FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
SZRCJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 707
File number(s): SYG 289 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE SKAROS Date of judgment: 16 May 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial review – Protection visa – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Indonesia - Where the Tribunal was only required to assess the complementary protection criterion – Whether Tribunal assessed harm at present or in the reasonably foreseeable future – Where Tribunal used the words ‘Indonesia today’ – Unfair reading of Tribunal’s decision – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)(aa) Cases cited: BOT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 654
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379
CPE15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCA 591
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
SZGHS v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 1572
SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 70 Date of hearing: 29 April 2025 Place: Parramatta Counsel for the Applicants: Ms F McNeil Solicitor for the Applicants: ALP Lawyers Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr M Vethecan, Clayton Utz Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance save as to costs ORDERS
SYG 289 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: SZRCJ
First Applicant
SZRCK
Second Applicant
SZRCL (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE SKAROS
DATE OF ORDER:
16 MAY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the First Respondent is amended to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.
2.The name of the Second Respondent is amended to the Administrative Review Tribunal.
3.The application filed 24 February 2021, and amended on 1 April 2025, is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE SKAROS:
By application filed on 24 February 2021 the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal[1] (the Tribunal) dated 21 January 2021. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (the delegate) of the first respondent (the Minister) in refusing to grant the applicants protection visas (the visas) under s…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 707
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court noted that the Tribunal was required to assess the risk of harm the applicants would face in the reasonably foreseeable future, not at the present time. The concept of the “reasonably foreseeable future” was described as a period of time that can be assessed on the basis of probative material, without extending into guesswork, and precludes predictions that are too remote from the reality of what the applicants may experience. The court held that by using the words ‘Indonesia today’, the Tribunal had unfairly read down their decision. The court found that the Tribunal’s decision was flawed as it did not properly assess the risk of harm in the reasonably foreseeable future, and thus the application for judicial review was dismissed.
No further orders were made by the court.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The oral of submissions of the parties as they developed at the hearing are discussed further below. CONSIDERATION The applicants in this matter had previously been assessed against the Refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) and found not to be owed protection. Following legislative changes in March 2012, the applicants became eligible to be considered against the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa). The Tribunal correctly identified at [8] – [9] that the question before it was whether (at the time of its assessment) there were ‘substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there was a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm’: s 36(2)(aa). Section 36(2A) of the Act exhaustively defines the types of harm that will amount to ‘significant harm’. A non-citizen will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or the death penalty will be carried out on them; they will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. It is not in dispute that, when assessing whether the applicant satisfied the complementary protection criterion, the Tribunal was required to consider the risk of the harm faced by the applicant in the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’: FFQ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 496 (FFQ18) at [18]. The meaning of ‘reasonably foreseeable future' was discussed in CPE15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCA 591 at [60] (and cited in FFQ18 at [22]), wherein Mortimer J, as her Honour then was, said: The “reasonably foreseeable future” is something of an ambulatory period of time, but the use of reasonable foreseeability as the benchmark concept indicates that the assessment is intended to be one which can be made on the basis of probative material, without extending into guesswork. It is also intended to preclude predictions of the future that are so far removed in point of time from the life of the person concerned at the time the person is returned to her or his country of nationality as to bear insufficient connection to the reality of what that person may experience. The purpose of the “well-founded” aspect of the Art 1A test is, after all, to be an objective but realistic and accurate assessment of what risks a person may face in the practical “on the ground” circumstances she or he will be living in. Using “reasonably foreseeable” also carries with it a rejection of an assessment which becomes too remote from a person’s expected life circumstances. These are not matters which can be expressed sensibly with any more precision. Further, as stated in FFQ18 at [23]:The task required by s 36(2)(aa) of the Act is prospective and assessed by reference to the consequences of removal: DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs (2021) 273 CLR 1; [2021] HCA 10 (DQU16) at [18]–[19] per Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ A “real chance” or “real risk” requires consideration of prospects that are neither remote nor far-fetched: DQU16 at [10].