BIK18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BIK18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 788

Appeal from: BIK18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 413
File number: WAD 60 of 2019
Judge: MCKERRACHER  J
Date of judgment: 27 May 2019
Date of publication of reasons: 28 May 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court – where the primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review – unparticularised grounds – where the Immigration Assessment Authority’s conclusions were open on the material – no appellable error  
Cases cited: DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784
Date of hearing: 27 May 2019
Registry: Western Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 22
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms A Ladhams
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submits to any order of the Court, save as to the question of costs

ORDERS

WAD 60 of 2019
BETWEEN:

BIK18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MCKERRACHER  J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 MAY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT

MCKERRACHER J:

  1. The appellant appeals a decision from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia: BIK18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2019] FCCA 413. By that decision, the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority.  The Authority had affirmed an earlier decision of the delegate for the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (as he then was) not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise visa.

  2. The sole ground of the appellant’s appeal to this Court is:

    1.        …

    2.JURISDICTIONAL ERROR DUE TO, NO [sic] FOLLOWING OR [sic] FACTS PRESENTED[.]

  3. This ground is a formula seen on a number of occasions and, without particularisation as to the error of law or even the jurisdictional error, it is not particularly helpful.  So it is necessary to dig a little deeper.  Although some earlier decisions of the Court and some relatively recent decisions have pointed out that technically a failure to particularise a ground is a basis for it to be dismissed, the Court has never approached appeals on that basis.  As observed by Colvin J in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 (at [9]), it will rarely be appropriate simply to dismiss a ground of appeal in a migration case for lack of particulars in circumstances where an unrepresented party has neither the legal training nor the background to understand the technicalities…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 788
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BIK18 v Minister for Home Affairs, the appellant, BIK18, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA), which had determined that BIK18 did not meet the criteria for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The matter was heard in the Federal Circuit Court, and subsequently, BIK18 appealed the Federal Circuit Court’s decision to the High Court. The key issue for determination was whether the IAA erred in its assessment of BIK18’s eligibility for a protection visa by not considering certain country information and by finding BIK18’s claims of past persecution and fear of future persecution unfounded.

The court examined the IAA’s assessment of BIK18's claims, including his family’s association with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and his own alleged involvement in LTTE activities. The IAA had scrutinised BIK18’s claims against the relevant provisions of the Migration Act and found that BIK18 did not provide credible evidence to substantiate his claims. The IAA also assessed whether BIK18 faced a real chance of serious harm if returned to Sri Lanka, considering both past persecution and fear of future persecution based on his Tamil ethnicity, alleged LTTE connections, and religious practices. The court found that the IAA's conclusions were reasonable and based on a proper consideration of the evidence and applicable legal standards.

