SBAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SBAF v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

[2002] FCA 686

SBAF & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

S.224 OF 2001

MANSFIELD J
6 JUNE 2002
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S.224 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

SBAF & ANOR
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 JUNE 2002

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicants pay to the respondent costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S.224 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

SBAF & ANOR
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MANSFIELD J

DATE:

6 JUNE 2002

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicants are husband and wife.  They arrived in Australia on 19 April 2001.  On 26 April 2001 they each applied for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). To be eligible for the grant of that visa, they had to satisfy the criteria specified in the Act and in the Migration Regulations. Relevantly for present purposes, s 36(2) of the Act imposed the criterion that the respondent, and on review the Tribunal, is satisfied that the applicants are persons to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol, using those terms as defined in the Act (the Convention). Article 1A(2) of the Convention defines a refugee as any person who:

    “ …owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”

  2. On 8 August 2001 a delegate of the respondent refused the two applications for protection visas under the Act, and on 30 November 2001 the Tribunal affirmed those decisions.

    THE CLAIMS

  3. To the extent that it is necessary, I shall refer to the claims of the male applicant and of the female applicant separately.

  4. The male applicant was born in 1973 in Hamdan in Iran.  He is of Kurdish ethnicity, and was born a Sunni Muslim.  He undertook secondary education, and subsequently has worked as a self-employed car salesman and developer, other than for a period in 1993-1994 when he undertook military service.

  5. The Tribunal accepted that in 1999 he and a cousin had come across a demonstration concerning the handing over of the Kurdish leader Ujalan to the Turkish authorities.  It descended into violence.  The applicant and his cousin took an injured person to the hospital.…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 686
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SBAF versus the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs involved the applicants challenging a decision by the Tribunal regarding their eligibility for refugee status based on their conversion to Christianity. The applicants contended that the Tribunal’s conclusion that they did not genuinely convert to Christianity was without basis, arbitrary, and lacked good faith. The applicants also claimed that the Tribunal had failed to identify discrepancies and inconsistencies in their evidence. The Federal Court was tasked with reviewing the Tribunal's decision and determining whether it had committed an error warranting relief under section 39B of the Judiciary Act.

The court considered whether the Tribunal had genuinely addressed the applicants' claims of conversion to Christianity and whether it had done so in good faith. It noted that the Tribunal did not explicitly identify discrepancies in the applicants' evidence but did find their evidence to contain implausibilities. The court held that the Tribunal's findings were neither capricious nor irrational, and it was within the Tribunal's discretion to weigh the considerations presented. The court also found no evidence of bias or lack of good faith on the part of the Tribunal. Regarding the applicants' claims about their father's activities and reasons for their brothers leaving Iran, the Tribunal had found these matters would not give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution even if true, and no complaints were made about this analysis.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal had not committed an error of law warranting relief under section 39B of the Judiciary Act. The court held that the Tribunal had bona fide addressed the applicants' claims and had not acted with bias or lack of good faith. Consequently, the court ordered the applicants to pay the costs of the application to the respondent.

The final orders of the court were that the application be dismissed and that the applicants pay the respondent’s costs of the application. This decision underscored the importance of the Tribunal's discretion in weighing evidence and the court's reluctance to second-guess such decisions unless there was clear evidence of error.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicants pay to the respondent costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J
In this matter, I do not infer from the Tribunal’s reasons for not believing the applicants’ claims to have held Christian beliefs for some time that it had actual bias or performed its review with a lack of good faith on its part. The particular considerations of the Tribunal are not capricious or irrational. They were considerations which appear to have emerged in part during the course of the hearing. They were put to the applicants for comment. The weight to be attached to them is a matter for the Tribunal. It is neither helpful, nor appropriate, to indicate whether I consider that other minds might have given those considerations different weight, or might have had regard to other considerations, in reaching a conclusion on that issue. The implausibility and improbabilities referred to are understandable although, as I have indicated, the Tribunal in one respect may have failed to consider another explanation for its conclusion. That does not of itself advance the contention that the Tribunal did not bona fide address the claims.CONCLUSION I have therefore reached the view that the Tribunal has not committed error of such a nature as to give rise to any order under s 39B of the Judiciary Act. I accordingly dismiss the application. I see no reason why the normal rule as to costs should not apply. I order the applicants to pay to the respondent costs of the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

Finally, I note that the Tribunal did not decide whether it accepted the claims as to the activities of the male applicant’s father prior to the 1979 revolution, or of the female applicant as to her father’s previous association with the previous regime and why her brothers had left Iran. It said that those matters would not give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution on the part of either applicant even if true. No particular complaint is made about that analysis. Nor is any complaint made about the findings of the Tribunal that, at the time the female applicant left Iran for Malaysia and returned, because she was able to travel on a lawful passport and to obtain an exit visa, she did not then have an adverse profile with the authorities, or that at least to 1999, when the male applicant was released because he was found not to have participated in the demonstration despite suspicions initially held to the contrary, the male applicant did not have an adverse profile with the authorities.CONSIDERATION The applicants jointly filed their notice seeking review to the Court, together with a contention in the form of a document headed “affidavit”, and subsequent written submissions dated 11 February and 4, 5 and 6 March 2002. They appeared in person and made oral submissions through the male applicant. In essence their complaint is of the Tribunal’s conclusion that they did not sincerely convert to Christianity as being “without any basis or foundation”. The application asserts that the Tribunal’s decision was arrived at without good faith, upon arbitrary findings, and with no examples of discrepancies and inconsistencies. As I read the Tribunal’s reasons, it is correct that the Tribunal did not identify discrepancies or inconsistencies in their evidence, although it did not find their evidence to be credible because it contained “several implausibilities and discrepancies”. It did not refer to any discrepancies. It referred to several “implausibilities” to which reference has been made above. It was submitted that the Tribunal had accepted the male applicant’s “experience and participation” in the demonstration in March of 1999, but had then contradicted itself by subsequently finding that the male applicant would not have had an adverse profile after his release following that demonstration because he was found not to have participated in it. I do not think any error is shown in the Tribunal’s reasoning in that regard. The contention, in my view, does not recognise that the Tribunal accepted the male applicant’s account of his experience at that demonstration, and his detention. His account did not assert that he was a participant in the demonstration, but a bystander. There is no inconsistency in the Tribunal’s findings. The applicant pointed out that the Tribunal accepted that both applicants possessed an apparently satisfactory level of knowledge about Christianity. That is correct. It is then contended that the Tribunal unreasonably dismissed their sincerely held belief in Christianity. It does not follow from the applicants having an apparently reasonably detailed knowledge about Christianity that they then have a sincere and genuine conversion to Christianity. Although knowledge of Christianity is of course an indication, and a significant indication, of a conversion to Christianity, it is not necessarily a logical consequence of such knowledge that such a conversion has taken place. Although the Tribunal has not sought to reconcile their level of knowledge of Christianity with its findings, it is not shown to be in error on the basis of those two findings being inconsistent. They are not necessarily inconsistent.