FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Tobasi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2002] FCA 1050
MIGRATION – application for protection visa – whether obligation under s 425(1) of the Migration Act as in force from 1 June 1999 following Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 1998 obliges Refugee Review Tribunal to provide an applicant with an opportunity to be heard.
MIGRATION – application for a protection visa – review of decisions of Refugee Review Tribunal – whether interpretation at Tribunal hearing was inadequate – whether inadequacies in interpretation affected Tribunal’s decision – whether inadequacies in interpretation constituted a failure to provide the applicant an opportunity to give evidence – whether Tribunal erred in failing to consider the applicant’s claims cumulatively – whether Tribunal erred in assessing the applicant’s claims on the basis that his past experiences might possibly be true – whether Tribunal based its findings on a particular fact that did not exist.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2), 476(1), 476(1)(a), 476(1)(b), 476(1)(e), 425(1)
Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth)Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 1998 (Cth)
Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 (Cth)Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1; [2001] HCA 30 - discussed
Perera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6 - discussed
W284 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1788 - discussed
Mazhar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1759; (2000) 64 ALD 395 – referred to
Sreeram v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 53 - discussed
De Silva v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 98 FCR 364 - cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Mohammad (2000) 101 FCR 434; [2000] FCA 1275 – referred to
Xiao v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1472 - discussed
Liu v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1362 - followed
Ismail v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1555 – referred to
Long v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1172 – referred to
Craig v State of South Australia (1994) 184 CLR 163 - cited
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 555 - cited
Re Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Durairajasingham (2000) 168 ALR 407; [2000] FCA 1 – discussed
Minister fro Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220 – referred toMinister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 – referred to
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Indatissa [2001] FCA 181 – referred to
Mohammed v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 264 – referred toOSAMA MOHAMMED TOBASI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
W.237 of 2001
MANSFIELD J
23 AUGUST 2002
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
W.237 OF 2001
BETWEEN:
OSAMA MOHAMMED TOBASI
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL…
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- Case
- [2002] FCA 1050
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the Tribunal had correctly interpreted and applied the law, particularly in relation to the applicant's claims and credibility. The applicant's arguments centred on alleged procedural errors, including the quality of interpretation, time restrictions for producing documents, and the Tribunal’s handling of inconsistencies in the applicant's statements. The court considered whether these alleged errors amounted to jurisdictional mistakes or breaches of natural justice.
In dismissing the application, the court found that the applicant's criticisms of the interpretation did not substantiate claims of inadequate opportunity to present evidence. The court held that the applicant's complaints about the interpretation were not persuasive, as he lacked the requisite expertise to assess the translation quality. Furthermore, the court determined that the Tribunal’s findings and application of the law were not flawed to the extent claimed by the applicant. The court held that the Tribunal had appropriately considered the applicant's claims and evidence, and the decision to refuse the visa was supported by the material before it.
The final order was to dismiss the application, affirming the Tribunal's decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MANSFIELD J
The Tribunal was said to have erred in law, either by incorrectly interpreting the applicable law or by applying the law to the facts as found by the Tribunal, in the following respects:“3.The Tribunal considered and dealt with the applicant’s claims separately. His claims are not independent claims but are all facts which together lead to the reason for his objectively well based fear of persecution. The Tribunal erred in not considering the facts cumulatively.4.The Tribunal correctly states the principles concerning assessing the applicant’s credibility due to the difficulties faced by refugee applicants but it does not in fact apply these principles.5.The Tribunal rejects some of his evidence and makes opposite positive findings which have no basis. It uses those findings in making its decision.6.The Tribunal improperly and unfairly restricted the applicant to one week from the hearing date of 6 February 2001 to produce a document.7.The Tribunal failed to consider material facts, namely if the applicant was at any risk of execution.8.The Tribunal misled the applicant that earlier apparent inconsistencies in written statements before the hearing were accepted as errors of translation but made findings on these issues against the applicant’s credibility.9.The Tribunal found facts without any evidence, and contrary to the Applicant’s evidence.10.It then relied on the above erroneous findings of fact in making its decision where there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision.11.The Tribunal failed to consider all the substantive matters which bear on whether the Applicant meets the criteria for a protection visa and so failed to consider the real question.”To an extent, those matters also were said to enliven s 476(1)(b) and s 476(1)(c) of the Act as there is some overlap between those grounds of review: see the discussion of McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 180 ALR 1 at [84] – [85]. The penultimate matter referred to above was also said to enliven the ground of review available under s 476(1)(g) as limited by s 476(4)(b) of the Act. CONSIDERATION OF GROUNDS OF REVIEW Section 425(1) of the Act provides:“The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.”That provision was amended, effective from 1 June 1999, by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No.1) 1998 (Cth). It previously provided that the Tribunal:“… must give the applicant an opportunity to appear before it to give evidence.”In Perera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1999) 92 FCR 6, Kenny J accepted that a departure from the appropriate standard of interpretation could amount to a failure to afford a visa applicant an opportunity to give evidence as then required by s 425 of the Act. Senior counsel for the applicant contended that the reformulated expression of s 425(1) had not altered the substance of the Tribunal’s obligation.