National Australia Bank Limited v KRDV

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

National Australia Bank Limited v KRDV [2012] FCA 543

Citation: National Australia Bank Limited v KRDV [2012] FCA 543
Appeal from: KRDV v National Australia Bank Limited
[2011] AATA 210
Parties: NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED v KRDV
File number: NSD 515 of 2011
Judge: COWDROY J
Date of judgment: 28 May 2012
Catchwords:

WORKER’S COMPENSATION – mental illness suffered by employee – Tribunal finds mental illness caused by meeting at work between employee and supervisor – whether meeting constituted ‘reasonable administrative action with respect to employee’s employment’ – whether meeting was administrative action taken in a reasonable manner – appeal dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – suppression orders – whether respondent’s name should be suppressed – risk of increased mental illness if respondent’s name published – suppression order made

Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 35, 44
Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 50
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4, 5A, 5B, 7, 14
Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 18
Cases cited: Advertiser Newspaper Ltd v Mc Allister
[2010] SASCFC 32
Anon 2 v XYZ [2008] VSC 466
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish
(1980) 29 ALR 228
BK v ADB [2003] VSC 129
Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (2004) 135 FCR 105
Commissioner of Taxation v H (2010) 268 ALR 101
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Reeve
(2012) 125 ALD 181
Hart v Comcare (2005) 154 FCR 29
Headway Support Services v Wickham [2009] TASSC 99
Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Williams & Others
(2003) 130 FCR 435
Hogan v The Australian Crime Commission & Ors
(2010) 240 CLR 651
Jeffery v Lintipal Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 138
Keen v Workers Rehabilitation & Compensation Corporation (1998) 71 SASR 42
KRDV v National Australia Bank Limited
(2011) 125 ALD 311
Pataki v University of Tasmania (2000) 9 TASR 397
Politis v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
(1988) 16 ALD 707
PVYW v Comcare Australia [2011] FCA 535
Re: a proposed proceeding by a plaintiff as “P.P.P.” (Coldrey J, Supreme Court of Victoria, 27 August 1993)
Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) (1987) 10 NSWLR 247
‘X’ v Sydney Children’s Hospitals Speciality Network and Anor [2011] NSWSC 1272
Wu Shan Liang v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 57 FCR 432
Yu v Comcare (2010) 121 ALD 583
Date of hearing: 11 August 2011
Date of last submissions: 2 April 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 101
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Howe QC with Mr Snell
Solicitor for the Applicant: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Phillips SC with Mr Best
Solicitor for the Respondent: Carroll & O'Dea Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 515 of 2011

ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
Applicant

AND:

KRDV
Respondent

JUDGE:

COWDROY J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 MAY 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The Applicant…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 543
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of National Australia Bank Limited v KRDV involved a dispute concerning worker’s compensation. The employee, KRDV, alleged that she suffered a mental illness due to a meeting with her supervisor at work. The primary issue before the court was whether the meeting constituted a ‘reasonable administrative action with respect to the employee’s employment’ and whether it was conducted in a reasonable manner. Additionally, there was an application for suppression of the respondent’s name to prevent prejudice to her mental health and wellbeing.

The court considered the evidence provided, including the psychologist’s report, which indicated that the respondent suffered from major depression, impaired self-esteem, and anxiety. The court concluded that the challenges to the Tribunal’s decision were unsuccessful and dismissed the appeal. Regarding the suppression order, the court examined the risk of prejudice to the administration of justice and found that the publication of the respondent’s name would likely exacerbate her mental health issues. Consequently, the court made a permanent suppression order to protect the respondent’s identity.

The court’s decision was based on the necessity to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice and the respondent’s mental health. The court acknowledged the importance of open justice but found that the respondent’s wellbeing and the potential deterrence from bringing proceedings justified the suppression order. The court emphasised that the order was necessary to prevent prejudice and not merely convenient or sensible.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondent.

3. The Respondent’s name be permanently suppressed

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

National Australia Bank Limited v KRDV is a case concerning a claim for worker's compensation brought by KRDV, an employee of the National Australia Bank Limited (NAB), against NAB. KRDV alleged that she suffered from major depression resulting from her employment, specifically from a meeting between her and her supervisor. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) found that the meeting constituted 'reasonable administrative action with respect to employee's employment' and was taken in a reasonable manner. KRDV was diagnosed with major depression and was in receipt of medication and regular treatment from a psychologist. She remained unemployed due to her condition and feared that the publication of her name would have a detrimental effect on her wellbeing and mental health, potentially worsening her condition.

