COURT IN THE FULL COURT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA KING CJ (1), MILLHOUSE(2) and OLSSON(3) JJ
CWDS
Vehicles and traffic - statutory compensation in respect of motor vehicle accidents - first respondent suffered bodily injury whilst attempting to operate a back hoe attached to front end loader - first respondent issued proceedings against the second respondent as his employer - second respondent issued third party proceedings against appellant as statutory third party insurer - consideration of Motor Vehicle Act - interaction between Fourth Schedule and s99(3) - whether any liability in respect of bodily injury arose out of the use of the vehicle - whether it has been demonstrated that the bodily injury is not a consequence of the driving of the vehicle - activity of operating back hoe required front end loader to be totally immobilised and first respondent unable to operate driving controls - operation of back hoe totally discrete activity from act of driving. Motor Vehicles Act, 1959s 99(3), Fourth Schedule. SGIC v Stevens Bros Pty Ltd (1984) 154 CLR 552; Dickinson v Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust (1987) 163 CLR 500 and Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia) Ltd v State Government Insurance Commission
(1991) 56 SASR 165, applied. R v McDonagh (1974) QB 448; SGIC v Sweeny (1989) 52 SASR 139; R v Roberts (1965) 1 QB 85; National and General Insurance Co Ltd v Chick (1984) 2 NSWLR 86 and American Home Assurance v Saunders (1987) 11 NSWLR 363, considered.
HRNG ADELAIDE, 30 November 1993 #DATE 23:12:1993
Counsel for appellant: Mr K McCarthy QC with
Mr C Allen
Solicitors for appellant: Phillips Fox
Counsel for respondent Wagner: Mr C Kourakis
Solicitors for respondent Wagner: Duncan and Hannon
Counsel for respondent State: Mr J Doyle QC with
Mr N Hodgson
Solicitors for respondent State: Crown Solicitor
ORDER
Appeal allowed.
JUDGE1 KING CJ The facts and relevant statutory provisions are set out in the judgment of Olsson J. 2. A question may arise in the future as to whether s.99(3) of the MotorVehicles Act is an interpretation clause which limits the meaning of the expression "caused by or arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in Clause 1 of the Schedule policy or whether it effectually writes an exclusion clause into the policy. The characterization of the subsection may have an impact on the onus of proof. No question of onus arises or was argued in these proceedings as the relevant facts are clearly established. Questions of onus can therefore be left for another occasion. 3. The Solicitor-General submitted that the expression "in consequence of" in subsection (3) had a different and wider connotation than the expression "caused by or arising out of" in Clause 1 of the Schedule policy, and that the former expression focussed more on the notion of aftermath or upshot than on a causal link. It is difficult to understand why the drafter varied the expression. "In consequence of" may have…
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- Case
- [1993] SASC 4354
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the injury sustained by Wagner was a consequence of the driving of the vehicle and whether the injury arose out of the use of the vehicle as per the relevant statutory provisions. The Full Court held that the injury was not a consequence of the driving of the vehicle, as there was a distinct separation between the activity of driving and the activity of operating the backhoe.
The court's reasoning was that the activity of operating the backhoe required the front-end loader to be immobilized, and the respondent was unable to operate the driving controls. The operation of the backhoe was a totally discrete activity from the act of driving. The court found that it was contrary to both common sense and legal concepts of causation to assert that the injury to Wagner was the consequence of the driving of the plant. The appeal was allowed, and the declaration and order appealed from were set aside. A judgment was to be entered declaring that the injury sustained by Wagner was not caused by and did not arise out of the use of the relevant motor vehicle.
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