Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 3

Citation: Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 3
Appeal from: Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 432
Parties: EINAV KEDEM v JOHNSONS LAWYERS
File number: SAD 117 of 2013
Judges: NORTH, BARKER AND KATZMANN JJ
Date of judgment: 5 February 2014
Catchwords:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – Appeal from judgment dismissing application to extend time for instituting action – whether primary judge erred in dismissing the application – claims statute barred – Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), s 48 – appellant aware of material facts before expiration of limitation period – appellant’s failure to commence action within limitation period not result of the respondent’s conduct – not just to grant extension of time – Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), s 45 – appellant not under legal disability – principles on appeal – primary judge’s conclusions open on the facts – no error.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application to adduce further evidence on appeal – Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 27 – principles – discretion – considerations – interests of justice – delay in making application – no sufficient explanation as to why evidence was not adduced below – further evidence would not have produced a different result if it had been adduced at trial – application refused.

Legislation: Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) ss 35, 45, 48
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 25, 37M
Cases cited: Adam P Browne Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170
August v Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 2013 ATC ¶20-406; [2013] FCAFC 85
Branir Pty Limited v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424
CDJ v VAJ (No 1) (1998) 197 CLR 172
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1
Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 739
Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2012] FMCA 1118
Keefe v Marks (1989) 16 NSWLR 713
Sobey v Nicol and Davies as Joint and Several Receivers and Managers of the Property of Mercorella and the Scheme and as Joint and Several Liquidators of the Scheme (2007) 245 ALR 389; [2007] FCAFC 136
Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491
Date of hearing: 18 November 2013
Place: Adelaide
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 122
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person.
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J James
Solicitor for the Respondent: Johnson Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

SAD 117 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

EINAV KEDEM
Appellant

AND:

JOHNSONS LAWYERS
Respondent

JUDGES:

NORTH, BARKER AND KATZMANN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

18 NOVEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCAFC 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd involved an appeal against the dismissal of an application to extend the time for instituting an action against the respondent, a firm of solicitors. The appellant, Mr Kedem, alleged professional negligence by the respondent in relation to a Supreme Court action, which he claimed was statute-barred. The primary judge dismissed the application to extend the time for instituting the action, finding that the causes of action were statute-barred under the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), s 48. The appellant also sought to adduce further evidence on appeal, which was refused.

