Patel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Patel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1317  

File number(s): SYG 2913 of 2024
Judgment of: JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS
Date of judgment: 3 December 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – urgent interlocutory application to restrain Minister from removing applicant from Australia – whether serious question to be tried – whether damages an insufficient remedy – where balance of convenience lies – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 25D

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 140

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 48, 116, 119, 127, 198, 476

Migration Regulations 1994 reg. 2.55, cll 4013, 4014 and 8202

Cases cited:

ABH18 v Minister for Home Affairs[2020] FCA 620

AJH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 192

ARK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2018] FCA 825

Calava v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 2525

Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148; HCA 58

CPC22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 734

CPK20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 870

DFF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2023] FedCFamC2G 149

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Srouji [2014] FCA 50

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (2010) 183 FCR 575

Mohammedv Minister for Immigration, Citizenship And Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 839

Zhaou v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 748

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 54
Date of hearing: 10 November 2024
Place: Sydney
Solicitor for the Applicant Mr Sultan, Sultan Legal
Solicitor for the Respondent Mr Sypott, Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

SYG 2913 of 2024

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

HARDIK BHIKABHAI PATEL
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS

DATE OF ORDER:

11 NOVEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondent is to provide a copy of the audio recording of the applicant’s interview with the delegate to the applicant on or before 13 November 2024.

2.The application for an interlocutory injunction heard on 10 November 2024 is dismissed.

3.The costs in relation to the determination of the applicant’s appeal for injunctive relief be costs in the cause.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS

INTRODUCTION

  1. Before the Court is an application for an interlocutory injunction filed on 10 November 2024, to restrain the first respondent (Minister) from removing the applicant from…

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Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 1317
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Patel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involves an urgent interlocutory application brought by Mr Patel, the applicant, seeking to restrain the Minister, represented by the respondent, from removing him from Australia. The Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether there was a serious question to be tried regarding Mr Patel's contentions that the decision to cancel his visa was defective, and whether damages would be an insufficient remedy in the event the application was successful. Additionally, the court had to assess the balance of convenience to decide whether to grant the injunction.

The legal issues before the court included whether Mr Patel had established a serious question to be tried regarding the alleged defects in the visa cancellation decision, and whether damages would be an inadequate remedy if his application was successful. The court also had to consider whether the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction. The applicant argued that the decision to cancel his visa was flawed as it did not address certain aspects of his case, and that damages would not be sufficient to compensate him for the potential removal from Australia. The Minister contended that the decision was correctly made and that the applicant had not demonstrated a serious question to be tried or that damages would be inadequate.

Mortimer J found that the applicant had not established a serious question to be tried regarding the alleged defects in the visa cancellation decision. The court noted that while the delegate's reasons were comprehensive and addressed various aspects of the applicant's case, they did not need to be exhaustive to be valid. The court was satisfied that the delegate had adequately considered the evidence and provided sufficient reasons for the decision. Furthermore, the court found that damages would be an adequate remedy for the applicant if his application was ultimately successful. Given these findings, the court concluded that the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of an injunction.

