Iliffe v Comcare

Case [2013] FCA 1434

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Iliffe v Comcare [2013] FCA 1434

Citation: Iliffe v Comcare [2013] FCA 1434
Appeal from: Iliffe v Comcare [2013] AATA 631
Parties: TONI ILIFFE v COMCARE
File number: ACD 100 of 2013
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 28 November 2013
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 43(2B), 44(1)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) ss 5(1)(e), 5(2)(b)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) s 14
Cases cited: Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522 applied
Comcare v Mooi (1996) 69 FCR 43 applied
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Reeve (2012) 199 FCR 463 applied
Hart v Comcare (2005) 145 FCR 29 applied
HBF Health Funds Inc v Minister for Health and Ageing (2006) 149 FCR 291 applied
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 applied
Smith v Comcare (2013) 212 FCR 335 applied
Date of hearing: 28 November 2013
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 44
Counsel for the Appellant: D Richards
Solicitor for the Appellant: Maurice Blackburn
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms R M Henderson
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 100 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

TONI ILIFFE
Appellant
AND:

COMCARE
Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 NOVEMBER 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent's cost.   

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ACD 100 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

TONI ILIFFE
Appellant
AND:

COMCARE
Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE:

28 NOVEMBER 2013

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

  1. This is an appeal under s 44(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act) and an application, in the alternative, for judicial review under s 5(1)(e) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (the ADJR Act). Counsel for Toni Iliffe, the applicant, had some difficulty in identifying any question of law in the notice of appeal. The right to appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act depends upon the applicant articulating a question of law within the meaning of the authorities as explained in HBF Health Funds Inc v Minister for Health and Ageing (2006) 149 FCR 291 at 293 [3]-[6] per Spender, Branson and Siopis JJ and Comcare v Etheridge (2006) 149 FCR 522 at 528 [19] and 530 [30] per Branson J with whom Spender and Nicholson JJ agreed.

  2. In light of that difficulty, Ms Iliffe focused the major part of her argument on a complaint that the making of the Tribunal’s decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred on it under s 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act

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Details
AGLC
Iliffe v Comcare [2013] FCA 1434
Case
[2013] FCA 1434
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Iliffe v Comcare, Ms Iliffe sought compensation from Comcare for injuries she alleged she sustained during her employment with the Department of Defence. The primary dispute was whether Ms Iliffe's claims for stress and migraines constituted injuries under the relevant statutory provisions. The case was heard and determined by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and subsequently appealed to the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issue was whether the Tribunal had correctly determined that Ms Iliffe's claims for stress and migraines did not qualify as injuries under section 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth). The appeal focused on whether the Tribunal had properly considered all relevant evidence and made appropriate findings concerning the timing and causation of Ms Iliffe's alleged injuries. Specifically, Ms Iliffe argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider whether she had suffered an injury prior to the events of March and May 2011, when she learned of her unsuccessful applications for employment.

The Federal Court considered the Tribunal's approach to the evidence and its findings. The Court noted that the Tribunal had concluded that the stress and migraine claims were not injuries because the events Ms Iliffe cited as causes occurred within the scope of reasonable administrative action, for which compensation was not payable. The Tribunal's reasoning indicated that it had examined the evidence of Ms Iliffe and her treating doctor, Dr Murphy, and found that her stress was not at a concerning level in 2010 and that her migraine condition did not constitute an injury until a significant hospitalisation event in April 2011. The Court found that the Tribunal had adequately considered the evidence and provided sufficient reasons for its conclusions, despite some apparent inconsistencies in its findings.

