Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Fejzullahu

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ

RE THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS  RESPONDENT

EX PARTE MEVLUD FEJZULLAHU & ORS  PROSECUTORS

AND TWENTY-TWO RELATED MATTERS

Re The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs;
Ex parte Fejzullahu [2000] HCA 23
10 April 2000
S51-S73/2000

ORDER

In the case of each summons, the application is dismissed with costs.

Representation:

R R S Tracey QC with G A Mowbray for the respondent (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)

A M Flower for the prosecutors (instructed by Basil Nuredini Barristers & Solicitors)

Notice:  This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ.   Twenty-three summonses seeking urgent injunctive relief were filed in the Sydney registry of the Court at about midday on Friday 7 April 2000.  By consent, they were made returnable at 2.15 pm on the same day.  The applicants sought to restrain the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs ("the Minister"), until further order, from taking steps to remove them from Australia.  The reason for the urgency will appear below.  The application was fully argued.  Argument concluded at about 5.15 pm on 7 April.  I reserved my decision until today.  The Minister undertook not to take any steps to remove the applicants in the meantime.

  2. Each of the applicants for injunctive relief is a Kosovar of Yugoslav nationality.  There are 81 applicants[1]. They have, between them, issued 23 summonses. It is immaterial to examine the basis upon which they have been arranged in groups for that purpose. Each summons seeks interlocutory relief in the context of proceedings brought against the Minister pursuant to s 75(v) of the Constitution ("the principal proceedings").

    [1]Counsel for the applicants said there were 81.  The names of only 79 appear on the summonses.  It is assumed, from the evidence, that the names of Zaide Iseni and Biondina Iseni were accidentally omitted from the summons in S67/2000.

    Nature of the proceedings

  3. It is necessary to explain, first, the nature of the principal proceedings and, secondly, the nature of the applications presently before the Court.

  4. In each of the principal proceedings, the Minister is named as respondent.  The draft order nisi states the order sought as follows:

    "The respondent DO SHOW CAUSE WHY A WRIT OF MANDAMUS and an INJUNCTION should not issue out of this Court directed to the respondent directing him to consider and determine according to law the application of the prosecutors for the respondent to exercise his discretion under s 91L of the Migration Act 1958 upon the grounds that:

    (a)     the decision of the respondent made 3 April 2000 ("the decision") is so unreasonable that no reasonable person exercising his or her discretion according to law could have made the decision.

    (b)    the respondent failed to consider relevant matters in making the decision, namely the matters referred to in the United Nations High Commission for Refugees Report dated 27 March 2000.

    (c)    the respondent failed to accord to…

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Details
Case
[2000] HCA 23
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Kosovar evacuees who had been granted temporary visas to enter Australia, sought judicial review of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs' decision not to grant them permanent protection visas. The dispute arose after the Minister invited remaining Kosovar evacuees to provide reasons why they should be permitted to stay longer in Australia, indicating that each individual case would be examined. The applicants alleged that the Minister had made representations that he would consult with and take into account the recommendations of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) regarding their claims, and that he failed to do so. The matter came before Gleeson CJ.

The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister had acted unlawfully in his consideration of the applicants' claims for permanent protection visas, specifically concerning his alleged undertaking to consult with and be bound by UNHCR recommendations. The applicants contended that the Minister's representations created an expectation that their cases would be assessed in accordance with UNHCR's advice, and that his failure to do so constituted a failure to consider relevant matters or an improper exercise of his discretion. A further issue was whether there was a serious question to be tried in the principal proceedings, which would be necessary for interlocutory relief.

Gleeson CJ reasoned that the Minister's undertaking was to "take the recommendations of UNHCR into account," not to "abide by them." The Court noted that the Minister's statutory obligations were to consider the public interest, which might differ from UNHCR's primary concerns. Furthermore, the evidence did not support the applicants' characterisation of UNHCR's statements, which recommended careful, case-by-case assessment for individuals with protection needs and consideration of medical and trauma counselling reports for vulnerable people. The Court found that the material before it did not demonstrate a serious question to be tried in the principal proceedings.

Consequently, Gleeson CJ dismissed the applications in each summons, ordering that the applicants pay the costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

In the case of each summons, the application is dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Fourthly, s 91L(6) provides that a Minister does not have a duty to consider whether to exercise the power under s 91L(1). If, contrary to the view of the facts I have formed, the evidence in the present case had supported the grounds relied upon by the applicants, that provision would have constituted a substantial obstacle to relief of the kind they seek in the principal proceedings.The evidence The Australian Government responded to a request in 1999 from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees ("UNHCR") to provide safe haven for Kosovars who had fled into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ("FYROM"). In April 1999 Australia agreed to take up to 4,000 Kosovars from camps in FYROM. All the people selected agreed that they would come to Australia on a temporary basis. Each person over the age of 16 signed an undertaking to that effect, the terms of which are in evidence. Between May and July 1999, 3,924 Kosovars came to Australia. They were issued with visas pursuant to the legislation set out above. In June 1999, following the signing of an agreement that ended the conflict in Kosovo, repatriation of Kosovars housed in camps in neighbouring countries commenced. On 12 July 1999, UNHCR announced that the security situation had improved sufficiently for it to coordinate organised voluntary repatriation. In July 1999, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs ("DIMA") began arranging returns of Kosovars from Australia. All returns were voluntary. The visas of those who did not wish to return were extended on a number of occasions, as noted above. On 28 October 1999, the Minister wrote to all remaining Kosovar evacuees asking them to set out in writing any reasons they wished to advance as to why they should be permitted to stay longer in Australia. He said that each individual case would be examined. In early November 1999, the Minister and the solicitor for the present applicants met. The Minister told the solicitor that:(1) the Minister would entertain submissions from each of the solicitor's clients (who included a substantial number of people who are not presently applicants) and would deal with each application under s 91L individually;(2) the solicitor should write to UNHCR setting out the grounds on which each of his clients claimed entitlement to a protection visa or a favourable exercise of discretion on other grounds;(3) the Minister would consult with UNHCR and take its recommendations into account. The above account of the meeting is taken from an affidavit of the applicants' solicitor. The Minister agreed to take the recommendations of UNHCR into account. He did not agree to abide by them. Having regard to his statutory obligations, it may be doubted that he could lawfully have agreed to do so. Nor did he agree not to receive information, or take advice, from other sources as well. In that connection, it is to be noted that, under the legislation, the Minister's concern is the public interest. That is not necessarily the way in which the primary concern of UNHCR would be characterised.

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ
Furthermore, the argument involves an erroneous characterisation of what UNHCR said. In the case of what UNHCR described as "individuals with protection needs", the recommendation was for careful assessment, on a case by case basis. According to the evidence, that is what occurred. As to categories of "vulnerable" people, the evidence is that they were individually assessed, and medical and trauma counselling reports were considered.Conclusion and orders The material before the Court does not show that there is a serious question to be tried in the principal proceedings. In the case of each summons, the application is dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