Toma v Workforce Recruitment and Labour Services Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Toma v Workforce Recruitment and Labour Services Pty Ltd [2022] FCAFC 100  

Appeal from: Toma v Workforce Recruitment and Labour Services Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1102
File number(s): NSD 1041 of 2020
Judgment of: RANGIAH, SC DERRINGTON AND ABRAHAM JJ
Date of judgment: 8 June 2022
Catchwords:

INDUSTRIAL LAW – unfair dismissal – whether primary judge denied appellant opportunity to run his case – whether primary judge erred in failing to find inadequate translation at directions hearing denied appellant procedural fairness – whether findings made by primary judge relating to return to work plan and identity of employer supported by the evidence – whether primary judge distracted

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether Court should permit issue of subpoena to receive fresh evidence on appeal – whether new evidence would have led to a different result at trial

COSTS – whether usual orders as to costs in Fair Work jurisdiction ought be departed from pursuant to s 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) – whether appeal pursued without reasonable cause or vexatiously

Legislation:

Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) ss 394, 570

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Cases cited:

Altintas v O’Dea Lawyers (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 187

Communications Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union v Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 148

District Council of Streaky Bay v Wilson [2021] FCAFC 181; 394 ALR 33

Loi Toma v Workforce Recruitment and Labour Services Pty Ltd [2019] FWC 1564

Loi Toma v Workforce Recruitment and Labour Services Pty Ltd [2019] FWCFB 4240

Loi Toma v Workforce Variable Pty Ltd T/A Workforce International [2018] FWC 2963

Loi Toma v Workforce Variable Pty Ltd T/A Workforce International [2018] FWCFB 5811

Northern Land Council v Quall (No 3) [2021] FCAFC 2

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57; 204 CLR 82

Ryan v Primesafe [2015] FCA 8; 323 ALR 107

Division: Fair Work Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Employment and Industrial Relations
Number of paragraphs: 49
Date of hearing: 24 May 2022
Counsel for the Appellant: Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Wyles

ORDERS

NSD 1041 of 2020
BETWEEN:

LOI TOMA

Appellant

AND:

WORKFORCE RECRUITMENT AND LABOUR SERVICES PTY LTD

First Respondent

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RANGIAH, SC DERRINGTON AND ABRAHAM JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 JUNE 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant’s interlocutory application filed on 28 February 2022 be dismissed.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

Introduction

  1. Mr Toma was employed by a labour hire company within the Workforce International Group Pty Ltd group of companies, between May 2016 and February 2018. Mr Toma’s employment with the Workforce International Group ended in February 2018. On 5 March 2018, Mr Toma filed an application for unfair dismissal…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCAFC 100
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in this matter was brought by Mr Toma against Workforce Recruitment and Labour Services Pty Ltd. The dispute centred on an unfair dismissal claim, where Mr Toma contended that he was wrongfully dismissed from his employment. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. Mr Toma argued that the primary judge had erred in several respects, including denying him procedural fairness by providing an incompetent interpreter, and that the primary judge had made findings that were not supported by the evidence. Additionally, he claimed that the primary judge was distracted during the proceedings, which affected the fairness of the decision-making process.

The court had to decide whether the primary judge's findings were supported by the evidence, whether there was a procedural error that warranted a different outcome, and whether the primary judge was distracted to the point of affecting the fairness of the proceedings. The court also had to determine whether Mr Toma's interlocutory application to subpoena a witness should be allowed, and whether the usual orders as to costs should be departed from under section 570 of the Fair Work Act 2009. The court found that the primary judge's findings were supported by the evidence and that there was no procedural error that would have led to a different outcome. The court also dismissed the interlocutory application to subpoena a witness, finding that the new evidence would not have led to a different result at trial. The appeal was dismissed, and the usual orders as to costs were upheld.

