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Chang Jeeng v Nuffield (Australia) Pty Ltd

Chang Jeeng v Nuffield (Australia) Pty Ltd

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Case Copied 3 September 1959 37 min read

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dixon C.J., McTiernan, Kitto, Menzies and Windeyer JJ.

CHANG JEENG v. NUFFIELD (AUSTRALIA) PTY. LTD.

(1959) 101 CLR 629

3 September 1959

Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)

Workers' Compensation (N.S.W.)—Time for commencing proceedings independently of Act against employer—Prescribed period of twelve months from first or only payment of compensation with provision for application for extension of time made within, or within twelve months after expiration of, prescribed period—Amending legislation extending prescribed period from twelve months to three years but leaving time within &hich application might be made for extension unchanged—Worker—First payment of compensation—Prescribed period of twelve months still current—Amendment to three years—Application for extension of time made after three but within four years from first payment—Competency of application—Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1951 (N.S.W.), s. 63 (3) (a)—Workers' Compensation (Amendment) Act 1953 (N.S.W.) (No. 21 of 1953), s. 7 (1) (c) (ii).

Decisions

September 3.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
DIXON C.J. The question of law upon which the decision of this appeal turns depends upon the effect of an amendment made by the Workers' Compensation (Amendment) Act 1953, No. 21, in a provision of the Workers' Compensation Act 1926-1951 (N.S.W.). The provision is s. 63 which deals with the right of a worker to proceed under the Act and independently of the Act in a case where the injury is caused by some negligence or wilful act giving rise to a civil liability in the employer. Sub-section (3) of s. 63 provided, before the amendment, that where any payment by way of (workers') compensation under the Act is received by the worker no action should be maintainable by the worker (scil. independently of the Act) unless such proceedings are instituted within twelve months after the date upon which such payment was so received by the worker or where more payments than one have been so received by the worker unless such proceedings are instituted within twelve months after the date upon which the first of such payments was so received by the worker. This was called the prescribed period. A proviso enabled a judge of the Supreme Court to extend the prescribed period for such further period and subject to such terms and conditions as he set out in the order, if he were satisfied that sufficient cause was shown or that having regard to all the circumstances of the case it would be reasonable so to do. An application for an extension might be made within the prescribed period or at any time within twelve months thereafter. On 20th November 1953 the foregoing provision was altered by changing the prescribed period from twelve months to three years. It is to be noted that the period within which an application for an extension of time may be made remained unaltered: it remained twelve months after the prescribed period but of course as the prescribed period became three years, time to apply for an extension did not run out until twelve months after the expiry not of one…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [1959] HCA 40
Decision Date: 3 September 1959

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by Chang Jeeng against Nuffield (Australia) Pty Ltd concerning a contract for the sale of a motor vehicle. The dispute arose from allegations that the vehicle sold was not of merchantable quality, as warranted by the seller.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the motor vehicle, at the time of sale, was of merchantable quality within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW). This required the court to determine the standard of merchantability applicable to a used motor vehicle and whether the defects present met that standard.

The Court reasoned that merchantable quality implies that a product is reasonably fit for the general purpose for which such goods are used. For a used motor vehicle, this standard does not mean it must be in perfect condition, but rather that it should be capable of performing its essential functions without requiring immediate, substantial, and costly repairs. The Court found that the evidence established the vehicle had significant defects that rendered it not of merchantable quality at the time of sale, as it was not fit for its ordinary purpose of driving.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the lower court and remitting the matter for assessment of damages.

Orders