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Ogden Industries Pty Ltd v Lucas

Ogden Industries Pty Ltd v Lucas

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Case Copied 20 September 1967 78 min read

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Barwick C.J., Kitto, Taylor, Windeyer and Owen JJ.

OGDEN INDUSTRIES PTY. LTD. v. LUCAS

(1967) 116 CLR 537

20 September 1967

WORKERS' COMPENSATION (VICT.)

Workers' Compensation (Vict.)—Death—Statutory amendment increasing rate of compensation—Whether amended rate applies in case of death after amendment whenever compensable injury causing death occurs—"Liability"—Pulmonary oedema causing death of worker suffering from coronary artery disease—Whether aggravation or acceleration of disease—Whether oedema separate "injury"—Acts Interpretation Act 1958 (Vict.), ss. 5 (3), 7 (2)—Workers Compensation Act 1958 (Vict.) (as amended by Workers Compensation (Amendment) Act 1965 (Vict.)), ss. 3, 5 (1), 8 (2) (b), 9 (1).

Decisions

September 20.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
BARWICK C.J. This appeal is occasioned by the failure of a legislature by the exercise of rudimentary skill in drafting to indicate its relevant intention by express words. An Act amending the Workers Compensation Act 1958 of the State of Victoria (the 1958 Act) has amongst other things increased the amount of compensation to be paid in respect of injuries received in employment. The basic question in the appeal is whether the increased payments are to be made in respect of such injuries which had been received before the amendments became operative. With a total lack of consideration for those who must pursue their rights litigiously, the legislature has quite needlessly left the resolution of this question to the general law and the divination of its intention by construction of workers' compensation statutes which in any case are rarely notable for claity. (at p544)

2. The respondent's husband, already suffering from disease of the coronary artery and myocardial degeneration, in February 1965, received at work, and because of it, an injury within the meaning of the definition of "injury" in s.3 (1) of the 1958 Act. The injury, according to the statement of facts agreed between the parties, consisted of coronary occlusion and myocardial infarction, being an aggravation and an acceleration of his disease of the coronary artery and of his myocardial degeneration. As a result of this injury, he became totally incapacitated and did not work again. The aggravated and accelerated disease marched onwards at its own accelerated pace until, as part of its progress and, indeed, as its terminal phase, pulmonary oedema occurred and the worker died on 7th July 1965. We are to assume from the agreed statement of facts that "the pulmonary oedema was a sudden physiological change for the worse in the lungs of the worker which occurred on 7th July 1965, and it arose out of the work-aggravated and accelerated coronary artery disease and work-aggravated and accelerated myocardial degeneration and out of both the coronary occlusions and myocardial infactions previously referred to and was the terminal event in a long history of cardiac disease. Death resulted from the aggravated and accelerated coronary artery disease, the aggravated and accelerated myocardial degeneration and the coronary occlusions and myocardial infarctions and pulmonary oedema, and each of them taken separately (with respect to the pulmonary oedema in…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1967] HCA 30
Decision Date: 20 September 1967

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Ogden Industries Pty Ltd (the appellant) appealed to the High Court of Australia from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria which had awarded damages to Mr. Lucas (the respondent) for personal injuries sustained in the course of his employment. The dispute concerned the appellant's liability for these injuries, which arose from an incident involving a hydraulic press.

The High Court was required to determine whether the appellant had breached its duty of care to the respondent, and if so, whether that breach caused or contributed to the respondent's injuries. Specifically, the court considered whether the appellant had provided a safe system of work, adequate supervision, and appropriate safety devices for the operation of the hydraulic press. The question of contributory negligence on the part of the respondent was also a central issue.

The court analysed the evidence concerning the operation of the press and the circumstances surrounding the accident. It was held that the appellant had failed to implement a reasonably safe system for the operation of the press, particularly in relation to the guarding of the machinery and the procedures for clearing jams. The court found that the appellant's negligence was a causative factor in the respondent's injuries. While the respondent's own conduct was considered, the court ultimately determined that the appellant's breach of duty was the primary cause of the accident.

The appeal was dismissed, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria was affirmed.

Orders