CUI19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs - [2025] FedCFamC2G 334

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
CUI19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 334

File number(s): ADG 254 of 2019

Judgment of: JUDGE LUCEV

Date of judgment: 12 March 2025

Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial review application – decision of Immigration Assessment Authority – affirmation of refusal to grant Safe Haven Enterprise visa – citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity – family support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – personal assistance to the Tamil National Alliance in parliamentary elections – alleged threats to and abduction by paramilitary groups – single unparticularised ground of review – further grounds raised orally at hearing – whether failure to understand threats and risks of harm from paramilitary groups – whether failure to consider evidence of political activity in correspondence from local officials – where correspondence not provided in translated form – whether treatment available in Sri Lanka for mental health conditions and following liver transplant – whether failure to understand medical treatment needs and available services following liver transplant – whether failure to understand mental health needs – whether jurisdictional error.

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J, 36, 473FB, 473CB, 473DC, 473DD, 474, 476

Cases cited:
Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510; (1999) 73 ALJR 584; (1999) 162 ALR 1; (1999) 55 ALD 1

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593; (2003) 75 ALD 630

AQF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 966

ASU22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 927

BIK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 788

BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384

BMH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1062

BYX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 41

Cabal v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 546

CHB17 vMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 635

CXS18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 18

DKN20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1158

DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784

EGJ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 2782

EQJ19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1476

FCT17 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 1167

GKH18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1125

LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610; (2024) 418 ALR 152

Ludgero v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 1060; (2021) 358 FLR 215

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le [2007] FCA 1318; (2007) 164 FCR 151; (2007) 242 ALR 455; (2007) 97 ALD 112

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332; (2013) 87 ALJR 618; (2013) 297 ALR 225; (2013) 138 ALD 181

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594; (2011) 85 ALJR 327; (2011) 273 ALR 223; (2011) 119 ALD 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123; (2009) 259 ALR 429; (2009) 111 ALD 15

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611; (2010) 84 ALJR 369; (2010) 266 ALR 367; (2010) 115 ALD 248

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 70 ALJR 568; (1996) 136 ALR 481; (1996) 41 ALD 1

MZAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 478

MZAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 151

MZAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCATrans 236

MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158

NADR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 167

NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 264 CLR 217; (2018) 92 ALJR 481; (2018) 353 ALR 600

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173; (2015) 90 ALJR 197; (2015) 327 ALR 8; (2015) 148 ALD 206

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; (2003) 77 ALJR 454; (2003) 195 ALR 24; (2003) 72 ALD 1

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S154/2002 [2003] HCA 60; (2003) 233 CLR 1; (2003) 77 ALJR 1909; (2003) 201 ALR 437; (2003) 75 ALD 1

SZDCD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 326

WZAVQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 188

WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760

X v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 3; (2002) 116 FCR 319; (2002) 67 ALD 355

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law

Number of paragraphs: 94

Date of last submission/s: 6 August 2024

Date of hearing: 6 August 2024

Place: Perth

Applicant: In person, with the assistance of an Interpreter

Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms P Durham

Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs
ORDERS

ADG 254 of 2019

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:
CUI19

Applicant

AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE LUCEV

DATE OF ORDER:

