FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Patel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1317
ORDERS
SYG 2913 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: HARDIK BHIKABHAI PATEL
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS
DATE OF ORDER:
11 NOVEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent is to provide a copy of the audio recording of the applicant’s interview with the delegate to the applicant on or before 13 November 2024.
2.The application for an interlocutory injunction heard on 10 November 2024 is dismissed.
3.The costs in relation to the determination of the applicant’s appeal for injunctive relief be costs in the cause.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is an application for an interlocutory injunction filed on 10 November 2024, to restrain the first respondent (Minister) from removing the applicant from…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1317
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether Mr Patel had established a serious question to be tried regarding the alleged defects in the visa cancellation decision, and whether damages would be an inadequate remedy if his application was successful. The court also had to consider whether the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction. The applicant argued that the decision to cancel his visa was flawed as it did not address certain aspects of his case, and that damages would not be sufficient to compensate him for the potential removal from Australia. The Minister contended that the decision was correctly made and that the applicant had not demonstrated a serious question to be tried or that damages would be inadequate.
Mortimer J found that the applicant had not established a serious question to be tried regarding the alleged defects in the visa cancellation decision. The court noted that while the delegate's reasons were comprehensive and addressed various aspects of the applicant's case, they did not need to be exhaustive to be valid. The court was satisfied that the delegate had adequately considered the evidence and provided sufficient reasons for the decision. Furthermore, the court found that damages would be an adequate remedy for the applicant if his application was ultimately successful. Given these findings, the court concluded that the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of an injunction.
As a result, the application for interlocutory injunction was dismissed. The court found that Mr Patel had not demonstrated a serious question to be tried or that damages would be an inadequate remedy, and the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of an injunction. Therefore, the court declined to restrain the Minister from removing Mr Patel from Australia.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I listed an urgent hearing for the applicant’s interlocutory application at 8.45 pm on 10 November 2024. At that hearing, the applicant was represented by Mr Sultan of Sultan Legal, and the Minister was represented by Mr Sypott of The Australian Government Solicitor. At the outset of the hearing, I confirmed that I did not propose to determine the substantive application and would primarily restrict my consideration to the request for injunctive relief. Mr Sultan also confirmed that the applicant no longer sought the third order requested in the application as he had received a copy of the delegate’s decision from the Court at 2.16pm that afternoon. At the conclusion of the hearing, the application for interlocutory injunction was dismissed. These are the reasons for dismissal.CONSIDERATIONRemoval injunction principles The Court has the power under s 140 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) to grant interlocutory orders. This includes within it a power of equity traditionally exercised to grant injunctions to preserve the status quo, pending a determination of a claim for a legal remedy: see Mohammedv Minister for Immigration, Citizenship And Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 839 per Judge Laing at [11]-[12]; AJH17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 192 per Judge Given at [8]; Calava v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 2525 per Judge Manousaridis at [8]. The principles which guide the exercise of that power are well-established. A court will grant interlocutory injunction if it is satisfied that:(a)there ‘is a serious question to be tried or that the [applicant] has made a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that the trial of the action the [applicant] will be held entitled to relief’;(b)the applicant ‘will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted’; and(c)the ‘balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction’.[11][11] Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148; HCA 58 at 153 per Mason ACJ. The principles were also more recently summarised by Thawley J in CPK20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 870:11.The issue before Mortimer J was whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction. The principles applicable to such relief may be briefly stated. There are two main inquiries. The first is whether the applicant has a prima facie case in the sense of “a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial”; this does not mean the applicant must establish that they are more probable than not to succeed at trial: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65] (Gummow and Hayne JJ) and [19] (Gleeson CJ and Crennan J). As Katzmann J observed in SZTZM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 534 at [39]:What will be sufficient will depend on “the nature of the rights [the applicant] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks”: Beecham Group Limited v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd [1968] HCA 1; (1968) 118 CLR 618 at 622.12.The second main inquiry is whether the inconvenience or injury the applicant would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs the injury the respondent would suffer if the injunction were granted: O’Neill at [65], citing Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd [1968] HCA 1; (1968) 118 CLR 618.13.Consideration of the two main inquiries cannot be conducted completely independently of each other, because “an apparently strong claim may lead a court more readily to grant an injunction when the balance of convenience is fairly even” and “[a] more doubtful claim (which nevertheless raises ‘a serious question to be tried’) may still attract interlocutory relief if there is a marked balance of convenience in favour of it”: Bullock v The Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 1) [1985] FCA 19; (1985) 5 FCR 464 at 472 per Woodward J (Smithers and Sweeney JJ agreeing at 467 and 469 respectively); see also ABAR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 363 at [28] (Charlesworth J).Is there a prima facie case such that there is a serious question to be tried?