Helbers v Registrar of Motor Vehicles

[2012] SASC 185

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil)

HELBERS & ORS v REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES

[2012] SASC 185

Judgment of The Honourable Justice White

18 October 2012

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - GENERAL APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION - GENERALLY

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - STATUTORY POWERS AND DUTIES - EXERCISE - TIME FOR EXERCISE

STATUTES - ACTS OF PARLIAMENT - INTERPRETATION - OBLIGATORY AND DISCRETIONARY PROVISIONS - OTHER PARTICULAR CASES - WHERE STRICT COMPLIANCE NECESSARY

Defendant gave each plaintiff a notice of disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence - a long period of time elapsed between expiation by the plaintiffs of the offences requiring their disqualification and the giving of the notices - the defendant was not informed of the plaintiffs' expiations - plaintiffs seek declarations that the notices are invalid and consequential injunctions.

Whether defendant failed to act with all convenient speed in giving the disqualification notices required under the respective provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) (MVA) - when the defendant became obliged to give the respective notices - whether the defendant was entitled to await notification from others of the circumstances requiring the giving of the disqualification notices - whether the defendant is entitled to give notices of disqualification on the basis of information provided by someone other than the Commissioner of Police - whether the exercise of the defendant's function in issuing disqualification notices is conditioned on the Commissioner providing the necessary information with all convenient speed - whether the exercise of the defendant's function in issuing disqualification notices is conditioned on the defendant exercising that function with all convenient speed - whether the defendant's delay has the consequence that the notices are invalid.

Claims of the plaintiffs Helbers and Sharma dismissed; claims of the plaintiffs Vu and Abraham upheld - the defendant failed to act with all convenient speed in giving the disqualification notices under ss 81D(2) and 98E(2a) of the MVA, but did act with all convenient speed in relation to the notices given under s 81B(1) - under ss 81D(2) and 98BE(2a), the defendant became obliged to give the notices upon the expiations by Messrs Vu and Abraham of their offences, but under s 81B(1) the defendant became obliged to give the notices to Messrs Helbers and Sharma only when she became aware of the relevant facts - in relation to ss 81D(2) and 98BE(2a) the defendant was not entitled to await notification from others of the circumstances requiring the giving of the notices, but no equivalent positive obligation exists under s 81B(1) - the defendant is entitled to give notices of disqualification on the basis of information provided by someone other than the Commissioner of Police - the exercise of the defendant's function in issuing disqualification notices is not conditioned on the Commissioner providing the necessary information with all convenient speed - the exercise of the defendant's function in issuing disqualification notices is conditioned on the defendant giving the notices with all convenient speed - the defendant's delay has the consequence that the notices given to Mr Vu and Mr Abraham respectively under ss 81D(2) and 98BE(2a) are invalid.

Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 5, s 73, s 75A, s 81A, s 81B, s 81BA, s 81BB, s 81BC, s 81C, s 81D, s 83, s 91, s 93, s 98AAB, s 98B, s 98BC, s 98BD, s 98BE, s 139BD; Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (SA) s 4, s 5, s 6, s 8, s 9, s 15, s 18, s 18A; Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) s 35, s 47BA, Part 4A; Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 49, s 52; Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 27; Victims of Crime Act 2001 (SA) s 32; Criminal Law Consolidation Act (SA) s 350; Motor Vehicles Regulations 2010 (SA) Sch 4; Australian Road Rules r 20, r 264; Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT); Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1998 (NSW); Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (NT); Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld); Vehicle and Traffic Act 1999 (Tas); Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic); Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), referred to.
Application for Reservation of Question of Law to the Court of Criminal Appeal (1997) 69 SASR 550; Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Oke [2007] FCAFC 94; Coombe v Samuels (1975) 12 SASR 342; Epstein and Morton v WorkCover Corporation (2003) 85 SASR 561; Goulburn Murray Rural Water Authority v Rawalpindi Nominees Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 166; Gribbles Pathology (Vic) Pty Ltd v Cassidy (2002) 122 FCR 78; Mikhman v Royal Victorian Aero Club [2012] VSC 42; Parisienne Basket Shoes Pty Ltd v Whyte (1938) 59 CLR 369; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; Re Conset Investments Pty Ltd [1993] 2 Qd R 244; Smith v Wyong Shire Council [2003] NSWCA 322; Watkins v State of Victoria (2010) 27 VR 543, considered.

HELBERS & ORS v REGISTRAR OF MOTOR VEHICLES
[2012] SASC 185

Civil

1. WHITE J:        The plaintiffs seek declarations that the respective notices of disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence given to them by the defendant, the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (RMV), in consequence of their commission of traffic offences are invalid.  They also seek consequential injunctions.

2. A long period of time elapsed between the expiation by the plaintiffs of the offences requiring their disqualifications, on the one hand, and the giving of the notices, on the other.  The delay occurred because the RMV was not informed, whether by the Commissioner of Police (the Commissioner) or otherwise, of those expiations.  In those circumstances the plaintiffs contend that the RMV failed to give the disqualification notices required by the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) (MVA) with “all convenient speed”. They referred to s 27(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) which provides:

   (3)Where no time is prescribed or allowed within which any thing must be done, the thing must be done with all convenient speed and as often as the prescribed occasion arises.

