District Council of Streaky Bay v Wilson

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

District Council of Streaky Bay v Wilson [2021] FCAFC 181  

Appeal from: Wilson v State of South Australia (No 4) [2020] FCA 1805
File number: SAD 5 of 2021
Judgment of: MORTIMER, PERRY AND SC DERRINGTON JJ
Date of judgment: 18 October 2021
Catchwords:

NATIVE TITLE – appeal from determination of native title – whether the construction of public works in the nature of major earthworks – whether construction in time or by validation sufficient to extinguish native title in relevant parts of the land – in the alternative whether a lease had been granted which constituted a previous exclusive possession act which extinguished native title in the land

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether Court could receive fresh evidence on appeal – whether new evidence would have led to a different result at trial – whether appellant exercised reasonable diligence to be made aware of evidence before trial – futher, where leave sought to raise new ground on appeal – where question live at trial – whether inadvertence can explain a failure at trial to nominate the correct provision

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1A), 27

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) Pts 20, 24, r 36.57

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 23B(2), 23B(7), 24IB, 24ID, 24JB(2), 85A, 87A, 229(4), 232A, 242, 249A, 251D, 253

Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) Sch 5

Associations Incorporations Act 1956-1965 (SA)

Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) ss 28, 29(1)

Local Government Act 1934 (SA) s 666C

Native Title (South Australia) Act 1994 (SA) ss 31(2), 32, 34, 36F, 36G

Real Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 41, 166

Cases cited:

Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakay Native Title Claim Group v Northern Territory of Australia [2004] FCA 472; 207 ALR 539

Anderson v Wilson [2000] FCA 394; 97 FCR 453

Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2) [2013] FCA 868; 305 ALR 1

Bibby Financial Services Australia Pty Ltd v Sharma [2014] NSWCA 37

Bodney v Bennell [2008] FCAFC 63; 167 FCR 84

Canale v GW and R Mould Pty Ltd [2018] VSCA 346

Commonwealth v Baume [1905] HCA 11; 2 CLR 405

Coulton v Holcombe [1986] HCA 33; 162 CLR 1

Daniel on behalf of Ngarluma People v Western Australia [2004] FCA 1388; 212 ALR 51

Living and Leisure Australia Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue [2018] VSCA 237; 108 ATR 736

Margarula v Northern Territory [2016] FCA 1018; 257 FCR 226

N and E Bowder Pty Ltd v Australian Keg Company Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 288; 220 FCR 166

Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Rush [2020] FCAFC 115; 380 ALR 432

Neowarra v State of Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 at [659]

Northern Land Council v Quall (No 3) [2021] FCAFC 2

Ohlsen on behalf of the Ngemba/Ngiyampaa People v Attorney General of New South Wales [2021] FCA 169

Peterson v Western Australia [2017] FCA 1056

Roberts on behalf of the Widjabul Wia-Bal People…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCAFC 181
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in District Council of Streaky Bay v Wilson concerns a dispute over the extinguishment of native title in certain parcels of land. The respondents, including the Wirangu people and the State, argued that the appellant council's construction of public works on the land extinguished their native title rights. Alternatively, the respondents argued that the council's lease to the golf club constituted a previous exclusive possession act that extinguished native title. The appeal focused on whether the court could receive fresh evidence and whether the council had exercised reasonable diligence in presenting its case. The central issue was whether the proposed grounds of appeal, which were not raised at trial, were sufficiently meritorious to warrant leave to appeal.

The court examined the circumstances under which the new grounds were raised and found that the appellant council had not exercised reasonable diligence in presenting its case. The court noted that the proposed grounds of appeal were not plainly lacking merit, but the timing and manner in which they were raised demonstrated a lack of diligence. The court further found that the proposed grounds were not sufficiently meritorious to warrant leave to appeal, as the council had ample opportunity to raise these arguments during the appeal process. The court concluded that the council's failure to raise these grounds at trial, despite their relevance, could not be excused by inadvertence. The council's position had already been fully developed and considered, and the other parties were entitled to finality.

The court granted leave to amend the application for leave to appeal, allowed the interlocutory application for leave to adduce further evidence, and granted leave to appeal in the terms of the draft notice of appeal. However, the court refused the interlocutory application to adduce fresh evidence on the appeal and the application to further amend the draft notice of appeal. Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the costs of the respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Leave is granted to amend the application for leave to appeal in terms of the proposed amended application for leave at annexure CD-03 to the affidavit of Ceilia Divakaran sworn on 28 June 2021.

2. The interlocutory application filed on 28 June 2021 for leave to adduce further evidence in support of the amended application for leave to appeal is, to the extent necessary, granted.

3. Leave to appeal in the terms of the draft notice of appeal at annexure CD-03 to the affidavit of Ceilia Divakaran sworn on 28 June 2021 is granted.

4. To the extent that the interlocutory application filed on 28 June 2021 seeks leave to adduce fresh evidence on the appeal pursuant to s 27 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 36.57 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), that application is refused.

5. The interlocutory application filed on 6 September 2021 to further amend the draft notice of appeal dated 28 June 2021 in terms of annexure CD-05 to the affidavit of Ceilia Divakaran sworn on 6 September 2021 is refused.