As a result, the application for interlocutory injunction was dismissed. The court found that Mr Patel had not demonstrated a serious question to be tried or that damages would be an inadequate remedy, and the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of an injunction. Therefore, the court declined to restrain the Minister from removing Mr Patel from Australia.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Further, by way of paragraph 5 of ground 2, the applicant takes issue with the content of the delegate’s decision arguing that it did not specify reasons and was therefore defective. In support of the contention, the applies relies upon s 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), which reads:Content of statements of reasons for decisionsWhere an Act requires a tribunal, body or person making a decision to give written reasons for the decision, whether the expression "reasons", "grounds" or any other expression is used, the instrument giving the reasons shall also set out the findings on material questions of fact and refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based. By way of response, the Minister contends that the delegate was under no obligation to provide reasons in the manner contended by the applicant. The Minister relied upon the interpretation of the relevant provisions by Judge Vasta in CPC22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 734 where his Honour articulated the scope of the content of a written decision made pursuant to s 127 of the Act in the following terms:152. The fact that what the Applicant has said is not reflected in the reasons, does not mean that there has been no consideration. Whilst the Applicant has drawn the Court’s attention to s 25D of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), this does not mean that there was an obligation on the Minister to write down all the considerations that the Minister has made in coming to the decision.153. All that is required for the Minister to do (pursuant to s 127) is to specify the ground for cancellation and to state whether the decision is reviewable. This section also legislates that failure to give notification of the decision does not affect the validity of the decision. His Honour did not consider it necessary to conclusively determine the issue. I also consider it similarly unnecessary to determine that particular issue as reasons were provided by the delegate in this case. It has been held that where a decision maker elects to provide reasons despite having no obligation to do so, ‘a supervising court is entitled to take a decision record as expressing the delegate’s reasoning on the exercise of power’: see ARK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2018] FCA 825 at [10] per Mortimer J (as her Honour was) and the cases cited therein; see also ABH18 v Minister for Home Affairs[2020] FCA 620 at [25] per Charlesworth J and DFF17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection[2023] FedCFamC2G 149 at [45]-[53] per Deputy Chief Judge Mercuri. The delegate’s reasons were fulsome such that the dispositive issues were determined on the basis of fact-finding undertaken by reference to the available evidence. Those reasons purportedly summarise the applicant’s evidence under various headings in the decision including ‘Details of the evidence and findings about why the delegate is satisfied GROUNDS for cancellation DO EXIST’, ‘Reasons the visa should not be cancelled’, ‘Delegate’s assessment of the reasons the visa should not be cancelled’ and ‘Other relevant reasons (including mandatory legal consequences)’. Relevantly, the applicant has not clearly articulated any particular defect or shortcoming in the reasons apart from the alleged failure to address the offer letter, a matter which has been addressed earlier in this judgment. Within this context, and having considered what the delegate included under these various headings within their decision, I am unprepared to accept the presence of error in this regard on the delegate’s part. Therefore, I am not satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried on this basis.Complaint regarding interpretation during the interview

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I listed an urgent hearing for the applicant’s interlocutory application at 8.45 pm on 10 November 2024. At that hearing, the applicant was represented by Mr Sultan of Sultan Legal, and the Minister was represented by Mr Sypott of The Australian Government Solicitor. At the outset of the hearing, I confirmed that I did not propose to determine the substantive application and would primarily restrict my consideration to the request for injunctive relief. Mr Sultan also confirmed that the applicant no longer sought the third order requested in the application as he had received a copy of the delegate’s decision from the Court at 2.16pm that afternoon. At the conclusion of the hearing, the application for interlocutory injunction was dismissed. These are the reasons for dismissal.CONSIDERATIONRemoval injunction principles The Court has the power under s 140 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) to grant interlocutory orders. This includes within it a power of equity traditionally exercised to grant injunctions to preserve the status quo, pending a determination of a claim for a legal remedy: see Mohammedv Minister for Immigration, Citizenship And Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 839 per Judge Laing at [11]-[12]; AJH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 192 per Judge Given at [8]; Calava v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 2525 per Judge Manousaridis at [8]. The principles which guide the exercise of that power are well-established. A court will grant interlocutory injunction if it is satisfied that:(a)there ‘is a serious question to be tried or that the [applicant] has made a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that the trial of the action the [applicant] will be held entitled to relief’;(b)the applicant ‘will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted’; and(c)the ‘balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction’.[11][11] Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148; HCA 58 at 153 per Mason ACJ. The principles were also more recently summarised by Thawley J in CPK20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 870:11.The issue before Mortimer J was whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction. The principles applicable to such relief may be briefly stated. There are two main inquiries. The first is whether the applicant has a prima facie case in the sense of “a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial”; this does not mean the applicant must establish that they are more probable than not to succeed at trial: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65] (Gummow and Hayne JJ) and [19] (Gleeson CJ and Crennan J). As Katzmann J observed in SZTZM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 534 at [39]:What will be sufficient will depend on “the nature of the rights [the applicant] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks”: Beecham Group Limited v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd [1968] HCA 1; (1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622.12.The second main inquiry is whether the inconvenience or injury the applicant would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs the injury the respondent would suffer if the injunction were granted: O’Neill at [65], citing Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd [1968] HCA 1; (1968) 118 CLR 618.13.Consideration of the two main inquiries cannot be conducted completely independently of each other, because “an apparently strong claim may lead a court more readily to grant an injunction when the balance of convenience is fairly even” and “[a] more doubtful claim (which nevertheless raises ‘a serious question to be tried’) may still attract interlocutory relief if there is a marked balance of convenience in favour of it”: Bullock v The Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 1) [1985] FCA 19; (1985) 5 FCR 464 at 472 per Woodward J (Smithers and Sweeney JJ agreeing at 467 and 469 respectively); see also ABAR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 363 at [28] (Charlesworth J).Is there a prima facie case such that there is a serious question to be tried?