SZTFI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTFI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 322

Citation: SZTFI v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 322
Appeal from: SZTFI & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 740
Parties: SZTFI and SZTFJ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 439 of 2014
Judge: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 8 April 2015
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of Refugee Review Tribunal decision  – where claim to fear persecution by reason of actual/imputed political opinion - whether Tribunal properly applied ‘real chance’ test – whether generalised findings embraced particular claim to fear risk of harm – where Tribunal considered risk of harm in leaving country of nationality only at time of departure - where failure to consider whether unexplained absence from State employment for significant period may give rise to risk of persecution when assessed with claims assumed as correct – where Tribunal’s failure to consider fear of future persecution following lengthy absence from employment amounted to jurisdictional error

MIGRATION – whether real risk that appellant will suffer significant harm engaging complementary protection obligations – whether failure to consider clearly articulated claim – where Tribunal correct to proceed on basis that appellant’s claims to fear persecution as a spy failed for the same reasons as his imputed political opinion claims

MIGRATION –whether primary judge erred in considering whether the claim to fear persecution took the form of repressed behaviour about which the appellant desired to be more open –where correct approach is to consider the appellant’s reasons for keeping his political opinions to himself if returned

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 36(2A), 65, 91R, 415
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37AF

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954)
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967)

Cases cited: Collector Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 322; (1993) 43 FCR 280
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSCA [2014] HCA 45; (2014) 89 ALJR 47
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam [1999] FCA 719; (1999) 93 FCR 220
NABD of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 29; (2005) 79 ALJR 1142
S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 71; (2003) 216 CLR 473
SASHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 125; (2013) 138 ALD 26
SZTFI & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 740
SZATV v Minister for…
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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 322
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a citizen of [country of nationality], appealed against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming the decision of the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister) to refuse the grant of protection visas. The Tribunal held that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion, or for fear of significant harm. The appellant claimed that he feared being persecuted for his political opinions and ideological views and that he would be charged with being a spy if he returned to his country of nationality. The primary judge dismissed the appeal and the appellant sought leave to appeal to the High Court. The primary issue for the court was whether the Tribunal properly applied the ‘real chance’ test in assessing whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution. The court considered whether the Tribunal was required to assess whether there was a real chance of persecution on the assumption that the appellant's claims were accepted as correct. The court held that the Tribunal was required to make such an assessment, but had failed to do so. The court also considered whether the Tribunal's generalised findings embraced the appellant's particular claim to fear risk of harm. The court held that the Tribunal's failure to consider the risk of harm in leaving the country of nationality at the time of departure amounted to a jurisdictional error. The court also considered whether the Tribunal failed to consider whether the appellant's unexplained absence from State employment for a significant period may give rise to a risk of persecution when assessed with the claims assumed as correct. The court held that this amounted to a jurisdictional error. The court further considered whether the Tribunal failed to consider the appellant's fear of future persecution following his lengthy absence from employment, which also amounted to a jurisdictional error. Finally, the court considered whether the Tribunal failed to consider the appellant's clearly articulated claim to fear persecution as a spy, which also amounted to a jurisdictional error. The appeal was allowed and the orders of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing the appellant's application and ordering that the appellant pay the Minister's costs of the application were set aside. An order in the nature of certiorari was made quashing the decision of the Tribunal and an order in the nature of mandamus was made requiring the Tribunal to determine the appellants' application for review according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal and of the application in the Federal Circuit Court. These reasons are not to be disclosed until 4pm on Wednesday 15 April 2015 other than to the parties and their external legal representatives, and the Court. The parties are to advise the associate to Justice Perry and each other of any concerns as to details contained in the judgment which might tend to identify the appellants. There be liberty to apply on short notice for any extension of the order.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court on 11 April 2014 dismissing the appellants’ application and ordering that the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application are set aside.

3. An order in the nature of certiorari is made quashing the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 1 August 2013 affirming the decision to refuse protection visas to the appellants.

4. An order in the nature of mandamus is made requiring the Refugee Review Tribunal to determine the appellants’ application for review according to law.

5. The first respondent is to pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal and of the application in the Federal Circuit Court.

6. Pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), and on the grounds that the order is necessary to protect the safety of the appellants, these reasons are not to be disclosed until 4pm on Wednesday 15 April 2015 other than to:

a) the parties and their external legal representatives; and

b) the Court.

7. On or before 4pm on Wednesday 15 April 2015, the parties are to advise the associate to Justice Perry and each other of any concerns as to details contained in the judgment which might tend to identify the appellants.

