[Redacted] v Commissioner of Taxation

Link copied
Case Copied 52 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

[Redacted] v Commissioner of Taxation [2024] FCA 185

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Commissioner of Taxation v [Redacted] [2023] FCA 1176
File number(s): [Redacted]
Judgment of: ANDERSON J
Date of judgment: 8 March 2024
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal decision of primary judge dismissing application for suppression orders under s 37AF of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – where disclosure would result in reputational and consequent commercial damage to respondent – whether order necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice – application for leave to appeal refused

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to file a further interlocutory application before single Judge on the basis of fresh evidence – alternative application to amend leave to appeal application and admit further evidence relevant to whether order necessary to protect safety of any person – whether if evidence admitted before primary judge it would very probably have led to a different result  – whether evidence could have been with reasonable diligence adduced before the primary judge – applications refused

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 17, 27, 37AE, 37AF, 37AG, 37M

Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ss 290-50, 290-55

Cases cited:

AB (a pseudonym) v CD (a pseudonym) (2019) 364 ALR 202

AB (a pseudonym) v R (No 3) (2019) 97 NSWLR 1046

Agency Group Australia Ltd v H.A.S. Real Estate Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 203

Applicant X v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2005] FCA 1288

Applicant Y v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority [2005] FCAFC 222

A v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2016] FCA 1307

BKX23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 184

BVZ21 v Commonwealth of Australia [2022] FCAFC 122

Council of theNew South Wales Bar Association v EFA (a pseudonym) (2021) 106 NSWLR 383

Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2020) 275 FCR 377

D A Christie Pty Ltd v Baker [1996] 2 VR 582

Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Ltd (No 5) (2015) 115 IPR 544

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Lee [2022] FCA 1307

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Miraki [2022] FCAFC 96

De Pyle v Commonwealth of Australia [2023] FCA 597

Director of Public Prosecutions v EN [2023] VSC 72

District Council of Streaky Bay v Wilson (2021) 287 FCR 538

DSLB v Comcare [2023] FCA 1222

Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651

House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499

Kayler-Thomson v Colonial First State Investments Limited (No 3) [2023] FCA 606

Lee v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2023) 296 FCR 272

Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Rush [2018] FCAFC 70

Northern Land Council v Quall (No 3) [2021] FCAFC 2

Ogawa (formerly Ms PD) v President of the Australian Human Rights Commission (Pseudonym) (2022) 294 FCR 221

P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (No 2) (2009) 255 ALR 466

Rinehart v Welker (2011) 93…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read [Redacted] v Commissioner of Taxation and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] FCA 185
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of [Redacted] v Commissioner of Taxation, the primary legal issues revolved around the application for leave to appeal against the dismissal of an application for suppression orders under section 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The Leave Applicant argued that the suppression orders were necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice due to the anticipated reputational and commercial damage resulting from the disclosure of certain information. The court also had to consider whether the Leave Applicant could have obtained a detailed psychologist's report and relied on it at the hearing before the primary judge, and if the evidence could have been adduced with reasonable diligence before the primary judge.

The court's reasoning focused on the established legal principles that to establish that an order under section 37AF is “necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice” within the meaning of section 37AG(1)(a), the party seeking that order must identify the contended prejudice to the proper administration of justice that would result if the order is not made, and identify the link between the contended harm and section 37AG(1)(a). The court emphasised that it is not sufficient merely to point to the possibility of reputational damage or commercial harm. The necessary link between the contended harm to the administration of justice and section 37AG(1)(a) may be established by evidence or made through argument. The court found that the Leave Applicant's evidence did not sufficiently establish the necessary link required by section 37AG(1)(a) of the Act.

The court dismissed both the application for leave to appeal and the interlocutory application, finding that the proposed evidence would not likely have led to a different result and that the evidence could have been with reasonable diligence adduced before the primary judge. The court also made orders for non-publication and suppression of certain information to protect the Leave Applicant's privacy and medical condition.

In conclusion, the court refused the substantive relief sought in the Further Evidence Application and dismissed the Leave to Appeal Application. The court ordered that certain documents and information be kept confidential and that the orders be published in a redacted and pseudonymised form. The Leave Applicant was also ordered to pay the First Respondent's costs of the application for leave to appeal and the interlocutory application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Applicant’s application for leave to appeal dated 7 October 2023 be dismissed.

