FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DWR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 2021
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 2021
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the AAT's reasoning in finding that the appellant lacked credibility was illogical or irrational, whether the AAT relied selectively upon country information in a legally unreasonable manner, and whether the AAT failed to comply with s 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by not giving the appellant an opportunity to obtain a document from China. The court also considered whether the AAT failed to consider a claim made by the appellant arising from the material before it. The court found that the AAT's credibility findings were not illogical or irrational and that the AAT had not selectively relied upon country information in a legally unreasonable manner. The court found that the AAT had not failed to comply with s 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by not giving the appellant an opportunity to obtain a document from China, and that the AAT had considered the claim made by the appellant arising from the material before it.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to rely upon the new grounds raised by the further amended notice of appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
3. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In my view, it is in the interests of justice to grant leave for the appellant to raise these issues. My reasons for reaching this view include: the seriousness of the consequences of this appeal for the appellant; my view that the grounds of appeal have sufficient merit, adopting a reasonably impressionistic view of the new grounds; the fact that the appellant was not represented before the FCC and was unable to advance the argument which counsel now seeks to advance for him; and the lack of prejudice to the Minister by the grant of leave.4. ALLEGED ILLOGICAL OR IRRATIONAL REASONING IN MAKING CREDIBILITY FINDINGS (GROUND 1, FURTHER AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL)4.1 The issues raised by ground 1 Ground 1 alleges that the FCC erred by failing to find that the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant lacked credibility was illogical. The two bases upon which the ground is advanced are set out in the particulars. First, five discrepancies in the appellant’s evidence upon which the Tribunal relied were said to be minor, trivial, or based upon a misconstruction of the evidence. Secondly, the appellant contended that “[t]he Tribunal failed to consider the full scope of the country information and relied upon it selectively to support the credibility of the appellant’s claims” (further amended notice of appeal at p. 3). 4.2 Relevant principles In support of ground 1, the appellant relied upon the emphasis in AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; (2018) 361 ALR 227 (AVQ15) on the importance of a decision-maker approaching the assessment of a protection visa applicant’s credibility “fairly and reasonably, taking into account that the assessment of the reliability, and credibility, of accounts given by asylum seekers is well recognised as involving a number of particular features and considerations”: AVQ15 at [23] (the Court). In particular, the Full Court in AVQ15 endorsed the approach described by James Hathaway and Michelle Foster in The Law of Refugee Status (2nd edition, 2014) at p. 139, explaining that 24. … James Hathaway and Michelle Foster describe the assessment of credibility as often being based on one or more of four matters: plausibility, relevant knowledge of an asylum seeker, demeanour and consistency of testimony. The learned authors discuss in detail (at pp 139-149) the comparative jurisprudence on these four features of credibility assessments, including references to many decisions of this Court dating back 20 years. The necessity for care, fairness and a reasonable approach, in order to avoid what the learned authors describe at one point as “a quest to disbelieve” (at p 138), or to avoid irrationality or legal unreasonableness in an approach to credibility assessment, is evident from the comparative authorities there discussed, including as we have noted, many authorities from this Court. … The Full Court also referred (at [25]) to W375/01A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 379 at [15] where the Court drew attention to the inevitability of differences in the accounts given by a person as interpreted into English at different times. The Full Court concluded in AVQ15 that:28. … even where it is reasonably open to find that a person has given inconsistent evidence, the decision-maker needs to assess the significance of that inconsistency and the weight to be given to it. This requires consideration of, for example, the significance of the inconsistency having regard to the person’s case as a whole and whether the inconsistency is on a matter which is central to the person’s case or is at its periphery and involves an objectively minor matter of fact. It also requires the decision maker to remain conscious of the particular challenges facing asylum seekers in giving accounts of why they fear persecution, including that they may have to give multiple accounts, using interpreters, and that they may reasonably expect an interview or a review process will provide an opportunity for them to elaborate on, or explain, the narratives they have previously given. Consideration should also be given to whether there is an acceptable explanation for the person having given inconsistent evidence such that the fact of the inconsistency should attract little, if any, weight. How all these matters are weighed and evaluated in a particular case is a matter for the decision-maker, but a failure by the decision-maker to appreciate the particular nature of the task, or to perform it reasonably and fairly, may be the subject of judicial review.(emphasis added)