Mewett v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mewett v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] FCA 808

ROMANA JANE MEWETT v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

NG 376 of 1994

WHITLAM J

1 AUGUST 2003
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NG 376 of 1994

ON REMITTAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

ROMANA JANE MEWETT
APPLICANT

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WHITLAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 AUGUST 2003

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        Judgment be entered for the respondent with costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NG 376 of 1994

ON REMITTAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

ROMANA JANE MEWETT
APPLICANT

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

WHITLAM J

DATE:

1 AUGUST 2003

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. This is an action for damages for negligence and breach of duty.  It is brought against the respondent (‘the Commonwealth’) by a former sailor in the Royal Australian Navy (‘RAN’) and arises out of an incident on 31 August 1979.  The Commonwealth admits that it breached the duty of care it owed the applicant, but it does not admit that the applicant suffered any damage as a result of its breach.  The so-called gist of negligence is thus in issue.

  2. An unusual feature of this case is that the applicant, who was born a male and named Robert John Mewett, now dresses and lives as a woman and uses the name Romana Jane Mewett.  The applicant has also undergone what is popularly known as a ‘sex change’ operation.  Nonetheless, the applicant subsequently married a woman called Valmai Margaret Stevens.  Although this woman now uses the surname Mewett, I shall refer to her as Ms Stevens in order to distinguish her from the applicant’s first wife.  So far as the applicant is concerned, whilst it may be confusing having regard to the applicant’s appearance and presentation at various stages of life, I will use throughout these reasons the pronouns ‘she’ and ‘her’ in relation to the applicant. 

    Background

  3. The applicant was born on 14 December 1955 in England in the town of Torquay, which is situated in a part of the county of Devon known as the English Riviera.  The great seaport of Plymouth and the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth lie farther to the east in the same county.  After attending a local school, the applicant joined the Royal Navy (‘RN’) on 7 June 1971.  Her initial service involved basic training at Shotley in Suffolk followed by training as a radio electrical mechanic at Fareham in southern Hampshire.  The applicant then served on the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal from 1 October 1972 until September 1973 when she went to the Devonport naval base in Plymouth.  In February 1974 she was posted overseas to the RN communications centre in Mauritius where she served for one year.  The applicant then returned…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 808
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Mewett v Commonwealth of Australia involved the applicant, who was born a male under the name Robert John Mewett but now identifies as a woman and uses the name Romana Jane Mewett. The applicant, who has undergone gender reassignment surgery, was suing the Commonwealth of Australia for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that she claimed resulted from a traumatic incident that occurred during her service in the Royal Australian Navy. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the applicant sought compensation for her alleged PTSD.

The central legal issue in this case was whether the applicant could claim compensation for PTSD under the common law, given that the High Court of Australia had previously ruled in Tame v New South Wales that recovery for mental distress was only available if it resulted in a recognized psychiatric condition. The court had to determine if the traumatic event that the applicant claimed caused her PTSD was foreseeable to a person of normal fortitude and if the applicant's silence about the event over many years undermined her claim.

The court reasoned that it was foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude might suffer mental harm from the traumatic event that the applicant described, which involved a heavy list and water sluicing down the side of the ship, potentially leading to fear of capsize and drowning. However, the court found that the applicant's failure to mention her alleged recurrent and intrusive recollections of the event in numerous clinical situations over the years undermined her claim. The court also noted that the applicant's record showed a willingness to consult naval medical services for various personal problems and seek treatment, making her silence about the traumatic event particularly significant.

Ultimately, the court was unconvinced that the events on board the ship had any effect on the applicant's psychological equilibrium, as her performance evaluations after the event showed no impairment in occupational functioning, and she was able to assimilate new skills in her training. Based on these findings, the court ruled in favor of the respondent, the Commonwealth of Australia, and ordered that judgment be entered for the respondent with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Judgment be entered for the respondent with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

