SZTZM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTZM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 534

Appeal from: SZTZM v Minister for Immigration & Ors [2017] FCCA 521
File number: NSD 424 of 2017
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 17 May 2017
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — application for interlocutory injunction to prevent removal of appellant from Australia pending hearing and determination of appeal — whether the appellant has a prima facie case on appeal
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), ss 23, 24(1)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5(9)–(9A), 36(2), 36(2A), 198(6)

Cases cited:

AKD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 166

ALZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 279

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57

Ayan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 126 FCR 152

Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618

Bullock v The Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 1) (1985) 5 FCR 464

Mastipour v Secretary, Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2014) 140 FCR 137

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTZI [2016] HCA 29; (2016) 333 ALR 653; (2016) 90 ALJR 901

Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 195 CLR 1

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Fejzullahu [2000] HCA 23; (2000) 171 ALR 341; (2000) 74 ALJR 830

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82

Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238

SZKUO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 180 FCR 438

SZSPI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another (2014) 233 FCR 279

SZSSJ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Others (No 2) (2015) 234 FCR 1

Tait v R (1962) 108 CLR 620

Woolworths Ltd v BP plc (2006) 150 FCR 134

Date of hearing: 16 May 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 58
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr S G Lawrence
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ms M Byers
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms J E Davidson
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 424 of 2017
BETWEEN:

SZTZM

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent

KATHY BACKHOUSE, IMA PROTECTION NSW, DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 MAY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant’s application for an interim injunction be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The appellant is a national of the Peoples…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 534
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZTZM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an appellant who sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent his removal from Australia pending the hearing and determination of his appeal against the refusal of his application for a protection visa. The primary issue before the court was whether the appellant had a prima facie case for the appeal and whether he could be removed from Australia in the interim. The appellant argued that he had a case for the appeal due to a data breach involving his personal information and contended that he should not be removed from Australia while his appeal was being heard.

The court considered the nature of the appellant’s application for an interlocutory injunction and the legal principles that applied. It noted that the appellant’s application was supported by an affidavit that merely annexed the Department’s correspondence. The court examined the background of the appellant’s claim, including his arrival in Australia on a tourist visa, his subsequent application for a protection visa, and the data breach that occurred after his personal information was disclosed on the Department’s website. The court also considered the High Court’s decision in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ, which addressed the implications of the data breach for visa applicants.

The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appellant’s application for an interim injunction. The court held that the appellant had not demonstrated that he had a prima facie case on appeal. It reasoned that the appellant’s reliance on the data breach did not establish a sufficient basis for the court to grant an injunction preventing his removal. The court noted that the appellant did not challenge the power of an officer to remove him and that the issue of practicability of removal did not arise. The court also found that the procedural fairness arguments were not well founded, as the High Court had already determined that procedural fairness had been afforded in similar cases.