The court considered whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the application to extend time, and whether the decision to order a separate trial of the limitation issues was erroneous. The court found that the primary judge's decision was based on the fact that the appellant was aware of the material facts before the expiration of the limitation period, and his failure to commence the action was not due to the respondent's conduct. The court also held that the decision to order a separate trial of the limitation issues was a discretionary decision concerning a matter of practice and procedure, and the appellant failed to show that there was an error of principle or that it resulted in a substantial injustice.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and the interlocutory application. The court's decision was based on the principles of limitation of actions, the appellant's knowledge of the material facts, and the considerations of cost, efficiency, and case management in exercising the court's powers.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The interlocutory application filed by the appellant on 7 November 2013 be dismissed.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal including its costs of defending the interlocutory application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal against those orders. The grounds of appeal are largely uninformative. Ground 1 pleads that the primary judge erred in fact and law and based his decision on “the false documents & information & arguments” submitted by Johnson and proffered to the court in later proceedings before another judge. Ground 2 complains of a decision of a judge of the District Court of South Australia to refuse to order discovery at a time when the action would not have been statute-barred. Ground 3 reads: “the rest of the grounds are in the attachment affidavit”. We will return to the contents of the affidavit shortly but first it is necessary to set out the background to the dispute so far as it is relevant to the appeal. BACKGROUND In March 2004 Pepper Finance Corporation (“Pepper”) lent Mr Kedem money on security of a mortgage over certain properties. The loan was for a period of 12 months. After a fire broke out in one of the properties Mr Kedem defaulted on interest payments due under the mortgage and in September Pepper applied to the Supreme Court for an order for possession. The following month Mr Kedem received an insurance payout of just under $130,000 and on 18 October 2004 Pepper offered to adjourn its claim for three months and not to restore it if, by 22 October 2004, Mr Kedem paid the interest arrears of $18,972, costs of $2,597 and fees of $520, maintained regular payments of interest, and applied the proceeds of the insurance settlement to reinstating the damaged property. Mr Kedem, through his then solicitors (not Johnson), rejected the offer the next day (19 October 2004) and made a counter-offer which Pepper rejected. Mr Kedem then wrote personally to Pepper’s solicitors purporting to accept their original offer (the one his former solicitors had rejected) and three days later paid the arrears of interest, costs and fees that Pepper had sought in that offer. Mr Kedem later complained that despite the fact that he had paid this money, Pepper continued to charge him at the default rate and did not discontinue the Supreme Court proceedings in accordance with what he said was the agreement. Mr Kedem then successively engaged two further firms of solicitors in relation to the Supreme Court action. By 28 June 2005 they had both ceased to act for him. The Supreme Court action was proceeding. In the meantime the date for repayment of the loan (19 March 2005) had passed and had not been extended. Mr Kedem first consulted Johnson on 30 June 2005 in connection with the Supreme Court proceedings – two working days before the hearing was due to start. He paid various amounts into the firm’s trust accounts. On 4 July 2005 a Master (Judge Withers) heard the application for possession. Judgment was reserved. After the hearing, counsel advised Johnson that it would be a good time to seek to negotiate a settlement of the action. Mr Kedem claims that he instructed Johnson to tell counsel to settle but that Johnson did not comply with his instructions.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Mr Kedem also argued that his Honour could not have known whether, and did not have a basis on which to conclude that, the offer he wanted Johnson to make would not have been accepted. He stated that the primary judge did not give him the opportunity to go to court to have that issue resolved, but had merely assumed that he would fail.THE APPLICATION TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE ON THE APPEAL By an interlocutory application filed on 7 November 2013 (six business days before the appeal was listed for hearing) Mr Kedem applied to tender three volumes of evidence containing 64 documents. According to the affidavit filed in support of the application, the evidence consists of medical evidence about injuries he received in the motor vehicle accident in February 2011, evidence relating to complaints he made to the Legal Practitioners Board, transcripts of hearings in the District Court of South Australia and various invoices and other accounting records issued by or belonging to Johnson. Although the affidavit appears to have been prepared by a lawyer, no attempt was made to relate the documents to the issues on the appeal. Several of the documents were in fact before the primary judge. In respect of them, no application was necessary. If they were relevant, they should have been included in Part C of the appeal book. We will treat them as though they were. Volume 1 consisted of an affidavit affirmed by Mr Kedem on 10 July 2013 in the South Australian Supreme Court apparently in support of an application in that court to set aside the judgment of Judge Lunn, annexing various documents and repeating the complaints made to the primary judge. Eleven of the 15 annexures were before the primary judge. Those which were not are an affidavit filed on behalf of Johnson in the Supreme Court (annexing various documents including bills of costs, the retainer agreement with Mr Kedem, correspondence between Johnson and Mr Kedem and a fee ledger) and correspondence between the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board and Mr Kedem (relating to his complaints about his former solicitor, Robert Chrzaszcz, and Johnson). Fifteen, possibly 16, of the 22 sets of documents in the second volume were in evidence before the primary judge. Those which were not are: an affidavit affirmed by Mr Kedem and filed in the Supreme Court on 9 August 2013; a medical report from a Dr Chen (a registered practitioner of Chinese medicine) dated 8 August 2013 relating to the effects of the stroke; a letter from the registry of the South Australian Supreme Court acceding to Mr Kedem’s request for a fee waiver; an undated document containing a record of fees owed to Johnson; email correspondence between Mr Kedem and Mr Lazarevich; and an extract of a transcript of the hearing before Bampton DCJ. Volume 3 contained 24 sets of documents, four of which were before the primary judge in their entirety, others only in part. The documents that were not before the primary judge consisted of a number of informal requests Mr Kedem made to Johnson for discovery; several affidavits filed in the Supreme Court; transcripts of hearings in the District Court; an application to adjourn a callover in the Magistrates Court; correspondence between the civil registry of the District Court and Mr Kedem; correspondence between Mr Chrzaszcz and Mr Kedem; correspondence between the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board and Mr Kedem; a tax invoice of Mr Lazarevich to Terry Charatsis; a sealed copy of Mr Kedem’s defence and counterclaim in the Pepper action; various medical reports relating to the motor vehicle accident; and a letter from an anaesthetist to Mr Kedem requesting consent to payment of his fees for an operation in September 2012.

