FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 3
Citation: Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 3 Appeal from: Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 432 Parties: EINAV KEDEM v JOHNSONS LAWYERS File number: SAD 117 of 2013 Judges: NORTH, BARKER AND KATZMANN JJ Date of judgment: 5 February 2014 Catchwords: LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – Appeal from judgment dismissing application to extend time for instituting action – whether primary judge erred in dismissing the application – claims statute barred – Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), s 48 – appellant aware of material facts before expiration of limitation period – appellant’s failure to commence action within limitation period not result of the respondent’s conduct – not just to grant extension of time – Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA), s 45 – appellant not under legal disability – principles on appeal – primary judge’s conclusions open on the facts – no error.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application to adduce further evidence on appeal – Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 27 – principles – discretion – considerations – interests of justice – delay in making application – no sufficient explanation as to why evidence was not adduced below – further evidence would not have produced a different result if it had been adduced at trial – application refused.
Legislation: Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) ss 35, 45, 48
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 25, 37MCases cited: Adam P Browne Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170
August v Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 2013 ATC ¶20-406; [2013] FCAFC 85
Branir Pty Limited v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424
CDJ v VAJ (No 1) (1998) 197 CLR 172
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1
Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 739
Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2012] FMCA 1118
Keefe v Marks (1989) 16 NSWLR 713
Sobey v Nicol and Davies as Joint and Several Receivers and Managers of the Property of Mercorella and the Scheme and as Joint and Several Liquidators of the Scheme (2007) 245 ALR 389; [2007] FCAFC 136
Water Board v Moustakas (1988) 180 CLR 491Date of hearing: 18 November 2013 Place: Adelaide Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 122 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person. Counsel for the Respondent: Mr J James Solicitor for the Respondent: Johnson Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
SAD 117 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: EINAV KEDEM
AppellantAND: JOHNSONS LAWYERS
Respondent
JUDGES:
NORTH, BARKER AND KATZMANN JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
18 NOVEMBER 2013
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory application…
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- Case
- [2014] FCAFC 3
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the application to extend time, and whether the decision to order a separate trial of the limitation issues was erroneous. The court found that the primary judge's decision was based on the fact that the appellant was aware of the material facts before the expiration of the limitation period, and his failure to commence the action was not due to the respondent's conduct. The court also held that the decision to order a separate trial of the limitation issues was a discretionary decision concerning a matter of practice and procedure, and the appellant failed to show that there was an error of principle or that it resulted in a substantial injustice.
In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal and the interlocutory application. The court's decision was based on the principles of limitation of actions, the appellant's knowledge of the material facts, and the considerations of cost, efficiency, and case management in exercising the court's powers.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The interlocutory application filed by the appellant on 7 November 2013 be dismissed.
2. The appeal be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal including its costs of defending the interlocutory application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In addition, the evidence relating to the motor vehicle accident does not explain the delay. Furthermore, it smacks of recent invention. Had Mr Kedem’s injuries or the treatment he was receiving for them affected his capacity to bring proceedings against Johnson, it is inconceivable that he would not have referred to them in the court below.CONSIDERATION As we have already mentioned, Mr Kedem did not argue that the primary judge was wrong to conclude that the causes of action were statute-barred. The appeal was concerned only with the decision to refuse an extension of time to sue at common law. The order for a separate trial The complaint about the order for a separate trial was not the subject of a ground of appeal. The submission was therefore irrelevant. That is sufficient of itself to dispose of the argument. In any event, the submission was never developed. There is nothing to indicate that Mr Kedem opposed the making of the order. He does not say so. Having regard to the breadth of Mr Kedem’s application and the considerations of cost, efficiency and case management which s 37M of the FCA Act requires the Court to take into account in exercising its powers, his Honour’s decision to make the order is entirely understandable. The decision to order a separate trial of the limitation issues was a discretionary decision concerning a matter of practice and procedure. Appellate courts are particularly cautious about reviewing decisions of this kind. The appellant must show that there has been an error of principle and that the error has resulted in a substantial injustice: Adam P Browne Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170 at 177. Mr Kedem failed to show that the decision was affected by any error of principle. Moreover, we do not consider that, if there were any such error, it resulted in a substantial injustice. For all these reasons the submission must be rejected.Section 48(3)(b)(i) of the Limitation Act Mr Kedem’s case was that he gave certain instructions to Johnson to settle the Pepper action and that Johnson failed to act on those instructions, that Johnson was negligent in the presentation of the argument to the Supreme Court, and that Johnson failed to bring a counterclaim. Mr Kedem did not contest the finding that he knew in July 2005 that Johnson had failed to follow his instructions to make an offer of settlement to Pepper. Indeed, he was in no position to contest the finding. His emails to Johnson of 29 and 30 July 2005 made that very allegation. As the primary judge pointed out at [106], Mr Kedem swore affidavits on 4 and 28 July 2011 in support of the application to set aside the taxation of costs which disclosed his claims against Johnson as a basis for his dispute over the payment of costs. These affidavits were filed before the end of the limitation period. The primary judge did not advert specifically to Mr Kedem’s complaint relating to negligence in the presentation of the argument. Rather, his Honour referred in a general sense to the allegation of negligence “in [the] conduct of the Supreme Court action” (for example, in [92]). We were taken to no evidence to suggest that Mr Kedem was unaware of the material facts in relation to this aspect of his claim and Mr Kedem made no submissions on the subject. In any event, that part of his case would be doomed to fail, as Johnson would be immune from such a suit: Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543; D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1. See also Keefe v Marks (1989) 16 NSWLR 713 at 718 per Gleeson CJ.