   The effect, so the plaintiffs submitted, is that the notices of disqualification given to them are invalid.

3. When the RMV did give the disqualification notices, she did so on the basis of information provided to her by the Courts Administration Authority (CAA) and not by the Commissioner.  The plaintiffs contend that the exercise of the RMV’s function of giving notices of licence disqualification is conditioned on the RMV receiving the relevant information from the Commissioner and the Commissioner only.  Thus, they contend that the RMV’s use of information provided by the CAA is an independent source of invalidity.

4. The principal issues arising in the proceedings are:

   1.Did the RMV fail to act with all convenient speed in giving the disqualification notices?  This involves consideration of when the RMV became obliged to give the respective notices and, in turn, whether the RMV was entitled to await notification from others of the circumstances requiring the giving of such notices.

   2.Is the RMV entitled to give notices of disqualification on the basis of information provided to her by someone other than the Commissioner and, in particular, by the CAA?

   3.Is the exercise of the RMV’s function in issuing disqualification notices conditioned on the Commissioner providing the necessary details of the offence to the RMV with all convenient speed?

   4.Is the exercise of the RMV’s function in issuing disqualification notices conditioned on the RMV exercising that function with all convenient speed?

   5.If any of these issues is resolved in the plaintiffs’ favour, does it have the consequence that the notices of disqualification given by the RMV to the plaintiffs are invalid?

   6.Even if the disqualification notices are not invalid, is there nevertheless some unlawfulness which would make it appropriate for this Court to grant injunctions restraining the RMV from taking any action to enforce the notices?

5. In order to understand how these issues arise, it is necessary to set out some background, including aspects of the demerit points scheme and some of the features of the means by which a person may become disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence by administrative action of the RMV. 

6. In these reasons, I will use the word “disqualification” and its cognates as a shorthand reference to disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence under the MVA.

   The Demerit Points Scheme

7. Part 3B of the MVA establishes a demerit points scheme.  Under that scheme, a person who is convicted of, or who expiates, a prescribed offence incurs the number of demerit points fixed by regulation (s 98B(1)). 

8. Persons who incur an aggregate of 12 or more demerit points in respect of offences committed within a period of three years will be disqualified (s 98BC).  The disqualification will be for at least three months, and may be longer depending on the extent to which the aggregate of the demerit points incurred by the person exceeds 12 (s 98BC(3)).  However, if the person is the holder of a provisional licence, the person becomes liable for disqualification for a period of six months on incurring four or more demerit points (s 81B(1)).

   The Plaintiffs’ Traffic Offences

   Mr Helbers

9. In 2008 and 2009 the first plaintiff (Mr Helbers) held a P2 Provisional Licence issued by the RMV under s 81A of the MVA. 

10. On 10 April 2008 and again on 30 May 2009, Mr Helbers committed speeding offences, contrary to r 20 of the Australian Road Rules (ARR).  This meant that he had incurred a total of six demerit points while the holder of a provisional licence with the effect that he was to be disqualified for six months (s 81B(1)). 

11. Administrative action by the RMV was necessary to fix the commencement date of Mr Helbers’ disqualification (ss 81B(1) and 139BD).

    Mr Sharma

12. At material times, Mr Sharma held a learner’s permit issued under s 75A of the MVA. On 26 January 2010, he committed three offences by driving a car on a road: first, without having his learner’s permit with him, contrary to s 98AAB of the MVA; secondly, without having “L” plates affixed to the car, contrary to s 75A(15) of the MVA; and, thirdly, without being accompanied by a qualified supervising driver, in breach of a condition of his learner’s permit (MVA s 75A(10)(c)(i)), thereby committing an offence under s 75A(14) of the MVA.

13. By virtue of the second and third of these offences, Mr Sharma too was liable to disqualification for a period of six months (s 81B(1)).  Administrative action by the RMV was necessary to fix the commencement date of that disqualification.

    Mr Vu

14. On 5 July 2009, the third plaintiff (Mr Vu) committed a second offence of driving a vehicle on a road whilst a prescribed drug was present in his blood, contrary to s 47BA(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) (RTA). He was therefore to be disqualified for a period of six months (MVA s 81D(2)(a)(i)). The same provision imposed an obligation on the RMV to give Mr Vu the notice which would result in the commencement of his period of disqualification being fixed.

    Mr Abraham

15. As a result of offences committed between 11 October 2006 and 25 February 2009, the fourth plaintiff (Mr Abraham) incurred 12 or more demerit points within a relevant three year period.  Accordingly, under s 98BC of the MVA, he was to be disqualified for a period of three months. 

16. However, Mr Abraham invoked s 98BE of the MVA.  Section 98BE entitles persons to elect, in lieu of suffering disqualification, to accept a condition on their licence requiring them to be of good behaviour for a period of 12 months commencing on the day on which the disqualification would otherwise take effect.  If, during that period of 12 months, the person incurs two or more demerit points in relation to further offences they will be disqualified for a period twice that of the original disqualification (s 98BE(2a)).

