AJQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AJQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 244

Appeal from: AJQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 661
File number: QUD 117 of 2017
Judge: KERR  J
Date of judgment: 7 March 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in failing to find that the Tribunal did not discharge its statutory obligation of review – whether Tribunal failed to satisfy itself that the appellant feared persecution for a convention reason – whether appellant would face a real risk of harm if returned to Sri Lanka – whether Tribunal failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to an integer of claim apparent on the material before it – appeal allowed – decision quashed and review remitted for reconsideration according to law

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – circumstances in which a court may grant leave to an appellant to rely on grounds of appeal not advanced in the court below – appellant unrepresented in court below – appeal proposed seeking to raise a “pure question of law” – opposition confined to merits – merits established – leave granted

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 36
Cases cited:

AJQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 661

Coshott v Crouch [2017] FCAFC 135

Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; (1986) 162 CLR 1

Mercer Superannuation (Australia) Limited v Billinghurst [2017] FCAFC 201

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2017] FCAFC 33; (2017) 248 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2017] HCATrans 191

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39; (2009) 83 ALJR 1123

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559

SZSFS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 534; (2015) 232 FCR 262

Date of hearing: 27 February 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 70
Counsel for the Appellant: Dr A McBeth
Solicitor for the Appellant: Wimal & Associates
Counsel for the First Appellant: Mr T Goodwin
Solicitor for the First Appellant: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

QUD 117 of 2017
BETWEEN:

AJQ16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KERR  J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Appellant have leave to rely on his amended notice of appeal in the form filed as a draft on 30 January 2018.

2.The appeal be granted.

3.The decision of the Second Respondent to affirm the delegate’s decision be quashed and the review remitted to the Second Respondent for determination according to law.

4.The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal.

5.The parties to file and serve submissions limited to 1 page,…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 244
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of AJQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, who had fled Sri Lanka, challenging a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to affirm the delegate's decision that he did not qualify for a protection visa. The appellant argued that the Tribunal failed to properly consider his claims and that he would face a real risk of harm if returned to Sri Lanka. The appeal was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had properly discharged its statutory obligation of review and whether it had failed to satisfy itself that the appellant feared persecution for a convention reason. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the Tribunal had failed to give proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to an integer of the appellant's claim that was apparent on the material before it. The court also had to determine whether to grant leave for the appellant to rely on grounds of appeal not raised in the court below.

The court found that the Tribunal had not properly discharged its statutory obligation of review, as it had failed to satisfy itself that the appellant feared persecution for a convention reason. The Tribunal had accepted that the appellant had been interrogated and mistreated by Sri Lankan authorities in June 2012, but it had been uncertain of the reason for that interrogation and mistreatment. The court held that the Tribunal's uncertainty as to the reason for the interrogation and mistreatment meant that it had not properly considered the appellant's claims for protection and complementary protection. The court also found that the Tribunal had not given proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to an integer of the appellant's claim that was apparent on the material before it.

The court granted leave for the appellant to rely on grounds of appeal not raised in the court below, as the appeal proposed to raise a "pure question of law" and the opposition was confined to the merits. The court held that the merits of the ground proposed were established and that the appeal should therefore be allowed. The decision of the Minister to affirm the delegate's decision was quashed, and the review was remitted to the Minister for determination according to law. The Minister was also ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal. The parties were directed to file and serve one-page submissions on whether the costs order made by the primary judge in a previous case should be disturbed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Appellant have leave to rely on his amended notice of appeal in the form filed as a draft on 30 January 2018.

2. The appeal be granted.

3. The decision of the Second Respondent to affirm the delegate’s decision be quashed and the review remitted to the Second Respondent for determination according to law.

