Nauru. The appellant, a citizen of Pakistan, had been transferred to Nauru in 2013 and subsequently applied for refugee status. His application was dismissed by both the Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control and the Refugee Status Review Tribunal. The appellant appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Nauru. During the proceedings in the Supreme Court, two grounds of appeal were struck out. Shortly before final judgment, the appellant filed a notice of motion to reinstate these grounds, but the primary judge delivered judgment without considering this motion. The central dispute on appeal to the High Court was whether this failure to consider the notice of motion constituted a denial of procedural fairness to the appellant.

The High Court was required to determine several legal issues. These included whether the primary judge's failure to consider the appellant's notice of motion amounted to a denial of procedural fairness. The court also considered whether the primary judge was entitled to treat the notice of motion as abandoned, and whether the appeal could be dismissed on the basis that a proper hearing would not have produced a different result. Furthermore, the court examined whether the appeal was incompetent due to its potential requirement to interpret the Constitution of Nauru, and whether the primary judge erred in failing to consider the appellant's complementary protection claim and in relying on an unsigned and unsworn transfer interview form.

The High Court reasoned that the failure of the primary judge to consider the appellant's notice of motion, which sought to reinstate grounds of appeal concerning the alleged unconstitutional nature of his detention, constituted a denial of procedural fairness. The court noted that the appellant's case was advanced on the basis of a failure to accord procedural fairness, and that the failure to deal with the motion was a significant omission. The court found that the primary judge had not addressed the notice of motion in his reasons for decision. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Supreme Court of Nauru, and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for reconsideration by a different judge. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the order made by the Supreme Court of Nauru on 7 February 2017.

3. Remit the matter to the Supreme Court of Nauru, to a judge other than Judge Khan, for reconsideration according to law.

4. The respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal to this Court.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal as of right from the Supreme Court of Nauru. The appellant is a Sunni Muslim of Pashtun ethnicity from a village in Pakistan. In August 2013, he arrived by boat at Christmas Island and in September 2013 was transferred to the Republic of Nauru ("the Republic") under a Memorandum of Understanding reached between Australia and the Republic. He applied for refugee status under s 5 of the Refugees Convention Act 2012 (Nr) ("the Refugees Act"). The Secretary of the Department of Justice and Border Control ("the Secretary") and the Refugee Status Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") dismissed the appellant's application. The Supreme Court of Nauru, on an appeal in the nature of judicial review, struck out two of the appellant's grounds of appeal for reasons that, the respondent accepts, were incorrect. Very shortly before final judgment on the remaining grounds was delivered the appellant filed a notice of motion to reinstate those grounds. Final judgment was delivered without hearing that motion. The primary issue on this appeal is whether, in all the circumstances of the case, this involved a denial of procedural fairness to the appellant. For the reasons below, it did involve such a denial and the matter should be remitted to the Supreme Court of Nauru for determination according to law. BackgroundThe appellant's application for refugee status On 31 July 2014, after the Secretary determined that the appellant was not a refugee and was not owed complementary protection under the Refugees Act, the appellant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the Secretary's determination. The Tribunal invited the appellant to appear before it at a hearing on 25 September 2014. Prior to the Tribunal hearing, the appellant's solicitors provided the Tribunal with materials, including lengthy written submissions and a statement from the appellant. The appellant attended the Tribunal hearing on 25 September 2014. On 29 December 2014, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Secretary that the appellant was not a refugee and was not owed complementary protection under the Refugees Act. The Tribunal concluded that there were many flaws and inconsistencies in the appellant's narrative which, taken together, led the Tribunal to reject the appellant's evidence that he had been targeted for extortion by the Taliban. The Tribunal did not accept that there was any reasonable possibility that the appellant would be targeted in the future by the Taliban or opportunistic criminals who targeted wealthy businessmen.The circumstances of the appeal to the Supreme Court of Nauru On 24 April 2015, the appellant, then unrepresented, appealed from the decision of the Tribunal to the Supreme Court of Nauru. The appeal was listed for hearing on 5 May 2016. The appellant was unsuccessful in obtaining legal representation until the day before his hearing when a barrister in Nauru agreed to assist him pro bono publico. On the morning of the hearing, the appellant filed an amended notice of appeal raising four grounds as follows:"1.The Tribunal acted in a way that was in breach of the principles of natural justice, contrary to s 22(b) of the [Refugees] Act, by conducting its hearing when and at the place where the [a]ppellant was unlawfully detained in breach of s 5 of the Constitution of Nauru. 2.The Tribunal's hearing in respect of the [a]ppellant was unconstitutional because he was unlawfully detained at that time. …3.The Tribunal erred in law in determining that the appellant is not owed complementary protection in that the Tribunal failed to respond to the appellant's claim that returning him to Pakistan would breach Nauru's international obligations due to the risk of arbitrary deprivation of life.4.The Tribunal erred by relying on the transfer interview form contrary to s 22(b) [of the Refugees Act] in circumstances where it was unsigned and unsworn, was not made available to his representative when he prepared his statement of claims and was expressly disowned as a record of his claims."

