Tobasi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Tobasi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs

[2002] FCA 1050

MIGRATION – application for protection visa – whether obligation under s 425(1) of the Migration Act as in force from 1 June 1999 following Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 1998 obliges Refugee Review Tribunal to provide an applicant with an opportunity to be heard.

MIGRATION – application for a protection visa – review of decisions of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether interpretation at Tribunal hearing was inadequate – whether inadequacies in interpretation affected Tribunal’s decision – whether inadequacies in interpretation constituted a failure to provide the applicant an opportunity to give evidence – whether Tribunal erred in failing to consider the applicant’s claims cumulatively – whether Tribunal erred in assessing the applicant’s claims on the basis that his past experiences might possibly be true – whether Tribunal based its findings on a particular fact that did not exist.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2), 476(1), 476(1)(a), 476(1)(b), 476(1)(e), 425(1)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)

Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 1998 (Cth)
Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 (Cth)

Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1; [2001] HCA 30 - discussed
Perera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6 - discussed
W284 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1788 - discussed
Mazhar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1759; (2000) 64 ALD 395 – referred to
Sreeram v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 53 - discussed
De Silva v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 98 FCR 364 - cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Mohammad (2000) 101 FCR 434; [2000] FCA 1275 – referred to
Xiao v Minister for Immigration &  Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1472 - discussed
Liu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1362 - followed
Ismail v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1555 – referred to
Long v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1172 – referred to
Craig v State of South Australia (1994) 184 CLR 163 - cited
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 555 - cited
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407; [2000] FCA 1 – discussed
Minister fro Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 – referred to

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 – referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa [2001] FCA 181 – referred to
Mohammed v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 264 – referred to

OSAMA MOHAMMED TOBASI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

W.237 of 2001

MANSFIELD J
23 AUGUST 2002
ADELAIDE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W.237 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

OSAMA MOHAMMED TOBASI
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 1050
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Tobasi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved a Syrian national challenging the refusal of a protection visa by the Tribunal under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant contended that the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation and application of the law, leading to an unjust decision. Issues included the Tribunal’s handling of the applicant's cumulative claims, assessment of credibility, and interpretation services. The applicant argued that the Tribunal failed to consider material facts, misinterpreted evidence, and did not provide adequate opportunity to present evidence due to poor interpretation services.

The court examined whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied the law, particularly in relation to the applicant's claims and credibility. The applicant's arguments centred on alleged procedural errors, including the quality of interpretation, time restrictions for producing documents, and the Tribunal’s handling of inconsistencies in the applicant's statements. The court considered whether these alleged errors amounted to jurisdictional mistakes or breaches of natural justice.

In dismissing the application, the court found that the applicant's criticisms of the interpretation did not substantiate claims of inadequate opportunity to present evidence. The court held that the applicant's complaints about the interpretation were not persuasive, as he lacked the requisite expertise to assess the translation quality. Furthermore, the court determined that the Tribunal’s findings and application of the law were not flawed to the extent claimed by the applicant. The court held that the Tribunal had appropriately considered the applicant's claims and evidence, and the decision to refuse the visa was supported by the material before it.

