FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
National Australia Bank Limited v KRDV [2012] FCA 543
Citation: National Australia Bank Limited v KRDV [2012] FCA 543 Appeal from: KRDV v National Australia Bank Limited
[2011] AATA 210Parties: NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED v KRDV File number: NSD 515 of 2011 Judge: COWDROY J Date of judgment: 28 May 2012 Catchwords: WORKER’S COMPENSATION – mental illness suffered by employee – Tribunal finds mental illness caused by meeting at work between employee and supervisor – whether meeting constituted ‘reasonable administrative action with respect to employee’s employment’ – whether meeting was administrative action taken in a reasonable manner – appeal dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – suppression orders – whether respondent’s name should be suppressed – risk of increased mental illness if respondent’s name published – suppression order made
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 35, 44
Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 50
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4, 5A, 5B, 7, 14
Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 18Cases cited: Advertiser Newspaper Ltd v Mc Allister
[2010] SASCFC 32
Anon 2 v XYZ [2008] VSC 466
Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish
(1980) 29 ALR 228
BK v ADB [2003] VSC 129
Bropho v Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (2004) 135 FCR 105
Commissioner of Taxation v H (2010) 268 ALR 101
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Reeve
(2012) 125 ALD 181
Hart v Comcare (2005) 154 FCR 29
Headway Support Services v Wickham [2009] TASSC 99
Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Williams & Others
(2003) 130 FCR 435
Hogan v The Australian Crime Commission & Ors
(2010) 240 CLR 651
Jeffery v Lintipal Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 138
Keen v Workers Rehabilitation & Compensation Corporation (1998) 71 SASR 42
KRDV v National Australia Bank Limited
(2011) 125 ALD 311
Pataki v University of Tasmania (2000) 9 TASR 397
Politis v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
(1988) 16 ALD 707
PVYW v Comcare Australia [2011] FCA 535
Re: a proposed proceeding by a plaintiff as “P.P.P.” (Coldrey J, Supreme Court of Victoria, 27 August 1993)
Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) (1987) 10 NSWLR 247
‘X’ v Sydney Children’s Hospitals Speciality Network and Anor [2011] NSWSC 1272
Wu Shan Liang v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1995) 57 FCR 432
Yu v Comcare (2010) 121 ALD 583Date of hearing: 11 August 2011 Date of last submissions: 2 April 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 101 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Howe QC with Mr Snell Solicitor for the Applicant: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Phillips SC with Mr Best Solicitor for the Respondent: Carroll & O'Dea Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 515 of 2011
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED
ApplicantAND: KRDV
Respondent
JUDGE:
COWDROY J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 MAY 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The Applicant…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 543
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the evidence provided, including the psychologist’s report, which indicated that the respondent suffered from major depression, impaired self-esteem, and anxiety. The court concluded that the challenges to the Tribunal’s decision were unsuccessful and dismissed the appeal. Regarding the suppression order, the court examined the risk of prejudice to the administration of justice and found that the publication of the respondent’s name would likely exacerbate her mental health issues. Consequently, the court made a permanent suppression order to protect the respondent’s identity.
The court’s decision was based on the necessity to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice and the respondent’s mental health. The court acknowledged the importance of open justice but found that the respondent’s wellbeing and the potential deterrence from bringing proceedings justified the suppression order. The court emphasised that the order was necessary to prevent prejudice and not merely convenient or sensible.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondent.
3. The Respondent’s name be permanently suppressed
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated from a decision made by the AAT, which was appealed to the Federal Court. An interim suppression order was granted at the commencement of the hearing to prevent the publication of KRDV's name, which was later sought to be made permanent. The appeal against the AAT's decision was heard, and the matter concerning the suppression order was also addressed.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Jabour concluded:The need for KRDV to continue treatment after this long and protracted legal process is essential if she is to rebuild and continue to reconnect with resilient and pleasurable activities that enhance self-confidence and return her to the workforce in a self assured manner. In my opinion the application of a permanent order restricting the publication of KRDV’s name would assist this considerably. CONSIDERATION The Court must evaluate the nature and extent of the hardship which will be suffered by a litigant or a witness in the event that a confidentiality order is not made: see PVYW v Comcare Australia [2011] FCA 535 at [15]. Should it be established that if the identity of an applicant were made known and this fact would cause such applicant to be deterred from bringing proceedings, the Court may regard this as a sufficient reason for granting an order preventing publication. In Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Williams & Others (2003) 130 FCR 435 the Full Court considered whether a suppression order granted by the Tribunal should be continued in this jurisdiction. At [30] Merkel J said:The fundamental differences between the AAT and the court, and the different criteria that are to be applied in respect of suppression orders under s 35 of the AAT Act and s 50 of the FCA Act, afford strong support for the view that there is no legislative intention that the privacy and confidentiality in relation to a matter in the AAT should continue when that matter, or a part thereof, comes before the court. When the matter comes before the court pursuant to ss 44 or 45 of the AAT Act, s 39B of the Judiciary Act or s 5 of the Administration Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977I (Cth) the criterion prescribed by s 50 must be satisfied before a suppression order may be made. His Honour continued relevantly at [31]:Thus, before exercising the power conferred by s 50 of the FCA Act the primary judge was required to determine whether it appears that the order sought was “necessary in order to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice”. Section 50 is concerned with prejudice in respect of the exercise by the court of the judicial power of the Commonwealth, rather than prejudice in respect of the exercise by the AAT of the administrative power of the Commonwealth. Merkel J recognised that embarrassment or damage resulting from publicity would be a relevant factor if it was such that a litigant would be deterred from litigating and at [36] said, inter alia:If that situation arises it can be weighed in the discretionary balance that is to be struck between the public interest of open justice and preventing prejudice to the administration of justice. However, that situation has not arisen in the present case. The Full Court observed that mere embarrassment was not of itself sufficient for the Court to grant a suppression order. In Hogan v The Australian Crime Commission & Ors (2010) 240 CLR 651 the High Court considered an application made under s 50 of the Federal Court Act in respect of the non-publication of the financial affairs of a well-known public figure. At [29] the High Court (French CCA, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon & Kiefel JJ) considered the operation of s 50 of the Federal Court Act. At [30]-[32] the High Court said:30. As it appears in s 50, “necessary” is a strong word. Hence the point made by Bowen CJ in Australian Broadcasting Commission v Parish, that the collocation of necessity to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice and necessity to prevent prejudice to the security of the Commonwealth “suggests parliament was not dealing with trivialities”. Further, as indicated earlier in these reasons: (a) s 50 is an example of a provision authorising the Federal Court to make orders for the exercise of its jurisdiction other than in open court as mandated by s 17(1); and (b) “the administration of justice” spoken of in s 50 is that involved in the exercise by the Federal Court of the judicial power of the Commonwealth; this is a more specific discipline than broader notions of the public interest.31. It is insufficient that the making or continuation of an order under s 50 appears to the Federal Court to be convenient, reasonable or sensible, or to serve some notion of the public interest, still less that, as the result of some “balancing exercise”, the order appears to have one or more of those characteristics.32. If it appears to the Federal Court, on the one hand, to be necessary to make a particular order forbidding or restricting the publication of particular evidence or the name of a party or witness, in order to prevent either species of prejudice identified in s 50, or, on the other hand, that that necessity no longer supports the continuation of such an order, then the power of the Federal Court under s 50 is enlivened. The appearance of the requisite necessity (or supervening cessation of it) having been demonstrated, the Court is to implement its conclusion by making or vacating the order. The expression in s 50 “may … make such order” is to be understood in this sense.