2. The Applicant’s interlocutory application dated 6 February 2024 be dismissed.

3. The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the application for leave to appeal dated 7 October 2023.

4. The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs of the interlocutory application dated 6 February 2024.

5. Pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and on the ground referred to in s 37AG(1)(a) of that Act, there be no disclosure, by publication or otherwise, of:

(a) documents filed in proceeding [redacted] (Underlying Proceeding), proceeding [redacted] (Leave to Appeal Proceeding), or a proceeding in which the Applicant seeks leave to appeal from the dismissal of paragraph 5 of the Applicant’s interlocutory application dated 6 February 2024 (Further Leave Application Proceeding), or information contained in those documents, including the fact that the documents have been filed, insofar as they refer to the name of the Applicant, witnesses and taxpayers;

(b) that claims in the nature contended for in the Underlying Proceeding, Leave to Appeal Proceeding or a Further Leave Application Proceeding have been brought against the Applicant;

(c) any medical conditions or medical treatment of the Applicant, insofar as referred to in material filed in the Underlying Proceeding, Leave to Appeal Proceeding or a Further Leave Application Proceeding;

(d) the report of [redacted] attached to her affidavit as sworn on 8 February 2024 and any draft of that report;

(e) any [redacted] conditions or treatment of the Applicant, insofar as referred to in material filed in the Underlying Proceeding, Leave to Appeal Proceeding or a Further Leave Application Proceeding; or

(f) the name of any treating psychologist of the Applicant, insofar as referred to in material filed in the Underlying Proceeding, Leave to Appeal Proceeding or a Further Leave Application Proceeding,

except

(g) to the legal advisers of Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd and the legal advisers of Ernst & Young, for purposes of enabling them to participate in the Leave to Appeal Proceeding or a Further Leave Application Proceeding;

(h) by the Commissioner of Taxation for the purposes of compliance with any statutory obligations;

(i) by the parties for the purposes of the conduct of the Underlying Proceeding, Leave to Appeal Proceeding or a Further Leave Application Proceeding, provided that the party notifies the person to whom disclosure is made of these orders (and any variation to these orders); or

(j) by the parties to the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia or the Attorney-General’s Department, in connection with the Senate Finance and Public Administration References Committee and non-publication and suppression orders in the Underlying Proceeding, Leave to Appeal Proceeding or a Further Leave Application Proceeding, provided that the party notifies the person to whom disclosure is made of these orders (and any variation to these orders).

6. Order 5 applies:

(a) to all media including but not limited to print, radio, television, internet and social media;

(b) to all persons, including any media organisation, present in the court whether in person or electronically;

(c) to the Applicant and to the Respondents and any other persons who are notified of this order;

(d) anywhere in the Commonwealth; and

(e) until the later of:

(i) 4pm on 20 March 2024; or

(ii) if the Applicant commences a Further Leave Application Proceeding before 4pm on 20 March 2024, until determination of that application (if leave to appeal is refused) or until final determination of the appeal (if leave to appeal is granted).

7. Until the later of the times referred to in Order 6(e) above, no access is to be granted to any document filed in the Underlying Proceeding, Leave to Appeal Proceeding or a Further Leave Application Proceeding which includes the information referred to in Order 5(a)-(f) above to any person apart from:

(a) the parties in the Underlying Proceeding, Leave to Appeal Proceeding or a Further Leave Application Proceeding and their respective legal advisers;

(b) the legal advisers of Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd; or

(c) the legal advisers of Ernst & Young.

8. These orders and reasons for judgment be published only in redacted and pseudonymised form (so as to remove references identifying the name of the Applicant and medical condition of the Applicant) until the later of the times referred to in Order 6(e).