The final order was to dismiss the application, affirming the Tribunal's decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Tribunal was therefore not satisfied that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason upon his return to Syria. He was not a person, in the Tribunal’s view, to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention. It followed that, in accordance with s 65(1) of the Act, the Tribunal properly affirmed the decision not to grant him a protection visa.THE EVIDENCE ON REVIEW At the hearing, senior counsel for the applicant tendered three affidavits which were received without opposition. The affidavits were from the applicant sworn on 12 January 2002, from the applicant’s solicitor sworn on 25 January 2002, and from Mohammad Bakir Hamoud, an interpreter also sworn on 25 January 2002. The latter two affidavits asserted the accuracy of a transcription of the recording of the Tribunal’s hearing on 6 February 2001. The respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the accuracy of that transcription, but has not done so. In addition, Mr Hamoud, who is a qualified interpreter, has interposed into the transcription in an identifiable way sections of the transcription by his interpretation what the applicant said to the interpreter at the hearing, or what the interpreter said to the applicant at the hearing where he considers the transcription at the hearing does not accurately or completely record what was said between the interpreter and the applicant at the hearing. There is therefore a composite document constituting what may be taken as an accurate transcription of what was said at the hearing in English. That document also identifies where Mr Hamoud considers that the exchange between the applicant and the interpreter in Arabic is not accurately reflected in the transcription, either translating the applicant’s response or the Tribunal’s question and Mr Hamoud’s view as to what was in fact said. In his affidavit he asserts that although part of the translation at the hearing was competent, overall it was not a competent translation. The applicant’s affidavit appears to raise two concerns. One relates to the quality of the interpretation at the hearing. He complains that, during the hearing, the interpreter on numerous occasions asked him the same question, using different wording, even after he had provided the interpreter with a detailed answer. He said he became frustrated with the same questions being asked, although he tried to remain patient in giving his response in repeating what he had previously said. He says:“I believe the interpreter understood the question asked by the ‘judge’ but was unable to translate the question in a precise manner for me to respond. I also believe the interpreter was unable to grasp or interpret precisely what my answer was to the question that was being asked of me.”I do not think that complaint can be given any weight. The applicant does not speak English, even slightly. He is not qualified to comment on the quality of the interpretation of what he said in Arabic into English. Moreover, the extent to which the interpretation at the hearing might be said to be unreliable is disclosed in the composite document referred to (assuming of course the accuracy of Mr Hamoud’s interpretation).

Decision

Reasons for decision

MANSFIELD J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MANSFIELD J

The Tribunal was said to have erred in law, either by incorrectly interpreting the applicable law or by applying the law to the facts as found by the Tribunal, in the following respects:“3.The Tribunal considered and dealt with the applicant’s claims separately. His claims are not independent claims but are all facts which together lead to the reason for his objectively well based fear of persecution. The Tribunal erred in not considering the facts cumulatively.4.The Tribunal correctly states the principles concerning assessing the applicant’s credibility due to the difficulties faced by refugee applicants but it does not in fact apply these principles.5.The Tribunal rejects some of his evidence and makes opposite positive findings which have no basis. It uses those findings in making its decision.6.The Tribunal improperly and unfairly restricted the applicant to one week from the hearing date of 6 February 2001 to produce a document.7.The Tribunal failed to consider material facts, namely if the applicant was at any risk of execution.8.The Tribunal misled the applicant that earlier apparent inconsistencies in written statements before the hearing were accepted as errors of translation but made findings on these issues against the applicant’s credibility.9.The Tribunal found facts without any evidence, and contrary to the Applicant’s evidence.10.It then relied on the above erroneous findings of fact in making its decision where there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision.11.The Tribunal failed to consider all the substantive matters which bear on whether the Applicant meets the criteria for a protection visa and so failed to consider the real question.”To an extent, those matters also were said to enliven s 476(1)(b) and s 476(1)(c) of the Act as there is some overlap between those grounds of review: see the discussion of McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 at [84] – [85]. The penultimate matter referred to above was also said to enliven the ground of review available under s 476(1)(g) as limited by s 476(4)(b) of the Act. CONSIDERATION OF GROUNDS OF REVIEW Section 425(1) of the Act provides:“The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.”That provision was amended, effective from 1 June 1999, by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 1998 (Cth). It previously provided that the Tribunal:“… must give the applicant an opportunity to appear before it to give evidence.”In Perera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6, Kenny J accepted that a departure from the appropriate standard of interpretation could amount to a failure to afford a visa applicant an opportunity to give evidence as then required by s 425 of the Act. Senior counsel for the applicant contended that the reformulated expression of s 425(1) had not altered the substance of the Tribunal’s obligation.