Hart v Comcare - [2005] HCATrans 1028

[2005] HCATrans 1028

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Registry No C8 of 2005
B e t w e e n -
OLGA HART
Applicant
and
COMCARE AUSTRALIA
Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 16 DECEMBER 2005, AT 9.37 AM

MR J L. GLISSAN, QC: If the Court please, I appear with my learned friend, MR A. ANFORTH, for the applicant. (instructed by Elrington Boardman Allport)

MR G.M. WATSON: May it please the Court, I appear with, MR B.H.J. DUBE, for the respondent. (instructed by Phillips Fox)

GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Glissan.

MR GLISSAN: If the Court please, your Honours, we say that this very narrow issue on the interpretation and proper construction of section 4 of what I might term if I can the SRC Act is a matter which requires special leave. It is both important. It is of very broad application in the Commonwealth generally, not only this Act but a number of other statutes adopt the same definition of “injury”, and that this case is peculiarly an appropriate vehicle for the determination of the important issue that is raised.

Perhaps if I can deal with that latter point first, the vehicle point, your Honours, is that the issue is starkly thrown up by the findings of fact by the AAT Member, Member Mowbray, between pages 24 and 25 of the application book. I do not ask your Honours to go to it but in essence what was determined was that the illness or disease – depending on how it is described – from which the applicant suffered was brought about by a number of contributing causations, a number of which were clearly injuries within the meaning of section 4, however it is read.

Indeed, the way the section is structured all of them were injuries within the meaning of the section subject to the exemption clause or the privative clause or the proviso, however one likes to describe it, that appears at the end. It was determined by the Tribunal member that that was made good, that one of those causes fell within the proviso to section 4 and that notwithstanding that because there were some causal elements which were clearly compensable the applicant was entitled to succeed.

GLEESON CJ: What do you say about paragraph 11 in the judgment of Justice Whitlam on page 44 of the application book?

MR GLISSAN: Yes, thank you, your Honour. That was resolved in our favour in the Full Court of the Federal Court from which there is no appeal. The so‑called spurious distinction to which his Honour referred was picking up an expression that had occurred in earlier cases but the Full Court of the Federal Court in this case – if I can take your Honours to it quickly – determined that at paragraph 26, at the bottom of page 59 of the book…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Hart v Comcare

Details

AGLC: Hart v Comcare [2005] HCATrans 1028
Case: [2005] HCATrans 1028
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Hart v Comcare*, the applicant, Mr Hart, sought to appeal a decision of the Full Federal Court which had affirmed a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court. The dispute concerned Mr Hart's claim for compensation under the *Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988* (Cth) (the SRC Act) for a psychological injury he alleged arose out of or in the course of his employment with the Australian Federal Police. Comcare had denied liability for the claim.

The High Court was required to determine whether the Full Federal Court had erred in its interpretation of section 14(1) of the SRC Act, specifically in relation to the meaning of "injury" and whether a psychological condition arising from a "reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner" in relation to the employee's employment could constitute a compensable injury under the Act. The central question was whether the exclusion in section 5A(1) of the SRC Act, which excludes certain conditions from being considered an "injury" for the purposes of the Act, applied to psychological conditions.

The High Court, comprising Gleeson CJ and Gummow J, held that the Full Federal Court had correctly interpreted section 14(1) and section 5A(1) of the SRC Act. Their Honours reasoned that the exclusion in section 5A(1) was intended to apply to all injuries, including psychological ones, and that a condition arising from reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner was not a compensable injury under the Act. The Court affirmed the principle that the SRC Act provides a statutory scheme for compensation, and its terms must be applied as written.

The appeal was dismissed.

Orders