8. There be liberty to apply on short notice for any extension of the order referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The delegate refused the applications for protection visas on 29 August 2012.2.2 The Tribunal’s decision2.2.1The appellant’s claims before the Tribunal The appellants applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision on 28 September 2012. The appellant was interviewed by the Tribunal on 3 May 2013 with the assistance of an interpreter. His claims can be summarised as follows. 1.He joined SA1 in [X year] and remained a member until he retired in [X year].2.All telephone calls, contacts and movements of members of SA1 were monitored by intelligence services within SA1 who tried to purify SA1 internally from all opposition. 3.On retirement, he felt compelled to join SA2, a government militia for retired SA1 members.4.After he joined SA2, he was required to train for anti-demonstration activities.5.To avoid participating in those activities, he resigned from SA2 and re-joined SA1. He had no choice when he re-joined SA1 but to agree to a contract of service for a minimum of four years.6.He attended a meeting with other members of SA1 in which a public official spoke. As a result of an incident at the meeting, a friend was arrested. Later, the appellant was questioned by intelligence services of the country of nationality, at the end of which he felt compelled to sign a declaration of loyalty and to agree to keep secret the arrest of his friend.7.Sometime later, he decided to visit relatives in Australia. As a member of SA1, he was not permitted to travel in and out of his country of nationality for a certain period of time but, after discovering that his name was not on a travel ban list, he left on a return airfare to Australia for one month.8.He feared being “persecuted for having political opinion against the [country of nationality’s] current regime and my Ideologies and political views that have been revealed to the authorities of my country”.9.He also claimed fear of significant harm in the country of nationality because he “believed he would be charged with being a spy on [his] return”.10.He further claimed that shortly after leaving his country of nationality, his departure was detected by SA1 and a number of events occurred leading him to believe that he would be persecuted if he returned. These events included a raid on his home as a consequence of which his diary, in which he claimed to write every day, together with other anti-regime materials, were found. He also claimed that summonses were issued for his wife and son to appear in court. On 1 August 2013 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the grant of the protection visas. 2.2.2The issues identified by the Tribunal The Tribunal was satisfied that the appellant claimed to fear persecution (arrest, imprisonment or a death sentence) for a reason under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention), namely, his concern that a political opinion may be imputed to him against the current regime in his country of nationality.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge rejected each of these grounds and dismissed the appeal. It is convenient to consider his Honour’s reasons for so doing in the context of considering the grounds of appeal. 3. CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL3.1 Ground 1: Did the Tribunal properly apply the ‘real chance’ test?3.1.1Relevant principles In conducting its review, the Tribunal is required to consider whether the applicant is “… a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the [Tribunal] is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol” (ss 36(2)(a) and 415 of the Act). This requires, subject to various qualifications in the Act, that the Tribunal be satisfied that the applicant is a refugee as defined in Article 1A(2) of the Convention, namely, a person who (relevantly):owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country… (emphasis added) If so satisfied, the Tribunal must grant the visa under s 65 of the Act. The question raised by ground 1 of the appeal is whether the Tribunal was required, but failed, to assess whether there was a “well-founded fear” (or real chance) of persecution by reason of imputed political opinion on certain assumptions set out at [35] below. No issue was taken by the parties as to the principles by which the Tribunal must assess whether there is a well-founded fear as set out by the primary judge at [18]-[26] of his reasons. Those principles are well settled and may be summarised as follows. First, a determination of whether a (subjective) fear is (objectively) “well-founded” requires the Tribunal to assess what will occur in the future. A fear is “well-founded” when there is “a real substantial basis for it”, even though the chance of the fear eventuating is less than 50 per cent: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; (1997) 191 CLR 559 (Guo) at 572 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). Conversely, a fear of persecution is not well-founded “if it is merely assumed or if it is mere speculation.”: ibid. In this regard, the joint judgment in Guo held that, when properly understood as a clarification of the phrase ‘well-founded’, application of the so-called “real chance” test will generally lead to the same result as a direct application of that phrase. Nonetheless, their Honours cautioned that it should not be used as a replacement or in substitution for the terms of the Convention (ibid). Secondly, in forming an opinion as to whether there is a real chance of persecution for a Convention reason, the Tribunal may be required to make findings about past events. As the joint judgment held in Guo at 574, “[p]ast events are not a certain guide to the future, but in many areas of life proof that events have occurred often provides a reliable basis for determining the probability – high or low – of their occurrence.” Thus, in the context of applying the definition of a refugee in the Convention, the joint judgment held at 575:Determining whether there is a real chance that something will occur requires an estimation of the likelihood that one or more events will give rise to the occurrence of that thing. In many if not most cases, determining what is likely to occur in the future will require findings as to what has occurred in the past because what has occurred in the past is likely to be the most reliable guide as to what will happen in the future. It is therefore ordinarily an integral part of the process of making a determination concerning the chance of something occurring in the future that conclusions are formed concerning past events.