Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited [2019] FCA 36

File numbers: NSD 1485 of 2018
NSD 1486 of 2018
NSD 1487 of 2018
Judge: BESANKO J
Date of judgment: 25 January 2019
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — application for suppression order under s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) — where suppression order sought in relation to the identity of a witness in the proceedings — whether a suppression order is necessary to protect the safety of any person pursuant to s 37AG(1)(c) of the Act — whether it is necessary to demonstrate that, in the absence of a suppression order being made, it is probable that the person in question will suffer harm — whether it is necessary to demonstrate that, on the balance of probabilities, a suppression order is necessary to protect the safety of the person in question — whether a suppression order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice pursuant to s 37AG(1)(a) of the Act
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AA, 37AE, 37AF, 37AG, 37AI

Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) ss 6, 8

Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 25, 26

Cases cited:

Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2011] HCA 21; (2011) 243 CLR 588

D1 v P1 [2012] NSWCA 314

Rinehart v Welker [2011] NSWCA 403; (2011) 93 NSWLR 311

Date of hearing: 16 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 41
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr B McClintock SC with Mr M Richardson
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mark O’Brien Legal
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr A Dawson SC with Ms L Barnett
Solicitor for the Respondents: MinterEllison
Counsel for the Commonwealth of Australia: Mr R Bhalla
Solicitor for the Commonwealth of Australia: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for Person 17: Ms C Amato
Solicitor for Person 17: Potts Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 1485 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BEN ROBERTS-SMITH

Applicant

AND:

FAIRFAX MEDIA PUBLICATIONS PTY LIMITED ACN 003 357 720

First Respondent (and others named in the Schedule)

NSD 1486 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BEN ROBERTS-SMITH

Applicant

AND:

THE AGE COMPANY PTY LIMITED ACN 004 262 702

First Respondent (and others named in the Schedule)

NSD 1487 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BEN ROBERTS-SMITH

Applicant

AND:

THE FEDERAL CAPITAL PRESS OF AUSTRALIA PTY LIMITED ACN 008 394 063

First Respondent (and others named in the Schedule)

JUDGE:

BESANKO J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JANUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The respondents bring in minutes of order reflecting the conclusions expressed in these reasons.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BESANKO J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. There are three defamation proceedings in the Court involving Mr Ben Roberts‑Smith as applicant, and various media companies and journalists as respondents. The media companies differ in the case of each proceeding, but the three journalists are the same…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 36
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited is a case before the Federal Court of Australia where the applicant, Mr. Ben Roberts-Smith, sought a suppression order to prevent the publication of the identity of a witness, referred to as Person 17, in the proceedings. The dispute revolves around the need for such an order to protect the safety of Person 17 and to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. The legal issues at hand were whether a suppression order is necessary to protect the safety of Person 17, and whether such an order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The court considered the evidence provided, including social media posts and the testimonies of individuals involved. The court found that while some of the posts were merely expressing opinions, others were abusive or threatening. The court took into account the principle of open justice but concluded that the order was necessary to protect the safety of Person 17 due to the significant risk of threats or intimidation. The court also found that the order was necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The court's reasoning was based on the evidence presented, including the testimonies and social media posts. The court noted that the risk of threats to or intimidation of Person 17 was sufficiently high to justify the suppression order. The court will hear from the parties regarding the appropriate orders to be made.

The court ordered that the respondents bring in minutes of order reflecting the conclusions expressed in the reasons. The entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondents bring in minutes of order reflecting the conclusions expressed in these reasons.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In Rinehart v Welker [2011] NSWCA 403; (2011) 93 NSWLR 311, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales considered ss 6 and 8 of the Court Suppression and Non‑publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW). These sections are in similar terms to ss 37AE and 37AG of the Act. Bathurst CJ and McColl JA made the following observations concerning the meaning of the word “necessary” (at [28], [29] and [31]):The word “necessary” was adopted as the test for making a suppression order on the recommendation of the NSW Law Reform Commission: see New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Report 100, Contempt by Publication (June 2003) at par 10.20; see also New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Discussion Paper 43, Contempt by Publication (July 2000) at chapter 10, where the principal discussion leading to the recommendation in the final Report appears. Similar language appears in s 50 of the Federal Court of Australia Act and s 4(2) and s 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK). It was the test applied by courts with an inherent jurisdiction to make nonpublication orders: John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of New South Wales at [38].A number of authorities are cited in the Discussion Paper (at pars [10.16]–[10.18]) as authority for the proposition that the test for making a suppression or non-publication order should be that it be “necessary”. Of those authorities, the clearest statement, and that which appears to underlie the form of s 8, appears in John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 at 476–477 (McHugh JA; Glass JA agreeing):“The fundamental rule of the common law is that the administration of justice must take place in open court. A court can only depart from this rule where its observance would frustrate the administration of justice or some other public interest for whose protection Parliament has modified the open justice rule. The principle of open justice also requires that nothing should be done to discourage the making of fair and accurate reports of what occurs in the courtroom. Accordingly, an order of a court prohibiting the publication of evidence is only valid if it is really necessary to secure the proper administration of justice in proceedings before it. Moreover, an order prohibiting publication of evidence must be clear in its terms and do no more than is necessary to achieve the due administration of justice. The making of the order must also be reasonably necessary; and there must be some material before the court upon which it can reasonably reach the conclusion that it is necessary to make an order prohibiting publication. Mere belief that the order is necessary is insufficient.” (Emphasis added)John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal of New South Wales was the principal authority on the subject of making non-publication orders in New South Wales prior to the enactment of the CSNPO Act: John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of New South Wales at [39]. French CJ referred to this passage with approval in Hogan v Hinch at [21]. …Significantly, an order is not “necessary” if it appears to the court “to be convenient, reasonable or sensible, or to serve some notion of the public interest, still less that, as the result of some ‘balancing exercise’, the order appears to have one or more of those characteristics”: Hogan v Australian Crime Commission at [31]. Further, it is not a sufficient basis for such an order that the information is inherently confidential as distinct from personal or commercial information the value of which as an asset would be seriously compromised by disclosure: Hogan v Australian Crime Commission at [38].THE EVIDENCE

Decision

Reasons for decision

The balance of Mr Levitan’s affidavit is devoted to the reaction of certain members of the public to two of the respondents, Mr Masters and Mr McKenzie, the respondents and Person 17.CONCLUSIONS I have considered the evidence carefully, including the various social media posts. It is true, as the applicant submitted, that some of the social media posts do no more than express a point of view, while others are abusive rather than threatening, or abusive and threatening. I take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice (s 37AE of the Act). Nevertheless, I am satisfied that, at this stage, the order sought should be made on the basis that it is necessary to protect the safety of Person 17 (s 37AG(1)(c) of the Act). In reaching that conclusion, I have had regard to the combined effect of the evidence, including, in particular, Person 17’s evidence, the Facebook posts and the evidence of the incident involving Ms Stynes and its aftermath. Furthermore, I consider that there is a sufficient risk of threats to, or intimidation of, Person 17 as a proposed witness in the proceedings should her identity be revealed, to justify the order by reference to s 37AG(1)(a) of the Act. I will hear the parties as to the appropriate orders.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.