Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2001] FCA 1671

MIGRATION – appeal from the decision of a single Judge affirming the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal to refuse the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa – respondent acknowledged for purposes of appeal that s 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) entitled appellant to an opportunity to give evidence and to present arguments to Tribunal – whether the trial Judge erred in finding that the appellant had been afforded a proper hearing – whether the trial Judge was correct in holding that the hearing was meaningful and genuine and non-perfunctory

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 425, 476(1)(a), (b), (c)

Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 763 affirmed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Cho (1999) 92 FCR 315 considered
Hussein v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 288 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Mohammad (2000) 101 FCR 434 referred to
Xiao v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1472 referred to
De Silva v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 98 FCR 364 referred to
Win v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 105 FCR 212 referred to
Sreeram v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 106 FCR 578 referred to
Algama v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 476 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Capitly (1999) 55 ALD 365 applied
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 applied

DE RONG CHEN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

N 1065 OF 2001

LINDGREN, TAMBERLIN AND MANSFIELD JJ
3 DECEMBER 2001
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1065 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

DE RONG CHEN
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

LINDGREN, TAMBERLIN, AND MANSFIELD JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

3 DECEMBER 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1065 OF 2001

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

DE RONG CHEN
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

LINDGREN, TAMBERLIN AND MANSFIELD JJ

DATE:

3 DECEMBER 2001

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

INTRODUCTION AND CLAIMS

  1. This is an appeal from a decision of Moore J given on 22 June 2001:  Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 763 His Honour dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) of 9 December 2000, which in turn affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent of 12 February 2000 to refuse to grant to the…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 1671
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant, a Chinese national, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) which dismissed his application for a visa on the grounds that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution if he were to return to China due to his practice of Falun Gong. The primary issue before the Federal Court was whether the appellant was afforded a proper hearing by the RRT before its decision was made. The appellant argued that he had not been given a proper hearing because the hearing was delayed until late in the afternoon, and that the RRT did not ask him sufficient questions to allow him to fully present his case.

Moore J, the primary judge, rejected the appellant’s claim, holding that the RRT had indeed provided him with a hearing, albeit delayed, and that the hearing was unexceptionable. The RRT had asked the appellant questions about his claims, and he had the opportunity to provide further information, which he declined to do. The judge further held that the RRT had considered the appellant’s evidence in reaching its decision. On appeal to the Full Court, the appellant argued that the RRT was required to provide him with a meaningful and genuine hearing, and that this requirement was not met in his case.

The Full Court considered the statutory provisions and previous case law on the issue of what constitutes an adequate hearing under the Migration Act. It noted that while the Act requires the RRT to give an applicant an opportunity to appear and give evidence, the obligation was narrower than the principles of natural justice would typically demand. The Court found that the RRT had provided the appellant with an opportunity to present his case, and that the appellant had not been deprived of a fair hearing. The Court concluded that the RRT had fulfilled its obligations under the Act, and dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

LINDGREN, TAMBERLIN AND MANSFIELD JJ
The Tribunal concluded:“The Tribunal finds that the applicant has only a relatively minor interest in Falun Gong practice. This finding is based on his evidence that he only occasionally practises Falun Gong. In addition the Tribunal finds that the Chinese authorities would not be interested in the applicant. Country information shows that the authorities have been targeting those who are organisers of Falun Gong groups, and organising protests. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was an organiser, nor that he was responsible for recruiting hundreds of people, nor that he was on a black list, nor that there was a warrant for his arrest, nor that he had been involved in any protests. The Tribunal makes these findings based on the country information and the applicant’s own evidence that he very rarely practices Falun Gong with others and even when in China had practised in public in a park only occasionally. This is not consistent with a claim that he was an organiser, the police were looking for him, or that he recruited others.”Consequently, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his religion. It was prepared, although with some hesitation, to accept that he was a member of Falun Gong. But the Tribunal concluded that the way in which he would practise Falun Gong if he were to return to China involved only occasional practice. It therefore was not satisfied that he would be of interest to the Chinese authorities, and thought any fear that he may have of persecution by them was not well-founded.THE DECISION OF MOORE J At the hearing of his application for judicial review, the appellant was not represented. The learned Judge at first instance, in an endeavour to identify what points the appellant might make on that application, discerned that he was complaining that he had not been given a proper hearing by the Tribunal. He had been notified that the Tribunal would provide him with a hearing in relation to his claim at 10.15 am on 6 December 2000. He attended at that time but the hearing did not then commence. It commenced at 4.45 pm that day and completed at 5.08 pm that day. It appears that the delay was because the appellant had not, as requested by the Tribunal, completed and returned to it the Tribunal’s standard “Response to Hearing Invitation” form advising that he wished to come to the hearing, and so no arrangements had been made for an interpreter to be available to assist him at the hearing. Material indicates that the interpreter became available on the hearing day only late in the afternoon. The Tribunal did not expressly refer to the hearing in its reasons for decision. Nor did it expressly identify any evidence given by the appellant to the Tribunal on that occasion. Moore J adjourned the hearing of the application for judicial review to discern what had transpired at the hearing. A transcript of the hearing was made available. Having had the opportunity to examine the course of the hearing, his Honour described the course of the hearing before the Tribunal as being “unexceptionable”. The Tribunal had asked questions of the appellant about the matters on which his claim was based. At the end of that process, it had asked him whether he had any more information that he wished to give to the Tribunal. Moore J was not satisfied that the appellant had not been given a hearing. His Honour said that he did not accept that the Tribunal did not undertake as extensive an inquiry as was justified in the circumstances. He concluded (at [14]):“It appears to me that the factual foundation of the contention of the applicant that there was no hearing is not made out. Accordingly it is unnecessary to embark upon a consideration of what the Act requires of the Tribunal, if anything, in conducting a hearing and to what extent, if at all, the manner in which a hearing is conducted is amenable to judicial review: see, for example, the discussion by Wilcox J in Xiao v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1472.”It may be added that the Tribunal clearly did have regard to the evidence given by the appellant to the Tribunal on 6 December 2000. The only information provided by the appellant to the Tribunal was that contained in his initial application for the visa and that provided at the hearing on 6 December 2000. Although both the initial application for the visa and the application for review made to the Tribunal on 16 March 2000 each stated that detailed statements in support of the appellant’s claim would be provided, no such statements were in fact provided. The Tribunal accepted the appellant’s evidence that he now practises Falun Gong only occasionally, that he very rarely practises it with others, and that even when in China he had practised Falun Gong in public in a park with others only occasionally. The source of that information is what the appellant told the Tribunal at the hearing on 6 December 2000.THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LINDGREN, TAMBERLIN AND MANSFIELD JJ

The contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant contained three essential propositions, namely:1.In the particular circumstances, the Tribunal was obliged to provide to the appellant an oral hearing with the opportunity to give evidence and present arguments in relation to his claims before it could make a decision under s 415 of the Act adverse to him.2.The hearing to be provided must be “meaningful and genuine and not perfunctory”.3.The requirement for a meaningful and genuine and non-perfunctory hearing was not observed in this case.CONSIDERATION Section 425 of the Act, as currently expressed, is in the following terms:“(1)The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.(2)Subsection (1) does not apply if:(a)the Tribunal considers that it should decide the review in the applicant’s favour on the basis of the material before it; or(b)the applicant consents to the Tribunal deciding the review without the applicant appearing before it; or(c)subsection 424C(1) or (2) applies to the applicant.(3)If any of the paragraphs in subsection (2) of this section apply, the applicant is not entitled to appear before the Tribunal.”That provision was inserted by Sch 3 to the Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1998 (No.1) (Cth), effective from 1 July 1999. Section 425 previously provided:“425(1) Where section 424 does not apply, the Tribunal:(a)must give the applicant an opportunity to appear before it to give evidence; and(b)may obtain such other evidence as it considers necessary.(2) Subject to paragraph (1)(a), the Tribunal is not required to allow any person to address it orally about the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.” In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Cho (1999) 92 FCR 315, Tamberlin and Katz JJ discussed (at 322 – 326) the nature of the “opportunity to appear … to give evidence”, referred to in s 425(1) in its previous form. Their Honours pointed out that the determination of the extent of the obligation imposed upon the Tribunal is essentially one of statutory construction. It was submitted in that case that the Tribunal must provide a “genuine” opportunity to give evidence and disclose material and views which the Tribunal may consider to be adverse to the visa applicant. Their Honours said (at 323):“According to its terms the section simply requires that an opportunity be given to the applicant to appear and give evidence. Obviously if there is no real opportunity given then the section has not been complied with. This could arise, for example, where relevant evidence is not admitted or misleading statements are made by the decision-maker which discourage an applicant from calling or proceeding with a particular line of evidence. It should also be noted that the above quoted observations of Lindgren J [a reference to observations made in Zhan Qui v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (unreported, Federal Court, Lindgren J, 6 May 1997)] support the proposition that a failure to comply with s 425(1)(a) may amount to a failure to observe a “procedure” within the meaning of s 476(1)(a) of the Act, although the objectives expressed in s 420 do not.”Their review of recent decisions concerning the then s 425(1)(a) led their Honours to observe that the content and extent of the statutory obligation to give a visa applicant an opportunity to appear and give evidence was narrower than the general law principles of natural justice would normally require. Their Honours referred (at [37]) with apparent approval to the following passage from the decision of the Full Court in Hussein v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 288 at [38]:“It is not the function of the Tribunal to ‘lead’ a visa applicant to assert a Convention-related fear of persecution when, without that direction, the visa applicant has been given the opportunity to explain the reasons for the fear of persecution without being led to a particular answer.”Sackville J at [64] – [71] had expressed similar views.