12 MARCH 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The originating application filed on 18 July 2019 be dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LUCEV
INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is an application for judicial review (“Judicial Review Application”) by the applicant, CUI19, under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”), in relation to a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“Authority Decision” and “Authority” respectively). The Authority Decision affirmed a decision of a delegate (“Delegate’s Decision” and “Delegate” respectively) of the first respondent, now the Minister for Home Affairs, Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Cyber Security and the Arts (“Minister”) not to grant CUI19 a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (“SHE Visa”).
All references to the Migration Act in these Reasons for Judgment are to the provisions therein as they were at the time of the Authority Decision.
The Authority Decision appears in the Court Book (“CB”) at CB 645-679. The CB was marked as Exhibit 1 at hearing.
BACKGROUND
The background to this matter, including the protection claims made by CUI19, is as follows:
(a)CUI19 is a citizen of Sri Lanka born in 1983: CB 13;
(b)in November 2012 CUI19 departed Sri Lanka and travelled to Australia: CB 75;
(c)on 2 January 2013 CUI19 participated in an irregular maritime arrival entry interview: CB 11;
(d)on 4 March 2016 CUI19 lodged an application for a SHE Visa, together with a statutory declaration setting out his claims: CB 36-79;
(e)on 12 December 2016 CUI19 participated in a SHE Visa interview with the Delegate (“Delegate Interview”): CB 183 and 197;
(f)on 14 March 2017 the Delegate’s Decision was to refuse the application for a SHE Visa: CB 192-209;
(g)on 21 March 2017 the matter was referred to the Authority: CB 214;
(h)on 10 November 2017 the Authority affirmed the Delegate’s Decision not to grant CUI19 a SHE Visa: CB 281-294 (“Previous Authority Decision”);
(i)the Previous Authority Decision was subsequently quashed by this Court (then styled the Federal Circuit Court of Australia): CB 308-338, with the Court finding that the Authority erred in its application of “exceptional circumstances” under s 473DD of the Migration Act in relation to a letter from the Liver Transplant Unit at Flinders Medical Centre dated 30 March 2017 (which appears at CB 240-242);
(j)on 3 May 2019 the matter was remitted to the Authority for re-consideration: CB 346;
(k)on 4 July 2019 the Authority made the Authority Decision affirming the Delegate’s Decision not to grant CUI19 a SHE Visa: CB 645-679;
(l)CUI19’s protection claims can be summarised as follows:
(i)he was a Tamil from Sri Lanka;
(ii)during the civil war his family supported the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”) and members of his extended family were LTTE combatants;
(iii)in 2001 his family refused to give money to the Karuna Group (a political and paramilitary group), and in 2002 he was abducted by the Karuna Group and taken to their jungle camp, but he escaped;
(iv)during 2003 to 2006 he lived and worked in the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”);
(v)upon his return to Sri Lanka from the UAE he worked in a farm and shop in a less populated area to avoid the paramilitaries;
(vi)in 2010 he helped his father’s cousin gain election to Parliament as part of the Tamil National Alliance (“TNA”) and was attacked as a result of providing that help;
(vii)in 2012 he assisted another TNA candidate to obtain election to a provincial council, and thereafter a member of the Karuna Group came to his house and threatened to kill him;
(viii)in October 2012 he departed Sri Lanka illegally by boat;
(ix)since he has left Sri Lanka paramilitaries have gone to his house looking for him;
(x)he feared harm because he was:
(A)a Tamil from a known LTTE family;
(B)opposed to paramilitaries;
(C)an active TNA supporter; and
(D)departed Sri Lanka illegally; and
(xi)in July 2016 he had a liver transplant in Australia and was diagnosed with depression and PTSD, and he now fears inadequate medical treatment if he is returned to Sri Lanka.
AUTHORITY DECISION
Submissions and new information
In relation to further submissions and new information put to the Authority by CUI19 the Authority:
(a)noted that a number of submissions with articles or information had been put forward by CUI19’s representative since the Delegate’s Decision: CB 646 at [5]. There were six submissions dated 24 April 2017, 6 June 2017, 30 May 2019, 4 June 2019, 21 June 2019 (including a 5-page summary submission), and 3 July 2019: CB 646-647 at [6]-[9];
(b)noted that it wrote to CUI19’s representative on 13 June 2019 and advised that the Authority’s Practice Direction allowed for up to five pages of written submissions, and sought clarification as to which five pages CUI19 sought to be considered: CB 646-647 at [7];
(c)noted that CUI19’s representative objected to this request, but in any event provided a further five-page summary submission but noted that all submissions should be considered, and that the five-page summary submission may not include all integers of CUI19’s claims: CB 647 at [8];
(d)decided to have regard to the argument in the fifth submission and disregarded the other submissions, having regard to the fact that:
(i)the other submissions did not comply with the Authority’s Practice Direction;
(ii)it was unclear why CUI19 could not comply;
(iii)the submissions contained repetition and argument in relation to the Previous Authority Decision which had been quashed; and
(iv)CUI19 had an opportunity to comply with the Authority’s Practice Direction which he did with the fifth submission: CB 647 at [8]-[9]; and
(e)large amounts of “new information” were also provided to the Authority, which the Authority dealt with at CB 647-653 at [10]-[27]. This included a report of 30 March 2017 from the Liver Transplant Unit at Flinders Medical Centre in Adelaide in relation to CUI19’s medical condition (“March 2017 Medical Report”). The Authority did not accept there were exceptional circumstances to consider the March 2017 Medical Report because:
(i)there was more up-to-date medical information about CUI19’s health from the same medical team which was considered (namely reports dated 27 February 2019 and 8 May 2019 (“February 2019 Medical Report” and “May 2019 Medical Report respectively);
(ii)it accepted CUI19 had the medical conditions claimed; and
(iii)over two years had passed since the March 2017 Medical Report was prepared: CB 648 at [11].
Determination of CUI19’s claims
As to CUI19’s claims the Authority found that:
(a)CUI19 was a Tamil from Sri Lanka: CB 654-655 at [29];
(b)CUI19’s family had members who had fought for and supported the LTTE, however the Authority did not accept that authorities in Sri Lanka bore a grudge about this: CB 655 at [30]-[32];
(c)in 2001-2002 CUI19’s family were threatened by the Karuna Group and CUI19 was abducted, however his abduction was for recruitment to the LTTE given the Karuna Group had not yet broken away from the LTTE: CB 655-656 at [33]-[36];
(d)in 2003-2006 CUI19 lived in the UAE: CB 656 at [37];
(e)when CUI19 returned to Sri Lanka in 2006 he lived in a rural area but was not in hiding from the Karuna Group as claimed: CB 657 at [39];
(f)in 2010 CUI19 did assist his father’s cousin with his election to Parliament and he was harassed as a result: CB 657-658 at [40]-[43];
(g)in 2012 CUI19 did provide support to the TNA in an election campaign, but the Authority did not accept that this caused the Karuna Party candidate to lose the election or that CUI19 was blamed for causing such a result, or that he was pursued as a result: CB 658-659 at [47]-[53];
(h)the Sri Lankan authorities have not shown any interest in CUI19 since his departure from Sri Lanka in 2012: CB 659 at [55];
(i)CUI19 has mental health conditions which require ongoing treatment, and he requires ongoing care in relation to his liver transplant, but the Authority was not satisfied that CUI19’s family in Sri Lanka live seven hours from the nearest hospital where he could receive treatment, nor that the availability of medicine in Sri Lanka was comparable with India: CB 660-661 at [58]-[61];
(j)on the basis of an extensive consideration of country information concerning the situation in Sri Lanka, that whilst CUI19 was detained and mistreated during the civil war in Sri Lanka, he would not be of any interest to the Karuna Group, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikai (“TMVP”) - a political party, or the Sri Lankan authorities, should he now return to Sri Lanka: CB 662-668 at [66]-[80];
(k)while CUI19 would face challenges in relation to his health condition in Sri Lanka, his claims about the level of care was speculative and no documents were provided to support his claim that his condition could not be treated in Sri Lanka: CB 670 at [91];
(l)as to CUI19’s illegal departure from Sri Lanka, whilst he may be detained at the airport on return to Sri Lanka and prosecuted for a breach of Sri Lanka’s migration laws, this would not amount to persecution: CB 672-673 at [100]; and
(m)found that CUI19 did not meet the criteria to be considered a refugee or warrant complementary protection.
LITIGATION HISTORY
The Judicial Review Application was filed on 18 July 2019 and included a single ground review as follows:
The Immigration Assessment Authority made a jurisdictional error in my case
In March 2023 the matter was docketed to the presently presiding Judge.
At a directions hearing on 31 March 2023 the Court made orders (“March 2023 Orders”) including the following:
2.Orders 3-8 and 10 of Registrar Colbran’s orders of 16 August 2019 be set aside, and in lieu thereof order that:
a)the applicant file and serve any amended originating application, further affidavits, and an outline of submissions by 20 September 2023;
b)the first respondent file and serve any amended response, affidavits in reply, and an outline of submissions by 18 October 2023; and
c)the matter be listed for final hearing by video link on 22 November 2023 at 10.00am AWST/12.30pm ACDT before Judge Lucev.
The March 2023 Orders were amended on 4 April 2023 (“April 2023 Amended Orders”). On 13 October 2023 order 2(a) of the April 2023 Amended Orders was varied so that CUI19 was permitted to file and serve any amended Judicial Review Application, further affidavits, and an outline of submissions 28 days before the final hearing (“October 2023 Orders”), the final hearing at that stage having been relisted to 6 August 2024 (from the previously listed date of 22 November 2023).
The Court notes that CUI19 did not file any amended Judicial Review Application, further affidavits, or outline of submissions pursuant to orders made by a Registrar of the Court on 16 August 2019 (“August 2019 Orders”), or pursuant to the March 2023 Orders, April 2023 Amended Orders or October 2023 Orders made by the Court.
The final hearing of the matter proceeded on 6 August 2024. What occurred at the final hearing is set out in more detail below.
SUBMISSIONS
Minister’s written submissions
In compliance with the March 2023 Orders and the April 2023 Amended Orders the Minister filed written submissions in relation to the single ground in the Judicial Review Application. The Minister submitted that:
(a)CUI19 bore the onus of establishing jurisdictional error in the Authority Decision;
(b)CUI19 had failed to identify or point to any jurisdictional error in the Authority Decision, and the Judicial Review Application was therefore liable to be dismissed because it provided no evident basis for finding that the Authority Decision was affected by jurisdictional error; and
(c)in any event, on review of the Authority Decision, no error was apparent as the Authority engaged in a careful and thorough evaluation of the claims made by CUI19, and also carefully considered the available country information, and the Authority Decision did not reveal any illogicality or irrationality in the Authority’s reasoning.
Submissions made by CUI19 at final hearing
Albeit that CUI19 did not file any materials he was permitted at the final hearing to make oral submissions, consistent with Federal Court authority to the effect that even where there are unparticularised grounds of review it is necessary for self-represented applicants to be afforded an opportunity by the Court to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to a ground or grounds of review: DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [9] (“DQQ17”) per Colvin J, cited with approval in EQJ19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1476 at [11] per Burley J; GKH18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1125 at [26] per Banks-Smith J; BIK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 788 at [3] per McKerracher J.