Consequently, the Court dismissed Ms Iliffe's appeal, upholding the Tribunal's decision. The Court ordered that the application be dismissed and that Ms Iliffe pay Comcare's costs. This decision underscores the importance of demonstrating clear and compensable injuries under the statutory framework and the need for administrative decision-makers to provide coherent and sufficient reasoning in their findings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent's cost.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It was common ground before the Tribunal that the circumstances of Ms Iliffe’s treatment in respect of the two occasions on 10 or 11 March 2011 and about 10 May 2011 on which she had learnt that her applications for employment had been unsuccessful fell within the definition of reasonable administrative action. In Hart v Comcare (2005) 145 FCR 29 at 33, Branson, Conti and Allsop JJ held that, for the purposes of the definition of injury under a relevantly identical statutory predecessor of s 5A, where an operative cause of an injury was a result of reasonable administrative action, the employee would not entitled to compensation even if other causes were also operative: see too Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Reeve (2012) 199 FCR 463 at 481-482 [53]-[56] per Rares and Tracey JJ.The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal made findings that ultimately led it to conclude that neither the stress claim nor the migraine claim was an injury for the purposes of s 14 of the SRC Act. It dealt with each of the claims in turn, as will I. Dr Murphy gave evidence to the Tribunal, which it accepted, together with the evidence of Ms Iliffe, that on occasion during 2010 she had raised the issue of stress with Dr Murphy and he had advised her that, if she wished to establish that her stress was work related, she would need to make a compensation claim. Ms Iliffe however, did not wish to do so because she feared it would jeopardise the renewal of her contract. She was aware that one of the questions on her employment application forms was whether or not the applicant had made a claim for compensation. The Tribunal considered Dr Murphy’s clinical notes, which it found were brief. It found that, as Ms Iliffe’s treating doctor since at least 2002, he had been aware that, previously, Ms Iliffe had taken antidepressant medication for about four years and that she had a predisposition to anxiety and depression. Given that history, the Tribunal found to be telling the absence of any reports of stress in Dr Murphy’s clinical notes during 2010. It found that that absence indicated that, although the two had discussed stress during Ms Iliffe’s consultations in that year, her stress was not at a level to raise a concern as to its impact on her health. The Tribunal found that if Dr Murphy had particular concerns about matters affecting Ms Iliffe’s health, his practice was to note the cause, as he did in 2011 when her stress increased. The Tribunal found that Ms Iliffe was under pressure from installers and others during the ordinary course of her work during 2010. It said that she had been managing on the short-term contract arrangements governing her employment, but that these had led to her having to submit her two latest applications for permanent employment. The Tribunal accepted that those were stressful events. However, it found their impact had been ameliorated to a degree because her workload pressure was diminishing in the latter half of 2011 and she was one, among a few, who would remain employed until the end of the program in mid-2011.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

She contended that, in effect, the Tribunal had not performed its statutory function of considering whether, prior to either of two events in 2011 in which she learnt of her not achieving further employment, she had nonetheless suffered an injury. She argued that it had reasoned in its findings that those events were reasonable administrative action and thus, a cause of her stress injury. It had not gone on to consider whether she had suffered an anterior cause of that injury that was compensible. In effect, she contended that, because the Tribunal attributed the consequences of her being notified on 10 or 11 March 2011 and about 10 May 2011 of her lack of future employment, it had simply failed to consider whether she suffered any pre-existing injury and it had given no reasons, and made no findings, about her state of psychological health in the period between the beginning of 2011 and, at least, the first of those events. She argued that the Tribunal’s general findings in her favour relating to the first half of 2011 supported her contention that she had established that she had suffered an injury before 10 March 2011. Accordingly, she submitted, the Tribunal had, in fact, or could be inferred to have, excluded from its consideration such injuries as she had suffered prior to 10 or 11 March 2011 on the basis of its finding that a cause of subsequent injury or aggravation of the injury was the notification to her of her failure to secure permanent employment at that time. She also argued that the Tribunal had failed to give consideration to, or reasons about, the impact of the workplace events she complained of on the migraine injury, prior to the serious hospitalisation event on 8 April 2011. She contended that [65] of the Tribunal’s reasons appeared to involve inconsistent findings by the Tribunal with its earlier findings within that paragraph itself and earlier in relation to her stress claim that there were significant work related factors aggravating her stress injury in the first half of 2011.Consideration It is important to bear in mind that the Tribunal is an administrative decision-maker. The Tribunal consisted of Professor Creyke, Senior Member, and Dr Hughson, a medical practitioner. The reasons of an administrative decision-maker must be understood in the manner described in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. Their purpose is to inform and they should not be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. There are aspects of the way in which the Tribunal expressed itself that could be understood to give rise to Ms Iliffe’s concerns. However, as Comcare argued, it is also important, in this regard, to bear in mind the way in which Ms Iliffe propounded her claims to the Tribunal, and her concentration in submissions on relevant facts for the purposes of persuading it that her claims should be upheld. Ms Iliffe, understandably, placed great reliance before the Tribunal on Dr Murphy’s prescription of a sleeping tablet on 8 March 2011, a few days prior to her being notified of her first failure to secure employment. That is why the Tribunal spent a considerable portion of its reasoning considering whether Ms Iliffe’s attendance on Dr Murphy on 8 March 2011 supported a conclusion that any psychological or stress condition had developed to the point where it could be classed as an aggravation or injury in itself, sufficient to warrant a finding of injury under s 14(1) of the SRC Act. Ms Iliffe had pointed in a generalised way to the ongoing and potentially cumulative impact of her working situation from the beginning of 2010, as sufficient to amount to an injury.