AYJ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AYJ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 863

Appeal from: AYJ15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 252
File number: QUD 75 of 2016
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 2 August 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application for judicial review of a Refugee Review Tribunal decision – where appellant raised new grounds of appeal that were not before the Federal Circuit Court – where no clear merit in the proposed new grounds of appeal – appeal dismissed  
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth)

Cases cited:

AYJ15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 252 (AYJ15)

Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 194 ALR 244; [2001] FCA 1802

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; [2010] HCA 16

MZYPO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 1

VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158

Date of hearing: 3 May 2016
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 27
Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr S Hodges of Hodges Legal
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms E Tattersall of Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

QUD 75 of 2016
BETWEEN:

AYJ15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to amend the notice of appeal is refused.

2.The appeal is dismissed.

3.The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

REEVES J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The appellant has appealed from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court: see AYJ15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 252 (AYJ15).

    THE GROUNDS OF THIS APPEAL

  2. In his original notice of appeal, the appellant relied on a sole ground of appeal:

    That the Federal Circuit Court Judge erred in dismissing the proceedings without proper reasoning and that to do so was procedurally unfair.

  3. However, in an amended notice of appeal filed shortly before the hearing of his matter, the appellant sought leave to amend his notice of appeal to abandon his original sole ground of appeal and to replace it with three entirely new grounds as follows:

    1.That the AAT fell into jurisdictional error in failing to correctly or adequately identify and assess the appellant’s particular social group or political opinion.

    ...

    2.That particular and dispositive findings of the AAT were not compatible with rational process.

    ...

    3.The AAT fell into error…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 863
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this matter, the appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, appealed against the Federal Circuit Court's decision dismissing his application for judicial review of a Refugee Review Tribunal decision. The appellant, who had arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival in 2012, had applied for a protection visa, which was subsequently refused by the Minister's delegate. The Refugee Review Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision in May 2015, finding that the appellant was not a credible witness and rejecting his claims of persecution due to his Tamil ethnicity, political affiliations, and illegal departure from Sri Lanka. The appellant sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Circuit Court in June 2015 but did not raise any new grounds of appeal. Instead, he sought to raise three new grounds of appeal in his appeal to the High Court, which were not before the Federal Circuit Court.

The primary legal issues in this case were whether the appellant had offered an adequate explanation for his failure to raise the proposed new grounds of appeal before the Federal Circuit Court and whether any of the proposed new grounds of appeal clearly had merit. The appellant's only explanation for not raising the new grounds of appeal before the Federal Circuit Court was that he had changed his lawyer, and the new lawyer had taken a different view of the matter. However, this explanation was deemed inadequate as it would shift the arena for judicial review of the Tribunal's decisions from the Federal Circuit Court to the High Court, pervert the role of the High Court as an appellate court, and subvert the intention of the Legislature in the Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth). Additionally, none of the proposed new grounds of appeal had clear merit, as required by the Court's appellate jurisdiction.

The High Court found that the appellant had not provided an adequate explanation for his failure to raise the new grounds of appeal before the Federal Circuit Court. Furthermore, none of the proposed new grounds of appeal had clear merit, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed. The appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to the proper judicial review and appellate procedures in migration matters and the need for appellants to provide adequate explanations for any departures from those procedures.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave to amend the notice of appeal is refused.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

3. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before proceeding to consider whether the appellant has offered an adequate explanation for his failure to raise these proposed new grounds before the Federal Circuit Court and whether any of them clearly has merit, it is appropriate to record briefly the factual and procedural background to this appeal.THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka, who first arrived in Australia on 28 July 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. He lodged an application for a protection (class XA) visa on 17 January 2013. During the civil war in Sri Lanka, he lived in an area that was controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He claimed to fear harm from the Karuna group, a political group in Sri Lanka, primarily because he is of Tamil ethnicity, but also because of his political support for the Ceylon Tamil Arasu Party which is opposed to the Sri Lankan government and to the Karuna group. He also claimed to fear harm as a result of his illegal departure from Sri Lanka and his extended presence in Australia as an asylum seeker. Finally, he claimed to fear harm based on his membership of a particular social group, namely that comprised of Tamil males.THE PROCEEDING BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL After the Minister’s delegate refused the appellant’s application for a protection visa, he applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), for merits review of that decision. The appellant attended a hearing before the Tribunal in April 2015. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision in May 2015. In short, the Tribunal did not accept that the appellant was a credible witness. It found that, although he gave clear and consistent evidence in relation to his (and his wife’s) family, his business earnings and the rental outgoings of his fruit shop, key aspects of his evidence were evasive, vague and repetitive, in particular concerning the two places where he claimed to have lived since 2005. Further, the appellant’s lack of spontaneity in his responses to questioning suggested to the Tribunal he was falsifying his account, even making allowances for his limited education. The Tribunal also found that his evidence evolved and changed over time. Consequently, the Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claims that:(a)his house had been occupied by the Karuna group;(b)the Karuna group had abducted and detained him for 10 days in 2010; (c)he was a member, or active supporter, of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), or any other party;(d)the Karuna group took his van;(e)his brother was a member, or was suspected of being a member, of the LTTE; and (f)the Karuna group were looking for him. The Tribunal did, however, accept some aspects of the appellant’s claims. In particular, it accepted that:(a)he had been made to walk naked at a checkpoint during the civil war in Sri Lanka when he was approximately 17 years of age;(b)he had seen people die during the civil war in Sri Lanka;(c)his father had been “rounded up” during the civil war in Sri Lanka; and(d)he had been required to pay an unofficial tax to the Karuna group.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal therefore concluded that the appellant did not satisfy the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). In light of its factual and credibility findings, the Tribunal also concluded that the appellant did not satisfy the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT By an application filed in the Federal Circuit Court in June 2015, the appellant sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. Since the appellant frankly conceded (see at [4] above) that none of his three proposed grounds of appeal was put to the Federal Circuit Court, it would be pointless to outline the details of the Federal Circuit Court’s decision dismissing his application.THERE IS NO ADEQUATE EXPLANATION FOR THE APPELLANT’S FAILURE TO RAISE THE THREE NEW GROUNDS OF APPEAL BEFORE THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT The only explanation the appellant has offered for his failure to raise before the Federal Circuit Court any of his three proposed new grounds of appeal was that he had changed his lawyer and his new lawyer had taken a different view of the matter. For obvious reasons, this is not an adequate explanation. It moves the arena for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decisions from the Federal Circuit Court to this Court: see Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7 per Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ. It perverts the role of this Court as an appellate court reviewing error in the Federal Circuit Court: see Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194 at [14] per Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ. It subverts the deliberate intention of the Legislature expressed in the Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth) to remove this Court’s original judicial review jurisdiction in migration matters and confer that role on the Federal Magistrates Court (now Federal Circuit Court) confining the role of this Court, in such matters, to that of an appellate court (ss 476 and 476A of the Act). It is therefore inimical to the due administration of justice in migration appeals. This lack of an adequate explanation would be sufficient, by itself, to dispose of this application to amend. Nonetheless, I will briefly consider whether any of the three proposed new grounds of appeal “clearly has merit”. This need for clear merit is obviously intended to discourage appellants from employing this approach to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction in the expectation that they will obtain a hearing on entirely new grounds of appeal, even though they have no adequate explanation for not raising them before the primary judge. On the other hand, it accommodates the interests of justice in the sense that if any of the proposed new grounds has such clear merit, the appellant should be allowed to advance it, notwithstanding the extraordinary departure from the normal review and appellate procedures described above.NONE OF THE PROPOSED NEW GROUNDS OF APPEAL HAS CLEAR MERIT

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established