In summary, the court dismissed both the interlocutory application and the substantive appeal, finding that Mr Toma's claims were not substantiated by the evidence. The interlocutory application to subpoena a witness was also dismissed, as the court found that the new evidence would not have led to a different result at trial. The appeal was dismissed, and the usual orders as to costs were upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant’s interlocutory application filed on 28 February 2022 be dismissed.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, both the interlocutory application and the appeal must be dismissed.Background to the unfair dismissal claim The first respondent supplied labour on a contract basis to a factory in Ingleburn, referred to as the PAX factory. The PAX factory was a manufacturing plant for mixing and filling aerosols and liquids for therapeutic and personal care goods, in addition to industrial, insecticides and household products. Mr Toma worked at the PAX factory primarily as a forklift driver, general labourer and process worker. On 6 February 2018, while working at the PAX factory, chemical solution splashed onto Mr Toma’s face. Mr Toma attended a doctor later that day and was certified as being fit to work other than in a “similar environment” to that where he was working when he suffered the injury. On 15 February 2018, Mr Toma sent a text message to the first respondent in which he resigned. On 19 February 2018, Mr Toma sent a text message to the first respondent in which he requested outstanding pay. The difficulty for Mr Toma in this appeal is that none of his grounds have any bearing on the fundamental finding of fact made by the FWC’s second decision, and upheld on appeal by the Full Bench’s second decision, namely, that Mr Toma resigned from his position and was not dismissed. At [54] of the reasons for the FWC’s second decision, the Senior Deputy President found:There can be no question that the applicant resigned his employment with the respondent. He told them twice, on 15 and 19 February 2018, that he had quit and had a new job with another employer. As the primary judge said (Reasons at [79]):The critical issue in Mr Toma’s unfair dismissal application was whether he was dismissed or whether he resigned. That question was resolved against Mr Toma for reasons that had nothing whatsoever to do with the precise identity of his employer. He was, in short, found to be a witness who was not credible. The evidence, both oral and documentary, also strongly supported Workplace Recruitment’s case that Mr Toma had resigned. Mr Toma would have lost his case whether his employer was Workforce Variable or Workforce Recruitment. It must follow that the problems with the interpreting at the directions hearing were immaterial. Even if the interpreting at the directions hearing had been perfect, the end result for Mr Toma would almost certainly have been the same. Mr Toma did not challenge the finding that he resigned in his application for judicial review before the primary judge. He relied on two grounds only. The first was that the FWC provided an interpreter who was incompetent. The second was that the name of the first respondent was incorrect.Application to subpoena witness to adduce new evidence The purpose of Mr Toma’s interlocutory application seeking leave to subpoena Ms Vanzwan was apparently to adduce evidence from the witness that she gave false testimony before the FWC as to the identity of Mr Toma’s employer, and in relation to a return to work plan. Mr Toma submitted that, on the basis of her oral testimony, both the Senior Deputy President (FWC’s second decision at [31]) and the primary judge (Reasons at [8]) made factual errors in stating that Mr Toma signed a return-to-work plan. Mr Toma asserted that were Ms Vanzwan to give evidence before this Court, she would admit that she had lied. The evidence sought to be adduced was clearly evidence that was not before the FWC and therefore is to be characterised as “fresh evidence”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides: 27 Evidence on appeal In an appeal, the Court shall have regard to the evidence given in the proceedings out of which the appeal arose, and has power to draw inferences of fact and, in its discretion, to receive further evidence, which evidence may be taken: (a) on affidavit; or (b) by video link, audio link or other appropriate means in accordance with another provision of this Act or another law of the Commonwealth; or (c) by oral examination before the Court or a Judge; or (d) otherwise in accordance with section 46. The relevant principles which guide the exercise of the Court’s discretion under s 27 were restated by the Full Court in Northern Land Council v Quall (No 3) [2021] FCAFC 2 at [16], per Griffiths and White JJ (and were adopted and applied by the Full Court in District Council of Streaky Bay v Wilson [2021] FCAFC 181; 394 ALR 33 at [149]: Drawing on authorities including CDJ v VAJ [1998] HCA 67; 197 CLR 172; Cottrell v Wilcox [2002] FCAFC 53; Sobey v Nicol and Davies, in the Matter of Guiseppe Antonio Mercorella [2007] FCAFC 136; 245 ALR 389; Watson Australian Community Pharmacy Authority [2012] FCAFC 142; 206 FCR 365 and Kedem v Johnson Lawyers Legal Practice Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 3, they may be summarised as follows: (1) The discretion conferred by s 27 is unfettered, save that it must be exercised judicially and according to principle. (2) The power to receive further evidence is remedial and its primary purpose is to empower the Court to receive further evidence to ensure that proceedings do not