Registrar of Motor Vehicles v Vu

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES v VU & ANOR

[2013] SASCFC 10

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Anderson and The Honourable Justice Stanley)

8 March 2013

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - STATUTORY POWERS AND DUTIES - EXERCISE - TIME FOR EXERCISE

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - GENERAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION - GENERALLY

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - OBLIGATORY AND DISCRETIONARY PROVISIONS - GENERAL PRINCIPLES

TRAFFIC LAW - LICENSING OF DRIVERS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - DISQUALIFICATION, CANCELLATION OR SUSPENSION OF LICENCES - GENERALLY

Appeal by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles against declarations made by a Judge of this Court that two disqualification notices issued pursuant to s 139BD of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) were invalid. The respondents had expiated traffic offences in circumstances which made them liable to statutory disqualifications but the Registrar did not attempt to activate the disqualifications by notifying the respondents until approximately two years after the expiations. The respondents subsequently brought applications in this Court seeking declarations that the Registrar was neither duty bound nor empowered to make notifications which activated the periods of statutory disqualification by reason of that long delay and that the notices which she had issued were invalid. The Judge upheld the respondents’ contention, holding that the Registrar’s duty, and concomitant power, to issue the notices was subject to, and conditional upon, compliance with her obligation to act “with all convenient speed” in accordance with s 27(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA).

Whether the Registrar acted “with all convenient speed” - whether the legislature intended non-compliance with s 27(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) to result in invalidity.

Held: appeal allowed – the declarations of invalidity made by the Judge to be set aside – the respondents’ actions be dismissed – the Registrar did not act “with all convenient speed” to issue notices to the respondents – the statutory disqualification provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) are not intended to limit the duty and power of the Registrar to make the prescribed notifications of cancellation and disqualification to those occasions when the Registrar has acted “with all convenient speed” – the legislature did not intend non-compliance with s 27(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) to result in invalidity.

Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 139BD, s 5(6), s 98BC, s 98BE, s 98BE(2a), s 81D(1), s 81D(2), s 98BE(2a)(a), s 81C(2), s 81B(1) s 81BA(4), s 81BC(2), s 81BB(8), s 93; Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 27(3); Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) s 47BA(1); Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (SA) s 9(1), s 9(4), s 9(9), s 5, s 18, s 6(1)(e); Road Traffic (Miscellaneous) Regulations 1999 (SA) Sch 9; Australian Road Rules r 264(1); Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 13; Courts Administration Act 1993 (SA) s 6, s 10, s 17, s 21A; Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s…

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Details
Case
[2013] SASCFC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia heard an appeal concerning the validity of disqualification notices issued by the Registrar of Motor Vehicles. The dispute centred on whether the Registrar's failure to issue these notices "with all convenient speed," as required by the *Motor Vehicles Act 1959* (SA), rendered the notices invalid. The respondents argued that the delay in issuing the notices meant they were ineffective.

The court was required to determine two primary legal issues. Firstly, when the Registrar's statutory duty to issue disqualification notices arises under sections 81D(2) and 98BE(2a) of the *Motor Vehicles Act 1959* (SA). Secondly, whether a failure by the Registrar to comply with the obligation to act "with all convenient speed" in issuing these notices would result in the invalidity of the notices themselves.

The Full Court, comprising Kourakis CJ, Anderson and Stanley JJ, allowed the appeal. While agreeing with the primary judge that the Registrar had failed to issue the notices with all convenient speed, the majority of the court disagreed with the conclusion that this failure led to invalidity. The court reasoned that Parliament did not intend for invalidity to be the natural consequence of such a breach. They found that the statutory language and context did not support a construction where a delay in issuing the notices would vitiate them. The court also considered that the duty to issue the notices arose as soon as the relevant demerit points were incurred or the conviction recorded, rather than upon the Registrar becoming aware of the circumstances, but this did not alter the conclusion regarding invalidity. The appeal was allowed, and the respondents' actions were dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, I mention, as is indeed apparent from my reasons, that the questions of when the Registrar’s duty arises and the content of that duty, on the one hand, and the intended statutory consequence of breach on the other, are interrelated. The more certain the content of the duty, and the more practicable it is for the Registrar to comply with it, the stronger the indication that non-compliance will result in invalidity. The converse is also true. My conclusion as to invalidity, thus far expressed, is founded on the premises that the duty first arises when the points are incurred, or the conviction recorded, and that the length of time in which the duty may be performed will vary according to all of the circumstances. However, the contraindications to which I have referred would, in my view, lead to the conclusion that a breach of the obligation to act with all convenient speed would not result in invalidity even if the Registrar’s duty arose only after she first became aware of the circumstances enlivening that duty and even if the content of that duty could be defined with much greater certainty.[16][16] If the duty was to issue the notices within a legislatively prescribed number of weeks or months, a more difficult question might arise but, in my view, for the reasons given in [37], it is not possible to so construe s 27(3) Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA).Conclusion I would allow the appeal. I would set aside the orders made by the Judge. I would order instead that the respondents’ actions be dismissed. ANDERSON J: I have read the reasons of the Chief Justice and Stanley J. I agree generally with the reasons expressed by their Honours. To my mind the interpretation of the words “with all convenient speed” is properly dealt with by the judge appealed from. I agree with the comments of Stanley J on this aspect. In relation to the question of the invalidity of the notices it is my view that it is only necessary to consider the first point made by the judge appealed from in order to resolve the matter. I respectfully disagree with His Honour’s analysis on that topic. The factors which influence me in coming to that conclusion are the two factors highlighted by Stanley J in his reasons. I agree also with what the Chief Justice says on this point. I agree that Parliament could not have intended that invalidity of the notices would be the natural consequence of failure to give notice “with all convenient speed”. In my view there is no such legislative purpose to be discerned. I would allow the appeal for those reasons. STANLEY J: I agree that the appeal must be allowed. The orders made by the judge of this Court should be set aside. An order should be made dismissing the respondents’ actions. I agree with the conclusion of the learned judge below that the Registrar failed to issue the disqualification notices to the respondents with all convenient speed. In my view, the learned judge was correct in his construction of the provisions of s 81D(2) and s 98BE(2a) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) (“the Act”). This construction is supported by both textual and contextual considerations. A reading of the Act as a whole strongly favours a construction that the obligations to give notice imposed by those provisions arise as soon as the points were incurred, and not at some later time when the Registrar becomes aware of that fact. The absence of the phrase “on becoming aware of the fact” in those provisions, in circumstances where analogous provisions e.g. s 81B(1), s 81BA(4), s 81BC(2) and s 81BB(8) expressly condition the obligation to give the specified notice on the Registrar “becoming aware of the fact” indicates that the Parliament intended that the obligation imposed on the Registrar to issue a notice arises at different times under different sections. I reject the submission of the respondents that the difference in language is a result of Parliamentary oversight. The learned judge’s careful analysis of the history of the enactment of these provisions offers persuasive refutation of that proposition.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established