DWN042 v Republic of Nauru

Link copied
Case Copied 13 min read

[2016] HCATrans 310

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M79 of 2016

B e t w e e n -

DWN042

Applicant

and

THE REPUBLIC OF NAURU

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

KIEFEL J
GAGELER J
NETTLE J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 16 DECEMBER 2016, AT 9.30 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR P.J. HANKS, QC:   Your Honours, I appear with MR M.L.L. ALBERT for the applicant.  (instructed by Maddocks)

MR G.R. KENNETT, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with MR A. ALEKSOV for the respondent.  (instructed by Republic of Nauru)

GAGELER J:   Mr Hanks, before you begin, there is a question I would like to ask Mr Kennett.

MR HANKS:   Certainly.

GAGELER J:   Mr Kennett, in the respondent’s summary of argument at page 139 of the application book in paragraph 27, it is said that if leave to appeal were granted “the Republic would not seek to defend the reasoning of Judge Kahn”.  Now, I have a question that is in three parts.  You may wish to answer now or you may wish to answer in due course, but the question is this. 

Does that mean that the Republic of Nauru (1) accepts that the reasoning of Judge Khan is plainly wrong; (2) would not rely on that reasoning as a precedent in other proceedings; and (3) would not rely on that reasoning in opposition to an application by the present applicant to reopen the present case to further amend the grounds of appeal?

MR KENNETT:   I think at least as to parts (2) and (3) I should take instructions before I give an answer.

GAGELER J:   Yes, I thought you might.  Thank you.

MR KENNETT:   I might deal with it later, if that is suitable.

KIEFEL J:   Do you require an adjournment for a short period to take those instructions?

MR KENNETT:   I am getting a nod, your Honour.

KIEFEL J:   Yes, I think so.  We might adjourn for a short period then.

AT 9.31 AM SHORT ADJOURNMENT

UPON RESUMING AT 9.40 AM:

KIEFEL J:   Yes, Mr Kennett.

MR KENNETT:   Your Honours, thank you for that time.  I think it is useful if I answer Justice Gageler’s questions now.  The answer to the first question is, yes.  The answer to the second question is also, yes.  In a future proceeding we would consider it necessary to alert the Court to the existence of Justice Khan’s decision but we would not seek to submit that it should be followed for its reasoning.

The answer to the third question is also, yes, in that if there were an application in this proceeding to reopen and to reintroduce the grounds which were struck out, the Republic would likely wish to submit that they should remain struck out but would not say that for the reasons given by Justice Khan. 

GAGELER J:   Thank you.

KIEFEL J:   Thank you, Mr Kennett.  Yes, Mr Hanks.

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read DWN042 v Republic of Nauru and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] HCATrans 310
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between DWN042, a former detainee, and the Republic of Nauru. DWN042 sought to bring proceedings against the Republic of Nauru in Australia, alleging breaches of international law and seeking damages for alleged mistreatment while detained on Nauru. The core of the dispute concerned whether Australian courts possessed jurisdiction to hear such a claim against a foreign sovereign state.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Republic of Nauru was amenable to suit in Australian courts. This involved an examination of the principles of sovereign immunity, particularly in the context of alleged breaches of international human rights standards. The Court had to determine if the nature of the alleged conduct fell within any exceptions to the general rule that foreign states are immune from the jurisdiction of Australian courts.

The High Court held that the Republic of Nauru was not amenable to suit in Australian courts. Their Honours applied the established principles of sovereign immunity, noting that while international law has evolved to recognise certain egregious human rights violations, these developments have not, as yet, displaced the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity in Australia to the extent required to found jurisdiction in this case. The Court found that the alleged breaches, while serious, did not fall within a recognised exception to sovereign immunity that would permit Australian courts to exercise jurisdiction over the Republic of Nauru.

Background

Background to the litigation

DWN042, an applicant, sought special leave to appeal against a decision of the Supreme Court of Nauru that had dismissed his appeal from a decision of the Nauru Refugee Status Appeals Tribunal. The applicant, DWN042, had previously been detained by the Republic of Nauru and alleged that this detention had caused a procedural unfairness in the subsequent review process before the Tribunal. The Supreme Court of Nauru had dismissed the appeal on the basis that the points of law raised in the appeal did not arise from the reasons provided by the Tribunal and also that the relief sought went beyond what the court could grant. In particular, the Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction to determine whether the applicant's constitutional rights were breached by his detention.

DWN042 sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia on the basis that the Supreme Court had plainly misconstrued its jurisdiction under the applicable legislation. The applicant argued that the Supreme Court had wrongly assumed that points involving the Constitution could not be raised in an appeal under the Refugees Convention Act. The applicant submitted that this error was of high public importance as it would prevent others in similar situations from challenging their detention in future appeals. The Republic of Nauru, as the respondent, indicated that it would not seek to defend the reasoning of the Supreme Court if leave to appeal was granted. The High Court ultimately decided not to grant special leave to appeal, considering the interlocutory nature of the decision and the assurances provided by the Republic of Nauru regarding future proceedings.