6. The appeal is dismissed.

7. The appellant is to pay the costs of the first-to-seventh respondents and the eighth respondent of and incidental to the application referred to in Order 5 as agreed or, if not agreed, to be determined by a Registrar.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

As the separate questions effectively determined a substantive right and the proposed grounds of appeal, when considered at a reasonably impressionistic level, were not plainly lacking any merit, it is appropriate for leave to appeal in terms of the notice of appeal dated 15 January 2021 to be granted. The appeal, however, should be dismissed.BACKGROUND There is no dispute about the background facts. Aerial images of Streaky Bay dated 2 March 1967 show the configuration of the golf course in 1967, which includes some portions of the land over which the State and the Wirangu respondent have agreed that native title has been extinguished. The remaining disputed parcels of land are shown enclosed within blue boundaries on the aerial photograph appearing at page 107 within annexure KDR2 to the affidavit of Kerin Dare Rain affirmed on 15 April 2020 (AB Pt C, 488) and is Annexure A to these appeal reasons. Aerial photographs taken in 1967 show the existence of a nine-hole golf course encompassing both the undisputed parcels and the disputed parcels. The land has, at all times since 1967, been accessible to members of the public. Over time, the golf course has been reconfigured on several occasions including by relocating or reconfiguring holes, tee-off points, scrapes, mounds, bunkers and fairways and to establish a new fairway. Between 1975 and the early 1980s, the Sceale Bay Road, which passed through one of the fairways, was dug up using a grader or bulldozer and in-filled with top soil and grass was seeded. In the 1980s, the existing driveway to the club rooms was removed and a new driveway and large all-weather carpark was created. The entrance, club rooms and carpark, and a significant area surrounding those features, are located on an undisputed parcel (Reasons at [52], [55], [65], [81], [82]). On 22 April 1975, the Club became an incorporated body under the Associations Incorporations Act 1956-1965 (SA) (Reasons at [50]). As at this date, the Club occupied the land comprising the golf course as a bare licencee, revokable at the will of the Council (Reasons at [119]). From 1975, the management of the land was the responsibility of the Management Committee of the Council (a controlling body for the purposes of s 666C of the Local Government Act 1934 (SA) as then in force). The Management Committee included persons who were members of the Club (Reasons at [164]). Under the controlling body model, the Council was liable for the acts and omissions of the Management Committee including in respect of the occupation and management of the land. This model existed until the repeal of s 666C in 1988 (Reasons at [164]). The impetus for moving from a relationship of bare licencee to lessee was to reduce the Council’s exposure to liability for any personal injury that might arise on or in relation to land under its responsibility (Reasons at [166]). Section 242 of the NTA defines a ‘lease’ to include:(a) a lease enforceable in equity; or(b) a contract that contains a statement to the effect that it is a lease; or(c)anything that, at or before the time of its creation, is, for any purpose, by a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, declared to be or described as a lease.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Wirangu respondent and the State contended that leave should not be granted to raise the new ground because:(a)there was no explanation for the failure to run the argument at trial, given it was always the appellant’s case that a lease or agreement to lease had existed prior to 23 December 1996 and the 14 September 1994 letter on which the Council relies as written evidence of the offer for the purposes of s 24IB was tendered at trial;(b)if this ground were to be raised for the first time on appeal, the time to do so was in the draft notice of appeal dated 15 January 2021, not in March 2021 as the Council contends. This further delay weighs against a grant of leave;(c)it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave because the proposed ground is not sufficiently meritorious (as addressed below); and(d)in addition, the Wirangu respondent submitted that the Council had not established that this ground could not have been met by calling evidence at trial. The Wirangu respondent submitted that it is “central” to the proposed new ground that the lease executed in 1997 now sought to be adduced is identical to the lease attached to the letter of 14 September 1994 sent to the Club. The Wirangu respondent submitted it is prejudiced by being denied the opportunity to lead evidence or cross-examine the Council’s witnesses on that issue. The State did not support this submission.Conclusion on leave Leave should be refused to the Council to raise this new ground. The circumstances in which it came to be raised demonstrate nothing more than a last minute idea by counsel, despite counsel having conducted the trial on behalf of the Council before the primary judge. As the Wirangu respondent submits, the question of which future act provisions were applicable was a live question at trial, and the State submitted to the primary judge that s 24JA was the applicable provision (Reasons at [34]). Inadvertence, even if in favour of the Council that is accepted to be the correct description of what occurred, cannot be an acceptable explanation for the failure at trial to nominate, and develop by evidence and argument, an entirely different future act provision. Inadvertence as an explanation is also difficult to accept in circumstances where, after the appeal was lodged, the matter was referred to further mediation. The Council’s position on this appeal has been fully developed and considered. The in terrorem submission that the Council could in any event re-agiatate the matter before the primary judge was inappropriate and should be rejected as a basis for granting leave. The Council has had ample opportunity to raise all matters it has sought to raise in order to advance its extinguishment contentions. After an exceptionally long period of time, close to consent determination, the Wirangu People, the State and the other respondents to the proceeding are entitled to finality. The Council has already sought indulgences to raise new grounds not relied on at trial, and new evidence. It was afforded a full opportunity to advance its arguments during the appeal process. Like any other party, it has duties to the Court and to the other parties to conduct itself in a reasonable and efficient manner. Advancing this ground in the way it has is not consistent with those duties.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established