17. Mr Abraham made the election under s 98BE and his 12 month good behaviour period commenced on 29 April 2009. 

18. Regrettably, on 15 October 2009 Mr Abraham committed the offence of failing to wear a seatbelt, contrary to ARR 264(1). He thereby incurred three demerit points with the effect that he had to be disqualified for six months in accordance with s 98BE(2a)(a)). The RMV was required to give him notice of that disqualification (s 98BE(2a)) in order for the period of disqualification to commence.

    The Scheme for Expiation of Offences

19. Each of the offences committed by the plaintiffs giving rise to their liability to licence disqualification was an expiable offence within the meaning of s 5 of the Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (SA) (Expiation Act). Two methods of enforcement in relation to their offences were therefore available. First, the plaintiffs could have been prosecuted on a complaint issued under s 49 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA).  Alternatively, the plaintiffs could have been given expiation notices under the Expiation Act. 

20. A person given an expiation notice may expiate the offence by paying the expiation fee fixed by the Act, Regulation or by-law in respect of that offence (Expiation Act s 5(1)) as well as the levy imposed by the Victims of Crime Act 2001 (SA) (VOC Act). Section 15 of the Expiation Act provides that, subject to some qualifications which are not presently material, the expiation of an offence has the effect that the alleged offender may not be prosecuted for the offence or offences expiated or for any other offences arising out of the same incident. However, a person given an expiation notice may elect to be prosecuted (Expiation Act s 8) and this is one of the courses of action open to those persons who dispute that they are guilty of the alleged offence.

21. The Expiation Act contains provisions permitting the Registrar of the Magistrates Court (the MC Registrar) to ameliorate the hardship which compliance with an expiation notice may produce.  Persons given an expiation notice may apply to the MC Registrar for relief (Expiation Act s 9(1)).  If the MC Registrar (or an “authorised officer” exercising the MC Registrar’s powers[1]) is satisfied that the applicant or the applicant’s dependants would suffer hardship if the expiation fee were to be paid in full, the Registrar may make an order permitting the fee to be paid in instalments, or an order extending the time within which the fee is to be paid.  An order of this kind is known colloquially as a “hardship order” and it is convenient in these reasons to refer to these orders in the same way.

    [1]    Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (SA), s 18A.

22. The function exercised by the MC Registrar in relation to an application for relief under s 9(4) is administrative in nature and his or her decision is not subject to appeal.  As I understand the position, ordinarily the person or entity issuing the expiation notice is not heard on an application for a hardship order and, in many cases, may not even be aware that an application for a hardship order has been made. 

23. Section 9(9) of the Expiation Act requires the MC Registrar to give notice of the decision made on a hardship application:

    (9)The Registrar must, on making a decision on an application for relief—

    (a)     give the applicant, personally or by post, written notice of the decision; and

    (b)     if an order for relief is made, give written notice of the order to the relevant issuing authority.

    As can be seen, if a hardship order is made, the Registrar is required to give notice of the order to the relevant issuing authority.  In most cases this will be the Commissioner but may, in some cases, be the relevant Minister, statutory authority or local council.[2]  Section 18 of the Expiation Act governs the manner in which the notice may be given:

    Where a written notice is to be given under this Act by a Registrar to an issuing authority, or an enforcement certificate is to be sent by an issuing authority to a Registrar, the notice or certificate may be given or sent in an electronic form that is acceptable to the recipient, provided that a printed copy of the notice or certificate can be produced if required.

    It will be observed, however, that both s 9(9) and s 18 are silent as to the time by which the notice must be given. 

    [2]    Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (SA), s 4 (definition of “issuing authority”).

24. Each of the plaintiffs was issued by a police officer with an expiation notice in relation to the offences described earlier.  None of the plaintiffs disputed, at least in any formal way, his commission of the alleged offences.  Each applied for and obtained a hardship order under s 9 of the Expiation Act: Mr Helbers on 29 June 2009; Mr Sharma on 12 February 2010; Mr Vu on 4 August 2009; and Mr Abraham on 17 November 2009.

25. Section 9(15) of the Expiation Act indicates that the offence to which a hardship order relates will be taken to be expiated when the person complies with the order for payment by instalments, or pays to the MC Registrar the amount then outstanding. This suggests that expiation in such cases does not occur until payment in full of the expiation fee. However, s 5(6) of the MVA modifies that position for the purposes of the MVA. Section 5(6) provides:

    A person who is granted an order for relief under the Expiation of Offences Act 1996 in respect of an expiation notice for an offence that attracts demerit points under this Act will, for the purposes of this Act, be taken to have expiated that offence on the day on which the order is granted.

    Thus, the expiation in the cases to which s 5(6) refers is deemed to have occurred on the date on which the hardship order is made, and not when the payment by instalments has been completed, or when, during an extended time for payment, the relevant payment is made.

26. Reference should also be made in this context to s 32(6) of the VOC Act.[3]  Section 32 imposes the Victims of Crime Levy.  Section 32(6) provides:

    (6)     If a levy is payable under this section by a person who expiates an offence—

    (a)     the amount of the levy must be shown on the expiation notice; and

    (b)     despite any other law, the offence will not be regarded as expiated, and no immunity from prosecution will arise, unless the levy has been paid.