Having been given the opportunity to make oral submissions CUI19 did so, and did so in English. To be fair, and without any intention to criticise, CUI19’s submissions in English were halting and not easy to understand. Dr Long (who appeared as a McKenzie friend for CUI19) made the helpful suggestion that CUI19, who was appearing remotely, be permitted to forward to the Court the typed submissions from which he had been reading, but which had not been filed with the Court. Arrangements were made for the typed submissions (which were in two documents) to be forwarded to the Court, to be read by the Minister’s lawyer, and the proceedings were adjourned for sufficient time for the Minister’s lawyer to make an adequate oral response to the typed submissions.
CUI19’s oral submissions are at Transcript, pp 5-7, but the typed submissions which were marked at Exhibits 2 and 3 are set out hereunder.
Exhibit 2 contains submissions relating to CUI19’s primary refugee protection claims, which are in the following terms:
I feel the IAA erred as follows
1.Not appreciating the complex and changing focus of the Karuna and Pillayan groups requiring me to hide at times and at other times it being relatively safe to come home and work.
2.In not accepting that (a) Being abducted and beaten by the Karuna group in 2002, whatever their affiliation at the time, with the need to subsequently maintain a low profile and then flee to the UAE from 2003 and
(b) in 2010 after helping my father’s cousin, …[name deleted], be elected to parliament for the TNA and being beaten by the defeated Pillayan Group forcing me to hide for a period with a letter by …[name deleted] in 2012, confirming my prominent role in the election and that I was beaten and
(c) In 2012 after helping another TNA candidate, …[name deleted], in local elections following which the losing Karuna Group threatened to my parents that they wanted to take me outside the house (I was not there at the time) and shoot me in the street-
was sufficient evidence for my life being in danger and a valid reason for hiding and then fleeing shortly after the threat of being shot to seek asylum in Australia.
3.In not accepting that a significant risk to my life still existed if returned to Sri Lanka in 2019 given the capricious and uncoordinated approach to politics in that area also mentioned in 1. above.
4.In not having the two letters, mentioned in para. 51, one from …[name deleted] and the other from a local official taken into account particularly as the other letter from …[name deleted] was so supportive of my contention that I was prominent in elections and therefore a political target.
Exhibit 3 contains submissions concerning the availability of medical services in Sri Lanka and CUI19’s needs in light of his liver transplant and mental health needs, which are as follows:
I feel the IAA erred as follows
1.The assessor failed to understand the impracticality of delivering timely and sufficiently expert care for my medical management in the Sri Lankan setting following a liver transplant in 2016 ignoring my doctors opinion preferring to rely on “broad brush” country information including a general report on availability of medication in the country which does not mention the medication tacrolimus on which I am dependant for survival. Alternatives would increase the risk of transplant rejection. There is no doubt that even critical medications were and still are only intermittently available and although some may be affordable privately tacrolimus is not.
2.The assessor failed to understand that primary medical management in …[name of home city deleted] with Colombo as a backup would not be practical. Although liver transplants have occurred in Sri Lanka they are not sufficiently common to give the doctors an acceptable level of competence in management which includes oversight, blood tests and, at time, vaccinations. This is probably the case even in Colombo where some expertise exists. The time taken in …[name of home city deleted] to assess any need for assessment in Colombo then followed by a long journey to Colombo from …[name of home city deleted] (minimum of six hours in a night bus and longer by train) and probable delays in getting an appointment in Colombo if problems were found in …[name of home city deleted] could create a critical delay in obtaining effective treatment.
3.In quoting that the Sirasena government in 2019 was intending to improve medical services (para.61). Rather than being a reassurance that I would be safe it was a tacit admission that the services were suboptimal at that time.
4.In failing to understand my mental health needs which would need to be addressed along with my physical health needs. I have had psychiatric treatment in Australia and counselling by STTARS not only for the stress associated with being a refugee but for the stress of living with a liver transplant with the added complexity this causes for my situatiomn
The written submissions set out at [17] and [18] above are in essentially the same terms as the oral submissions made by CUI19 to the Court at Transcript pages 5-7.
CUI19 also made some further oral submissions (Transcript, pages 11-13) in which he submitted that:
(a)there had been further political changes in Sri Lanka and that the brother of the former Prime Minister, Mahinda Rajapaksa, that is Gotabaya Rajapaksa, had come into power and had just handed over his power to Ranil Wickremesinghe, and that these changes had occurred subsequent to the Authority Decision;
(b)both the availability of doctors and his medication in Sri Lanka were restricted, and that the restricted availability of the medication would also impact his mental health, and that the taking of the medications is critical for his life and well-being; and
(c)his capacity to work was a capacity to carry out light duties only.
Dr Long made an intervention in which he suggested that the country information relied upon by the Authority only suggested that medications were available about 60% of the time, and that it did not mention the tacrolimus medication upon which CUI19 was critically dependent, and that the Authority had misinterpreted the country information with respect to the medication upon which CUI19 was dependent on for his survival.
Minister’s oral submissions – claims based on political affiliation – Exhibit 2
In relation to grounds 1 and 2 of Exhibit 2 the Minister submitted that the Authority Decision made it clear that the Authority was aware of these claims, and that the Authority considered significant country information about the changing situation in Sri Lanka at the relevant time, and provided logical reasons for finding that there were periods where CUI19 was not in hiding to avoid harm. Critically, having accepted that CUI19 had LTTE links and involvement in elections for the TNA, and again after considering significant country information about the situation in Sri Lanka, the Authority found that CUI19 would not face harm on that basis, and these two grounds do not establish any jurisdictional error in the Authority’s reasoning process.
In relation to ground 3 the Minister submitted that the Authority had assessed the situation in Sri Lanka at the time of the Authority Decision and provided a logical basis for its assessment that CUI19 would not face harm, and that those findings were open to be made by the Authority. Further, insofar as information was relied upon by CUI19 concerning events since the Authority Decision they were matters which could not have been considered by the Authority Decision.
In relation to ground 4 of Exhibit 2 the Minister submitted that the two letters are referred to in the Authority Decision at CB 659 at [51] where the Authority observes that both letters were untranslated, appeared to be in Tamil, and that in such circumstances it was open for the Authority not to consider them further because it could not assess their contents. The Minister further submitted that it was for CUI19 to provide evidence in support of his claim by providing copies of these documents in translated form if he wanted them to be considered.
Minister’s oral submission – medical claims – Exhibit 3
In relation to ground 1 of Exhibit 3 the Minister submits that CUI19 is taking issue with the Authority relying on country information instead of the most recent medical report – the May 2019 Medical Report. The Minister submitted that the detail of the May 2019 Medical Report was set out at CB 661 at [60]-[61]. There the Authority accepted that CUI19 had undergone a liver transplant and had complex and ongoing medical needs that would need to be met for the remainder of his life. The Authority however identified concerns about statements made in the May 2019 Medical Report that seemed to be unsupported and outside of the doctor’s knowledge, and in particular did not accept that the availability of medicines in India was relevant to the ability to access medication in Sri Lanka. The Minister also submitted that the claims about the level of care in Sri Lanka for transplant patients were largely unsupported and speculative: citing CB 670 at [91], where the Authority noted that CUI19 did not provide credible details about the situation in Sri Lanka concerning the medical treatment he required, and in that regard it was therefore open to the Authority to rely upon country information, and the Authority, considering that country information, made findings that CUI19 would have access to medical care. The Authority also made findings that any denial of medical treatment would not amount to significant harm because concerns about the consequences of scarce medical resources in developing countries did not constitute arbitrary deprivation of life for the purposes of s 5J of the Migration Act: CB 674 at [107], citing at fn 52, MZAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 151 (“MZAAJ – FCCA”).
In relation to ground 2 of Exhibit 3 the Minister submitted that the Authority gave specific consideration to CUI19’s ability to travel to get medical care, and had regard to information concerning CUI19’s capacity to work, before finding that there was no reason that CUI19 should not be able to travel to a major centre (in Sri Lanka) for medical treatment, and found that he would be able to get day-to-day testing and treatment in a regional centre such as his home city and that he would be able to travel to Colombo for specialist review as required.