The case originated from a decision made by the AAT, which was appealed to the Federal Court. An interim suppression order was granted at the commencement of the hearing to prevent the publication of KRDV's name, which was later sought to be made permanent. The appeal against the AAT's decision was heard, and the matter concerning the suppression order was also addressed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

An application has been made pursuant to s 50(1) of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) (‘the Federal Court Act’) that the Court prohibit the publication of the name of the respondent. Section 50(1) of the Federal Court Act provides:Prohibition of publication of evidence etc. (1) The Court may, at any time during or after the hearing of a proceeding in the Court, make such order forbidding or restricting the publication of particular evidence, or the name of a party or witness, as appears to the Court to be necessary in order to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice or the security of the Commonwealth. When the hearing of these proceedings commenced the Court granted an interim order pursuant to s 50(1) of the Federal Court Act as it was aware that the Tribunal had made an order before it pursuant to s 35(2)(a) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). At that stage of the proceedings the Court was not fully apprised of the facts and the making of the interim order was considered appropriate until the appeal had been fully heard. The application is now sought on a permanent basis and such application is not opposed by NAB. The application is made upon the ground that the respondent has been diagnosed with major depression resulting from her employment with NAB. The evidence discloses that the respondent, who remains unemployed because of such condition, is in receipt of medication for her condition and that she is under the regular treatment of Mr Patrick Jabour, a psychologist. The evidence contained in the affidavit of the respondent sworn on 17 August 2011 avers that if the respondent’s name is published, it will have a detrimental effect upon her wellbeing and particularly her mental health and adversely impact upon others who do not know her. The respondent fears that should her name be publicised, she will be ‘wrongly labelled’. She claims that she frequently feels ashamed, stigmatised and embarrassed by the events which have happened resulting from the conduct of NAB and that she is endeavouring to return to the state of her pre-injury mental health. In written submissions made in support of the application for the continued suppression order, the respondent acknowledges the basic principle that the Court is usually to exercise jurisdiction in open court: see Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (1980) 29 ALR 228 at 232 and at 253 per Deane J; Commissioner of Taxation v H (2010) 268 ALR 101 at [14]; that s 50 of the Federal Court Act allows an exception to that principle and that when applying s 50 of the Federal Court Act, the Court must consider the risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in deciding whether to make a suppression order (Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish at 233-235 per Bowen CJ and 255-257 per Deane J). Mr Patrick Jabour, psychologist, in his report dated 14 August 2011 stated that he has been treating the respondent since 24 July 2009 for major depression. Mr Jabour states that the respondent’s symptoms indicate significant levels of depression, anxious arousal, anger and irritability and impaired self esteem. The report continues:KRDV continues to suffer from major depression, impaired self-esteem, and a lack of confidence. KRDV currently fulfils the DSM IV criteria for major depression. Although she is motivated to function and her level of focus is strong for short periods of time she is excessively depressed and anxious. This is exacerbated by extreme concern about her future.

