CPN16 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CPN16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 872

Appeal from: CPN16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 2424
File number: VID 1107 of 2017
Judge: KERR  J
Date of judgment: 7 June 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister refusing the appellant’s visa application – where appellant seeks to advance grounds of appeal not agitated before primary judge – whether interpretation of Tribunal hearings was so inadequate to constitute a failure to provide the appellant with a hearing as required by s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Tribunal made adverse credibility findings on the basis of the lack of detail in Appellant’s evidence – leave to rely on new grounds granted – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 425

Cases cited:

Coshott v Crouch [2017] FCAFC 135; (2017) 253 FCR 413

Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1

Habtegebriel v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1470

M175 of 2012 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1212

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2017] FCAFC 33; (2017) 248 FCR 1

Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507; (1999) 92 FCR 6

SZHEW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2009] FCA 783

SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142; (2013) 219 FCR 212

SZSFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 534; (2015) 232 FCR 262

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 347 ALR 405

Date of hearing: 4 and 7 June 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 123
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms G A Costello
Solicitor for the Appellant: Kajaliny Ranjith Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G A Hill
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1107 of 2017
BETWEEN:

CPN16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KERR  J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 JUNE 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss the Appellant’s application for review be set aside.

3.In substitution therefor it be ordered that the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to affirm the delegate’s decision be quashed and the review be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.

4.Subject to the orders of 27 February 2018, the First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal as…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 872
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

CPN16 brought an appeal against the Minister for Home Affairs after the Federal Circuit Court dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister refusing the appellant's visa application. The appellant argued that the interpretation provided during his Tribunal hearings was so inadequate that it constituted a failure to provide him with a hearing as required by s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The AAT made adverse credibility findings on the basis of the lack of detail in the appellant's evidence. The court granted leave to rely on new grounds and allowed the appeal.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the interpretation provided during the appellant's Tribunal hearings was adequate, and whether the lack of detail in his evidence was due to the inadequacy of the interpretation. The court found that the interpreters provided for the first Tribunal hearing did not hold NAATI accreditation, while the interpreters provided at the second and third Tribunal hearings each held "Level 2" accreditation in Sri Lankan Tamil, equivalent to a "paraprofessional" accreditation, which is a level below that of "professional", the standard that NAATI considers to be required for interpretation of court proceedings. The court found that the interpreters' lack of accreditation and lower level of proficiency may have contributed to the lack of detail in the appellant's evidence.

The court found that the appellant's lack of detail in his evidence was not solely due to the inadequacy of the interpretation, but also due to the nature of the traumatic experiences he had undergone. However, the court found that the interpretation provided during the Tribunal hearings was inadequate and that it may have contributed to the lack of detail in the appellant's evidence. The court found that the inadequacy of the interpretation constituted a failure to provide the appellant with a hearing as required by s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Federal Circuit Court, quashed the decision of the AAT, and remitted the review to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The decision of the Federal Circuit Court to dismiss the Appellant’s application for review be set aside.

3. In substitution therefor it be ordered that the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to affirm the delegate’s decision be quashed and the review be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.

4. Subject to the orders of 27 February 2018, the First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal as assessed or agreed.