In relation to ground 3 of Exhibit 3 the Minister submitted that the Authority accepted that the treatment available to CUI19 in Sri Lanka would not be at the same level as he would get in Australia and that he would face particular challenges relating to travel and having to pay for medication, but was nevertheless satisfied that CUI19 would be able to seek treatment in Sri Lanka and that he would not be denied access to treatment in Sri Lanka on the basis of discrimination, and that denial of treatment would not amount to significant harm as defined in the Migration Act.
In relation to ground 4 of Exhibit 3 the Minister submitted that it was plain that the Authority had identified CUI19’s mental health claims, and considered and set out relevant country information in relation thereto: CB 668 at [81] and 668-669 at [85], and having clearly identified the claim the Minister submitted that the Authority’s findings that CUI19 could access medical care also applied to his mental health claims.
CONSIDERATION
Onus
It is well established that an applicant for judicial review bears the onus of establishing jurisdictional error in an administrative decision: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594; (2011) 85 ALJR 327; (2011) 273 ALR 223; (2011) 119 ALD 1 at [67] per Gummow J (with Heydon J at [91] and Crennan J at [92] agreeing); Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173; (2015) 90 ALJR 197; (2015) 327 ALR 8; (2015) 148 ALD 206 at [24] per French CJ, Bell, Keane, and Gordon JJ.
Judicial review generally
The Court is cognisant that on judicial review:
(a)the Authority’s fact-finding is not reviewable by this Court if the findings of fact were open to the Authority, and otherwise made in accordance with the law: NADR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 167 at [9] per Heerey, RD Nicholson and Selway JJ; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 70 ALJR 568; (1996) 136 ALR 481; (1996) 41 ALD 1 (“Wu Shan Liang”), CLR at 272 and 281-282 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ, and the weight to be given to an applicant's claims and evidence is a matter for the Authority to assess as part of its fact-finding function: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 281-282 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ;
(b)it ought not adopt an approach to the Authority Decision which scrutinizes the Authority Decision over-zealously in search of error: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611; (2010) 84 ALJR 369; (2010) 266 ALR 367; (2010) 115 ALD 248 (“SZMDS”) at [35] per Gummow ACJ and Kiefel J; and
(c)the Authority Decision must be read fairly and as a whole: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593; (2003) 75 ALD 630 (“WAEE”) at [47] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ; BYX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 41 (“BYX17”) at [49] per Rangiah, White and O’Callaghan JJ; WZAVQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 188 (“WZAVQ”) at [55] per Barker J.
Requirement for material jurisdictional error
For present purposes it otherwise suffices to observe that the Court may set aside a decision of the Authority upon judicial review if it is affected by material jurisdictional error: Migration Act, ss 474 and 476; Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; (2003) 77 ALJR 454; (2003) 195 ALR 24; (2003) 72 ALD 1; LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610; (2024) 418 ALR 152 (“LPDT”) at [15]-[16] per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ.
Single ground of review
The Judicial Review Application as filed on 18 July 2019 contains the single ground of review set out at [7] above.
The Court notes that CUI19 had a number of opportunities to file material setting out an alleged jurisdictional error in the Authority Decision. The first opportunity was upon the making of the Judicial Review Application on 18 July 2019. That opportunity was not taken. The second opportunity was upon the making of the Registrar’s August 2019 Orders which permitted CUI19 to file an amended Judicial Review Application and further material by 29 November 2019, but he did not do so. The third opportunity was upon the making of the March 2023 Orders and the April 2023 Amended Orders which permitted CUI19 to file an amended Judicial Review Application, any further affidavits and an outline of submissions by 20 September 2023, but he did not do so. The fourth opportunity was upon the making of the October 2023 Orders which permitted CUI19 to file an amended Judicial Review Application, any further affidavits and an outline of submissions by 28 days before final hearing, so by 8 July 2024, but he did not do so. Thus, CUI19 did not avail himself of any of those opportunities. In the circumstances, the Court is satisfied that CUI19 had adequate opportunity to allege and particularise any alleged jurisdictional error in the Authority Decision in relation to the single ground of judicial review as filed on 18 July 2019: BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 at [31]-[35] per Feutrill J; DQQ17 at [8]-[9] per Colvin J.
CUI19’s failure to go beyond the bare assertion of jurisdictional error in the single ground of judicial review, and the failure to particularise the single ground of judicial review, is sufficient reason to warrant this Court dismissing the single ground of judicial review as filed on 18 July 2019: NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176 at [37] per Perram, Derrington and Stewart JJ; WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 (“WZAVW”) at [35] per Gilmour J (and cases there cited); DKN20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1158 at [60] per Perry J, citing WZAVW.
Exhibit 2
The Authority considered the factual issues raised by grounds 1 and 2, and did so at length: CB 662-668 at [65]-[80], setting out:
(a)the nature of CUI19’s claims;
(b)information on Tamils as an ethnic group and their distribution in Sri Lanka;
(c)the nature of the civil conflict in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009, and the involvement of the LTTE and the Karuna Group;
(d)information concerning the arrest, torture and mistreatment (including abduction and sexual violence) of Tamils by the Sri Lankan authorities;
(e)information concerning attempts at, and progress in, reconciliation between the Tamils and the Sri Lankan government;
(f)information concerning the improvements in political representation for Tamils in Sri Lanka;
(g)CUI19’s involvement in Martyr’s Day events in Australia, and recent recognition by the Sri Lankan government of memorial events in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka;
(h)CUI19’s claim that those that threatened him in Sri Lanka remained armed and active, and an assessment as to whether they remained so, and whether CUI19 was of any ongoing interest to those who had threatened him; and
(i)the increasing involvement of the TNA in Sri Lankan politics, and their emergence as a mainstream political party.
In dealing with these matters the Authority also referred to relevant country information, the choice and weight to be placed upon country information being, generally speaking, a matter for the Authority to determine: NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 at [11]-[13] per Gray J, Tamberlin and Lander JJ; CXS18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 18 at [37] per McKerracher, White and Colvin JJ. Having regard to its factual conclusions the Authority concluded that CUI19 would not now face harm in Sri Lanka on the basis of his LTTE links, TNA involvement, and the political situation generally. At CB 667-668 at [80] the Authority found that:
I also note that the country information before the delegate indicates that, since the applicant’s departure from Sri Lanka in 2012, the TNA has become increasingly accepted as a player in the Sri Lanka’s political process. In the 2015 parliamentary elections the TNA won 16 seats and the TNA leader was appointed as Opposition Leader, the first Tamil politician in that position in 32 years. The TNA also holds the majority of seats in the Northern Provincial Council. The 2015 elections were widely considered the most peaceful and orderly in Sri Lanka’s recent history. DFAT reported in 2018 that Tamils have a substantial level of political influence and their inclusion in political dialogue has increased since the change of government in 2015. Tamil political parties are numerous, with the largest coalition of parties operating under the umbrella of the TNA. DFAT understands Tamils do not receive unwarranted attention from authorities. Given the TNA’s current status as a mainstream party, I am not satisfied the applicant faces a real chance of harm because of his prior support or membership of the TNA, or any continuing such involvement should he return to Sri Lanka. I do not accept that there is a real chance the applicant would be targeted on his return to Sri Lanka by the Karuna Group, TMVP supporters or the authorities as a result of his former support of the TNA and as a result of profile, background and experiences as considered above, including as a young Tamil male from the Eastern province; his evasion of and opposition to the Karuna Group faction; his evasion of TMVP supporters; and his involvement in Tamil remembrance events or for any of the other matters assessed below.
and at CB 673 at [102] found that:
I have considered the country information outlined above as well as the applicant’s cumulative profile, background and experiences, including as a person from a known LTTE family; as a young Tamil male from the Eastern province; his political involvement with the TNA; his evasion of and opposition to the Karuna Group faction; his evasion of TMVP supporters; his illegal departure and seeking of asylum in Australia; his involvement in Tamil remembrance events; and his complex health needs. I am not satisfied that the applicant has a profile of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities. I find the chance he would face harm because of background and experiences including as a person from a known LTTE family; as a young Tamil male from the Eastern province; his political involvement with the TNA; his evasion of and opposition to the Karuna Group faction; and his evasion of TMVP supporters; and his level of involvement in Tamil remembrance events in Australia to be no more than remote. Further I am not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm as a result of his departure from Sri Lanka or as a result of being a person with complex medical needs seeking asylum and spending time in Australia or any combination or accumulation of those factors.

