FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2001] FCA 1671MIGRATION – appeal from the decision of a single Judge affirming the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal to refuse the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa – respondent acknowledged for purposes of appeal that s 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) entitled appellant to an opportunity to give evidence and to present arguments to Tribunal – whether the trial Judge erred in finding that the appellant had been afforded a proper hearing – whether the trial Judge was correct in holding that the hearing was meaningful and genuine and non-perfunctory
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 425, 476(1)(a), (b), (c)
Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 763 affirmed
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Cho (1999) 92 FCR 315 considered
Hussein v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 288 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Mohammad (2000) 101 FCR 434 referred to
Xiao v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1472 referred to
De Silva v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 98 FCR 364 referred to
Win v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 105 FCR 212 referred to
Sreeram v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 106 FCR 578 referred to
Algama v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 476 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Capitly (1999) 55 ALD 365 applied
Abebe v Commonwealth of Australia (1999) 197 CLR 510 appliedDE RONG CHEN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 1065 OF 2001
LINDGREN, TAMBERLIN AND MANSFIELD JJ
3 DECEMBER 2001
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1065 OF 2001
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
DE RONG CHEN
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
LINDGREN, TAMBERLIN, AND MANSFIELD JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
3 DECEMBER 2001
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1065 OF 2001
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
DE RONG CHEN
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
LINDGREN, TAMBERLIN AND MANSFIELD JJ
DATE:
3 DECEMBER 2001
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
INTRODUCTION AND CLAIMS
This is an appeal from a decision of Moore J given on 22 June 2001: Chen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 763 His Honour dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) of 9 December 2000, which in turn affirmed a decision of a delegate of the respondent of 12 February 2000 to refuse to grant to the…
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- Case
- [2001] FCA 1671
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Moore J, the primary judge, rejected the appellant’s claim, holding that the RRT had indeed provided him with a hearing, albeit delayed, and that the hearing was unexceptionable. The RRT had asked the appellant questions about his claims, and he had the opportunity to provide further information, which he declined to do. The judge further held that the RRT had considered the appellant’s evidence in reaching its decision. On appeal to the Full Court, the appellant argued that the RRT was required to provide him with a meaningful and genuine hearing, and that this requirement was not met in his case.
The Full Court considered the statutory provisions and previous case law on the issue of what constitutes an adequate hearing under the Migration Act. It noted that while the Act requires the RRT to give an applicant an opportunity to appear and give evidence, the obligation was narrower than the principles of natural justice would typically demand. The Court found that the RRT had provided the appellant with an opportunity to present his case, and that the appellant had not been deprived of a fair hearing. The Court concluded that the RRT had fulfilled its obligations under the Act, and dismissed the appeal. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: LINDGREN, TAMBERLIN AND MANSFIELD JJ
The contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant contained three essential propositions, namely:1.In the particular circumstances, the Tribunal was obliged to provide to the appellant an oral hearing with the opportunity to give evidence and present arguments in relation to his claims before it could make a decision under s 415 of the Act adverse to him.2.The hearing to be provided must be “meaningful and genuine and not perfunctory”.3.The requirement for a meaningful and genuine and non-perfunctory hearing was not observed in this case.CONSIDERATION Section 425 of the Act, as currently expressed, is in the following terms:“(1)The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.(2)Subsection (1) does not apply if:(a)the Tribunal considers that it should decide the review in the applicant’s favour on the basis of the material before it; or(b)the applicant consents to the Tribunal deciding the review without the applicant appearing before it; or(c)subsection 424C(1) or (2) applies to the applicant.(3)If any of the paragraphs in subsection (2) of this section apply, the applicant is not entitled to appear before the Tribunal.”That provision was inserted by Sch 3 to the Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1998 (No.1) (Cth), effective from 1 July 1999. Section 425 previously provided:“425(1) Where section 424 does not apply, the Tribunal:(a)must give the applicant an opportunity to appear before it to give evidence; and(b)may obtain such other evidence as it considers necessary.(2) Subject to paragraph (1)(a), the Tribunal is not required to allow any person to address it orally about the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.” In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Cho (1999) 92 FCR 315, Tamberlin and Katz JJ discussed (at 322 – 326) the nature of the “opportunity to appear … to give evidence”, referred to in s 425(1) in its previous form. Their Honours pointed out that the determination of the extent of the obligation imposed upon the Tribunal is essentially one of statutory construction. It was submitted in that case that the Tribunal must provide a “genuine” opportunity to give evidence and disclose material and views which the Tribunal may consider to be adverse to the visa applicant. Their Honours said (at 323):“According to its terms the section simply requires that an opportunity be given to the applicant to appear and give evidence. Obviously if there is no real opportunity given then the section has not been complied with. This could arise, for example, where relevant evidence is not admitted or misleading statements are made by the decision-maker which discourage an applicant from calling or proceeding with a particular line of evidence. It should also be noted that the above quoted observations of Lindgren J [a reference to observations made in Zhan Qui v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (unreported, Federal Court, Lindgren J, 6 May 1997)] support the proposition that a failure to comply with s 425(1)(a) may amount to a failure to observe a “procedure” within the meaning of s 476(1)(a) of the Act, although the objectives expressed in s 420 do not.”Their review of recent decisions concerning the then s 425(1)(a) led their Honours to observe that the content and extent of the statutory obligation to give a visa applicant an opportunity to appear and give evidence was narrower than the general law principles of natural justice would normally require. Their Honours referred (at [37]) with apparent approval to the following passage from the decision of the Full Court in Hussein v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 288 at [38]:“It is not the function of the Tribunal to ‘lead’ a visa applicant to assert a Convention-related fear of persecution when, without that direction, the visa applicant has been given the opportunity to explain the reasons for the fear of persecution without being led to a particular answer.”Sackville J at [64] – [71] had expressed similar views.