    The phrase “despite any other law” at the commencement of sub‑par (b) may indicate that, despite s 9(15) of the Expiation Act and s 5(6) of the MVA, an offence will not be regarded as expiated unless the levy has been paid.

    [3] Somewhat curiously, ss 5(1), 9(15) and 15(2) of the Expiation Act continue to refer to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1978 (SA) even though that Act was repealed by the VOC Act, but nothing turns on that for present purposes.

27. Neither party contended for that construction and, on reflection, I consider their submissions to be correct, at least in relation to s 5(6). Section 32(6) of the VOC Act and s 5(6) of the MVA have a different focus. The former is concerned with whether an offence has, in fact and in law, been expiated, whereas the latter is addressed to the time when an expiation should, for the purposes of the MVA, be taken to have occurred. In other words, even if an offence has not been expiated by reason of s 9(15) or s 32(6), s 5(6) deems it, for the particular purposes of the MVA, to have occurred at a particular time.

28. There is an obvious public interest in having the sanctions for traffic offences imposed with reasonable contemporaneity. However, in the absence of s 5(6), disqualifications imposed on the expiation of an offence would be deferred and that public interest would be frustrated. Accordingly, it is appropriate to construe s 5(6) as directed to the time when an expiation should, for the purposes of the MVA, be taken to have occurred, whether or not it has, for the purposes of the Expiation Act or the VOC Act, actually occurred.

1. Even if that view of the interrelationship between s 5(6) of the MVA and s 32(6) of the VOC Act is wrong, it would have little practical effect in the present cases. That is because each of the plaintiffs made a payment or payments which had the effect of settling the Victims of Crime Levy within a matter of weeks of the making of the hardship order. Those few weeks in each case are but a minor proportion of the long period of time which elapsed between the making of the hardship orders, on the one hand, and the issue by the RMV of the disqualification notices, on the other.

   Notification of Disqualification by the RMV

2. As previously noted, the RMV was obliged to give each of the plaintiffs notice of their licence disqualifications.  In the case of Mr Helbers and Mr Sharma, that obligation arose from s 81B(1) of the MVA:

   (1)     Subject to this section, if—

   (a)     a person who holds a learner's permit, provisional licence or probationary licence commits an offence of contravening a prescribed condition; or

   (b)     a person expiates an offence of contravening a prescribed condition allegedly committed while the holder of a learner's permit, provisional licence or probationary licence; or

   (c)     demerit points are incurred by a person and, in consequence, the total number of demerit points recorded against the person in respect of offences committed or allegedly committed while the holder of a learner's permit or a provisional licence equals or exceeds 4,

   the Registrar must, on becoming aware of that fact, give the person written notice—

   (d)     that, commencing on the day on which the notice takes effect in accordance with section 139BD, the person is disqualified from holding or obtaining a permit or licence for a period of 6 months; and

   (e)     that, if the person holds any permit or licence when the notice takes effect, the permit or licence is cancelled.

   (Emphasis added)

   In the case of Mr Vu, the RMV’s obligation arose from s 81D(1) and (2) of the MVA:

   (1)This section applies to an alleged offence against section 47BA(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 other than a first offence.

   (2)If a person expiates an offence to which this section applies, the Registrar must give the person written notice—

   (a)     that, commencing on the day on which the notice takes effect in accordance with section 139BD, the person is disqualified from holding or obtaining a licence or learner's permit for—

   (i)    if the offence is a second offence—6 months; or

   (ii)     if the offence is a third offence—12 months; or

   (iii)    if the offence is a subsequent offence—2 years; and

   (b)     that, if the person holds any licence or learner's permit when the notice takes effect, the licence or permit is cancelled.

   (Emphasis added)

   Finally, in the case Mr Abraham, the RMV’s obligation arose from s 98BE(2a) of the MVA:

   (2a)If a person incurs 2 or more demerit points in relation to 1 or more offences committed by the person while the holder of a licence subject to the condition referred to in subsection (2), the Registrar must give the person written notice—

   (a)     that, commencing on the day on which the notice takes effect in accordance with section 139BD, the person is disqualified from holding or obtaining a licence for a period that is twice the period for which the disqualification would have applied under section 98BC if the person's licence had not been subject to that condition; and

   (b)     that, if the person holds any licence when the notice takes effect, the licence is suspended during the period of disqualification.

   (Emphasis added)

3. These provisions have in common the requirement that the RMV give the person written notice that, commencing on the day on which the notice takes effect, the person is disqualified for the specified period. However, s 81B(1) requires the RMV to give the notice “on becoming aware of that fact” whereas neither s 81D(2) nor s 98BE(2a) contain this clause.

4. There are other provisions in the MVA of a similar character to s 81B(1) which require the RMV to give notice of disqualification on “becoming aware” of specified facts. Two are pertinent presently.[4] These are s 81BA(4) relating to offences committed while subject to a “Safer Driver Agreement” and s 81BB(8) relating to offences committed after an appeal against disqualification on hardship grounds has been allowed. There are also two other provisions like s 81D(2) and s 98BE(2a) which, while imposing an obligation on the RMV to issue disqualification notices, are not prefaced with the clause “on becoming aware of that fact”. These are s 81C(2) relating to the expiation of drink driving offences and s 98BD(2) relating to the incurring of 12 or more demerit points in a three year period. The periods of disqualifications under ss 81BA(4), 81BB(8), 81C(2) and 98BD(2) range from three months to two years.