The Authority considered the information available to it such that it determined that there was not a real risk of significant harm to CUI19 were he to return to Sri Lanka, and in so determining it considered the relevant country information, as well as information particular to CUI19, to draw conclusions that CUI19 did not require protection as a refugee or under the complementary protection provisions of the Migration Act: CB 674 at [104] and 675 at [112]. The Authority Decision was one which, in the circumstances, was open to the Authority on the evidence before it, for the reasons that it gave, and it cannot be said that no other rational or logical decision-maker could not have arrived at, or drawn, the same conclusions: SZMDS at [131]-[135] per Crennan and Bell JJ. Grounds 1 and 2 of Exhibit 2 in relation to CUI19’s personal profile and political claims simply invite reconsideration of the merits of the factual findings made by the Authority Decision, contrary to long-standing principle that such factual findings are matters for the Authority: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. Grounds 1 and 2 of Exhibit 2 disclose no error in the Authority Decision.
Ground 3 of Exhibit 2 is no more than a more broadly stated version of ground 1 and for the same reasons as set out in the previous three paragraphs discloses no error in the Authority Decision. In relation to ground 3 of Exhibit 2 the Authority was restricted to considering information available to it at the time of the Authority Decision, and therefore the Court cannot have regard to changes in the political make-up of the Sri Lankan government subsequent to the Authority Decision.
In relation to ground 4 of Exhibit 2 CUI19 provided with his SHE Visa application untranslated copies of the two letters to the Delegate at CB 90 and 91-92 respectively. The letters were dated 10 and 19 June 2013 respectively. In a letter from the Department dated 17 November 2016, addressed to CUI19 but the original of which was sent to CUI19’s then authorised representative: CB 183 and 185, requesting CUI19 to attend the Delegate Interview CUI19 was advised:
(a)to bring to the Delegate Interview “any evidence you have relating to your protection claims; and certified English translations of any documents not in English”: CB 183;
(b)under the heading “Translating your documents” at CB 184 that:
Documents in languages other than English should be accompanied by an English translation. The English translations must be official certified translations from a National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters (NAATI) accredited translator. Translation provided by non-accredited translators outside Australia should be endorsed by the translator with their full name, address, telephone number, and details of their qualifications and experience in the language being translated.
It does not appear that:
(a)CUI19 provided translations of either of the two documents to the Delegate; and
(b)the Delegate referred to or considered the two letters in the Delegate’s Decision.
In a lengthy post-Delegate Interview submission dated 22 December 2016: CB 258-275, CUI19’s authorised representative (a solicitor and migration agent) did not refer to either of the two untranslated letters.
On 14 March 2017 the Delegate’s Decision was to refuse the application for a SHE Visa: CB 192-209. The Delegate’s Decision did not refer to either of the two untranslated letters.
On 22 March 2017 the Authority wrote to CUI19 acknowledging and advising CUI19 that the Delegate’s Decision to refuse to grant CUI19 the SHE Visa had been referred to the Authority for review: CB 214-215. Attached to the Authority’s 22 March 2017 letter was a copy of a Practice Direction made pursuant to s 473FB of the Migration Act on 1 February 2017 by the President of the Authority: CB 223-227, and which provided at CB 225 at [27] as follows:
All documents that are not in English should be translated into English by a translator with a ‘Translator’ level accreditation from the National Accreditation Authority for Translators and Interpreters (NAATI). Both the documents and the translations should be provided.
This paragraph of the Practice Direction appears under the heading “Submissions and new information” and is plainly directed to additional documents by way of submissions and new information provided to the Authority subsequent to the making of the Delegate’s Decision and the referral for review by the Authority of the Delegate’s Decision.
On 30 March 2017 CUI19 appointed an authorised representative, who was both a solicitor (see CB 249) and a registered migration agent, for the purposes of the Authority’s review: CB 229-230.
In written submissions sent to the Authority by CUI19’s authorised representative on:
(a)24 April 2017 at CB 243-249;
(b)6 June 2017 at CB 250-252;
(c)24 July 2017 at CB 253-254;
CUI19 did not refer to or rely upon either of the two untranslated letters.
In the Previous Authority Decision at CB 287 at [30] the Authority (differently constituted) observed as follows:
Attached to the SHEV application are two other letters, which the applicant requested the delegate refer to as evidence of his political involvement and the threats he faced. The first letter is typed and displays … [name deleted] MP details on the letterhead, and is dated 10 June 2013. The second letter is handwritten, and bears a stamp from the village administration official and a stamp from the Divisional Secretary of … [name deleted] dated 19 June 2013. The contents of both letters are in a language other than English and as such, I am unable to place any weight on them.
CUI19 sought judicial review of the Previous Authority Decision. On 3 May 2019 in FCT17 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 1167 (“FCT17”) this Court (then the Federal Circuit Court) issued prerogative writs quashing the Previous Authority Decision and requiring the Authority to redetermine the matter according to law. In FCT17 the Court found that that the Authority erred in its application of “exceptional circumstances” under s 473DD of the Migration Act in relation to a letter from the Liver Transplant Unit at Flinders Medical Centre dated 30 March 2017. FCT17 did not refer to either of the untranslated letters as they were not relevant to the issue upon which judicial review was sought.
On 9 May 2019 CUI19 appointed an authorised representative, who was both a solicitor (see CB 342) and a registered migration agent, for the purposes of the Authority’s review: CB 340-341. There was a change in authorised representative by 4 June 2019, but again the authorised representative was a solicitor and registered migration agent: CB 513.
On 30 May 2019 CUI19’s authorised representative provided submissions to the Authority which did not advert to either of the two untranslated letters, nor to CUI19’s profile or political based claims (save for the claims related to his health): CB 355-425.
On 4 June 2019 CUI19’s authorised representative provided further submissions to the Authority, but they did not refer to or seek to rely upon the two untranslated letters: CB 433-512.
On 13 June 2019 the Authority wrote to CUI19’s authorised representatives, referring to the various submissions provided by CUI19 in 2017 and 2019 and to the Practice Direction, but only for the purpose of pointing out that the Practice Direction allowed for a five-page submission, and seeking clarification as to which five pages of the submissions provided CUI19 wished to rely upon: CB 517. In an attached copy of the Practice Direction issued by the President of the Authority on 17 December 2018: CB 518-522, at CB 521 at [31] a paragraph in the same terms as that in the 1 February 2017 Practice Direction set out at [43] above appears.
On 20 June 2019 CUI19’s authorised representative, under protest: CB 523-524, provided a five-page summary submission: CB 525-529, but again did not refer to or rely upon either of the two untranslated letters.
In what appears to be a cut and paste from the Previous Authority Decision (as set out at [47] above), in the Authority Decision at CB 659 at [51] the Authority observed as follows:
Attached to the SHEV application are two other letters which the applicant requested the delegate refer to as evidence of his political involvement and the threats he faced. The first letter is typed and displays … [name deleted] MP details on the letterhead, and is dated 10 June 2013. The second letter is handwritten, and bears a stamp from the village administration official and a stamp from the Divisional Secretary of … [name deleted] dated 19 June 2013. The contents of both letters appear to be in Tamil and are untranslated and as such, I am unable to assess their contents.
It is not in dispute that the two untranslated letters were in the material provided by the Secretary of the Department to the Authority under s 473CB(1) of the Migration Act for the purposes of the Authority’s review, but it would appear that translated copies of the two untranslated letters were never provided to the Delegate by CUI19, and likewise translated copies were never provided to the Authority by CUI19. At no stage has CUI19 sought to put translated copies of the two letters before the Authority as new information. And, there is no evidence that the two letters have ever been translated.
There is no question that in conducting the review and exercising its powers that the Authority must act in a manner that is legally reasonable: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332; (2013) 87 ALJR 618; (2013) 297 ALR 225; (2013) 138 ALD 181 (“Li”); Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 264 CLR 217; (2018) 92 ALJR 481; (2018) 353 ALR 600 (“Plaintiff M174/2016”) at [21] per Gageler, Keane and Nettle JJ.
The question arises as to whether the Authority acted in a manner that was legally unreasonable in not exercising procedural powers under s 473DC of the Migration Act to invite CUI19 to provide a translation of the letters prior to the Authority’s consideration of CUI19’s claims.
In the Court’s view there was no error in the Authority not exercising procedural powers under s 473DC of the Migration Act to invite CUI19 to provide a translation of the letters prior to the Authority’s consideration of CUI19’s claims in the following circumstances.
