ALZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ALZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 279

Appeal from: ALZ15 v Minister for Immigration & Ors [2015] FCCA 1947
File number: NSD 951 of 2015
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 21 March 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where appellant made protection claims in relation to data breach – whether assessor fell into error in conducting International Treaties Obligation Assessment (ITOA) – application of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29 – appeal dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to amend notice of appeal – circumstances in which it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant leave

Legislation:

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 19 December 1996, 999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 386 (entered into force 23 March 1976)

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85; 23 ILM 1027 (entered into force 26 June 1987)

Cases cited:

AKD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 166

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; 90 ALJR 901

SZTGV v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 3

SZUBX v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2822

Date of hearing: 7 March 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 55
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr C Lenehan
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 951 of 2015
BETWEEN:

ALZ15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent

AUDREY FERNANDES

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

MORTIMER J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MARCH 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave be granted to the appellant to rely on Ground 1 of the amended notice of appeal filed on 2 March 2017.

2.Leave be refused to the appellant to rely on Grounds 2 and 3 of the amended notice of appeal filed on 2 March 2017.

3.The appeal be dismissed.

4.The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal, to be fixed in a lump sum by order of the Court.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

5.On or before 4 pm on 4 April 2017, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS) dated 25 October 2016.

6.On or before 4 pm on 18 April…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 279
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, who had previously made two unsuccessful applications for protection visas, sought judicial review of the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia which dismissed his application for review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT). The RRT had affirmed the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to refuse his application for a protection visa. The appellant argued that the decision-maker fell into error in conducting the International Treaties Obligation Assessment (ITOA), specifically that she failed to provide him with all the information relevant to the assessment, including an unabridged report from KPMG on the data breach, which was necessary to effectively and competently prepare his claim for refugee status. The appellant also claimed that the decision-maker was in a conflict of interest because she was required to make a decision on whether there was a real chance that he would face serious or significant harm upon return to Thailand due to his name and personal details being placed on the Internet by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP).

The court was required to determine whether the decision-maker fell into error in conducting the ITOA by failing to provide the appellant with all the relevant information, and whether this error was a jurisdictional error that would invalidate the decision. The court was also required to determine whether the decision-maker was in a conflict of interest and whether this affected the validity of the decision.

The court found that the decision-maker did not fall into error in conducting the ITOA because she had provided the appellant with an opportunity to comment on and respond to the information that was relevant to the assessment. The court found that the decision-maker had fulfilled her obligations of procedural fairness to the appellant in this way. The court also found that the decision-maker was not in a conflict of interest because she was not required to make a decision on whether there was a real chance that the appellant would face serious or significant harm upon return to Thailand due to his name and personal details being placed on the Internet by the DIBP. The court found that the decision-maker was required to make a decision on whether the appellant faced a real chance of persecution in Thailand, which was a separate issue from the data breach.

The appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the appeal, to be fixed in a lump sum by order of the Court. The Court directed that the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with the Court's Costs Practice Note, and that the applicant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with the Costs Practice Note.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave be granted to the appellant to rely on Ground 1 of the amended notice of appeal filed on 2 March 2017.

2. Leave be refused to the appellant to rely on Grounds 2 and 3 of the amended notice of appeal filed on 2 March 2017.

3. The appeal be dismissed.

4. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal, to be fixed in a lump sum by order of the Court.

THE COURT DIRECTS THAT:

5. On or before 4 pm on 4 April 2017, the first respondent file and serve an affidavit constituting a Costs Summary in accordance with paragraphs 4.10 to 4.12 of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS) dated 25 October 2016.