The court held that the IAA did not commit any error in dismissing BIK18’s application for a protection visa. The IAA’s assessment was thorough and considered the relevant statutory provisions and country information. The court found that the IAA's decision was open on the material before it and that there was no basis for finding an error in the IAA's exercise of its discretion. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and BIK18 was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The factual background is also set out in some detail in the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court (at [1]-[20]). The primary judge also summarised the decision of the Authority in reasonable detail (at [30]-[49]) as follows:The [Authority’s] Decision…30.At paragraphs 4 to 5, the [Authority] noted that it had received submissions from the [appellant]. The [Authority] noted that it had reviewed that document and, to the extent that the submissions dated 13 July 2018 contained argument, the [Authority] had regard to them: [4]. However, the [Authority] found that the submissions also contained “new information”; namely five country reports. In relation to these country reports, the [Authority] found that three of the reports predated the delegate’s decision and contained general country information. The other two reports did not have either footnotes or citations and the extracts contained general country information. There was no explanation provided as to why the information could not have been provided prior to the delegate’s decision and no reasons were given as to why it may be considered credible personal information. The [Authority] was not satisfied that the requirements of s.473DD(b)(i) or s.473DD(b)(ii) were met in relation to the country information. Furthermore, it was not apparent that there were any “exceptional circumstances” to justify considering the information.31.It is clear from the above that the [Authority] assessed this information in light of s.473DD of the Act. 32. The [Authority] then summarised the [appellant’s] claim (at [6]) as follows:…33. This is an accurate summary of the [appellant’s] claims. 34.In relation to his identity and background, the [Authority] accepted that the [appellant] was of Tamil ethnicity and…, and that he was born in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka. 35.The [Authority] also accepted that the [appellant’s] family was temporarily displaced on a number of occasions during the conflict and their home may have been damaged causing it to be uninhabitable in 2005.36.In relation to his claimed family connections to the LTTE, the [Authority] accepted aspects of his claims despite these not being raised at entry interview. It accepted that:a)the [appellant’s] family provided support including monetary support to the LTTE;b)the [appellant’s] father may have briefly been forced to undertake physical training with the LTTE; andc)the [appellant’s] uncles may have been members of LTTE more than 20 years ago.37.The [Authority] then undertook a refugee assessment as per s.5J of the Act and the meaning of “well-founded fear of persecution”.38.At paragraphs 10 to 30, the [Authority] assessed the [appellant’s] evidence in relation to his family links and imputed association with the LTTE, his status as a Tamil business man and his Tamil Ethnicity. 39.The [Authority] accepted that the [appellant] is from the …, which was an LTTE controlled area during the war. It further accepted that the [appellant’s] older brother was forced to be part of the LTTE and was later taken to a rehabilitation camp, and that the [appellant] and his family spent time in a government camp. The [Authority] accepted it was plausible that the [appellant] was taken by the LTTE on two occasions and escaped on each occasion. The [Authority] also accepted that it was credible that the [appellant] may have been involved in LTTE activities whilst at school, including being an MC at funerals. 40.The [Authority] was not satisfied that the [appellant’s] brother was head of the LTTE Communications Department. The [Authority] considered the claim was illogical given the [appellant’s] claim that his brother was an unwilling recruit and so soon after being trained would be given such a position of responsibility, would have only been approximately 21 years old at the time, had no relevant skills, and the [appellant] provided limited evidence as to his brother’s responsibilities in this role at the interview before the delegate. The [Authority] considered that the [appellant] embellished the brother’s role and was of the view that the brother was a low level LTTE cadre.41.The [Authority] referred to country information suggesting that close relatives of high-profile former LTTE members who remain wanted by the authorities may be subject to monitoring, but did not accept that the [appellant’s] brother would be considered a high profile former LTTE member. Accordingly, the [Authority] found that the [appellant] was not at any risk on this basis.42.The [Authority] accepted that the [appellant] was involved in a family business and that it was plausible that the family may have experienced some harassment from the Sri Lankan Army. However, the [Authority] was not satisfied of the claimed events of 1 and 3 April 2013 and found that the [appellant] fabricated these events in their entirety. The [Authority] reached this conclusion for a number of reasons, including that:a)it did not accept that the [appellant] and his family would knowingly bring attention to themselves by playing loud music next to an army base considering the claimed abuse his brother went through during his rehabilitation and the [appellant’s] claimed harassment from the Sri Lankan Army whilst running the business;b)the [appellant] was inconsistent as to whether he was held overnight on 1 April 2013 and who attended the family business;c)the [appellant] and his brother decided not to pay the bribe intentionally without taking any precautions or action;d)it was fanciful that the [appellant] was so easily able to free himself and run away when his hands were tied behind his back; ande)the [appellant’s] departure from Sri Lanka on his own passport appeared somewhat premeditated given that the [appellant] had never travelled outside Sri Lanka previously.43.The [Authority] found it far-fetched that the [appellant’s] brothers are still required to travel to Colombo when they have done nothing except allegedly not paying the ransom, and found that that the brothers are not of any ongoing interest to the authorities because of the [appellant].44.The [Authority] was not satisfied that, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, the [appellant] would be targeted or monitored by the Sri Lankan authorities because of his Tamil ethnicity or because he originates from the north of Sri Lanka or a former LTTE controlled area. This finding was made taking into account country information and the [appellant’s] evidence. The finding was also made on the basis of the [appellant’s] lack of profile, and that he has no substantive connection or links to the LTTE other than his brother who the [Authority] found was not of a high profile, completed rehabilitation and was released in 2011. Further, the [Authority] was not satisfied that if the [appellant] were to reopen his business he would experience the level of harassment he may have experienced in the past. Therefore, the [Authority] was not satisfied that the [appellant] faced a real chance of harm on these bases.45.The [Authority] was not satisfied that the [appellant] was involved in any way with post-conflict Tamil separatism. 46.The [Authority] was not satisfied that the [appellant] experienced harm on the basis of his practice of the … faith in the past. Further, it was not satisfied that on his return the [appellant] would attempt to proselytise or convert others. Therefore, the [Authority] was not satisfied that the [appellant] faced a real chance of serious harm on the basis of his religion.47.The [Authority] was not satisfied that the [appellant] faced a real chance of harm as a returning Tamil asylum seeker.48.Accordingly, the [Authority] concluded that the [appellant] did not meet the requirements of s.36(2)(a) of the Act. 49.In relation to any Complementary protections, the [Authority] concluded that, for similar reasons, the [appellant] did not face a real risk of significant harm in Sri Lanka. (Citations omitted.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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