The court dismissed the appellant’s application for an interim injunction and ordered that he pay the respondents’ costs. The reasoning of the court was grounded in the legal principles concerning interlocutory injunctions and the nature of the appellant’s case, which did not meet the threshold for granting the relief sought. The court's decision focused on the lack of a prima facie case and the absence of any grounds to justify the grant of an injunction pending the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant’s application for an interim injunction be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Two days later, the appellant filed an interlocutory application seeking an injunction to prevent his removal from Australia. The application was supported by an affidavit affirmed by Michaela Byers, the appellant’s solicitor, which merely annexed the Department’s correspondence. At the hearing the appellant was granted leave to amend the application to limit its terms so as to restrain the respondents from removing him until the appeal was determined or withdrawn. Background The appellant arrived in Australia in September 2010 on a month-long tourist visa. He was apprehended nearly three years later and taken into immigration detention at Villawood. While in detention he applied for a protection visa, claiming to be a Christian who fears harm from local officials in his country of nationality. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the visa and that decision was affirmed by the Refugee Review Tribunal on review. On 12 March 2014, exactly a month after the Tribunal’s decision, while the appellant remained in immigration detention, presumably awaiting his removal, the Department advised him that there had been unauthorised access to his personal information (the data breach). The circumstances in which this occurred are set out in the High Court’s judgment in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSSJ; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTZI [2016] HCA 29; (2016) 334 ALR 653; 90 ALJR 901 (SZSSJ). It appears that the data breach occurred following the publication on the Department’s website on 14 February 2014 of embedded information disclosing the identities of 9,258 detainees who had applied for protection visas (the information). The information that was disclosed was protected from disclosure by criminal sanctions: see Migration Act, Pt 4A. The appellant was one of those detainees. The information in his case consisted of his name, date of birth, nationality, gender, the fact that he had overstayed his visitor’s visa, and the duration of his time in detention. The information remained on the website for two weeks. The Department arranged for the firm, KPMG, to investigate the data breach. KPMG conducted an investigation and reported to the Department. An abridged version of the KPMG report was made available to affected applicants. The abridged version revealed that the information had been accessed 123 times and that the access had originated from 104 unique IP addresses. It did not, however, disclose the IP addresses or the precise times of access. It merely “acknowledge[d] that access originated from a range of sources, including media organisations, various Australian Government agencies, internet proxies, TOR network and web crawlers”. It also noted that there was nothing to indicate that the disclosure of the underlying data was intentional or malicious. But as the High Court observed in SZSSJ at [7]:Irrespective of the cause of the disclosure there was obviously a risk that those in other countries from whom applicants for protection visas claimed to fear persecution or other relevant harm might have gained access to the document containing the embedded information so as to become aware of the identities of applicants for protection visas in Australia.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The only remaining question is whether it is reasonably practicable to remove the appellant, as planned, while his appeal is pending. There are a number of cases in which this question has been considered: see Mastipour v Secretary, Department of Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1571 at [34] and SZSPI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another (2014) 233 FCR 279 at [17]–[21]. But the appellant did not challenge the power of an officer to remove him. The question does not therefore arise. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court The appellant relied on four grounds of review in the court below. All four were dismissed. The first ground pleaded that the assessor had misdirected herself and/or asked herself the wrong question. It is unnecessary to say anything more about it other than to note that, as I understand it, the complaint is largely replicated in ground 1 of the notice of appeal. Grounds 2 and 4 of the review application are presently irrelevant. Having regard to the grounds of appeal and the way in which the interlocutory application was argued, it is also unnecessary to refer to the primary judge’s reasons for dismissing these three grounds. The only ground which is presently relevant is ground 3. It pleaded that the assessor denied the appellant procedural fairness by failing to warn him that she would not apply the assumption made in SZSSJ that all of the appellant’s personal information had been accessed by all the persons or entities from whom he feared persecution or other relevant harm. I interpolate that in SZSSJ a Full Court of this Court made declarations that the process conducted to assess the implications of the data breach for SZSSJ and SZTZI had been procedurally unfair and, in the appeal by SZSSJ, granted an injunction restraining the Minister and the Secretary from removing him until after the determination of the ITOA process. No injunction was sought by SZTZI but the Full Court declared that the process was procedurally unfair. The High Court unanimously allowed the Minister’s appeals in both cases. It agreed with the Full Court that procedural fairness was required but it held that procedural fairness had been afforded. In the course of its reasons the court said this (at [90]‑[91]):90.The assumption made in the ITOA process that their personal information may have been accessed by authorities in Bangladesh and China removed from the scope of factual inquiry any question of precisely who accessed their personal information as a result of the Data Breach. The assumption was sensible because the true extent of access to the personal information of each affected applicant must in practical terms have been unknowable. Once downloaded from the Department's website, the document containing the personal information of the 9,258 visa applicants could have been forwarded to and interrogated by anyone, anywhere and at any time. Attempting to make a finding about precisely who had obtained access to the personal information of any one of them, and when, might be expected to have been a hopeless endeavour.91.Sensibly interpreted and applied in the context of making an assessment of whether the Data Breach engaged Australia's non-refoulement obligations with respect to them, the assumption was not simply that some of their personal information might have been accessed by some authorities. The assumption was rather that all of their personal information had been accessed by all of the persons or entities from whom they feared persecution or other relevant harm. That is how the assumption was in fact interpreted and applied by the officer who conducted SZTZI's ITOA and how it could reasonably be expected to be interpreted and applied in the conduct of SZSSJ's ITOA.(Emphasis added.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established