An unusual feature of this case is that the applicant, who was born a male and named Robert John Mewett, now dresses and lives as a woman and uses the name Romana Jane Mewett. The applicant has also undergone what is popularly known as a ‘sex change’ operation. Nonetheless, the applicant subsequently married a woman called Valmai Margaret Stevens. Although this woman now uses the surname Mewett, I shall refer to her as Ms Stevens in order to distinguish her from the applicant’s first wife. So far as the applicant is concerned, whilst it may be confusing having regard to the applicant’s appearance and presentation at various stages of life, I will use throughout these reasons the pronouns ‘she’ and ‘her’ in relation to the applicant. Background The applicant was born on 14 December 1955 in England in the town of Torquay, which is situated in a part of the county of Devon known as the English Riviera. The great seaport of Plymouth and the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth lie farther to the east in the same county. After attending a local school, the applicant joined the Royal Navy (‘RN’) on 7 June 1971. Her initial service involved basic training at Shotley in Suffolk followed by training as a radio electrical mechanic at Fareham in southern Hampshire. The applicant then served on the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal from 1 October 1972 until September 1973 when she went to the Devonport naval base in Plymouth. In February 1974 she was posted overseas to the RN communications centre in Mauritius where she served for one year. The applicant then returned to Dartmouth for four and a half months before commencing service on 1 August 1975 aboard the Leander class frigate HMS Ajax. In November 1975 Ajax made a four-day visit to the port of Fremantle in Western Australia. During that visit the applicant met in Perth a nineteen-year old Australian woman, Shirley June Capewell. (It will avoid confusion if I simply refer to this woman as Shirley.) On 22 December 1975 the applicant returned to Perth where she married Shirley on 31 December 1975. Three days later the applicant left Perth to rejoin Ajax. Shirley followed the applicant to England where they were reunited on 14 April 1976. Their first child, a daughter Julie, was born on 2 March 1977. The applicant decided to migrate to Australia by joining the RAN. On 21 November 1977 Shirley and Julie left England to travel ahead of the applicant to Australia. The applicant was discharged from the RN on 26 February 1978. The next day she joined the RAN in London with the rank of able seaman. Her job category was electrical technical communications (‘ETC’). Although her designated home port was Perth/Fremantle, the applicant flew directly to Melbourne and commenced training at the depot HMAS Cerberus on Western Port Bay in Victoria. Shirley and Julie joined her there on 17 March 1978. Following her training the applicant was posted to Sydney in February 1979 (HMAS Kimbla), to Perth in February 1980 (HMAS Moresby) and to Canberra in August 1981 (HMAS Harman). In September 1983 she was posted to Sydney (HMAS Nirimba) for advanced ETC training. Shirley moved with the applicant on these postings, and during this period of service they had three sons: Alan (born 2 November 1979), Jason (born 7 January 1981) and Damian (born 15 October 1983). The applicant was promoted to the rank of leading seaman on 9 April 1981.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As a final note to this record of extensive treatment, I should mention that the applicant continues her peregrinations. She went on a week’s holiday in Malta in December 1999 and a fortnight’s holiday in Tunisia in November 2000. Expert Evidence I have described the evidence relating to the applicant’s treatment since August 1990, and I have also summarized the effect of the evidence given by those treating doctors who have been called as witnesses. Each side in this case also arranged to have the applicant examined in the middle of 2001 for the purposes of this case by experts who have been cross-examined on reports they have prepared. The applicant’s solicitors qualified two psychiatrists, Dr Duncan Veasey in London and Dr Jonathan Phillips in Sydney, together with the Sydney consultant psychologist, Dr Alex Gilandis. Dr Veasey accepted the premise that the applicant suffered PTSD. He was concerned to weigh the effect of her longstanding problem with gender dysphoria and the impact of PTSD upon the family stressors to which she was exposed. It should be noted that Dr Veasey had a background of service in the RN, and he thought it at least debatable whether the applicant’s dysphoria constituted a formally diagnosable personality disorder. Dr Gilandis thought that the applicant’s PTSD was at least at a moderate level and chronic. He also thought it plausible that the applicant’s previous stressors and identity conflicts may have made her vulnerable to decompensate if faced with major trauma. Dr Gilandis’s psychometric testing of the applicant produced scores within severe depression and severe anxiety ranges. Dr Phillips’s evidence was most helpful and instructive. He was, quite properly, ready to acknowledge gaps in the history that he had taken from the applicant. In particular, Dr Phillips acknowledged his limited information about the applicant’s ongoing urological problems and the consequent significance of associated pain problems. (Dr Veasey acknowledged, perhaps too casually, that much of the applicant’s formidable medication related to physical problems subsequent to her gender reassignment surgery.) Dr Phillips focussed on the connection between diagnosed PTSD and the disturbance of her fragile gender balance. He thought that this involved a move to compulsive cross-dressing which culminated in Dr Haertsch’s operation. Dr Phillips considered it highly unlikely that the applicant experienced post traumatic psychological problems after any electrical fire on Ajax. He did think that the applicant was rendered psychologically unstable by the Kimbla incident, thus causing her with her gender identity disorder to proceed slowly but inexorably to hormonal and surgical reassignment. Dr Phillips allowed that the applicant’s significant depression symptoms over the years had their origin in a number of other areas. But his acceptance of the PTSD diagnosis by the RAN consultants appears to rest on this passage in his report:‘Ms Mewett identified psychological symptoms at least from November 1979. Her prominent symptoms at the time included increasingly aggressive behaviour (directed at her then wife), recurrent flashbacks of the incident (in response to various cues linked with the initiating trauma), impaired sleep (initial insomnia, repeated wakenings, morning exhaustion, repeated nightmares always with violent themes), difficulties associating with others, excessive vigilance to potentially dangerous situations and a tendency to drink more heavily. Ms Mewett was unable at the time to make a coherent link between her various symptoms and post traumatic stress disorder. She did not seek advice or treatment from naval medical authorities.’

