QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
REASONS FOR DECISION
Separate reasons are provided below by Senior Member Aughterson and Member Browne, respectively. The final orders appear at…
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- Case
- [2020] QCATA 138
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the statutory language in section 38(4) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) meant that any delay in making a referral rendered it invalid. The court examined the purpose behind the statutory requirement to act 'as soon as possible', finding that it was to ensure prompt action, but not necessarily to create a bar to proceedings if the delay did not cause prejudice. The court held that the Board's delay did not result in any prejudice to the respondent, and therefore, the referral was not rendered invalid. Furthermore, the court found that the QCAT had the discretion to grant an extension of time under section 61 of the QCAT Act, and it was not mandatory for the QCAT to dismiss the referral due to the delay. The appeal was ultimately dismissed, and leave to appeal was granted.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicants submitted that s 38(4) of the AI applied in circumstances where the Council failed to institute proceedings in respect of the conditions of the 2010 approval until January 2018. Both the Planning and Environment Court and the Court of Appeal rejected that submission. Morrison JA, with whom Mullins JA and Callaghan J agreed, adopted the reasoning of the Planning and Environment Court:[41]I am unable to accept that the operation of s 38(4) of the AIA brings into force some form of de facto limitation of actions defence. I agree with the submission made on behalf of the Council that as a matter of both construction and intent, the construction of s 38(4) does not create any legal limitation or bar to a proceeding of the type under consideration. In this context, it is also quite clear that the respondents are relying on s 38(4) as a defence for the “recovery of money”. In my view, in circumstances where s 10 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 specifically deals with “an action [in (contact or tort) for the recovery of a sum recoverable…” there is no scope for the operation of s 38(4) of the AIA as contended for. As was submitted on behalf of the Council, insofar as proceedings of that nature are concerned, s 10 of the Statute of Limitations Act 1974 “covers the field”. (emphasis added)It was added:[42]If s 38(4) did not operate as a limitation of or a bar to the institution of proceedings, as I consider to be correct, its application otherwise would depend upon the delay causing some form of prejudice. However, the applicants confront factual findings that prevent that conclusion.[41]Ibid, [87].[42]Ibid, [88]. In the Planning and Environment Court (see [2019] QPEC 12, [25]), reliance was placed on Conset Investments Pty Ltd. However, RS Jones DCJ stated that that case and other authorities cited:were concerned with circumstances where it could readily be appreciated that the party having to defend itself would be or could be materially prejudiced by the passage of time. For the reasons set out in more detail below, I do not consider that is the situation in this case. The passage of time, particularly involving material delay, will almost always be a relevant consideration in the exercise of discretion. However, in this case it has not caused the respondents such prejudice as to warrant precluding the Council from seeking appropriate relief. The Court of Appeal also noted that failure to pay the infrastructure charges ‘would constitute a continuing breach of the obligation’, adding:That there was a continuing breach is a circumstance that would prevent finding that the delay in commencing the proceeding caused any prejudice, or was something not done ‘as soon as possible’ within the meaning of s 38(4) of the Acts Interpretation Act. In the present case, it is not contended by the respondent that the failure to make the referral as soon as possible gave rise to a nullity or statutory invalidity.[43] Rather, it was submitted that where the referral was not made ‘as soon as possible’, the referral can proceed only if an extension of time is allowed pursuant to s 61 of the QCAT Act.[43]Transcript of proceedings, 1-59.