   [4]    I will refer later to ss 81BC and 83.

5. Section 139BD of the MVA governs the manner in which the RMV is to give the notices required by all these provisions, and the effect of those notices.

   (1)A notice of disqualification authorised or required to be given under this Act must be given in accordance with this section.

   (2)A notice of disqualification must in the first instance be sent by post, addressed to the person to whom it is required to be given, at his or her last known postal address.

   (3)     The Registrar must, in the notice—

   (a)     require the person—

   (i)to attend, within the period specified in the notice, at a specified place of a kind prescribed by the regulations to personally acknowledge receipt of the notice in accordance with the notice; and

   (ii)to pay to the Registrar, in accordance with the notice, the administration fee prescribed by the regulations; and

   (b)     inform the person that if he or she fails to comply with the requirements of the notice—

   (i)another notice of disqualification will be issued and served on the person personally; and

   (ii)the person will be liable to pay a service fee of the amount prescribed by the regulations; and

   (iii)the Registrar may refuse to enter into any transaction with the person until the person pays the service fee; and

   (c)     inform the person that if another notice of disqualification is issued and an attempt to serve the notice personally is unsuccessful, the Registrar may refuse to enter into any transaction with the person until the person pays the service fee and personally acknowledges receipt of the notice in accordance with the notice.

   (4)If a person to whom a notice of disqualification is posted fails to comply with a requirement made under subsection (3) within the period specified in the notice—

   (a)     the notice is to be taken for the purposes of this Act not to have been given to the person; and

   (b)     the Registrar must issue another notice of disqualification and cause it to be served on the person personally.

   …

   (6)For the purposes of this Act, a notice of disqualification is to be taken to have been given to a person—

   (a)     in the case of a notice receipt of which is personally acknowledged by the person as required by the notice—on the day on which receipt of the notice is so acknowledged; or

   (b)     in the case of a notice that is served on the person personally—on the day on which the notice is so served.

   (7)A notice of disqualification must specify when the notice will take effect in accordance with this section.

   (8)     Subject to subsection (9), a notice of disqualification takes effect as follows:

   (a)     in the case of a notice receipt of which is personally acknowledged by a person as required by the notice—28 days after the day specified in the notice;

   (b)     in the case of a notice that is served on a person personally—28 days after the day on which the notice is so served.

   (9)If, at the time that a notice of disqualification is due to take effect, the person is already disqualified from holding or obtaining a licence or permit, the notice of disqualification will instead take effect on the termination of that prior disqualification.

   …

   As can be seen, subs (1) requires the notice of disqualification to be given in accordance with s 139BD.  The section contemplates service by post in the first instance (subs (2)) and personal service in those cases in which the person fails to comply with the requirements of the first notice (subs (4)).  The combined effect of subss (7) and (8) is that a notice of disqualification takes effect 28 days after the day specified in the notice, other than in those cases in which the notice is served personally, in which case the notice takes effect 28 days after the date of service.

6. Section 93 of the MVA provides for means by which the RMV may become aware of circumstances requiring the exercise of the obligation to issue notices of disqualification.  If the person has been prosecuted and a court order of a defined type is made, then the “proper officer” of the Court must give the RMV details of the order (s 93(1)).  In the case of expiations, it is the Commissioner who must give the notice to the RMV (s 93(3a)).  Section 93 provides:

   (1)     If a court—

   (a)     convicts a person of an offence that attracts demerit points under this Act; or

   (b)     finds a person guilty of the offence of contravening or failing to comply with a condition of a permit or licence under this Act; or

   (c)     makes an order affecting demerit points or disqualifying a person from holding or obtaining a driver's licence; or

   (d) makes an order under section 47IAB of the Road Traffic Act 1961; or

   (da) makes an order under section 47J(9) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 revoking a disqualification; or

   (e)     makes an order modifying a person's driver's licence,

   the proper officer of the court must notify the Registrar in writing of the date of the finding or order, the nature and effect of the finding or order and short particulars of the grounds on which the finding or order was made.

   (2)If any such finding or order is quashed or varied by a court on appeal, the proper officer of the court must forthwith notify the Registrar in writing of the date of the order made on the appeal and the effect of the order.

   (3a)Where a person expiates an offence to which an expiation notice relates, and that offence—

   (a)     attracts demerit points under this Act; or

   (b)     is an offence of contravening a condition of a learner's permit, probationary licence or provisional licence,

   the Commissioner of Police must send to the Registrar notice in writing of the expiation.

   (3b)Where the Commissioner of Police withdraws an expiation notice in relation to which notice under subsection (3a) has been given, the Commissioner must, by further notice in writing, advise the Registrar forthwith of the withdrawal and the grounds upon which the withdrawal was made.

   (4)     In this section—

   proper officer means—

   (a)     in relation to the Supreme Court, the registrar of that court;

   (b)     in relation to any other court, the clerk of that court.

