CPE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CPE15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 591

Appeal from: CPE15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 2388
File number: VID 1236 of 2016
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 26 May 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia – appeal on proposed new ground that the Tribunal failed to deal with a substantial argument put to it – SZSSC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 863 applied – Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 considered – consideration of “reasonably foreseeable future” in the context of the “real chance” test

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to amend notice of appeal with new grounds not previously raised below – application refused – consideration of circumstances in which it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant leave

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 37M

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2), 65, 425(1)

Cases cited:

ALZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 279

ApplicantWAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; 236 FCR 593

AYJ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 863

Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration (1989) 169 CLR 379

Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 197 ALR 389

Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114; 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR [2011] HCA 1; 241 CLR 594

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKTI [2009] HCA 30; 238 CLR 489

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

MZABO v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 980

MZANX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 307

MZZGB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1052

NAHI v Minister for Immigrationand Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

NBMB v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 149

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152

SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35; 232 CLR 189

SZQXE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1292

SZRBA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 81; 314 ALR 146

SZSSC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 863; 317 ALR 365

Date of hearing: 21 April 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 66
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Aleksov
Solicitor for the Appellant: WLW Migration Lawyers
Counsel for…
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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 591
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The appellant, who had applied for protection under Australian law, sought to introduce a new ground of appeal, arguing that the Tribunal had failed to address a significant argument regarding the anticipated instability in Kabul following the departure of international military forces. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection opposed the introduction of this new ground, arguing that the application for leave to amend the notice of appeal was not in the interests of the administration of justice.

The court was required to determine whether it was appropriate to permit the appellant to introduce a new ground of appeal, particularly in light of the fact that the proposed new ground had been fully argued. The court noted that the presence of full argument on both sides meant that the consideration of the proposed new ground was necessarily more detailed. However, the court emphasised that the procedure of dealing with leave in the course of the appeal could not, of itself, increase or improve an appellant's chances of being granted leave. The court also highlighted the importance of maintaining a distinction between the leave stage and the final disposition of an appeal.

In this case, the court found that the appellant's proposed new ground had been fully argued, and the detailed consideration of the proposed ground had been undertaken. However, the court held that the procedure of dealing with leave in the course of the appeal could not, of itself, increase or improve an appellant's chances of being granted leave. The court held that it was not in the interests of the administration of justice to permit the introduction of the new ground of appeal. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the costs of the application for leave and the appeal.

The court's decision highlights the importance of maintaining a distinction between the leave stage and the final disposition of an appeal, and the need to ensure that the procedure of dealing with leave does not unfairly advantage or disadvantage any party. The court's decision also emphasises the importance of considering the interests of the administration of justice when deciding whether to permit the introduction of new grounds of appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to rely on ground 1 of the proposed amended notice of appeal filed 5 April 2017 be refused.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application for leave, and of the appeal, to be fixed in a lump sum by order of the Court.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

4. On or before 4 pm on 9 June 2017, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS) dated 25 October 2016.

5. On or before 4 pm on 23 June 2017, the appellant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 to 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant, CPE15, is an Afghan national who applied for a protection visa in Australia. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia reviewed the decision by the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse the appellant’s application for a protection visa. The Court dismissed the appellant's judicial review application. Subsequently, the appellant lodged an appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court, proposing new grounds for appeal. One of the proposed grounds was that the Tribunal failed to consider a substantial argument put forward on behalf of the appellant, which was that the security situation in Kabul would worsen following the departure of international military forces from Afghanistan.

The appellant originally applied for a protection visa which was refused by the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The appellant sought judicial review of that decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed the application. The appellant then appealed to the court against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court. During the course of the appeal, the appellant applied for leave to amend the notice of appeal to include new grounds, specifically arguing that the Tribunal had failed to consider a substantial argument regarding the future security situation in Kabul. The court heard arguments on the proposed new ground but ultimately decided not to grant leave to rely on it.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The new ground was fully argued, as it would have been if leave were granted. The presence of full argument on both sides means the consideration I set out below is necessarily more detailed than might otherwise be expected on an application for leave. The procedure of dealing with leave in the course of the appeal cannot however, of itself, increase or improve an appellant’s chances of being granted leave, even if (as here) judicial consideration of the proposed ground in such a situation tends to be more detailed. In some circumstances, it will be appropriate to leave this detailed consideration of the strength of any new proposed ground of appeal to full consideration in the final disposition of an appeal, rather than at the leave stage. There is some artificiality in these distinctions when, as a matter of practice and for good reason, the application for leave and the hearing on the appeal occur at the same time. Nevertheless, the distinction is one that is important to maintain.FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT DECISION The Federal Circuit Court’s reasons for judgment set out comprehensively and clearly the background to the appellant’s claim for protection and the judicial review application and I need not repeat them here. If I might say so, with respect, the Federal Circuit Court’s reasons on the two grounds of judicial review advanced before it also deal comprehensively with those two grounds. Since neither of them is advanced on the appeal, there is no point in setting out those parts of the Court’s reasons in this judgment.RESOLUTION On the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the appellant indicated to the Court that new grounds 2, 3 and 4 of the proposed amended notice of appeal would not be pressed. He indicated to the Court that only proposed new ground 1 of the amended notice of appeal would be pressed and leave would be sought only in relation to that ground. The appellant contended that the Tribunal had failed to deal with an argument put on his behalf by his migration agent, both to the delegate and to the Tribunal on review, to the effect that the situation in Kabul would descend into even greater instability when the international military forces then present in Afghanistan departed. In other words, as counsel for the appellant accepted during oral argument, the contention made on behalf of the appellant was that there would be a change of circumstances in the security situation in Kabul as a result of the departure of the international military forces that had been stationed there. The appellant contended this was a substantial and clearly articulated argument in both the submissions before the delegate and the submissions to the Tribunal. It was more than the identification of country information in a submission, but rather was a positive argument put on behalf of the appellant. The appellant submitted that the Tribunal did not mention this argument at any stage in its reasons and the Court should infer the Tribunal did not consider it.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the arguments presented by the appellant that the Tribunal had failed to address a substantial argument regarding the future security situation in Kabul following the departure of international military forces. The court examined the submissions made by the appellant's migration agent, both to the delegate and to the Tribunal, and found that the argument was more of a positive argument rather than merely the identification of country information. However, the court concluded that the Tribunal did not need to mention this argument as it was not sufficiently articulated to warrant consideration. The court applied the principles from SZSSC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 863 and Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 to determine that the Tribunal's omission did not affect the outcome of the case. The court also considered the circumstances in which it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant leave to rely on a new ground of appeal. The court found that the detailed consideration of the proposed new ground did not warrant altering the outcome of the case and maintained the importance of distinguishing between the leave stage and the final disposition of an appeal. The court referred to the principles from SZSSC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 863 and Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 to support its decision. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the court will not grant leave to rely on a new ground of appeal that was not previously raised below if the detailed consideration of the proposed new ground does not warrant altering the outcome of the case.