SZRCJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

SZRCJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 707

File number(s): SYG 289 of 2021
Judgment of: JUDGE SKAROS
Date of judgment: 16 May 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Judicial review – Protection visa – Administrative Appeals Tribunal – Indonesia - Where the Tribunal was only required to assess the complementary protection criterion – Whether Tribunal assessed harm at present or in the reasonably foreseeable future – Where Tribunal used the words ‘Indonesia today’ – Unfair reading of Tribunal’s decision – application dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)(aa)
Cases cited:

BOT15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 654

Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379

CPE15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCA 591

FFQ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 496

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

SZGHS v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2007] FCA 1572

SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 70
Date of hearing: 29 April 2025
Place: Parramatta
Counsel for the Applicants: Ms F McNeil
Solicitor for the Applicants: ALP Lawyers
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr M Vethecan, Clayton Utz
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance save as to costs

ORDERS

SYG 289 of 2021

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

SZRCJ

First Applicant

SZRCK

Second Applicant

SZRCL (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE SKAROS

DATE OF ORDER:

16 MAY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the First Respondent is amended to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

2.The name of the Second Respondent is amended to the Administrative Review Tribunal.

3.The application filed 24 February 2021, and amended on 1 April 2025, is dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE SKAROS:

  1. By application filed on 24 February 2021 the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal[1] (the Tribunal) dated 21 January 2021. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (the delegate) of the first respondent (the Minister) in refusing to grant the applicants protection visas (the visas) under s…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 707
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Indonesian nationals of Chinese ethnicity and Christian faith, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) to affirm a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs to refuse their applications for protection visas. The Tribunal was only required to assess the complementary protection criterion under section 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). The applicants argued that the Tribunal had unfairly read down their decision by considering the risk of harm in Indonesia today rather than in the reasonably foreseeable future. The central legal issue was whether the Tribunal had correctly assessed the risk of significant harm to the applicants if they were returned to Indonesia, by focusing on the present rather than the reasonably foreseeable future as required by the Act.

The court noted that the Tribunal was required to assess the risk of harm the applicants would face in the reasonably foreseeable future, not at the present time. The concept of the “reasonably foreseeable future” was described as a period of time that can be assessed on the basis of probative material, without extending into guesswork, and precludes predictions that are too remote from the reality of what the applicants may experience. The court held that by using the words ‘Indonesia today’, the Tribunal had unfairly read down their decision. The court found that the Tribunal’s decision was flawed as it did not properly assess the risk of harm in the reasonably foreseeable future, and thus the application for judicial review was dismissed.

No further orders were made by the court.