4. The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal.

5. The parties to file and serve submissions limited to 1 page, excluding lists of authorities, within 7 days from the date of this order as to whether the costs order made by the primary judge in AJQ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 661 should be disturbed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Having regard to the reasoning in SZSFS and the conclusions I have reached as to the merits of the ground proposed, I would grant leave to the Appellant to rely on his proposed amended ground of appeal notwithstanding that it was not agitated in the court below. Factual background The Tribunal accepted that the Appellant’s friend was murdered in 2006; that the Appellant had been one of the last people who had been with him before he was killed; and that the Appellant had been questioned in October and November 2006 in relation to his friend’s murder. It accepted that he had been required by the Sri Lankan Army to remain in Point Pedro for a short time after his friend’s death. However, it was satisfied that since then he not been the subject of further adverse attention from the Sri Lankan authorities until the events described below. In June 2012 the Appellant was interrogated and brutally mistreated by different elements of the Sri Lankan Army. He told the Tribunal that he had been interrogated about his suspected involvement in his friend’s murder. The Tribunal accepted his account of having been interrogated and mistreated but disbelieved his explanation for that having occurred. The Tribunal put various other hypotheses to the Appellant, all of which he rejected. It concluded that what had happened to him in 2012 was “not for any reason he put to the Tribunal.” The Tribunal then reasoned as follows at [68]:Given the Tribunal is uncertain why the [Appellant] was questioned in June 2012, I am satisfied it was not for any reason that would now give rise to protection obligations. Having regard to the context in which that conclusion appears in the Tribunal’s reasons it is clear that the Tribunal’s reference in that paragraph to “any reason that would now give rise to protection obligations” was to those as might meet the criterion of s 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The Tribunal discussed complimentary protection later in its reasons. The Appellant fled Sri Lanka shortly after that event, arriving in Australia in August of that year. The gravamen of this appeal The attack that is made on the Tribunal’s decision is that, having found that the Appellant was interrogated and mistreated by Sri Lankan authorities in June 2012, but uncertain of the reason for that interrogation and mistreatment, the Tribunal, by rejecting his claims for protection and complimentary protection notwithstanding, had failed to discharge its statutory obligation to complete its review according to law. It is therefore appropriate to set out the Tribunal’s findings with respect to that contention. The Tribunal’s reasons with regard such claims for protection as the Appellant advanced in reliance of s 36(2) of the Act are at [63] to [69]:63.The [Appellant] then said that after returning to Sri Lanka from India in December 2011, he was subjected to another of his “regular interrogations in June 2012”. On 5 June 2012, the [Appellant] reported to the SLA camp and was interrogated by different officers. He said they were “extremely harsh on the torture they subjected him to [and he] feared they were going to kill him”. One of the officers said he knew the [Appellant] knew who [X]’s murderer was, and that the [Appellant] was simply refusing to tell them. After being released on this occasion the [Appellant] decided it was time to flee Sri Lanka. On 27 July 2012, the [Appellant] illegally departed Sri Lanka by boat. 64.As stated above, by migration agent submission dated 19 March 2015, it was submitted inter alia that it was “difficult to make a subjective assessment of the intention of the SLA [for] failing to arrest the [Appellant].” The Tribunal accepts this to be true, however a critical part of any refugee protection process involves establishing the facts; and assessing credibility is a critical part of the process for establishing the facts. That said, the Tribunal accepts the Sri Lankan authorities have acted in a brutal and arbitrary manner (particularly prior to and in the immediate aftermath of, the cessation of the civil war in May 2009). However, and as stated above, I do not accept it [is] plausible the [Appellant] was regularly questioned about the October 2006 death of [X] up to [and] including mid-2012. I am satisfied the [Appellant] was not questioned about the incident, at least in the 4 years leading up to his July 2012 departure from Sri Lanka.65.The Tribunal is also satisfied the [Appellant’s] claim that “maybe” [X] was important to inter alia the Sri Lankan authorities, is speculation on his part, and I also do not accept this overcomes the Tribunal’s other adverse findings herein.66.Next, regarding the June 2012 interrogation, the [Appellant] explained at hearing this was particularly brutal, and again he was questioned about the death of [X]. He was at that time accused of being with the LTTE (and given the material findings herein, even if this was stated, I am not satisfied this was a serious accusation); he was accused of murdering [X] (and given the material findings herein, I reject this as false). The [Appellant] said the SLA officer who interrogated him was new, and that might be why he was so brutal. He also said (words to the effect) that “maybe” pressure had been put in the SLA to “solve” the crime.67.For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal is not satisfied the [Appellant] was subject to ongoing questioning about the October 2006 death of [X]. Neither am I satisfied this was the reason for his interrogation in June 2012. On my understanding of the available country circumstances, it might be plausible the [Appellant] had come to the adverse attention of local SLA personnel (ie arising from personal animosity – or due to some isolated incident) and he was thus subject to mistreatment. However, the [Appellant] did not agree with this and said this was not the reason for the harm). In the circumstances, the Tribunal has not found the [Appellant] was subject to some form of personal animosity with a local SLA person, or local Sri Lankan government official in his home area, being Point Pedro.68.That said, based on the findings herein, including the adverse credibility findings, the Tribunal is not satisfied that an essential and significant part of the reason for questioning the [Appellant] in June 2012, related to the October 2006 death of [X]. The Tribunal is satisfied this is untrue. However, the Tribunal proposes to accept the [Appellant] was interrogated and mistreated in June 2012, but not for any reason he put to the Tribunal. Given the Tribunal is uncertain why the [Appellant] was questioned in June 2012, I am not satisfied it was for any reason that would now give rise to protection obligations in Australia.69.The Tribunal does not accept the [Appellant] has a real chance of persecution in Sri Lanka for any matter discussed above.(Footnotes omitted.)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established