FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BCF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 19
Appeal from: BCF16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2953 File number: VID 1258 of 2017 Judge: CHARLESWORTH J Date of judgment: 18 January 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – whether Tribunal failed to consider and assess an essential integer of the appellant’s claims – whether Tribunal misapplied complementary protection criterion – application to raise additional argument on appeal not raised in judicial review proceedings before primary judge – proposed new ground asserting mental incapacity at time of Tribunal hearing – proposed new ground having no reasonable prospect of success – appeal dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 36, 65, 414, 425, 474, 476
Cases cited: BCF16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2953
BGA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2018] FCA 1589
Gomez v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 480; (2002) 190 ALR 543
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (2010) 183 FCR 575
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB (2013) 210 FCR 505
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR (2003) 128 FCR 553
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
Pallett v Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Human Services - Centrelink [2017] FCA 1132
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476
SZKMS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 499
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 347 ALR 405
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588
Date of hearing: 11 May 2018 and continued on the papers Date of last submissions: Appellant: 9 July 2018
First Respondent: 23 July 2018Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 47 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Petrie Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice ORDERS
VID 1258 of 2017 BETWEEN: BCF16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
CHARLESWORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 JANUARY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CHARLESWORTH J:
The appellant is a national of Sri Lanka. He is of Tamil ethnicity and also a Hindu.
The appellant applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in December 2012. A delegate of the then-named Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused to grant the visa. On review, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read BCF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2019] FCA 19
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the appellant’s argument that the Tribunal failed to consider and assess an essential integer of his claims. The court found that the Tribunal had indeed considered the appellant’s claims and had provided detailed reasons for its decision. The court also examined the appellant’s argument that the Tribunal misapplied the Complementary Protection Criterion. The court held that the Tribunal had correctly applied the criterion and that there was no error in its application. Furthermore, the court considered the appellant’s proposed new ground of appeal, asserting mental incapacity at the time of the Tribunal hearing. The court found that this proposed new ground had no reasonable prospect of success, as the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to support his claim of mental incapacity at the relevant time.
The court dismissed the appeal and held that the Tribunal’s decision was correct. The court found that the Tribunal had properly considered the appellant’s claims and had provided sufficient reasons for its decision. The court also held that the Tribunal had correctly applied the Complementary Protection Criterion and that there was no error in its application. The court further found that the proposed new ground of appeal, asserting mental incapacity at the time of the Tribunal hearing, had no reasonable prospect of success, as the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to support his claim. The court noted that the appellant had not made any reference to the audio recording of the Tribunal’s proceedings to identify which part of his evidence was said to be affected by his mental state at the time. The court held that the letter from the psychiatrist, who performed an initial assessment of the appellant some two and a half years after the Tribunal’s hearing, was not admissible evidence of the appellant’s mental state at the relevant time.
The court made an order dismissing the appeal. The court held that the Tribunal’s decision was correct and that the appellant’s arguments on appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success to justify the grant of leave to introduce them. The court also held that the proposed new ground of appeal, asserting mental incapacity at the time of the Tribunal hearing, had no reasonable prospect of success, as the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to support his claim. The court noted that the appellant had not made any reference to the audio recording of the Tribunal’s proceedings to identify which part of his evidence was said to be affected by his mental state at the time. The court held that the letter from the psychiatrist, who performed an initial assessment of the appellant some two and a half years after the Tribunal’s hearing, was not admissible evidence of the appellant’s mental state at the relevant time.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The appellant’s initial application for a Protection (Class XA) visa was refused by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. Following this refusal, the appellant sought a review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT affirmed the delegate’s decision, prompting the appellant to apply for judicial review in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the application for judicial review, a decision which the appellant has now appealed to the Federal Court. In the course of the appeal, the appellant sought to introduce new arguments not raised in the judicial review proceedings, specifically concerning a proposed new ground asserting mental incapacity at the time of the AAT hearing.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant lodged written submissions, on 8 July 2018. The Registrar was ordered to accept those submissions for filing. They have now been read. The Court also has before it supplementary submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 23 July 2018.Consideration For present purposes I will assume (without deciding) that the failure of the appellant to raise the proposed new issue before the primary judge may be explained by his status as a self-represented litigant in that proceeding. For the reasons that follow, the argument now sought to be raised by the appellant does not enjoy sufficient prospects of success to justify the grant of leave to introduce it, even if there be an adequate explanation for the failure to raise the issue at an earlier time. The Court made orders requiring the Minister’s representatives to provide to the appellant an audio recording of the proceedings before the Tribunal. The appellant has made no reference to the audio recording so as to identify which part of the appellant’s evidence was said to be affected by his mental state at the time. It is to be recalled that the Tribunal’s concerns about the appellant’s credibility arose principally from discrepancies between the evidence given in the appellant’s statutory declaration and the oral evidence he gave before the Tribunal. According to the Tribunal’s reasons, when asked to explain the discrepancy concerning the amount of time the appellant had remained at place K, the appellant had responded by stating that he could not remember where he was by reason of “shelling from the sky” which had required him to stay on the move and making it difficult for him to obtain documents. It appears that at the time of the Tribunal’s hearing the appellant, assisted by a migration agent, gave explanations for the discrepancies which were more concerned with external circumstances and less concerned with mental health. Furthermore, as I have said, the psychiatrist who performed an initial assessment of the appellant did so some two and a half years after the Tribunal’s hearing. Whilst the Minister did not object to the letter being received in evidence, in my view it is not admissible evidence of the appellant’s mental state at the relevant time and so should not be received: cf Pallett v Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Human Services - Centrelink [2017] FCA 1132. Whilst the letter does contain assertions of fact concerning the appellant’s self-reported symptoms over a significant period of time, it is not for this Court to draw its own conclusions as to the existence, nature and effect of a mental incapacity by reference to the appellant’s submissions. This Court does not have the expertise to draw any safe inference from the statements of fact asserted in the letter as to the appellant’s mental state in December 2015. Even assuming the letter were admissible in evidence (which is doubtful), it is not sufficient to prove that the appellant was not in a fit state to particulate meaningfully and effectively in the Tribunal’s processes.