6. On or before 4 pm on 18 April 2017, the applicant file and serve any Costs Response in accordance with paragraphs 4.13 and 4.14 of the Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons I set out below, his appeal must be dismissed.BACKGROUND The appellant has made two previous unsuccessful applications for protection visas. The last was in June 2013. It was refused, and that decision was affirmed on review by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) on 20 January 2014. The appellant sought judicial review through the Federal Circuit Court and then on an application for leave to appeal to this Court but was unsuccessful: see SZTGV v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 3. While he was undertaking judicial review, the publication to which I have referred above at [1] occurred, in February 2014. How the publication occurred is set out in SZSSJ at [3]-[7]. A letter from the Secretary of the Department dated 12 March 2014 informed the appellant about the publication, in substantively the same terms as the letter sent to the appellant in SZSSJ, assuring him that the “implications for you personally” will be assessed by the Department “as part of its normal processes”. In fact, rather than any “normal process”, what occurred was that all those affected were given special access to a further protection obligations assessment, namely the ITOA to which I referred in [1] above. Notification of this process to the appellant took some time. He was not informed about the ITOA process until February 2015, a year after the publication. Counsel for the Minister accepted there was no evidence before the Court about why it took a year before the appellant was notified of the ITOA process. The appellant remained in immigration detention for all this time: so much is apparent from the affidavit he filed on this appeal, dated 7 August 2015, in which he gave his address as Villawood Immigration Detention Centre. After an event such as the public release of his personal identifying information, it seems extraordinary for the appellant to be detained for an entire year with no progress at all in addressing the consequences of such a disclosure for him. By that correspondence in February 2015, the appellant was told about the ITOA and that its purpose was to assess the effect of the publication on Australia’s non-refoulement obligations with respect to him. He was told that information he had already provided would be taken into account in the ITOA, and he was invited to provide any further information within 14 days of receiving the letter. The appellant provided a response by email. In this document the appellant made six points:1.The DIBP possesses all the information in relation to the data breach, in particular the unabridged report from KPMG which provides details such as IP addresses and number of accesses to the information;2.On page 2 of your letter you mention that that I will receive procedural fairness during the ITOA process. I respectfully submit that procedural fairness is more than just putting adverse material for comment. On the contrary natural justice and procedural fairness or the “fair hearing” rule requires that all relevant information be provided before preparation of a reply. I cannot effectively and competently prepare my claim with respect to the data breach that I am a refugee sur place without having access to that information. I respectfully submit that to deny me access to the information held by DIBP is a breach of natural justice and procedural fairness; 3.If DIBP will not give me access to the information then the only course of action open to you is to recognise me as a refugee sur place; 4.Your employer, DIBP breached s336E of the Act in disclosing my name and personal details on the Internet. The breach is a criminal act. Complaints have been made to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC). The applicant’s OAIC complaint reference no.: [redacted].5.The AFP is awaiting the outcome of the Privacy Commissioner complaint and court matters SZSSJ and SZTXY before commencing its own investigation; and6.An opportunity to be heard by an “impartial decision maker” is at the heart of natural justice and procedural fairness. Your employer, DIBP has placed you as the decision maker in a position of conflict of interest. You are required to make a decision on whether there is a real chance that I will face serious or significant harm upon return to Thailand due to my name and personal details being placed on the Internet by your employer. You cannot undertake this assessment without having full disclosure of the information that is in the possession of your employer to you and I cannot make any submissions without full disclosure of this information to me. Can you be an impartial decision maker and make a decision adverse to your employer? If you make a decision adverse to me without disclosing any information in relation to the data breach then you have breached the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness. Therefore, I respectfully submit that the only decision is open to you is to find that I am a refugee sur place.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

This approach did not suffer from the error identified by Street J. Ms Fernandes was not focusing on the RRT findings and simply using those as a reason to decide that the appellant faced no risk of harm in Thailand because of the public disclosure of his personal information. Rather, she was relying on those findings as indicating the circumstances which would face the appellant on his return to Thailand, as they had been found to be. This is, expressly, what she had given the appellant an opportunity to comment on and respond to, in her letter of 17 March 2015, as I have set out at [12] above. Ms Fernandes fulfilled her obligations of procedural fairness to the appellant in this way. The appellant did not respond to Ms Fernandes’ invitation to provide any comments or further information.CONCLUSION It follows that Ground 1 of the amended notice of appeal should be rejected. Ms Fernandes did not make the error identified by Street J in SZUBX, even if (as the Minister accepted it was appropriate to do) the Court assumes the error identified was a jurisdictional error. That conclusion relieves me of the task of determining whether the error identified by Street J is properly characterised as a jurisdictional error in an ITOA. If the Minister wishes to submit otherwise, that question can be left for another day. The appeal must be dismissed. There is no legal basis to refrain from making a costs order against the appellant. However, the Court’s practice now is to award costs by way of a lump sum wherever that is appropriate: see [3.5] and [4.1] of the Court’s Costs Practice Note (GPN-COSTS) dated 25 October 2016. I consider it is appropriate for a lump sum costs order to be made in this case and I propose to give a direction to the first respondent to prepare a Costs Summary in accordance with [4.10] to [4.12] of the Costs Practice Note.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established