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

At the hearing of the Leave to Appeal Application, I refused the substantive relief sought in the Further Evidence Application. My reasons for doing so are set out in this judgment. I will also dismiss the Leave to Appeal Application for the reasons set out in this judgment.BACKGROUND FACTS The Commissioner served its Originating Application and Statement of Claim on the Leave Applicant on 29 August 2023. Following a media request, a Client Services Officer at the Court emailed the parties on 4 September 2023, requesting that the Leave Applicant confirm whether the Leave Applicant intended to make an application for suppression orders in respect of information contained in the Statement of Claim and Originating Application. On 6 September 2023, the Leave Applicant confirmed an intention to make such an application. On 13 September 2023, the Leave Applicant filed an interlocutory application seeking, amongst other things, interlocutory orders in the form of suppression orders under ss 37AF of the Act. The Leave Applicant filed an amended interlocutory application on 15 September 2023 and a further amended interlocutory application on 21 September 2023 which also sought interlocutory orders in the form of suppression orders under ss 37AF of the Act. The further amended interlocutory application made clear that interlocutory suppression orders were sought on the grounds referred to in s 37AG(1)(a) and/or (1)(c) of the Act. On 17 September 2023, the Leave Applicant attended his first appointment with the Psychologist. The evidence as to what occurred at that appointment is not entirely consistent. A letter from the Psychologist dated 22 January 2024 stated that [redacted]. However, the Second Psychologist Report stated that, at the first appointment, the Psychologist “[redacted]”. The Psychologist further stated that “[redacted]”. Nonetheless, the Psychologist described the 17 September 2023 consultation as “[redacted]”. On 20 September 2023, the Leave Applicant filed written submissions in support of the further amended interlocutory application. Amongst other things, those submissions referred generally to the Leave Applicant having commenced seeing a psychologist following commencement of the proceedings, with a concern being “[redacted]”. That submission was not supported by evidence from the Psychologist as to the Leave Applicant’s mental state. The Leave Applicant’s application for interlocutory suppression orders was heard on 29 September 2023. On 3 October 2023, the primary judge handed down the Judgment and made orders dismissing the application for interlocutory suppression orders. Notwithstanding this decision, the primary judge made interim suppression orders in place pending the determination of the Leave Applicant’s Application for Leave to Appeal. On 7 October 2023, the Leave Applicant filed and served the Leave to Appeal Application. Following a case management hearing on 1 November 2023, the Leave to Appeal Application was listed for hearing on Thursday, 8 February 2024.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For convenience, the further interlocutory application will be referred to as the Further Evidence Application. The “further” or “fresh” evidence central to the Further Evidence Application was as follows: (a)two affidavits of a clinical psychologist (Psychologist) which respectively annexed reports prepared by the Psychologist dated 31 January 2024 (First Psychologist Report) and 8 February 2024 (Second Psychologist Report) (together, Psychologist Reports). Those reports referred to the Leave Applicant’s [redacted] condition and the effect of lifting the interim suppression orders on that condition. It is not necessary to identify the Psychologist as her expertise is not in issue;(b)two solicitor’s affidavits dated 6 and 8 February 2024 which respectively provided a chronology of events leading to the Further Evidence Application. It is also not necessary to identify the deponents of these affidavits. At the hearing of the Leave to Appeal Application, I refused the substantive relief sought in the Further Evidence Application. My reasons for doing so are set out in this judgment. I will also dismiss the Leave to Appeal Application for the reasons set out in this judgment.BACKGROUND FACTS The Commissioner served its Originating Application and Statement of Claim on the Leave Applicant on 29 August 2023. Following a media request, a Client Services Officer at the Court emailed the parties on 4 September 2023, requesting that the Leave Applicant confirm whether the Leave Applicant intended to make an application for suppression orders in respect of information contained in the Statement of Claim and Originating Application. On 6 September 2023, the Leave Applicant confirmed an intention to make such an application. On 13 September 2023, the Leave Applicant filed an interlocutory application seeking, amongst other things, interlocutory orders in the form of suppression orders under ss 37AF of the Act. The Leave Applicant filed an amended interlocutory application on 15 September 2023 and a further amended interlocutory application on 21 September 2023 which also sought interlocutory orders in the form of suppression orders under ss 37AF of the Act. The further amended interlocutory application made clear that interlocutory suppression orders were sought on the grounds referred to in s 37AG(1)(a) and/or (1)(c) of the Act. On 17 September 2023, the Leave Applicant attended his first appointment with the Psychologist. The evidence as to what occurred at that appointment is not entirely consistent. A letter from the Psychologist dated 22 January 2024 stated that [redacted]. However, the Second Psychologist Report stated that, at the first appointment, the Psychologist “[redacted]”. The Psychologist further stated that “[redacted]”. Nonetheless, the Psychologist described the 17 September 2023 consultation as “[redacted]”. On 20 September 2023, the Leave Applicant filed written submissions in support of the further amended interlocutory application. Amongst other things, those submissions referred generally to the Leave Applicant having commenced seeing a psychologist following commencement of the proceedings, with a concern being “[redacted]”. That submission was not supported by evidence from the Psychologist as to the Leave Applicant’s mental state.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether any further interlocutory application before a single Judge in respect of s 37AG(1)(c) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) would constitute an abuse of process.
2. Whether the Leave Applicant could have obtained a detailed psychologist’s report and relied on it at the hearing before the primary judge.
3. Whether, if the evidence was sought to be relied on in the Leave to Appeal Application, the Psychologist Reports were of sufficient weight to warrant their admission into evidence.