5. The costs orders made in the court below not be disturbed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Having regard to the reasoning in SZSFS and the conclusions I have reached as to the merits of the ground proposed, I would grant leave to the Appellant to rely on his proposed amended ground of appeal notwithstanding that it was not agitated in the court below. The evidence in these proceedings At the commencement of the hearing Ms Costello sought to read the affidavit of the Appellant of 19 February 2018 and the affidavits of Ms Ranjithkumar dated 18 April 2018 and 29 May 2018 respectively. Ms Costello did not seek to read Ms Ranjithkumar’s affidavit of 25 May 2018 into evidence on the basis that it was in identical terms to the 29 May 2018 affidavit, save that it incorporated an additional annexure. Notwithstanding the procedural circumstances, Mr Hill did not object to those affidavits being admitted into evidence, subject only to an objection to [6] of Ms Ranjithkumar’s 29 May 2018 affidavit on the basis that it purported to express an expert opinion in a form inconsistent with the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). At [6] Ms Ranjithkumar deposed that, having herself listened to the recordings and read the interpretations her client had secured in writing, she believed the oral interpretation of the Appellant’s evidence in the Tribunal had over summarised his testimony and that the detail and narrative of his testimony had been lost at various points. With the consent of the parties, the Court admitted into evidence the three affidavits Ms Costello sought to read, subject to [6] of the affidavit of Ms Ranjithkumar of 29 May 2018 being admitted only as a submission. The critical evidence in these proceedings includes the three typed interpretations of the hearings before the Tribunal which took place on 22 May 2015 and 18 May 2016. Towards the commencement of this hearing I therefore raised with Ms Costello that there appeared to be no evidence of the qualifications of those who had provided the “accredited translations” or any affidavit from their makers deposing to the accuracy of them. Ms Costello accepted that to be so but indicated from the bar table that she understood that Mrs Somasundaram was a NAATI level 3 interpreter. I asked Mr Hill if the Minister accepted that she was a NAATI accredited level 3 interpreter whose translations the Court was entitled to rely on in these proceedings. Mr Hill noted that Mrs Somasundaram had signed the final page of her interpretation (KR2) and had identified herself as a NAATI accredited provisional interpreter which was equivalent to NAATI level 2; she was qualified but no more qualified than the interpreters who had been assisting in the Tribunal. However, that appropriate observation aside, Mr Hill took no issue during the hearing with the proposition that the typescript interpretations annexed to Ms Ranjithkumar’s affidavits as produced by Ms Somasundaram and Mr Kathiravelu were other than completely accurate. I have earlier noted that the Minister’s legal representatives had approached the Court to relist the hearing to allow for the opportunity to take instructions. I infer from the absence of any challenge to any part of the typescript interpretations, with the opportunity open to the Minister to take the point, that Mr Hill’s instructions had been that there was no basis to contest their accuracy in this appeal. I proceed on that basis.The Appellant’s submissions

