Murad v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Murad v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2017] FCAFC 73

Appeal from: Murad v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 876
File number: NSD 1446 of 2016
Judges: GRIFFITHS, MORTIMER AND PERRY JJ
Date of judgment: 11 May 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – whether primary judge erred in rejecting appellant’s complaints of procedural unfairness and jurisdictional error relating to Minister’s consideration of the best interests of the appellant’s children as a primary consideration – formal challenge to correctness of Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; 219 CLR 562

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – interlocutory application for leave to amend notice of appeal – whether appellant should have leave to raise a new ground not run below

Held: appeal dismissed with costs

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 37M

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 189, 192, 196, 198, 501

United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Opened for signature 20 November 1989. 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990), art 3

Cases cited:

Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; 219 CLR 562

ALZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 279

Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1

Cubillo v Commonwealth [2001] FCA 1213; 112 FCR 455

Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation [2015] FCAFC 92; 233 FCR 315

Lesianawai v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 897; 131 ALD 27

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh [1995] HCA 20; 183 CLR 273

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

Murad v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 876

Nweke v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 266; 126 ALD 501

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S20/2002 [2003] HCA 30; 198 ALR 59

SHDB v Goodwin [2003] FCA 300

Summers v Repatriation Commission [2015] FCAFC 36; 230 FCR 179

Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 52; 243 FCR 220

VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588

Wan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 568; 107 FCR 133

Date of hearing: 21 November 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 77
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr SA Beckett and Mr A Naylor
Solicitor for the Appellant: Chalmers Law
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

NSD 1446 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SABER NASER MURAD

Appellant

AND:

ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGES:

GRIFFITHS, MORTIMER AND PERRY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

11 MAY 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 73
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Murad v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, Murad, challenging the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to cancel his visa. The appellant argued that the Minister had failed to give adequate consideration to the best interests of his children as required by the Migration Act and international law. The primary judge dismissed the appeal, and Murad sought to appeal this decision to a higher court. The legal issues before the court included whether the primary judge erred in rejecting Murad’s complaints of procedural unfairness and jurisdictional error in the Minister’s consideration of the best interests of the appellant’s children.

The court examined the principles of procedural fairness and jurisdictional error, particularly in relation to the best interests of children being a primary consideration in migration decisions. The court noted that while the Minister did identify the best interests of the children as a primary consideration, the lack of further reference to this consideration when weighing up competing factors was problematic. However, the court held that the authorities relied on by Murad did not require the best interests of children to be the only or predominant consideration, and that the Minister’s assessment of the children’s best interests was not hypothetical or equivocal. The court found that the requirement to consider the best interests of the children as a primary matter had been met.