Held
1. Whether any further interlocutory application before a single Judge in respect of s 37AG(1)(c) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) would constitute an abuse of process. The court held that any further interlocutory application before a single Judge in respect of s 37AG(1)(c) would constitute an abuse of process.
2. Whether the Leave Applicant could have obtained a detailed psychologist’s report and relied on it at the hearing before the primary judge. The court held that the Leave Applicant could have obtained a detailed psychologist’s report and relied on it at the hearing before the primary judge.
3. Whether, if the evidence was sought to be relied on in the Leave to Appeal Application, the Psychologist Reports were of sufficient weight to warrant their admission into evidence. The court held that the Psychologist Reports were not of sufficient weight to warrant their admission into evidence.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The above cases illustrate that an application for suppression orders on the ground that the orders are necessary to protect the safety of any person will ultimately depend on all of the facts, including the cogency of any expert evidence adduced in support of the application. Section 37AG(1)(a): Prejudice to the proper administration of justice To establish that an order under s 37AF is “necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice” within the meaning of s 37AG(1)(a), the party seeking that order must “identify the contended prejudice to the proper administration of justice that would result if the order is not made”, and identify the link “between the contended harm and s 37AG(1)(a)”: Lee v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2023) 296 FCR 272 at [90], [93], [95] (Thawley, Stewart and Abraham JJ) (Lee FC) and Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Lee [2022] FCA 1307 at [40] (Bromwich J) (Lee PJ). It is not sufficient merely to point to the possibility of reputational damage or commercial harm. That a person will suffer such damage or harm by reason of publication of evidence relied upon in open court “does not have the necessary consequence that the proper administration of justice is or will be prejudiced”: Lee FC at [90]. The necessary link between the contended harm to the administration of justice and s 37AG(1)(a) may be established by evidence or made through argument. There are “categories” of situations which arise more regularly than others – eg, the publication of bank account numbers which might be misused if published and which are wholly irrelevant to the Court’s reasons – but there is no set of closed “categories”: Lee FC at [95].FURTHER EVIDENCE APPLICATIONLeave Applicant’s submissions By the time of the hearing of the Further Evidence Application, three issues had crystallised as potential grounds for refusing that application: first, whether any further interlocutory application before a single Judge in respect of s 37AG(1)(c) of the Act would constitute an abuse of process; secondly, whether the Leave Applicant could have obtained a detailed psychologist’s report and relied on it at the hearing before the primary judge; and thirdly, if the evidence was sought to be relied on in the Leave to Appeal Application, whether the Psychologist Reports were of sufficient weight to warrant their admission into evidence. As to the first issue, as explained in the Leave Applicant’s written submissions dated 6 February 2024 at [2] and [6]-[7], the Leave Applicant sought leave to amend the Leave to Appeal Application to add a further ground in the notice of appeal that suppression orders should be made on the ground that such orders were necessary to protect the safety of any person. The Leave Applicant explained that an alternative, albeit perhaps preferable, course was for the Court to adjourn the Application for Leave to Appeal and make directions for the filing of an application for suppression orders before a single Judge, and lead fresh evidence on that application. The Leave Applicant’s written submissions at [7] candidly recognised the prospect of abuse of process arising from the alternative course.