Decision

Reasons for decision

No oral submissions were addressed on this issue by either party. In these circumstances the Court infers that this ground of appeal is abandoned. The Court also observes that there was ample evidence before the Tribunal to support its finding that it was the distressing events of the casual chat meeting which was causative of the respondent’s ‘injury’ as defined, by way of an aggravation of an existing condition.CONCLUSION The Court is satisfied that the challenges to the Tribunal’s decision fail. Accordingly the Court will order that the appeal be dismissed with costs.SUPPRESSION OF RESPONDENT’S IDENTITY An application has been made pursuant to s 50(1) of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) (‘the Federal Court Act’) that the Court prohibit the publication of the name of the respondent. Section 50(1) of the Federal Court Act provides:Prohibition of publication of evidence etc. (1) The Court may, at any time during or after the hearing of a proceeding in the Court, make such order forbidding or restricting the publication of particular evidence, or the name of a party or witness, as appears to the Court to be necessary in order to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice or the security of the Commonwealth. When the hearing of these proceedings commenced the Court granted an interim order pursuant to s 50(1) of the Federal Court Act as it was aware that the Tribunal had made an order before it pursuant to s 35(2)(a) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). At that stage of the proceedings the Court was not fully apprised of the facts and the making of the interim order was considered appropriate until the appeal had been fully heard. The application is now sought on a permanent basis and such application is not opposed by NAB. The application is made upon the ground that the respondent has been diagnosed with major depression resulting from her employment with NAB. The evidence discloses that the respondent, who remains unemployed because of such condition, is in receipt of medication for her condition and that she is under the regular treatment of Mr Patrick Jabour, a psychologist. The evidence contained in the affidavit of the respondent sworn on 17 August 2011 avers that if the respondent’s name is published, it will have a detrimental effect upon her wellbeing and particularly her mental health and adversely impact upon others who do not know her. The respondent fears that should her name be publicised, she will be ‘wrongly labelled’. She claims that she frequently feels ashamed, stigmatised and embarrassed by the events which have happened resulting from the conduct of NAB and that she is endeavouring to return to the state of her pre-injury mental health. In written submissions made in support of the application for the continued suppression order, the respondent acknowledges the basic principle that the Court is usually to exercise jurisdiction in open court: see Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish (1980) 29 ALR 228 at 232 and at 253 per Deane J; Commissioner of Taxation v H (2010) 268 ALR 101 at [14]; that s 50 of the Federal Court Act allows an exception to that principle and that when applying s 50 of the Federal Court Act, the Court must consider the risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in deciding whether to make a suppression order (Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish at 233-235 per Bowen CJ and 255-257 per Deane J).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Jabour concluded:The need for KRDV to continue treatment after this long and protracted legal process is essential if she is to rebuild and continue to reconnect with resilient and pleasurable activities that enhance self-confidence and return her to the workforce in a self assured manner. In my opinion the application of a permanent order restricting the publication of KRDV’s name would assist this considerably. CONSIDERATION The Court must evaluate the nature and extent of the hardship which will be suffered by a litigant or a witness in the event that a confidentiality order is not made: see PVYW v Comcare Australia [2011] FCA 535 at [15]. Should it be established that if the identity of an applicant were made known and this fact would cause such applicant to be deterred from bringing proceedings, the Court may regard this as a sufficient reason for granting an order preventing publication. In Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Williams & Others (2003) 130 FCR 435 the Full Court considered whether a suppression order granted by the Tribunal should be continued in this jurisdiction. At [30] Merkel J said:The fundamental differences between the AAT and the court, and the different criteria that are to be applied in respect of suppression orders under s 35 of the AAT Act and s 50 of the FCA Act, afford strong support for the view that there is no legislative intention that the privacy and confidentiality in relation to a matter in the AAT should continue when that matter, or a part thereof, comes before the court. When the matter comes before the court pursuant to ss 44 or 45 of the AAT Act, s 39B of the Judiciary Act or s 5 of the Administration Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977I (Cth) the criterion prescribed by s 50 must be satisfied before a suppression order may be made. His Honour continued relevantly at [31]:Thus, before exercising the power conferred by s 50 of the FCA Act the primary judge was required to determine whether it appears that the order sought was “necessary in order to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice”. Section 50 is concerned with prejudice in respect of the exercise by the court of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, rather than prejudice in respect of the exercise by the AAT of the administrative power of the Commonwealth. Merkel J recognised that embarrassment or damage resulting from publicity would be a relevant factor if it was such that a litigant would be deterred from litigating and at [36] said, inter alia:If that situation arises it can be weighed in the discretionary balance that is to be struck between the public interest of open justice and preventing prejudice to the administration of justice. However, that situation has not arisen in the present case. The Full Court observed that mere embarrassment was not of itself sufficient for the Court to grant a suppression order. In Hogan v The Australian Crime Commission & Ors (2010) 240 CLR 651 the High Court considered an application made under s 50 of the Federal Court Act in respect of the non-publication of the financial affairs of a well-known public figure. At [29] the High Court (French CCA, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon & Kiefel JJ) considered the operation of s 50 of the Federal Court Act. At [30]-[32] the High Court said:30. As it appears in s 50, “necessary” is a strong word. Hence the point made by Bowen CJ in Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish, that the collocation of necessity to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice and necessity to prevent prejudice to the security of the Commonwealth “suggests parliament was not dealing with trivialities”. Further, as indicated earlier in these reasons: (a) s 50 is an example of a provision authorising the Federal Court to make orders for the exercise of its jurisdiction other than in open court as mandated by s 17(1); and (b) “the administration of justice” spoken of in s 50 is that involved in the exercise by the Federal Court of the judicial power of the Commonwealth; this is a more specific discipline than broader notions of the public interest.31. It is insufficient that the making or continuation of an order under s 50 appears to the Federal Court to be convenient, reasonable or sensible, or to serve some notion of the public interest, still less that, as the result of some “balancing exercise”, the order appears to have one or more of those characteristics.32. If it appears to the Federal Court, on the one hand, to be necessary to make a particular order forbidding or restricting the publication of particular evidence or the name of a party or witness, in order to prevent either species of prejudice identified in s 50, or, on the other hand, that that necessity no longer supports the continuation of such an order, then the power of the Federal Court under s 50 is enlivened. The appearance of the requisite necessity (or supervening cessation of it) having been demonstrated, the Court is to implement its conclusion by making or vacating the order. The expression in s 50 “may … make such order” is to be understood in this sense.