The court concluded that the primary judge had not erred in rejecting Murad’s claims of procedural unfairness and jurisdictional error. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the final section of the statement of reasons, headed “CONCLUSION”, the Minister stated:49.I considered all relevant matters including (1) an assessment against the character test as defined by s 501(6) of the Migration Act, (2) Direction 65 and (3) all other evidence available to me, including evidence provided by, or on behalf of Mr MURAD.50.I find that the Australian community could be exposed to great harm should Mr MURAD re-offend in a similar fashion. I could not rule out the possibility of further offending by Mr MURAD. The Australian community should not tolerate any further risk of harm.51.I found the above consideration outweighed the countervailing considerations in Mr MURAD's case, including the best interests of his two children, his statelessness, the prospect of indefinite detention if his visa was cancelled and the impact on family members. I have also considered the length of time Mr MURAD has made a positive contribution to the Australian community and or the consequences of my decision for minor children and other family members.52.I am cognisant that where great harm could be inflicted on the Australian community even strong countervailing considerations are insufficient for me not to cancel the visa. This is the case even applying a higher tolerance of risk of re-offending by Mr MURAD, than I otherwise would, because he has lived in Australia for most of his life.53.I found the above consideration outweighed the countervailing considerations in Mr MURAD's case, including the impact on family members. I have also considered the length of time Mr MURAD has made a positive contribution to the Australian community and the consequences of my decision for family members.54.In reaching my decision I concluded that Mr MURAD represents an unacceptable risk of harm to the Australian community and that the protection of the Australian community outweighed any countervailing considerations above.55.Having given full consideration to all of these matters, I decided to exercise my discretion to cancel Mr MURAD's Class AH Subclass 101 Child visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act. The primary judge rejected the appellant’s claim that he had been denied procedural fairness because the Minister had not given primary consideration to the best interests of his children, contrary to authorities such as Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Ah Hin Teoh [1995] HCA 20; 183 CLR 273 (Teoh); Wan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 568; 107 FCR 133 (Wan); Nweke v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 266; 126 ALD 501 (Nweke) and Lesianawai v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 897; 131 ALD 27 (Lesianawai). The primary judge acknowledged that these cases and, Wan, in particular, required the Minister to identify the best interests of any affected minor child and to then assess whether that factor was outweighed by any other relevant consideration, whether individually or in combination. His Honour noted that although the Minister identified the best interests of Mr Murad’s minor children as a “primary consideration” in [26], there was no further reference to that being a “primary” consideration when the Minister came to weigh up the competing considerations. Nevertheless, the primary judge held that Wan, Nweke and Lesianawai were distinguishable because, unlike those cases the Minister’s assessment of the children’s best interests was not “hypothetical or equivocal” (at [51]). The essence of his Honour’s reasoning is contained in [52]:52.Importantly, none of the authorities require that the best interests of children be the only primary consideration, or the predominant consideration. That could virtually entail such a consideration having to prevail, no matter what else was to be taken into account. The legitimate expectation which grounds the obligation, as identified in Teoh, was to ensure that a first or primary matter to be taken into account in all migration decisions affecting a child would be the best interests of that child. I consider that this requirement has been met, such that there could not have been a failure to give notice that the best interests of the children would not be a primary consideration.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The amended notice of appeal contained four grounds which may be summarised as follows. The first ground was that the primary judge erred in rejecting the appellant’s complaint of procedural unfairness, which turned on the Minister’s failure to notify the appellant that he would not treat the best interests of the appellant’s children as a primary consideration and/or that he would treat risk to the Australian community as the paramount consideration. The second ground was that the primary judge erred in not finding that the Minister had fallen into jurisdictional error by failing to take into account the best interests of the appellant’s children as a primary consideration. The third ground of appeal was not pressed. The fourth ground related to the appellant’s status as a stateless person and involved a formal challenge to the correctness of Al-Kateb. The appellant sought various remedies, including an order in the nature of habeas corpus to release him from immigration detention. Consideration and determination of the appeal(a) Ground 1 – procedural unfairness The relevant principles are not in doubt. Procedural fairness requires that, if the Minister proposes to make a decision which does not accord with the legal requirement that the best interests of affected minor children be a primary consideration, prior notice has to be given and an adequate opportunity afforded so as to present a case against the taking of such a course (see Teoh at 291-292 per Mason CJ and Deane J). The source of this procedural fairness requirement is Art 3.1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which provides:In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. In Teoh, at 289, Mason CJ and Deane J emphasised the significance of the wording of Art 3.1 and the reference to the best interests of the child being “a” primary consideration. Their Honours added (emphasis in original):The article is careful to avoid putting the best interests of the child as the primary consideration; it does no more than give those interests first importance along with such other considerations as may, in the circumstances of a given case, require equal, but not paramount, weight. Their Honours said at 292 that a “decision-maker with an eye to the principle enshrined in the Convention would be looking to the best interests of the children as a primary consideration, asking whether the force of any other consideration outweighed it”. Other authorities illustrate how the obligation to treat the best interests of a child as a primary consideration in making decisions under s 501 of the Act can give rise to jurisdictional error. For example, in Wan, the Full Court (Branson, North and Stone JJ) stated at [32]:An identification by the Tribunal of what the best interests of Mr Wan's children required, and a recognition by the Tribunal of the need to treat such interests as a primary consideration, would not have led inexorably to a decision by the Tribunal to adopt a course in conformity with those interests. That is, even had the Tribunal concluded that the best interests of the children indicated that Mr Wan should be granted a visa, it was legally open to it to refuse to grant Mr Wan a visa. Provided that the Tribunal did not treat any other consideration as inherently more significant than the best interests of Mr Wan's children, it was entitled to conclude, after a proper consideration of the evidence and other material before it, that the strength of other considerations outweighed the best interests of the children. However, it was required to identify what the best interests of Mr Wan's children required with respect to the exercise of its discretion and then to assess whether the strength of any other consideration, or the cumulative effect of other considerations, outweighed the consideration of the best interests of the children understood as a primary consideration.