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

KEANE, NETTLE AND EDELMAN JJ
The appellant was unable to attend the handing down of the judgment due to ill health. Nor was the appellant represented, except by the solicitor, Ms Keane, who had been instructed by the appellant's Melbourne solicitors to appear for the sole purpose of physically taking judgment. Judgment was handed down. Ms Keane made no mention of the motion to reopen grounds 1 and 2 or of the possibility of any adjournment. The judgment of the primary judge In his Honour's reasons for decision, after observing that he had struck out grounds 1 and 2, the primary judge considered the remaining two grounds. The third ground was dismissed by the primary judge because he concluded that the appellant had not made any claim before the Tribunal that returning him to Pakistan would breach Nauru's international obligations due to the risk of arbitrary deprivation of life. Hence, his Honour concluded that the Tribunal was not required to consider this issue[4]. The fourth ground was dismissed essentially because the Tribunal was not bound by the rules of evidence and was not precluded from relying upon an unsigned written statement[5]. At no stage in his reasons did the primary judge address the appellant's notice of motion to reinstate grounds 1 and 2, and to reopen the appeal to further amend those grounds. [4]DWN042 v The Republic [2017] NRSC 4 at [26].[5]DWN042 v The Republic [2017] NRSC 4 at [32].The appeal to this Court For the reasons explained in BRF038 v The Republic of Nauru[6], the Supreme Court of Nauru was exercising original jurisdiction on "appeal" to it under s 43(1) of the Refugees Act, and an appeal to this Court under s 44(a) of the Appeals Act lies as of right in accordance with s 5 of the Nauru (High Court Appeals) Act 1976 (Cth), read with Art 1(A)(b)(i) of the Agreement forming the Schedule to that Act. However, Art 1(A)(b)(i) of the Agreement is subject to Art 2(a), which provides[7]: "An appeal is not to lie to the High Court of Australia from the Supreme Court of Nauru … where the appeal involves the interpretation or effect of the Constitution of Nauru". [6][2017] HCA 44 at [35]-[41].[7]See also Appeals Act 1972 (Nr), s 45(a). The appellant appealed to the High Court on five grounds. The first ground alleged error by the primary judge by failing to consider the appellant's notice of motion prior to giving judgment on the whole of the appeal. The second and third grounds reiterated the grounds that had been struck out. They concerned the alleged unconstitutional nature of the appellant's detention at the time of the Tribunal hearing. The fourth ground alleged error by the primary judge in failing to conclude that the Tribunal erred in failing to consider part of the appellant's claim to complementary protection. The fifth ground alleged that the primary judge erred in failing to conclude that the Tribunal erred by relying upon the appellant's unsigned and unsworn transfer interview form. The failure to consider the notice of motion This appeal proceeded on the assumed basis that the notice of motion was no longer extant. The failure by the primary judge to consider the appellant's notice of motion involved a failure to deal with an important part of the appellant's case. The appellant only put his case on the basis of a failure to afford procedural fairness and did not submit that the failure to deal with the notice of motion involved a failure to exercise jurisdiction[8]. As the appellant submitted, the failure by the primary judge involved, at least, a failure to accord procedural fairness[9]. [8]Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 at 612 [44], 649 [163]; [2002] HCA 11; Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088 at 1093 [32]; 197 ALR 389 at 395; [2003] HCA 26.[9]Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088 at 1092 [24]; 197 ALR 389 at 394.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KEANE, NETTLE AND EDELMAN JJ

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