Background

Background to the litigation

By application filed on 24 February 2021 the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal[1] (the Tribunal) dated 21 January 2021. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (the delegate) of the first respondent (the Minister) in refusing to grant the applicants protection visas (the visas) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).[1] The Court notes that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal has been superseded by the Administrative Review Tribunal. Item 10, Part 2 of Schedule 16 to the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 provides that for any proceedings that were pending in any court or tribunal immediately before the transition time and to which the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was a party, the Administrative Review Tribunal is, after the transition time, substituted for the Tribunal as a party to the proceedings. Therefore, in these Reasons, reference to the Tribunal is a reference to the Administrative Review Tribunal.BACKGROUND The first and second applicants are husband and wife and the third and fourth applicants are their daughter and son. The second, third and fourth applicants did not make their own claims for protection and applied for the visas as members of the first applicant’s family unit. Any reference to ‘the applicant’ in these Reasons is a reference to the first applicant. The applicants are Indonesian nationals, born in Indonesia, of Chinese ethnicity and identify as Christians. The applicants first arrived in Australia as holders of tourist visas on 20 April 2010 and on 6 August 2010 they applied for protection visas (the First Protection Application). On 25 November 2010, the protection visas were refused by a delegate of the Minister. The Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) affirmed that decision on 14 July 2011. The applicant’s initial claim was that he feared harm as a businessman of Chinese ethnicity on return to Indonesia. The applicant later made claims that he feared harm due to his practice of Christianity in Indonesia. On 10 August 2011, the applicant sought Ministerial interventions pursuant to s 417 of the Act and on 14 September 2011 the Minister declined to intervene in the case. On 30 January 2012, the applicants sought judicial review in the then Federal Magistrate’s Court and that court dismissed the applications on 24 July 2012. In the meantime, on 24 March 2012, the Act was amended to introduce the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) which, in effect, ‘added a new type of protection visa to the list already set out in s 36’: SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 235 (SZGIZ) at [9]. On 17 October 2012, the applicants lodged the visa applications, they were initially notified that the applications were s 48 barred however on 29 August 2013 the Minister conceded that the visa applications were not barred because of what fell from the Full Court of the Federal Court in SZGIZ.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 24 April 2016, the applicants lodged applications for review with the Tribunal, on 5 November 2020 they attended a hearing before the Tribunal and on 21 January 2021 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicants the visas.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal summarised the applicant’s claims for protection as set out in the initial application and the application before it. The Tribunal identified that the dispositive issue in this review was whether the applicants were persons in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act, being the complementary protection criterion only. The Tribunal identified that it must have regard to Ministerial Direction No. 84 made under s 499 of the Act, and that it must take into account the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department. The Tribunal stated it had considered assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trading (DFAT) insofar as they were relevant. The Tribunal specifically stated it had regard to the DFAT Report on Indonesia dated 25 January 2019 (the DFAT Report). The Tribunal was satisfied that the second, third and fourth applicants were members of the same family unit as the applicant and therefore proceeded to assess the protection claims and evidence of the applicant. The Tribunal summarised the applicant’s travel history and made findings as to the applicant’s circumstances generally. It accepted that he was an Indonesian national of Chinese ethnicity who was a Christian. It accepted that the applicant was a salesman, marketing professional and an owner of multiple businesses in Indonesia at various points in time. The Tribunal then extracted the applicant’s claims for protection which were contained in two statements. The first was identical to that provided to the Department at the time of the First Protection Application and the second was provided to the RRT after its hearing on the review of the delegate’s decision to refuse the First Protection Application. In summary, in the first statement the applicant claimed that he was subject to persecution in China mainly due to his Chinese ethnicity. He claimed that in the riots of May 1998 his parents’ house was raided, that he had to run away and that he was assaulted on the street. He had lost contact with his parents and when he returned to his family home, it had been burnt down, exploded and his parents were burned alive inside. Several businesses that the applicant worked for were also burnt down or looted during the riots. In or about 2000 the applicant was helping to build his church, and the Muslims/ethnic Indonesians forced them to stop the construction which prevented the congregation from meeting at the church for almost a year – eventually they were able to complete the church. In 2001 his house was flooded and his family had to move house and upon return they discovered that their house had been looted. In 2002 – 2004 the applicant joined a ‘venture business’ and a mob said he must pay ‘protection money’ – these people vandalised his business and he had to stop working in that area. The applicant established another business in 2005 and due to racial issues and allegations of stealing, a mob came and vandalised the business’ premises and intimidated him – the authorities did not assist. The applicant claims he was traumatised by these experiences and seeks protection for himself and his family.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The oral of submissions of the parties as they developed at the hearing are discussed further below. CONSIDERATION The applicants in this matter had previously been assessed against the Refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) and found not to be owed protection. Following legislative changes in March 2012, the applicants became eligible to be considered against the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa). The Tribunal correctly identified at [8] – [9] that the question before it was whether (at the time of its assessment) there were ‘substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there was a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm’: s 36(2)(aa). Section 36(2A) of the Act exhaustively defines the types of harm that will amount to ‘significant harm’. A non-citizen will suffer significant harm if he or she will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or the death penalty will be carried out on them; they will be subjected to torture; or to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or to degrading treatment or punishment. It is not in dispute that, when assessing whether the applicant satisfied the complementary protection criterion, the Tribunal was required to consider the risk of the harm faced by the applicant in the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’: FFQ18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 496 (FFQ18) at [18]. The meaning of ‘reasonably foreseeable future' was discussed in CPE15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2017] FCA 591 at [60] (and cited in FFQ18 at [22]), wherein Mortimer J, as her Honour then was, said: The “reasonably foreseeable future” is something of an ambulatory period of time, but the use of reasonable foreseeability as the benchmark concept indicates that the assessment is intended to be one which can be made on the basis of probative material, without extending into guesswork. It is also intended to preclude predictions of the future that are so far removed in point of time from the life of the person concerned at the time the person is returned to her or his country of nationality as to bear insufficient connection to the reality of what that person may experience. The purpose of the “well-founded” aspect of the Art 1A test is, after all, to be an objective but realistic and accurate assessment of what risks a person may face in the practical “on the ground” circumstances she or he will be living in. Using “reasonably foreseeable” also carries with it a rejection of an assessment which becomes too remote from a person’s expected life circumstances. These are not matters which can be expressed sensibly with any more precision. Further, as stated in FFQ18 at [23]:The task required by s 36(2)(aa) of the Act is prospective and assessed by reference to the consequences of removal: DQU16 v Minister for Home Affairs (2021) 273 CLR 1; [2021] HCA 10 (DQU16) at [18]–[19] per Kiefel CJ, Keane, Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ A “real chance” or “real risk” requires consideration of prospects that are neither remote nor far-fetched: DQU16 at [10].