   It can be seen that s 93(3a) imposes on the Commissioner an obligation to send to the RMV written notice of “the expiation” of an offence of a defined type.  It was common ground at the hearing that s 93(3a) applies to both actual and deemed expiations.  Significantly for present purposes, s 93 does not impose that obligation on the MC Registrar or the “proper officer” of a Court.

7. The effect of s 93 seems to be that the RMV will be informed of the specified matters affecting a person’s entitlement to a driver’s licence whether that matter results from a court order (following a plea of guilty or a trial) or from the person exercising the option to expiate an offence.  However, it is at least arguable that the Commissioner’s obligation under s 93(3a) relates only to expiation notices issued by police officers.  If so, that would mean that s 93 does not provide any means of notification to the RMV of the expiation of offences on expiation notices issued by someone other than a police officer.  It is not necessary for present purposes to determine that issue.

   Summary of Scheme for Administrative Disqualification

8. The submissions at the hearing proceeded on the basis that the statutory provisions in the MVA and the Expiation Act outlined above constitute a scheme leading to disqualification following administrative action by the RMV (administrative disqualification).  There may be a question as to whether that characterisation of the provisions is entirely appropriate.  It may be instead that, while there is some interrelationship between the provisions outlined, they impose no more than a number of independent obligations on the respective public officers.  However, I will put that to one side for the moment.  The steps in the scheme can be summarised as follows:

   1.a person commits an offence for which the MVA requires disqualification or incurs a sufficient number of demerit points so as to be liable to disqualification;

   2.the person is issued with an expiation notice by a police officer;

   3.the person obtains a hardship order under s 9 of the Expiation Act;

   4.for the purposes of the MVA, the person is taken to have expiated the offence on the day on which the order is granted (MVA s 5(6));

   5.the MC Registrar gives written notice of the hardship order to the issuing authority (in this case the Commissioner) (s 9(9) of the Expiation Act);

   6.the Commissioner sends to the RMV notice in writing of the expiation (s 93(3a));

   7.if the person’s circumstances come within ss 81B(1), 81BA(4), 81BB(8), 81C(2), 81D(2), 98BD(2) or 98BE(2a), the Registrar gives the person written notice of disqualification in the manner required by s 139BD; and

   8.depending upon the manner in which the notice is served and the person’s acknowledgment of the notice, the disqualification commences either 28 days after the day specified in the notice or 28 days after the day on which the notice is served (s 139BD).

9. In summary, the MVA and the Expiation Act can, on one view, be construed as providing an integrated scheme by which the RMV will be informed of convictions for offences, or expiations of offences, which may give rise to licence disqualification and therefore be informed of circumstances in which the RMV is obliged to issue the notice which fixes, in the case of each individual, the commencement of the applicable period of disqualification.  On the other hand, the legislative provisions can also be construed as imposing on the Registrar a duty, independently of Steps 5 and 6, to issue disqualification notices when Steps 3 and 4 occur.

10. Significantly for present purposes, no time limit is fixed within which the notices referred to in Steps 5, 6 and 7 must be given. It is that circumstance which attracts the application of s 27(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA).

    Breakdown in the Application of the Scheme

11. The scheme outlined above did not operate in the contemplated way in relation to the four plaintiffs and, it seems, in relation to many others.  Over the two year period from June 2009 to June 2011, the RMV did not become aware of the deemed expiation of offences resulting from the making of hardship orders under s 9 of the Expiation Act.

12. The evidence discloses, and I find, that the CAA (presumably on behalf of the MC Registrar) did, throughout this two year period, by an electronic transfer of data, give the Commissioner the written notice of hardship orders required by s 9(9) of the Expiation Act.  The evidence did not reveal the precise information provided by the CAA to the Commissioner concerning the present four plaintiffs.  However the MC Registrar deposed (and I accept) that the information sent to the Commissioner on each working day during the two year period included the date on which hardship orders had been made, the relevant expiation notice number and details of the offence or offences to which the orders related.  I am also satisfied that this information was received by the Commissioner.

13. However, the Commissioner did not discharge the obligation imposed on him under s 93(3a) of sending to the RMV notice in writing of expiations resulting from hardship orders.  Accordingly, Step 6 in the sequence outlined above did not occur.  Nor was the RMV informed by other means of the hardship orders in this period, with the consequence that Step 7 did not occur either.  In fact, it seems that the Commissioner had not, for many years before June 2009, provided to the RMV any information concerning expiations resulting from hardship orders.[5]

    [5]    I mention that, in order to provide the Commissioner with procedural fairness, the Court granted him permission to file an affidavit, and to make written or oral submissions in the proceedings.  The Court was informed that the Commissioner did not wish to exercise that permission.

14. The omission of the Commissioner before June 2009 to discharge the obligation under s 93(3a) in relation to expiations resulting from hardship orders does not seem to have produced any practical consequence.  This is because the CAA included the relevant information in material which it (presumably on behalf of the proper officers of the Supreme, District and Magistrates Courts) provided directly to the RMV by an electronic transfer of data.  It is unclear when the CAA commenced providing information of this kind directly to the RMV but it seems to have been a practice of many years standing.  The evidence did not disclose the arrangement by which the CAA provided the information.  As already noted, s 93(1) of the MVA requires the proper officer of a Court to give written notice to the RMV of orders of the Court which may have an effect on a person’s licence to drive a vehicle.  It is possible therefore that, although not strictly obliged to do so, the CAA, when discharging this obligation on behalf of the proper officers of the Courts, also included information relating to hardship orders made by the MC Registrar or by an authorised officer.  It is also possible that the CAA provided the information at the separate request of the RMV, in order to facilitate the discharge by the RMV of her obligations to issue disqualification notices.