First, it was for CUI19 to provide translated copies of the two letters to the Authority before the Authority was required to consider those documents, and the Authority is under no general obligation to obtain a translation of a document given to the Authority that is not in English: Cabal v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 546 at [25] per Wilcox, Whitlam and Marshall JJ; ASU22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 927 (“ASU22”) at [37]-[38] per Halley J; EGJ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 2782 at [17] per Judge Egan.
Second, the Authority was under no duty to inquire: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le [2007] FCA 1318; (2007) 164 FCR 151; (2007) 242 ALR 455; (2007) 97 ALD 112 at [63] per Kenny J, and therefore had no duty to gather new information. The statutory scheme under which the Authority operates is consistent with the notion that it was not for the Delegate nor the Authority to gather information in support of CUI19’s claims, or to make inquiries, or to make out CUI19’s case for him: AQF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 966 at [53] per Farrell J applying Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510; (1999) 73 ALJR 584; (1999) 162 ALR 1; (1999) 55 ALD 1 at [187] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; see also Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123; (2009) 259 ALR 429; (2009) 111 ALD 15 at [24]-[25] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ and Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S154/2002 [2003] HCA 60; (2003) 233 CLR 1; (2003) 77 ALJR 1909; (2003) 201 ALR 437; (2003) 75 ALD 1 at [57] per Gummow and Heydon JJ.
Third, CUI19 was on notice of the need to provide documents in English, not once, but three times: originally before the Delegate by letter in the request to attend the Delegate Interview, and then twice before the Authority by reference to the Practice Direction: see [39], [43] and [52] above. As was observed by one member of the majority in the Full Court of the Federal Court in X v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 3; (2002) 116 FCR 319; (2002) 67 ALD 355 at [53] per Moore J “[i]t is improbable that the statutory scheme would require the Tribunal ordinarily to obtain a translation if none was provided”.
Fourth, CUI19 was represented by specialist migration lawyers and registered migration agents throughout the process before the Delegate and before the Authority, both originally and on remitter. At no stage in the multiple submissions put forward over more than two years were the two untranslated letters referred to, and at no stage was any request made for further time to submit translated documents, and in particular, the two untranslated letters.
Fifth, the process before the Delegate and before the Authority, both originally and on remitter, took more than two years and CUI19 therefore had more than adequate time to obtain translations of the two untranslated letters.
Sixth, no explanation has been provided as to why no translations of the two untranslated letters were ever provided: CHB17 vMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 635 at [63] per Greenwood J.
Seventh, there is no evidence as to what the two untranslated letters actually say, as translated into English. CUI19 cannot therefore establish that a translation of either of the two untranslated letters could have realistically resulted in the Authority making a different decision: LPDT at [15]-[16] per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson and Jagot JJ.
Finally, the Court notes that this is not a case like BMH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1062 (“BMH17”) where the Authority inferred or assumed no copy of a translation had been given to the delegate, and therefore did not appear in the materials referred to the Authority by the Secretary of the Department under s 473CB(1) of the Migration Act, when there was a specific identification of the translation provided in the audio recording of the interview between BMH17 and the delegate: BMH17 at [121]-[122] per Feutrill J. In this case CUI19 has not provided translations of the two letters, if translations exist which is not apparent, notwithstanding both ample time and requests from the Delegate and the Authority to do so.
Ground 4 of Exhibit 2 is therefore not made out.
It follows that none of the four grounds of Exhibit 2 have been made out, and they therefore do not establish any error in the Authority Decision.
Exhibit 3
Grounds 1 to 4 of Exhibit 3 relate to the Authority’s treatment of the medical claims made by CUI19. It is convenient to set out some of the Authority’s considerations and findings in relation thereto.
At CB 660-661 at [58]-[61] the Authority observed that:
Mental health
58.The applicant provided a new medical letter to the IAA, dated 8 May 2019, that was not before the delegate. That letter stated that the applicant suffered from PTSD and anxiety prior to his liver transplant. Having an emergency transplant further exacerbated his trauma. He suffered from adjustment issues post-transplant for which he received counselling from the transplant unit social worker. During early 2017, it became evident that his mental health had significantly deteriorated at which time he was referred for counselling with STTARS. The applicant subsequently provided the IAA with a report from STTARS dated 27 February 2019 which stated that he is undergoing treatment for depression with PTSD symptoms and will continue to need treatment. I accept that the applicant has mental health conditions which require ongoing treatment and which he feels will be exacerbated by being returned to Sri Lanka.
Liver transplant
59.The applicant has provided extensive medical evidence in support of his claim that in July 2016 he underwent a liver transplant as a result of a life threatening liver condition. I have had regard to the original medical letter, dated 16 December 2016, which the applicant’s representative forwarded to the delegate after the SHEV interview. The letter indicated that the applicant recovered well after surgery and returned to his usual routines; however he is required to take immunosuppressant medications daily for the rest of his life. The letter specifies the names and quantities of the drugs which the applicant is required to take, and states that he will also require follow up blood tests and medical reviews in a specialist liver transplant unit every three months. The letter concluded that the applicant is physically well enough to work as long as it does not place him at a high risk of infection, as his immune system is permanently compromised as the result of the transplant.
60.On 8 May 2019 the applicant’s medical team provided a new medical letter to the IAA. It stated that since his transplant in July 2016, the applicant is doing well with normal liver function and currently has no evidence of rejection. His clinical condition requires regular blood tests to monitor his liver and kidney functions. If he becomes unwell he requires access to the 24 hour service from the liver transplant co-ordinators for provision of advice and urgent medical assessment. His vital immunosuppressive therapy consists of Tacrolimus 0.5mg twice a day. The author notes that, “drawing from his experience in India”, immunosuppressive medications such as Tacrolimus are likely to be expensive In Sri Lanka, and they may not be freely available in the Government run hospitals. The applicant will not be able to afford them on his own in view of their prohibitive cost. He requires life-long follow up with transplant physicians who are only available in tertiary medical centres in the capital cities. He will find it difficult to liaise with a transplant unit on his own and travel to Colombo. Lack of access to life saving immunosuppressive medications and timely medical assistance for potential medical emergencies which are likely in view of the infective risks he will be exposed to In Sri Lanka could compromise his life. If the applicant would not be able to receive immunosuppressive treatment, it is highly likely he will experience failure of the transplanted liver and die. He faces a high risk of infection due to exposure to communicable diseases which are more prevalent in Sri Lanka. He will need ongoing appropriate vaccinations to help prevent infection. His family live seven hours from the nearest hospital which could provide the appropriate treatment and would not have the means to move to Colombo. If returned to Sri Lanka, he would need the support of his family due to his vulnerable physical and mental health and economic status. He would need their care and careful monitoring if he became unwell and would also need them to provide food and accommodation whilst he recovers. Currently, the applicant has the physical capacity to perform any work which does not involve lifting heavy weights or being exposed to a work environment in which there is a higher than normal risk of infection.
61.I accept that the applicant has undergone a liver transplant and that he has complex and ongoing medical needs for the rest of his life as his immune system is permanently compromised as the result of the transplant. I accept that he requires regular blood tests to monitor his liver and kidney functions. I accept that if he becomes unwell he requires access to advice and urgent medical assessment. I accept that he requires access to immunosuppressive therapy. I am not satisfied that the specialist’s inferences about the availability of medicines in India is relevant to the applicant’s ability to access medication in Sri Lanka. I accept that he will require follow up at times with transplant physicians. I accept that the applicant currently has the physical capacity to perform any work which does not involve lifting heavy weights or being exposed to a work environment in which there is a higher than normal risk of infection. I accept that the applicant will need ongoing appropriate vaccinations to help prevent infection. I am not satisfied that the applicant’s family live seven hours from the nearest hospital which could provide him appropriate treatment. This assertion is unsupported. The applicant has not presented any current information about the availability of transplant physicians across Sri Lanka, noting that country information indicates that the Sirisena government made a commitment to expand medical services in the North and East. I accept that the applicant may require care should he become sick and that he would seek the support of his family to provide this care. I note that the applicant’s specialist has advised that he is currently doing well and shows no evidence of rejection.