Decision

Reasons for decision

A delegate of the Minister largely rejected the Appellant’s claims, and rejected his visa application. DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL On 26 August 2016 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate. The Tribunal accepted (at [42]-[43]) the Appellant’s claim that he was trapped at his employer’s house from August 2008 until the house was shelled in May 2009, killing some of his employer’s family members and wounding the Appellant’s employer. The Tribunal accepted that the Appellant was taken by the Sri Lankan army and detained in an army camp in Vavuniya in September 2009, where he may have been mistreated. The Tribunal did not accept that the Appellant escaped identification whilst at the camp (at [44]) or that he had escaped from the camp (at [45]) on the basis that the Appellant was unable to describe the alleged escape in convincing detail. The Tribunal did not accept that the Appellant was detained twice by the CID. The Tribunal found the Appellant’s claims with respect to both the first and second detentions implausible. The Tribunal did not accept that the Appellant’s father made a complaint to the Human Rights Commission. The Tribunal found that the Appellant’s evidence was, in part, vague, inconsistent and implausible. The findings of the Tribunal most material to these proceedings were:44.However, I do not accept that the applicant was not identified at the camp. He claims to have given a false last name, the family name of his boss, at the camp. I do not believe this. He gave evidence that he had his ID card, which identifies him by name and picture. Given that one of the expressed purposes of the camps was to detain civilians and to separate and identify those who had involvement with the LTTE during the conflict, I do not accept as credible or plausible that the army would not have checked his ID card and determined his true identity, either at the point of his entry to the camp or shortly afterwards. l do not accept as credible that the army would not have checked his ID card because there were too many people, or because he did not want to give his ID card to them, given that a main purpose was to identify people who had possible links to the LTTE, which would require the authorities to know people's true identities, and that the army, in control of the camp, could have, and I find would have, compelled him to present his ID card. I find that the applicant has fabricated this claim.45.I do not accept that the applicant escaped from the camp. The applicant was unable to describe in any convincing detail how he escaped. I asked him to try and describe the escape in detail but he was unable to provide more than general statements about getting out. He was unable to describe how the solder showed him to get out, how he was able to pass through a fence he said was electrified, and then some form of sharpened wire fencing. He was unable to describe how the wire was moved or cut or how a way was made for him and his boss to pass through. Despite passing through the fencing he was unable to provide any details about these things. This is despite me telling the applicant at the beginning of the hearing, and when asking him about his claimed escape, to describe events in as much detail as he could. When I noted that I had concerns with the vagueness of his claim of escape and noted that I may reach a view that he and his boss had been released, without a bribe, rather than escaped from the camp, the applicant said that I had asked different questions to those asked previously. His representative noted that the applicant had been through traumatic experiences and this may affect recall. I have also had regard to the reports from Foundation house. However, I find that in this case the lack of detail and a plausible description of how he and his boss escaped from the camp lead me to disbelieve this claim. When I put this together with my findings below in relation to what he claims to have done after escaping, I find that the applicant and his boss did not escape from the army camp but were released, because they were of no interest to the authorities. I do not accept that the applicant's boss or the applicant had to pay a bribe to anyone to escape or be released.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Hill also made extensive oral arguments responding to the specifics of the interpretation and to the oral arguments advanced by Ms Costello.Consideration It is clear that the adequacy of interpretation of a hearing will depend on the circumstances of a particular case: see SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142; (2013) 219 FCR 212 (SZRMQ) per Allsop CJ at [5]. At [9], Allsop CJ found as follows:The question whether standards of interpretation have affected a hearing as an opportunity to be heard is a question of evaluation as to whether the hearing was fair. That in turn involves the recognition of the purpose of the hearing: to give the person concerned or affected by the exercise of power a real opportunity to place before the repository of the power such information as is relevant. This will require a substantially effective mechanism of communicating oral and written information, both from, and to, the person. To the extent that interpretation or translation is necessary, it must be adequate to convey the substance of what is said, to a degree that the hearing can be described both as real and fair. It will be a matter of evaluation in all the circumstances, by reference to the issues, the nature of the evidence, the character and frequency of any proven errors in interpretation, and any other factor apparently relevant to the quality of the communication, as to whether the hearing was fair. Relevant to the task will be how the decision-maker approached the resolution of the task before her or him. The “Hearing Record” of the 30 April 2015 hearing appears at AB 183. The interpreter is identified but no details of their NAATI level or accreditation number, if any, is recorded. Ms Costello submitted from the bar table that a search had been made of the NATTI public register and no person with the name of the interpreter appears. The Minister did not suggest otherwise. I proceed on the basis that it is open to the Court to infer that the interpreter who assisted during the hearing of 30 April 2015 was not a formally accredited interpreter. The “Hearing Record” of the 22 May 2015 and 18 May 2016 Tribunal hearings appear at AB 204 and AB 222 respectively. The interpreters for both hearings each identified that they had NAATI Level 2 accreditation in Sri Lankan Tamil. However I note that the evidence (KR4) establishes that Mr Ramalingam who interpreted at the third hearing only very shortly afterwards in December 2016 achieved NAATI level 3 (professional) accreditation. I proceed on the basis that it is not contentious that the interpreter provided for the first Tribunal hearing (on 30 April 2015) did not hold NAATI accreditation and that the interpreters provided at the second and third Tribunal hearings (22 May 2015 and 18 May 2016) each held “Level 2” accreditation in Sri Lankan Tamil, equivalent to a “paraprofessional” accreditation, which is a level below that of “professional”, the standard that NAATI considers to be required for interpretation of court proceedings.