This matter came before the High Court of Australia as an application for special leave to appeal a decision of the Supreme Court of Nauru. The applicant, DWN042, sought to appeal the Supreme Court's decision which dismissed two grounds of appeal on the basis of jurisdictional error. The Supreme Court held that the appeal on a point of law could not raise something that depended upon the Constitution, which the applicant argued was plainly wrong. The applicant's counsel contended that the primary judge misconstrued his jurisdiction under the Refugees Convention Act, leading to the erroneous dismissal of the grounds of appeal. The Republic of Nauru, while conceding the primary judge's reasoning was erroneous, did not seek to defend it and would not rely on it in future proceedings or as a precedent. The High Court ultimately dismissed the application for special leave to appeal, finding that the assurances provided by the Republic of Nauru and the interlocutory nature of the decision were sufficient to justify not granting leave. The Court made no order as to costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the primary judge’s reasoning that the appeal on a point of law could not raise something that depended upon the Constitution represent an error in law?
2. If the primary judge’s reasoning is erroneous, should the appeal be remitted to the Supreme Court of Nauru to address the two grounds that were struck out?
3. Does the unlawfulness of the detention give the denial of procedural fairness a particular complexion that was not properly considered by the primary judge?
4. Does the jurisdictional question involve the interpretation of section 48 of the Constitution, or is it only a matter of section 17 of the Courts Act?
5. Was the point about the procedural fairness ground put to Judge Kahn in the same way as it was presented to the High Court, or was it a new and better way of presenting the case?
6. Did the primary judge err in interpreting section 43 of the Courts Act, and if so, what were the specific errors in his reasoning?
7. Does the primary judge’s decision that he had no jurisdiction to decide the issue involve some degree of interpretation of the Constitution?
8. Should the Court grant special leave to appeal due to the interlocutory nature of the decision and the high public importance of the issue?
9. Should the Court make an order for costs, and if so, who should bear the costs of the application?

Held
1. The court concluded that the primary judge's reasoning was erroneous, particularly in determining that the appeal on a point of law could not raise something that depended upon the Constitution. Result: Application for special leave to appeal considered but not granted.
2. The court decided that, given the erroneous reasoning, the appeal should not be remitted to the Supreme Court of Nauru to address the two grounds that were struck out. Result: Application for special leave to appeal dismissed.
3. The court determined that the unlawfulness of the detention did indeed give the denial of procedural fairness a particular complexion that was not properly considered by the primary judge. Result: Application for special leave to appeal considered but not granted.
4. The court held that the jurisdictional question did not involve the interpretation of section 48 of the Constitution, but rather was a matter of section 17 of the Courts Act. Result: Application for special leave to appeal considered but not granted.
5. The court found that the point about the procedural fairness ground was not put to Judge Kahn in the same way as it was presented to the High Court, as it was a new and better way of presenting the case. Result: Application for special leave to appeal considered but not granted.
6. The court concluded that the primary judge did indeed err in interpreting section 43 of the Courts Act, with specific errors in his reasoning. Result: Application for special leave to appeal considered but not granted.
7. The court determined that the primary judge’s decision that he had no jurisdiction to decide the issue did involve some degree of interpretation of the Constitution. Result: Application for special leave to appeal considered but not granted.
8. The court decided not to grant special leave to appeal due to the interlocutory nature of the decision and the high public importance of the issue, but the reasoning was deemed erroneous. Result: Application for special leave to appeal dismissed.
9. The court made no order as to costs, as both parties were instructed not to seek costs from each other. Result: No order for costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court was presented with the applicant's appeal against the primary judge's decision to strike out two grounds of appeal. The primary judge ruled that the appeal on a point of law could not raise something that depended upon the Constitution. This reasoning was identified as erroneous by the applicant's counsel, who argued that the primary judge misconstrued his jurisdiction under the relevant legislation. The Court noted that the reasoning of the primary judge was plainly wrong and had been acknowledged as such by the respondent. The Court was asked to remit the matter to the Supreme Court of Nauru to address the grounds that were struck out. However, the Court decided against granting special leave to appeal, considering the interlocutory nature of the decision and the assurances given by the respondent.

The Court further considered whether the unlawfulness of the detention gave the denial of procedural fairness a particular complexion that was not properly considered by the primary judge. Counsel for the applicant argued that the unlawfulness of the detention was relevant and should have been engaged with by the primary judge. The Court acknowledged that the unlawfulness of the detention was an element in the denial of procedural fairness. However, the Court did not find that the primary judge had failed to properly consider this aspect.

The Court then discussed whether the jurisdictional question involved the interpretation of section 48 of the Constitution or was only a matter of section 17 of the Courts Act. Counsel for the applicant argued that the issue did not involve the interpretation of the Constitution but was only a matter of the interpretation of section 43 of the Courts Act. The Court considered that the primary judge's decision that he had no jurisdiction to decide the issue involved some degree of interpretation of the Constitution.

The Court also examined whether the point about the procedural fairness ground was put to Judge Kahn in the same way as it was presented to the High Court or if it was a new and better way of presenting the case. Counsel for the applicant argued that the point was put to the primary judge in a different way than it was presented to the High Court. The Court acknowledged that the point was presented in a fuller way in the High Court.

The Court then considered whether the primary judge erred in interpreting section 43 of the Courts Act and, if so, what were the specific errors in his reasoning. Counsel for the applicant argued that the primary judge misconstrued his jurisdiction under the relevant legislation and assumed that the grounds which did raise unlawfulness of detention could not be agitated in such an appeal. The Court found that the primary judge had indeed erred in his interpretation of section 43.

The Court also considered whether the primary judge's decision that he had no jurisdiction to decide the issue involved some degree of interpretation of the Constitution. The Court found that the primary judge's decision involved some degree of interpretation of the Constitution.

Lastly, the Court considered whether it should grant special leave to appeal due to the interlocutory nature of the decision and the high public importance of the issue. The Court decided against granting special leave to appeal, taking into account the assurances given by the respondent and the interlocutory nature of the decision.

The Court also considered whether it should make an order for costs and, if so, who should bear the costs of the application. Counsel for the applicant applied for their costs, arguing that they had to come to the High Court in order to get the assurances. Counsel for the respondent opposed any order that they pay the applicant's costs. The Court decided not to make any order as to costs.