15. It was not suggested that when the CAA provided this information to the RMV, it was doing so on behalf of the Commissioner. 

16. In any event, as a result of an unintended computer programming change, the CAA did not provide the RMV with written notice of the hardship orders made by the MC Registrar or by an authorised officer in the period between June 2009 and June 2011.  The fact that information of this kind was not being provided in this two year period went unobserved by all involved.

17. The omission of the Commissioner to provide the RMV with the required information during the two year period has not been explained.  An affidavit from a senior police officer proffered the following:

    [9]Although SAPOL did advise the [RMV] of certain matters (such as when an expiation notice was paid in full), SAPOL did not send the [RMV] information regarding orders for relief granted by the Magistrates Court during the relevant period.  It appears to have been assumed that this information was being provided to the [RMV] by the CAA in accordance with the longstanding practice described in paragraph 5 above.

18. It is not necessary to make a finding about this possible explanation, although I do note that the evidence does not actually indicate that the Police had any knowledge of the practice of the CAA of providing the information directly to the RMV.

19. Each of the hardship orders concerning the plaintiffs was made during the period in which the RMV was not being provided with details of those orders.  The RMV did not become aware of them by any other means in that period.

20. The computer programming error was discovered in July 2011.  Almost immediately, the CAA resumed the practice of providing directly to the RMV details of hardship orders.  This included details of the hardship orders made in the period between June 2009 and June 2011, including those relating to the plaintiffs.

1. In the case of Messrs Helbers, Sharma and Abraham, the relevant information was provided by the CAA on 27 July 2011 and, acting on that information, the RMV posted a disqualification notice to them on 3 August 2011.  None of these three plaintiffs acknowledged receipt of the notice and accordingly, on 2 September 2011, the RMV issued a second notice under s 139BD(4) for personal service upon each of them.

2. In the case of Mr Vu, the CAA provided the written notice to the RMV on 27 July but the RMV did not post a disqualification notice to him until 7 September.  The RMV issued a second notice under s 139BD(4) on 7 October.  I accept the RMV’s explanation for the lapse of time between 27 July 2011 and 7 September 2011, namely, that an invalid offence code meant that the data could not be recorded automatically on the Transport Regulation User Management Processing System (TRUMPS) used by the RMV.  This meant that the data concerning Mr Vu had to be processed manually and this did not occur until 1 September.

3. The timelines relating to each plaintiff are summarised in the following table.

Mr Helbers	Mr Sharma	Mr Vu	Mr Abraham
Date of Alleged Offence	30 May 2009	26 Jan 2010	5 July 2009	15 Oct 2009
Date of Hardship Order and Deemed Expiation	29 June 2009	12 Feb 2010	4 Aug 2009	17 Nov 2009
Date of transfer of information from MC Registrar to RMV	27 July 2011	27 July 2011	1 Sept 2011	27 July 2011
Date of s 139BD(2) notice	3 Aug 2011	3 Aug 2011	7 Sept 2011	3 Aug 2011
Period of time between deemed expiation and first s 139BD notice	2 years, 1 month and 5 days	1 year, 5 months and 22 days	2 years, 1 month and 3 days	1 year, 8 months and 17 days

Prejudice to the Plaintiffs

1. A licence disqualification is a serious matter.  A person must not drive a motor vehicle while disqualified.  Doing so is punishable by imprisonment for up to six months for a first offence, and up to two years for subsequent offences.[6]  The inability to drive can be a source of considerable personal inconvenience.  Each plaintiff deposed to circumstances of that kind.  Each also deposed to the prejudice which the late disqualification notice would produce if they must, belatedly, serve the applicable period of disqualification.  It is for these reasons that the plaintiffs seek the declarations and injunctions to which I referred at the commencement of these reasons.

   [6]    Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA), s 91(5).

2. On 23 March 2012, a judge of this Court issued, by consent, an interlocutory injunction restraining the RMV until further order from taking any action in relation to the notices of disqualification dated 3 August 2011 issued to Messrs Helbers and Sharma, and from refusing, under s 139BD, to enter into any transaction with them by reason of the issue of the notices.  No such injunction was issued in relation to Messrs Vu and Abraham as at that time they were not parties to the action.  It was not suggested that the absence of an interlocutory injunction in their cases made the present proceedings futile.

3. Against that background, I turn to address the issues identified at the commencement of these reasons.

   A Requirement that the Notices be Issued with all Convenient Speed?

4. As previously noted, s 27(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) provides that when legislation does not prescribe or allow a time within which a thing must be done, that thing must be done “with all convenient speed”. All parties accepted that s 27(3) was applicable to the obligations imposed on the RMV by ss 81B(1), 81D(2) and 98BE(2a) of the MVA. Those provisions are expressed in mandatory terms, and the RMV is not vested with any discretion concerning the giving of notices. Subject to one matter to be mentioned shortly, I consider that the parties were correct in accepting that s 27(3) is applicable to these provisions.