The Authority found at CB 669-670 at [89]-[90] as follows:
89.The applicant’s specialist has advised, and I accept, that he will require follow up at times with transplant physicians. The applicant’s specialist has stated that the applicant’s family live seven hours from the nearest hospital which could provide the appropriate treatment and would not have the means to move to Colombo. The source of this observation is not apparent. I am not satisfied that this is currently the case noting the development of medical facilities across Sri Lanka. However, I am also not satisfied that the applicant could not travel to a major centre such as Colombo for his specialist review as is generally the case for people with medical conditions that live in rural or remote areas. I note the specialists’ assertion that the applicant will find it difficult to liaise with a transplant unit on his own and travel to Colombo. It is not apparent why this would be the case or how this assessment has been arrived at. I am not satisfied that the evidence supports that the applicant faces any medical restrictions on his ability to travel noting that the medical information indicates that he is fit to work and the main physical restriction he faces is in relation to lifting heavy weights. The report from his treating psychiatrist notes that that the applicant is apprehensive about the limited treatment that would be available for his liver condition and need to travel long distances and pay for services, however, it does not indicate that he faces any restriction on his ability to travel if required nor does it indicate that he would be precluded from working and earning a living.
90.I accept the applicant’s specialist’s advice that he requires access to immunosuppressive therapy. I note that the applicant has submitted that he will not have access to immunosuppressant medication if he returns to Sri Lanka. Two of the applicant’s current medications, aspirin and Azathioprine, are included on the 2009 ‘National List of Essential Medicines’, which lists medicines that are essential, have been quality tested and are available at a price the individual and the country can afford. The National Medicine Regulatory Authority, which was established in 2015, ensures quality, safety and affordability of medicines, and generic brands are widely available. Country information from 2014 also indicates that 67 per cent of privately purchased medicines surveyed required less than a single day’s average wage to purchase one month’s supply. The applicant has made claims about not being able to easily access a third medication that he currently takes, Tacrolimus. The applicant has not provided any information as to what medications are offered to liver transplant patients as an alternative in Sri Lanka and whether or not the applicant can benefit from those medications. More importantly in terms of the assessment of his claims, he has not pointed to any intention on the part of the Sri Lankan Government to restrict access to Tacrolimus for any reason set out in s.5(J) of the Act which would amount to persecution.
At CB 670 at [92] the Authority found that:
…I do not accept the assertion, made at the end of the SHEV interview, that the Sri Lankan government withholds medication in the north and east of [the] country in an attempt to harm Tamils. Further I do not accept that the applicant would face systemic discrimination because of the location of many specialist services in Colombo rather than the Eastern Province. The evidence before me indicates that government-run facilities exist in Colombo with the requisite specialist services to manage the applicant’s condition and I am not satisfied that there is a real chance the applicant would be denied access to those services…
and went on at CB 671 at [93] to conclude that:
Overall, while I accept that the applicant will not have the same access to essential medical services in Sri Lanka as he does in Australia, I am not satisfied that the applicant would be denied access to health services or medication in Sri Lanka for reason of race, political opinion (real or imputed) or any other reason mentioned in s.5J.
At CB 673 at [102] having observed that it had considered the country information, CUI19’s profile as claimed, and “his complex health needs” said that it was “not satisfied” that CUI19 “faces a real chance of serious harm as a result of his departure from Sri Lanka or as a result of being a person with complex medical needs seeking asylum and spending time in Australia or any combination or accumulation of those factors”.
In relation to its complementary protection assessment the Authority accepted that CUI19 had “mental health conditions that require ongoing care” and referred to the availability of specialist care: CB 674 at [107]. It observed that any denial of medical treatment would not amount to significant harm because concerns about the consequences of scarce medical resources in developing countries did not constitute arbitrary deprivation of life for the purposes of s 5J of the Migration Act: CB 674 at [107], citing at fn 52, MZAAJ – FCCA. Having referred again to “his medical conditions” (including it can be inferred his mental health conditions) the Authority found that any difficulties, including with treatment, would not constitute significant harm as defined for the purposes of complementary protection (the definition under s 36(2A) of the Migration Act being set out at CB 674 at [106]): CB 675 at [109].
In MZAAJ-FCCA at [41] per Judge Riley it was held that the Tribunal was correct in concluding that the prospect of an applicant dying as a result of being unable to access dialysis in Sri Lanka would not fall within the concept of the arbitrary deprivation of life for the purposes of the Migration Act. That conclusion was upheld by the Federal Court on appeal: MZAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 478 (“MZAAJ-FCA Appeal”) at [6] per Pagone J. An application for special leave to appeal MZAAJ-FCA Appeal was also dismissed: MZAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCATrans 236. Subsequently, in SZDCD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 326 at [48] per Gleeson J the Federal Court, having referred to MZAAJ-FCCA and MZAAJ-FCA Appeal, found that:
While the appellant may suffer the loss of his life as a result of losing access to medical treatment currently available to him in Australia, those facts are insufficient to support a conclusion that there is a risk to him that he will be “arbitrarily deprived of his life” as a consequence of his removal to Bangladesh because they do not involve an arbitrary conduct.
The Court observes that the Authority plainly understood and set out the nature of the medical conditions affecting CUI19 and the medications required to treat those medical conditions, and their availability.
Each of grounds 1 and 2 of Exhibit 3 refer to the alleged failure of the Authority to “understand” issues in relation to CUI19’s “medical management” by reference to issues of practicality. Each ground essentially sets out the alleged failure of the Authority and then briefly re-argues the issue. Each of grounds 1 and 2 must fail on the basis that overall what is sought is no more than impermissible merits review: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
Ground 1 of Exhibit 3 can be seen as a complaint that the Authority preferred to rely upon country information concerning the medical services and medication available in Sri Lanka rather than the February and May 2019 Medical Reports (together “Medical Reports”). The task of considering the materials before it and making findings on the facts is uniquely one for the finder of fact: here the Authority. Here the Authority has specifically set out, for example, information from the Medical Reports concerning CUI19’s clinical condition and the availability of medications, albeit in India not Sri Lanka, and particularly in relation to a critical medication, tacrolimus. But the Authority expressed doubts about the information in the Medical Reports, particularly as it related to the availability of medication, because it related to India and not Sri Lanka. Further, CUI19 did not put before the Authority any information sourced from Sri Lanka in relation to the availability of medical services or medication in Sri Lanka. The Medical Reports did not deal with some of these issues other than peripherally and without indicating any proper source for some of the opinions put forward, for example in relation to liaison with and travel to medical services in Sri Lanka: CB 669-670 at [89], and in relation to medications available to liver transplant patients in Sri Lanka provided no information at all to the Authority: CB 670 at [90], and in relation to the treatment of liver transplant patients in Sri Lanka the Authority noted that CUI19 had not pointed to “any current documentary evidence from Sri Lanka about the treatment of liver transplant patients in Sri Lanka”: CB 670 at [91] (see also CB 669 at [87]). The failure of CUI19 to put forward documentary material specifically about the availability of medical services or medication in Sri Lanka makes it difficult for the Authority to make findings of the type CUI19 now suggests should have been made in the Authority Decision. In the circumstances, and in any event, the Authority was able to refer to country information specifically about availability of medical services or medication in Sri Lanka, and the Authority was also able to make findings based on the available country information about Sri Lanka, which it did, and which were open to be made on the basis of that country information. It cannot be said that no other rational or logical decision-maker could not have arrived at, or drawn, the same conclusions: SZMDS at [131]-[135] per Crennan and Bell JJ. On this basis ground 1 of Exhibit 3 is not made out and discloses no error in the Authority Decision.
Insofar as ground 2 of Exhibit 3 seeks to argue about the availability of medical practitioners and their competence in management of CUI19’s medical conditions that argument cannot succeed as no error in the Authority Decision is disclosed for the reasons set out in the previous paragraph.
Insofar as ground 2 of Exhibit 3 seeks to argue about the travel arrangements which might be required for CUI19 to obtain medical care in Sri Lanka the Authority the Authority set out the claims made by CUI19 made in relation to the treatment he required and travel to obtain the treatment in Sri Lanka: CB 660-661 at [58]-[60], and
(a)specifically considered, having regard to available country information:
(i)the availability of the required medical services in Sri Lanka in relation to CUI19’s specialised needs: CB 661 at [61];
(ii)CUI19’s access to any required care in Sri Lanka, both on a day-to-day basis and for more specialised care, noting that CUI19 was not precluded from travelling to access care in his home region, or a major centre such as Colombo: CB 661 at [61] and 669-670 at [88]-[89]; and
(iii)the travel time for CUI19 and his family in terms of any required care, and specifically found that CUI19’s family did not live seven hours from the nearest hospital that could provide him with appropriate treatment: CB 661 at [61], particularly having regard to “the development of medical facilities across Sri Lanka”: CB 669-670 at [89];
(b)was not satisfied, given CUI19’s capacity for work, that there were any medical restrictions on his capacity to travel: CB 669-670 at [89].
The Authority made findings concerning the travel issue based on, and having had regard to, the evidence, including available country information about Sri Lanka, and the findings it made were open to be made on the basis of its consideration of the evidence, including the country information. It cannot be said that no other rational or logical decision-maker could not have made the same findings: SZMDS at [131]-[135] per Crennan and Bell JJ. On this basis ground 2 of Exhibit 3 is not made out and discloses no error in the Authority Decision.
In relation to ground 3 of Exhibit 3 the observation made by the Authority concerning the Sri Lankan government’s commitment to expand medical services has been misconstrued. The complete sentence is as follows, at CB 661 at [61:
…The applicant has not presented any current information about the availability of transplant physicians across Sri Lanka, noting that country information indicates that the Sirisena government made a commitment to expand medical services in the North and East…
The complete sentence says nothing about the level of medical services available in Sri Lanka. Rather it says that:
(a)CUI19 presented no information about the availability of transplant physicians across Sri Lanka; and
(b)whatever the level of services available, whether sub-optimal, average, optimal, or better or worse than those available elsewhere (including Australia), that a commitment had been made by the Sri Lankan government to improve them.
Thus, reading the complete sentence alone, it cannot be inferred that, in the language of ground 3 of Exhibit 3, it was a “tacit admission that the services were sub-optimal at the time”. Further, reading the complete sentence in the context of the Authority Decision as a whole (as the Court is required to do: WAEE at [47] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ; BYX17 at [49] per Rangiah, White and O’Callaghan JJ; WZAVQ at [55] per Barker J), it is evident for the reasons set out at [70]-[74] and [78] above that the Authority considered that the medical services available both regionally and nationally in Sri Lanka were sufficient to meet CUI19’s needs. It cannot be inferred from a reading of the Authority Decision as a whole that the Authority considered the available medical services relevant to CUI19’s needs were sub-optimal. Ground 3 of Exhibit 3 is not made out and does not establish error in the Authority Decision.
Ground 4 of Exhibit 4 argues that the Authority failed “to understand” CUI19’s “mental health needs which would need to be addressed along with … [his] physical health needs”.
The Authority clearly identified that CUI19 was undergoing treatment for depression with PTSD symptoms brought on by his liver transplant, and that he would need ongoing treatment, and that “he feels” his “mental health conditions … will be exacerbated by being returned to Sri Lanka”: CB 660 at [58]. CUI19’s claims concerning the effect of a return to Sri Lanka, and the February 2019 Medical Report from a psychiatrist referring to CUI19’s need for treatment and support are set out by the Authority at CB 668 at [81]. Country information concerning mental health services, and their expansion into the community in recent years, are referred to at CB 668-669 at [85]. As set out at [70] and [73]-[74] above, CUI19’s “mental health conditions” and “medical conditions” were also considered in the context of complementary protection and a finding was made that they did not constitute significant harm as defined under s 36(2A) of the Migration Act: CB 674 at [107] and 675 at [109].
In WAEE at [47] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ the Full Court of the Federal Court held that:
[47]The inference that the tribunal has failed to consider an issue may be drawn from its failure to expressly deal with that issue in its reasons. But that is an inference not too readily to be drawn where the reasons are otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point. It may be that it is unnecessary to make a finding on a particular matter because it is subsumed in findings of greater generality or because there is a factual premise upon which a contention rests which has been rejected. Where, however, there is an issue raised by the evidence advanced on behalf of an applicant and contentions made by the applicant and that issue, if resolved one way, would be dispositive of the tribunal’s review of the delegate’s decision, a failure to deal with it in the published reasons may raise a strong inference that it has been overlooked.
Thus, while the Court can infer a failure to consider a claim if the Authority did not expressly mention a claim in the Authority Decision, it must read the reasons in the Authority Decision as a whole, and such an inference ought not too readily be drawn where the reasoning in the Authority Decision is otherwise comprehensive and the issue has at least been identified at some point: WAEE at [47] per French, Sackville and Hely JJ.
The Authority plainly identified, set out and understood them CUI19’s claims concerning his mental health conditions. By reference to the evidence, including CUI19’s February 2019 Medical Report and the country information, the Authority drew conclusions concerning the claims made by CUI19 in relation thereto, both for refugee and complementary protection purposes. Those conclusions were open to be made on the evidence, and it cannot be said that no other rational or logical decision-maker could not have arrived at, or drawn, the same conclusions: SZMDS at [131]-[135] per Crennan and Bell JJ. It follows that ground 4 of Exhibit 3 is not made out and discloses no error in the Authority Decision.
Otherwise, considered both as a whole and with respect to its individual grounds, Exhibit 3 does little more than seek to argue – or reargue – the merits of the review application before the Authority. As set out above, it is impermissible for this to be done upon judicial review: Wu Shan Liang, CLR at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ.
In the above circumstances, grounds 1 to 4 of Exhibit 3 do not establish error in the Authority Decision.
Jurisdictional error otherwise
The Court is cognisant that CUI19 was self-represented (albeit assisted by a capable McKenzie friend) before the Court, and that in those circumstances the Court must endeavour to remain independently alert to the possibility of a jurisdictional error having been made by the Authority: MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158 at [100] and [112] per Mortimer J; Ludgero v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 1060; (2021) 358 FLR 215 at [26] per Judge Lucev. Save for the matters otherwise considered in these Reasons for Judgment, it is not evident to the Court that some other form of possibly arguable legal error, and in particular possibly arguable jurisdictional error, arises in relation to the Authority Decision.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
CUI19 has failed to establish any jurisdictional error in the Authority Decision. It follows that the Judicial Review Application must be dismissed. There will be an order accordingly.
The Court will hear the parties as to costs.