miscarry. (3) The power is not constrained by common law rules that govern the grant of new trials on the ground of discovery of “fresh evidence”. (4) The following two considerations will normally be relevant to the exercise of the discretion: (i) the further evidence is such that, had it been adduced at trial, the result would very probably have been different; and (ii) the party seeking to adduce the evidence demonstrates that it was unaware of the evidence and could not have been, with reasonable diligence, made aware of the evidence; (5) The interests of third parties and the public at large may outweigh a party’s interest in the finality of litigation. For example, a greater willingness to receive further evidence on appeal has been apparent in bankruptcy matters which affect the interests of creditors generally. The only real issue that falls for determination in relation to the application for leave to adduce fresh evidence is whether the result at trial would have very probably been different had Ms Vanzwan given different evidence before the FWC. As is explained below, any evidence sought to be adduced from Ms Vanzwan in relation to the name of the respondent could not achieve a different result for Mr Toma in the face of the finding of fact by the FWC, and upheld on appeal to the Full Bench, that Mr Toma resigned from his position. As to the allegation of a factual error having been made by the FWC and the primary judge, there is simply no basis for such an allegation. The Senior Deputy President found that Mr Toma signed the return-to-work plan, to return as a forklift driver, on 7 February 2018 (FWC’s second decision at [31]). Although Mr Toma maintains that this is not so, the documentary evidence suggests otherwise. The affidavit of David Ross Slater filed on 27 September 2021 annexes a return-to-work plan dated 6 February 2018 which, in all material respects, is identical to the document to which the Court was taken by Mr Toma as proof of the error (at pp 137-139 of Part C of the Appeal Book) with the exception that the return-to-work plan does indeed appear to have been signed by Mr Toma on 7 February 2018 (as found by the FWC), by his Work Location Supervisor on the same date, and by his treating doctor on 8 February 2018.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 25 March 2019, Mr Toma filed a notice of appeal. On 18 June 2019, the Full Bench refused Mr Toma permission to appeal, finding at [28] that Mr Toma had not demonstrated that it was in the public interest to grant permission to appeal as the Senior Deputy President had “addressed the relevant statutory requirements” and the Commission’s decision did not disclose “any error of principle or any significant error of fact” (Full Bench’s second decision): Loi Toma v Workforce Recruitment and Labour Services Pty Ltd [2019] FWCFB 4240. Mr Toma applied to the Federal Court for judicial review of the FWC’s second decision and the Full Bench’s second decision on the basis that the FWC had denied him procedural fairness by providing an “incompetent” interpreter, who did not accurately interpret the proceedings, and that the name of the first respondent was incorrect. On 3 August 2020, that application was dismissed, the primary judge finding that any error arising from either deficient interpretation or the change of the first respondent’s name was immaterial and had no bearing on either the FWC’s second decision or the Full Bench’s second decision. Accordingly, there was no jurisdictional error on the part of either decision-maker (Reasons at [3]). Mr Toma appeals from the decision of the primary judge on three grounds:(1)The Judge made a significant error in applying an incorrect principle of law and thus denied the appellant an opportunity to run his case; (Ground 1) (2)The Judge made findings on important issues which cannot be supported by the evidence; (Ground 2) (3)The Judge appeared distracted by an appeal, into another of his decisions, and this affected the performance of his duties. (Ground 3) By interlocutory application filed on 28 February 2022, Mr Toma also sought an order that he be allowed to subpoena Lisa Jacalyn Vanzwan to answer questions in relation to the evidence she gave before the FWC. Mr Toma has represented himself throughout the proceedings, including during his appeal to this Court. He relied on three sets of written submissions to this Court, one in relation to the interlocutory application, and one in chief and one in reply in relation to his substantive appeal. Mr Toma asked that his friend Mr Nagan, who was in Court with him, be permitted to read a statement, in English, on his behalf in relation to the interlocutory application. The Court permitted Mr Nagan to read the statement, although at times it was clear that Mr Nagan was doing more than merely reading and was attempting to make submissions on Mr Toma’s behalf. Mr Toma also made brief oral submissions through a Court-appointed interpreter of the Samoan language after indicating to the Court that he wished to use an interpreter. For the reasons that follow, both the interlocutory application and the appeal must be dismissed.Background to the unfair dismissal claim The first respondent supplied labour on a contract basis to a factory in Ingleburn, referred to as the PAX factory. The PAX factory was a manufacturing plant for mixing and filling aerosols and liquids for therapeutic and personal care goods, in addition to industrial, insecticides and household products. Mr Toma worked at the PAX factory primarily as a forklift driver, general labourer and process worker.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.