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant’s ‘long standing personality disorder’ was also central to Dr Roldan’s opinion. He said that his psychometric testing of the applicant achieved scores associated with possible malingering and over-reporting of both physical and psychological symptomatology. In particular, Dr Roldan thought that the applicant’s contrived and self-serving reporting style was adopted as a result of her indoctrination by Ms Stevens. He did not, however, downplay her chaotic family life, gender identity problem and significant physical problems.Conclusion The law on liability for mental trauma is stated in Tame v New South Wales (2002) 76 ALJR 1348. The High Court confirmed the position that recovery at common law was not available for any form of mental distress, but was restricted to a recognized psychiatric condition. The judgment in Tame establishes that a duty of care to avoid mental harm will be owed to a plaintiff only if it was foreseeable that a person of ‘normal fortitude’ might suffer mental harm in the circumstances of the case if care was not taken. This test does not require a plaintiff to be a person of normal fortitude in order to be owed a duty of care. It only requires it to be foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude in the plaintiff’s position might suffer mental harm. In this sense, being a person of normal fortitude is not a precondition of being owed a duty of care. In this case the applicant claims to have suffered PTSD. This is a recognized psychiatric condition. The test for the existence of a duty of care laid down in Tame bears on the nature of the traumatic event which is called a stressor in the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. In my view, it is quite foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude in the wheelhouse of Kimbla might suffer mental harm in the circumstances disclosed in the dry language of the RAN inquiry report. The heavy list and the water sluicing down the side of the ship, combined with the delay in recovering from the list, might well put a person of normal fortitude in such fear of capsize and drowning that she might suffer mental harm. The admission of the breach of duty of care by the Commonwealth, which was made in this case prior to the decision in Tame, thus poses no problem in its resolution. The applicant has given evidence of re-experiencing the Kimbla incident in various ways. These are quite dramatic accounts. I do not need to restate them The problem for the applicant is her total silence on the topic in so many clinical situations over the intervening years where it would have been natural to mention what she said were recurrent and intrusive recollections of the event. I find the suggestion that the applicant was observing some kind of naval tradition of stoicism quite fantastic. Her record shows a readiness to consult RAN medical services over all kinds of personal problems and avail herself of treatment provided, whether it be drug therapy or a vasectomy. I have no doubt that the applicant has a long standing personality disorder but, equally, I remain unconvinced that events on board Kimbla had any effect upon her psychological equilibrium. Her performance evaluation reports in the RAN after the event reveal no impairment in occupational functioning. Moreover, she was able to assimilate new skills in her training.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established