JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: BURNS -v- MINISTER FOR HEALTH [2012] WASCA 267
CORAM: MARTIN CJ
PULLIN JA
NEWNES JA
HEARD: 16 AUGUST 2012
DELIVERED : 14 DECEMBER 2012
FILE NO/S: CACV 149 of 2011
BETWEEN: TAHLIA BURNS (by her next friend DAVID BURNS)
Appellant
AND
MINISTER FOR HEALTH
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram :COMMISSIONER GETHING
Citation :TAHLIA BURNS (by her next friend DAVID BURNS) -v- MINISTER FOR HEALTH [2011] WADC 205
File No :CIV 3304 of 2011
Catchwords:
Limitation periods - Limitation Act 1935 (WA) s 47A - Whether period in which plaintiff can apply for order extending limitation period constitutes limitation period
Limitation periods - Limitation Act 1935 (WA) s 47A - Whether limitation period is procedural or substantive
Limitation periods - Limitation Act 2005 (WA) - Where limitation period under 1935 Act expired before commencement of 2005 Act - Whether s 7 applies - Whether extension provisions in pt 3 of the 2005 Act available
Legislation:
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 19, s 37
Limitation Act 1935 (WA), s 38, s 40, s 47A
Limitation Act 2005 (WA), s 4, s 5, s 6, s 7, s 8, s 39, s 41, s 42
Limitation Legislation Amendment and Repeal Act 2005 (WA), s 4
Result:
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal allowed
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
Appellant: Ms G Archer SC
Respondent: Mr D R Clyne
Solicitors:
Appellant: Ilberys Lawyers
Respondent: Downings Legal
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Asher‑Relf v Minister of Health [2009] WADC 202
Attorney General of New South Wales v World Best Holdings [2005] NSWCA 261; (2005) 63 NSWLR 557
Australian Iron & Steel Ltd v Hoogland (1962) 108 CLR 471
Bingham v England (1996) 17 WAR 226; (1996) Aust Tort Rep 81 ‑ 393
Chang Jeeng v Nuffield (Australia) Pty Ltd (1959) 101 CLR 629
Chang v Laidley Shire Council [2007] HCA 37; (2007) 81 ALJR 1598
Charlton v Workcover Queensland [2006] QCA 498; (2007) 2 Qd R 421
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1997] HCA 2; (1997) 187 CLR 384
Coleman v Shell Co of Australia (1943) 45 SR (NSW) 27
Commonwealth v Mewett [1997] HCA 29; (1997) 191 CLR 471
Commonwealth v SCI Operations Pty Ltd [1998] HCA 20; (1998) 192 CLR 285
Desai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 320
Fisher v Hebburn Ltd (1960) 105 CLR 188
Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45
Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd v May (1977) 136 CLR 379
Harding v Coburn [1976] 2 NZLR 577
Lauri v Renad [1892] 3 Ch 402
Lodhi v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 121; (2006) 199 FLR 303
Matheson v Commissioner of Main Roads [2001] WASCA 402; (2001) 25 WAR 269
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- Case
- [2012] WASCA 267
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining the nature of the limitation period, whether it was procedural or substantive, and whether the 2005 Act applied retrospectively. The court needed to decide if the limitation period was subject to retrospective application and whether the extension provisions in the 2005 Act could be invoked despite the expiry of the limitation period under the 1935 Act.
The court examined the intention of the legislature as expressed in the wording of the statute, considering the normal canons of construction and relevant provisions of any interpretation statute. The court noted that statutes should only be given retrospective operation to the extent necessitated by the words of the statute, construed in their full context and in accordance with the legislative purpose. The court held that the limitation period was substantive, and therefore, the presumption against retrospective operation applied. As a result, the extension provisions in the 2005 Act were not available to the plaintiff.
The court's decision was that the limitation period in the 1935 Act was substantive, and thus, the 2005 Act did not apply retrospectively. Consequently, the plaintiff's application for an extension of the limitation period was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
'Retrospectivity' is a word that is not always used with a constant meaning: Commonwealth v SCI Operations Pty Ltd [1998] HCA 20; (1998) 192 CLR 285, 309 [57] (McHugh and Gummow JJ); Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 92 [114] (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ); Coleman v Shell Co of Australia (1943) 45 SR (NSW) 27, 30 (Jordan CJ). However, it is settled that if events have occurred prior to the passing of an Act which have brought into existence particular rights or liabilities in respect of a matter, if the Act is construed as altering those rights or liabilities, it is thereby given a retrospective operation: Coleman v Shell Co of Australia, 31 (Jordan CJ). Whether a statute is to be construed in a retrospective sense, and if so to what extent, depends on the intention of the legislature as expressed in the wording of the statute, having regard to the normal canons of construction and to the relevant provisions of any interpretation statute: Yew Bon Tew v Kenderaan Bas Mara [1983] 1 AC 553, 559. It has been observed that a statute should only be given retrospective operation to the extent necessitated by the words of the statute, construed in their full context and in accordance with the legislative purpose, but no greater extent: see Reid v Reid (1886) 31 Ch D 402, 408 ‑ 409; Lauri v Renad [1892] 3 Ch 402, 421; Moss v Donohoe [1915] HCA 61; (1915) 20 CLR 615, 621; Secretary of State for Social Security v Tunnicliffe [1991] 2 All ER 712, 724; Plewa v Chief Adjudication Officer [1995] 1 AC 249, 257; Attorney General of New South Wales v World Best Holdings [2005] NSWCA 261; (2005) 63 NSWLR 557; Thaina Town (On Goulburn) Pty Ltd v City of Sydney Council (2007) 71 NSWLR 230, 253 [127]; Lodhi v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 121; (2006) 199 FLR 303, 310–311; R v JS [2007] NSWCCA 272; (2007) 230 FLR 276, 121 [45] ‑ [46]; Chang v Laidley Shire Council [2007] HCA 37; (2007) 81 ALJR 1598, 1614, [82] ‑ [83]; 237 ALR 482, 501 [82] - [83] (Kirby J). At common law, as a matter of construction, in the absence of some clear indication to the contrary, an act will be presumed not to have retrospective operation: Maxwell v Murphy (1957) 96 CLR 261; Fisher v Hebburn Ltd (1960) 105 CLR 188, 194 (Fullagar J); Geraldton Building Co Pty Ltd v May (1977) 136 CLR 379. In Maxwell v Murphy, Dixon CJ held that: [A] statute changing the law ought not, unless the intention appears with reasonable certainty, to be understood as applying to facts or events that have already occurred in such a way as to confer or impose or otherwise affect rights or liabilities which the law had defined by reference to the past events (267). However, this rule of construction does not apply to provisions which are categorised as altering procedural laws, as opposed to substantive laws, as no person has a vested right in any particular course of procedure: Maxwell v Murphy, 267 (Dixon CJ); Yrttiaho v The Public Curator of Queensland (1971) 125 CLR 228. However, as the High Court (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) explained in Rodway v The Queen [1990] HCA 19; (1990) 169 CLR 515: [T]he difference between substantive law and procedure is often difficult to draw and statutes which are commonly classified as procedural - statutes of limitation, for example - may operate in such a way as to affect existing rights or obligations. When they operate in that way they are not merely procedural and they fall within the presumption against retrospective operation (518).