I certify that the preceding ninety-four (94) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Lucev.
Associate:
Dated: 12 March 2024

File number(s):	ADG 254 of 2019
Judgment of:	JUDGE LUCEV
Date of judgment:	12 March 2025
Catchwords:	MIGRATION – Judicial review application – decision of Immigration Assessment Authority – affirmation of refusal to grant Safe Haven Enterprise visa – citizen of Sri Lanka of Tamil ethnicity – family support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam – personal assistance to the Tamil National Alliance in parliamentary elections – alleged threats to and abduction by paramilitary groups – single unparticularised ground of review – further grounds raised orally at hearing – whether failure to understand threats and risks of harm from paramilitary groups – whether failure to consider evidence of political activity in correspondence from local officials – where correspondence not provided in translated form – whether treatment available in Sri Lanka for mental health conditions and following liver transplant – whether failure to understand medical treatment needs and available services following liver transplant – whether failure to understand mental health needs – whether jurisdictional error.
Legislation:	Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5J, 36, 473FB, 473CB, 473DC, 473DD, 474, 476
Cases cited:	Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510; (1999) 73 ALJR 584; (1999) 162 ALR 1; (1999) 55 ALD 1 Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593; (2003) 75 ALD 630 AQF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 966 ASU22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 927 BIK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 788 BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 BMH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1062 BYX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 41 Cabal v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 546 CHB17 vMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 635 CXS18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 18 DKN20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1158 DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 EGJ18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 2782 EQJ19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1476 FCT17 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 1167 GKH18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1125 LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 98 ALJR 610; (2024) 418 ALR 152 Ludgero v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 1060; (2021) 358 FLR 215 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le [2007] FCA 1318; (2007) 164 FCR 151; (2007) 242 ALR 455; (2007) 97 ALD 112 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332; (2013) 87 ALJR 618; (2013) 297 ALR 225; (2013) 138 ALD 181 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; (2011) 241 CLR 594; (2011) 85 ALJR 327; (2011) 273 ALR 223; (2011) 119 ALD 1 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123; (2009) 259 ALR 429; (2009) 111 ALD 15 Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611; (2010) 84 ALJR 369; (2010) 266 ALR 367; (2010) 115 ALD 248 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259; (1996) 70 ALJR 568; (1996) 136 ALR 481; (1996) 41 ALD 1 MZAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 478 MZAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 151 MZAAJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCATrans 236 MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; (2015) 238 FCR 158 NADR v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 167 NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 NWWJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 176 Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; (2018) 264 CLR 217; (2018) 92 ALJR 481; (2018) 353 ALR 600 Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] HCA 50; (2015) 258 CLR 173; (2015) 90 ALJR 197; (2015) 327 ALR 8; (2015) 148 ALD 206 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476; (2003) 77 ALJR 454; (2003) 195 ALR 24; (2003) 72 ALD 1 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S154/2002 [2003] HCA 60; (2003) 233 CLR 1; (2003) 77 ALJR 1909; (2003) 201 ALR 437; (2003) 75 ALD 1 SZDCD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 326 WZAVQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 188 WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 X v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 3; (2002) 116 FCR 319; (2002) 67 ALD 355
Division:	Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs:	94
Date of last submission/s:	6 August 2024
Date of hearing:	6 August 2024
Place:	Perth
Applicant:	In person, with the assistance of an Interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent:	Ms P Durham
Solicitor for the Respondents:	Australian Government Solicitor
Second Respondent:	Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ADG 254 of 2019
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN:	CUI19 Applicant
AND:	MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS First Respondent IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE LUCEV
DATE OF ORDER:	12 MARCH 2025