Decision

Reasons for decision

As the primary judge’s decision on the question of discretion was based only on the first three reasons he set out at [96]‑[98], it is unnecessary to say anything about his Honour’s observations about the consequences of any failure to put a settlement offer. CONCLUSION For all these reasons the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In addition, the evidence relating to the motor vehicle accident does not explain the delay. Furthermore, it smacks of recent invention. Had Mr Kedem’s injuries or the treatment he was receiving for them affected his capacity to bring proceedings against Johnson, it is inconceivable that he would not have referred to them in the court below.CONSIDERATION As we have already mentioned, Mr Kedem did not argue that the primary judge was wrong to conclude that the causes of action were statute-barred. The appeal was concerned only with the decision to refuse an extension of time to sue at common law. The order for a separate trial The complaint about the order for a separate trial was not the subject of a ground of appeal. The submission was therefore irrelevant. That is sufficient of itself to dispose of the argument. In any event, the submission was never developed. There is nothing to indicate that Mr Kedem opposed the making of the order. He does not say so. Having regard to the breadth of Mr Kedem’s application and the considerations of cost, efficiency and case management which s 37M of the FCA Act requires the Court to take into account in exercising its powers, his Honour’s decision to make the order is entirely understandable. The decision to order a separate trial of the limitation issues was a discretionary decision concerning a matter of practice and procedure. Appellate courts are particularly cautious about reviewing decisions of this kind. The appellant must show that there has been an error of principle and that the error has resulted in a substantial injustice: Adam P Browne Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 177. Mr Kedem failed to show that the decision was affected by any error of principle. Moreover, we do not consider that, if there were any such error, it resulted in a substantial injustice. For all these reasons the submission must be rejected.Section 48(3)(b)(i) of the Limitation Act Mr Kedem’s case was that he gave certain instructions to Johnson to settle the Pepper action and that Johnson failed to act on those instructions, that Johnson was negligent in the presentation of the argument to the Supreme Court, and that Johnson failed to bring a counterclaim. Mr Kedem did not contest the finding that he knew in July 2005 that Johnson had failed to follow his instructions to make an offer of settlement to Pepper. Indeed, he was in no position to contest the finding. His emails to Johnson of 29 and 30 July 2005 made that very allegation. As the primary judge pointed out at [106], Mr Kedem swore affidavits on 4 and 28 July 2011 in support of the application to set aside the taxation of costs which disclosed his claims against Johnson as a basis for his dispute over the payment of costs. These affidavits were filed before the end of the limitation period. The primary judge did not advert specifically to Mr Kedem’s complaint relating to negligence in the presentation of the argument. Rather, his Honour referred in a general sense to the allegation of negligence “in [the] conduct of the Supreme Court action” (for example, in [92]). We were taken to no evidence to suggest that Mr Kedem was unaware of the material facts in relation to this aspect of his claim and Mr Kedem made no submissions on the subject. In any event, that part of his case would be doomed to fail, as Johnson would be immune from such a suit: Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543; D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1. See also Keefe v Marks (1989) 16 NSWLR 713 at 718 per Gleeson CJ.