Leigh v National Disability Insurance Agency

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Leigh v National Disability Insurance Agency [2025] FCA 623

File number: WAD 100 of 2025
Judgment of: VANDONGEN J
Date of judgment: 13 June 2025
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - application for suppression orders pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA) - whether grounds in s 37AG of the FCA are established - application dismissed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 35

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37AA, 37AE, 37AF, 37AG, Part VAA Division 2

National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) ss 33, 100, 103

Cases cited:

AB (a pseudonym) v CD (a pseudonym) [2019] HCA 6

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Limited (No 12) [2013] FCA 533

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 1) [2015] FCA 607

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cascade Coal Pty Ltd (No 4) [2018] FCA 1243

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 3) [2017] FCA 1279

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 5) [2016] FCA 741

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Dunjey (No 2) [2023] FCA 610

Computer Interchange Pty Ltd v Microsoft Corporation [1999] FCA 198; (1999) 88 FCR 438

DSLB v Comcare [2023] FCA 1222

Fletcher v Brown (No 2) [2021] FCA 725

Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Williams [2003] FCAFC 217; (2003) 130 FCR 435

Hogan v Australian Crime Commission [2010] HCA 21; (2010) 240 CLR 651

Huikeshoven v Secretary, Department of Education, Skills and Employment [2021] FCA 1359

John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court of New South Wales (1991) 26 NSWLR 131

National Australia Bank Ltd v KRDV [2012] FCA 543; (2012) 204 FCR 436

The Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 44; (2020) 275 FCR 377

Division: General Division
Registry: Western Australia
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 44
Date of hearing: 9 June 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: The respondents did not appear

ORDERS

WAD 100 of 2025
BETWEEN:

TRACY LEIGH

Applicant

AND:

NATIONAL DISABILITY INSURANCE AGENCY

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

VANDONGEN J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 JUNE 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant's interlocutory application for orders pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

VANDONGEN J:

  1. In these proceedings, the applicant applies for an extension of time within which to start an appeal against a decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART) to dismiss an application made pursuant to s 103 of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) (NDIS Act). In her…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 623
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Leigh v National Disability Insurance Agency involved an application by the applicant for suppression orders. The applicant sought the orders under section 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the grounds outlined in section 37AG of the same act were satisfied. The central issue before the court was whether the criteria for issuing suppression orders were met, specifically focusing on the necessity to protect the safety of any person.

In considering the application, the court examined the evidence provided by the applicant. The applicant relied solely on an affidavit affirmed on May 14, 2025, in support of her interlocutory application. The court applied precedents such as Fletcher v Brown (No 2) and AB (a pseudonym) v CD (a pseudonym) to interpret the criteria for issuing suppression orders. The court noted that while the applicant needed to demonstrate a real risk to safety if the orders were not made, it was not necessary to show that harm was probable without the orders.

The court concluded that the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to meet the threshold required for a suppression order. The evidence did not demonstrate a real risk to the applicant's safety if the orders were not granted. The court emphasized that suppression orders should only be imposed where there is a clear need, and the scope and duration of such orders should be no greater than necessary. Consequently, the application was dismissed.

The Federal Court dismissed the applicant's interlocutory application for orders pursuant to section 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). The court determined that the applicant had not satisfied the grounds for suppression orders as outlined in section 37AG of the act. The decision was based on the insufficiency of the evidence provided to demonstrate a real risk to the applicant's safety if the orders were not granted. The entry of orders was dealt with in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant's interlocutory application for orders pursuant to s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In relation to the ground that suppression or non-publication orders are necessary to protect the safety of any person, I gratefully adopt the following observations of Jackson J in Fletcher v Brown (No 2) [2021] FCA 725 at [37]‑[38]:In relation to the specific ground of suppression in relation to the safety of a person, in AB (a pseudonym) v CD (a pseudonym) [2019] HCA 6; (2019) 364 ALR 202 at [15], Nettle J said of an equivalent provision (s 77RF(1)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)):The criterion is not one of necessity to prevent harm to a person but of necessity to protect the safety of a person. And safety is a protean conception which is certainly informed by the nature and gravity of apprehended harm and the risk of its occurrence. To take but one, prosaic example, no one today rationally doubts that the wearing of seat belts while travelling in a motor car is necessary to protect the safety of drivers and passengers. At the same time, it is certainly not the case that, but for wearing a seat belt, it is more probable than not that an occupant of a moving motor car will suffer harm. That is not to suggest that just any risk of harm will suffice. To repeat, the provision is not concerned with trivialities. But what it is intended to convey is that, because the idea of safety invariably entails the assessment of risk, it should be regarded as sufficient to satisfy the test of 'necessary to protect the safety of any person' that, upon the evidence, the court is satisfied of the existence of a possibility of harm of such gravity and likelihood that, without the order sought, the risk of prejudice to the safety of the person would range above the level that can reasonably be regarded as acceptable.So it is not necessary to show that, absent the order being made or extended, it is probable that a person will suffer harm. Rather, the necessity for such an order will be informed by the nature, imminence and degree of the likelihood of harm occurring to the relevant person: Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited [2019] FCA 36 at [16]‑[17] (Besanko J). But there must at least be a demonstrable or real risk to the safety of an applicant for a suppression order (or another person) if the order is not made (or extended): see C7A/2017 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 70 at [16] (Katzmann, Wigney and Abraham JJ). In Royal Women's Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board of Australia (No 2) [2007] VSCA 284 at [11] Maxwell P (Curtain AJA agreeing) said:It is axiomatic of course that neither the scope nor the duration of a suppression order should be any greater than is demonstrably necessary. What occurs in court should be open and should be the subject of unfettered publication and a constraint on publication will only be imposed where clear need has been demonstrated.The evidence relied on by the applicant As I have already said, the applicant relies only on an affidavit she affirmed on 14 May 2025 in support of her interlocutory application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established