De Silva v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

De Silva v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 765

MIGRATION ‑ Application for protection visa ‑ Whether procedures required by Act observed in connection with making of decision ‑ Whether Tribunal failed to make finding on material question of fact ‑ Requirement that applicant be invited to appear before Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to issue arising in relation to decision under review ‑ Whether imposes obligation on Tribunal to identify issues and draw them to applicant’s attention.

Migration Act 1958, ss 424A(1), 425(1), 430(1)(c), 476(1)(a)

The Minister v Cho (1999) 164 ALR 339 applied
Mohammed v The Minister [2000] FCA 264 applied
Chan v The Minister (1989) 169 CLR 379 cited
Ram v The Minister (1995) 57 FCR 565 cited
Diatlov v The Minister (1999) 167 ALR 313 cited

DODAMPEGAMAGE KUMUDU SUSIL DE SILVA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 67 of 2000

HILL, CARR and SUNDBERG JJ
9 JUNE 2000
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 67 OF 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT

BETWEEN:

DODAMPEGAMAGE KUMUDU SUSIL DE SILVA
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HILL, CARR and SUNDBERG JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

9 JUNE 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 67 OF 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT

BETWEEN:

DODAMPEGAMAGE KUMUDU SUSIL DE SILVA
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

HILL, CARR and SUNDBERG JJ

DATE:

9 JUNE 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

BACKGROUND

  1. The appellant is a Sri Lankan national of Singhalese ethnicity.  He worked in Sri Lanka for a large Tamil owned company.  In August 1997, at the request of a Tamil friend, he gave two young Tamil men a lift in his vehicle.  In early September 1997 the appellant was questioned by army personnel about the two men.  The army personnel raised with the appellant his employment by a Tamil owned company, suggested that he supported the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelan (“the LTTE”), and expressed the opinion that Singhalese who assist the LTTE should be shot.  They threatened to take the appellant into custody if the two men had not surrendered by the end of October 1997.  Soon after this the appellant heard that a bombing incident had occurred at Yala.  He assumed that the army had questioned him about the two men because they were under suspicion in relation to the bombing.  He decided to leave Sri Lanka.  On 22 September 1997 he was issued with a passport in his own name, and on 1 October left from the international airport without difficulty.

  2. The appellant arrived in…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 765
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of De Silva v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant contested the decision of the Tribunal that had determined his application for a protection visa. The dispute centred on whether the Tribunal erred in not making a finding regarding the appellant's unwillingness to avail himself of the protection of his country of nationality, as stipulated by Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention. The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal was legally obligated to consider this issue in the absence of a prior finding that the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution.

The legal issues the Court addressed were primarily concerned with the obligations of the Tribunal under the Migration Act, particularly under section 425, and whether these obligations included identifying and drawing to the applicant's attention any matters upon which the Tribunal proposed to place weight. The Court found that section 425(1) of the Act, which mandates inviting an applicant to a hearing, does not impose a procedural obligation on the Tribunal to identify issues and inform the applicant about the matters that will be weighed during the hearing. The Court reasoned that such a construction would be artificial and not supported by the plain language of the statute. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that section 424A, which imposes specific obligations on the Tribunal to provide certain information to the applicant, indicates that section 425 does not extend to identifying issues for the applicant.

The Court concluded that none of the grounds of review raised by the appellant were substantiated. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case concerns an appeal by an appellant against a decision made by the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) regarding his eligibility for refugee status under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Tribunal had determined that the appellant was not a refugee as defined under the relevant legislation and conventions. The appellant's claim was based on a well-founded fear of persecution in his country of nationality. However, the Tribunal did not make a finding on whether the appellant was "unwilling to avail himself of the protection of [his] country [of nationality]" as required by Article 1A(2) of the Convention. This aspect of the decision was challenged by the appellant, who argued that the Tribunal failed to consider this issue, which should have been addressed if the Tribunal first found that he had a well-founded fear of persecution based on a Convention reason. There was no such finding in this case.

The matter was initially heard by the Migration Review Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's application for review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. The appellant then appealed this decision to the Federal Court of Australia. The primary judge, Justice North, dismissed the appeal. The appellant sought special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia, which was refused. Subsequently, the appellant applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court again, which was also refused.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The complaint here was that the Tribunal had failed to make a finding as to whether the appellant was “unwilling to avail himself of the protection of [his] country [of nationality]” as required by Article 1A(2). The Tribunal is not required to consider this issue unless it has first found that an applicant is outside his or her country of nationality owing to a well‑founded fear of persecution based on a Convention reason. See Diatlov v The Minister (1999) 167 ALR 313. There was no such finding in the present case.CONCLUSION None of the grounds of review has been made out, and the appeal must be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge noted that it had not been suggested that the appellant’s solicitor, Mr Karp, had been placed under any restrictions in advancing his client’s case before the Tribunal. The complaint was that the Tribunal did not tell Mr Karp that in determining whether the appellant was of any interest to the authorities it proposed to place weight on the fact that he had been able to leave without let or hindrance on a passport in his own name. Her Honour noted that the capacity of a person freely to obtain a passport in his or her own name and to pass through airport security checks without difficulty is commonly relied on by decision makers as suggesting that the person is not of interest to the authorities. She continued:“More importantly, however, I do not consider that s 425 imposes any procedural obligation within the meaning of s 476(1)(a) of the Act on the Tribunal subsequent to its issuing of the invitation referred to in the section.The way in which the Tribunal is to operate is indicated by s 420 of the Act. A failure by the Tribunal to operate in such a way is not a failure to observe a procedure required by the Act to be observed within the meaning of s 476(1)(a) of the Act, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21, (1994) 162 ALR 577. A breach by the Tribunal of the rules of natural justice does not give rise to a ground of complaint before this Court. It would be artificial, in my view, to construe s 425 as indirectly imposing on the Tribunal an obligation to advise an applicant during the course of the hearing of each matter upon which the Tribunal proposed to place weight for the purpose of allowing the applicant to present argument on the topic. I do not so construe it.” It was submitted for the appellant that s 425(1) is not restricted to inviting an applicant, prior to the date set for the hearing, to attend the hearing in order that he or she may give evidence and present arguments, but has a continuing operation during the hearing obliging the Tribunal to identify issues and draw them to the applicant’s attention. We do not accept this construction of the provision. The governing word in s 425(1) is “invite”. The purpose of the invitation is to enable an applicant to attend the hearing so that he or she can give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues in the case. On the plain words of the sub‑section the obligation is to invite the applicant to appear. It does not impose on the Tribunal an obligation to identify issues and draw them to an applicant’s attention. That s 425 does not bear the construction placed upon it by the appellant is confirmed by s 424A, which was inserted into the Act at the same time as s 425 was amended. Section 424A(1) provides:“Subject to subsection (3), the Tribunal must:(a)give the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and(b)ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review; and(c)invite the applicant to comment on it.”The obligation thus imposed does not apply to certain classes of information, one of which is information given by the applicant for the purposes of the application: sub‑s (3). The existence of an express provision imposing obligations on the Tribunal to assist an applicant in relation to matters that may be important to the outcome of the case shows that s 425(1) does not impose obligations of the type asserted by the appellant.