5. The question of whether something is done with all convenient speed is one of fact to be answered having regard to all the circumstances in which the act is to be done.[7]  However, before that question can be determined some antecedent issues must be addressed.  These include an identification of the time at which the obligation of the RMV to give the notices was enlivened. 

   [7]    Re Conset Investments Pty Ltd [1993] 2 Qd R 244.

6. The plaintiffs contended that the respective statutory provisions required the RMV to give the disqualification notices when the respective hardship orders were made.  That was when they had expiated their offences, or acknowledged their guilt of the offences to which the expiation notices related, or had incurred the relevant demerit points, so that it could then be said that the conditions for disqualification contained in ss 81B(1), 81D(2) and 98BE(2a) had occurred.

7. The RMV submitted that the obligation did not arise in any of the plaintiffs’ cases until she became aware of the circumstances requiring the giving of a disqualification notice.  The provisions in the MVA should not be construed, the RMV submitted, so as to require her to take action which was conditioned on the happening of events of which she had no knowledge. 

8. The plaintiffs accepted that the RMV had to have knowledge of the circumstances requiring the issue of disqualification notices but submitted that the RMV was not entitled to await notification of those circumstances, whenever that may be.  Instead, the obligation of the RMV to give the notices when the specified circumstances existed meant that the RMV was subject to an implicit obligation to take sufficient steps to learn of those circumstances.  They submitted that the RMV had failed to discharge that obligation.

9. The plaintiffs sensibly agreed that, if the RMV became obliged to give a notice only on the receipt of proper notice of the expiation of the relevant offence, then she had acted with all convenient speed. 

   When is the RMV Obliged to Issue Notices under s 81B?

10. Section 81B(1) requires the RMV to give a person the disqualification notice “on becoming aware of that fact”, with the fact being the commission of an offence of a defined type or the incurring of a prescribed minimum number of demerit points.  Sections 81BA(4) and 81BB(8) are to similar effect.

11. Section 81D(2), together with ss 81C(2), 98BD(2) and 98BE(2a), do not include this clause. On its face, this distinction in the manner of expression suggests that in the case of the former group of provisions, the RMV’s obligation arises only when the RMV becomes aware of the relevant fact, whereas in the case of the latter, the RMV’s obligation arises on the happening of the event. In other words, under s 81B the commission of a specified offence or the incurring of the minimum number of demerit points does not of itself enliven the RMV’s duty. This construction of s 81B(1) gives effect to the clause “on becoming aware of that fact” and in turn gives effect to the principle that, so far as possible, meaning should be given to every word in a statutory provision.[8]

    [8]    Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28 at [71]; (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 382.

12. The RMV submitted that no relevant distinction should be drawn between these provisions.  She referred again to the incongruity of the legislative provisions requiring her to issue a notice in circumstances of which she had no knowledge.  The RMV submitted that the ordinary inference that the use of different expressions in provisions of a similar kind in the one statute should be regarded as intended to produce a different effect should not be applied in this case.  Instead, the use of the different expressions is more naturally to be understood as a consequence of amendments to the MVA having been made at different times and for different purposes, without the legislature adverting to the desirability of consistency in the manner of expression. 

13. In my opinion, the words “on becoming aware of that fact” in s 81B(1) operate as a temporal qualification on the exercise of the RMV’s duty.  They have the meaning of “after but in close proximity to” the time at which the RMV learns of the specified fact.  This means that the RMV is not obliged to give the notice until after he or she does become aware of the relevant fact but must give the notice “on” learning of it.  This requires the RMV to give the required notice upon learning of the specified fact, or in close proximity to that time.

14. Considered in this way, it could be said that ss 81B(1), 81BA(4) and 81BB(8) do specify the time at which action by the RMV is required and, therefore, that s 27(3) is inapplicable to them. It is not necessary to express a final view about that because, in practical terms, the time for action contemplated by “after but in close proximity to” will be similar to the time encompassed by the expression “with all convenient speed”.

15. Considerations of legislative history support this construction of s 81B(1).  That section was first introduced into the MVA in 1980.[9]  When first enacted, s 81B(1) required the RMV to issue a notice of “cancellation” of a licence “if the [consultative] committee so recommends”, ie, the obligation was conditioned on a recommendation being made.

    [9]    Motor Vehicles Act Amendment Act 1980 (SA), s 4.

16. In 1985, s 81B was amended significantly[10] and the obligation imposed on the MVR was recast to read:

    (2)Where a person who holds a learner’s permit or a driver’s licence endorsed with probationary conditions—

    (a)     commits an offence of contravening a probationary condition;

    or

    (b)     commits an offence in respect of which a demerit point is, or demerit points are, recorded against him and, in consequence, the total number of demerit points recorded against him in respect of offences committed while the holder of a learner’s permit or a driver’s licence endorsed with probationary conditions equals or exceeds four,

    the Registrar shall, upon receiving notice under section 93 of the conviction, or the expiation, of the offence, give notice ….

    (Emphasis added)

    Thus, s 81B(2) in that form did not require the RMV to take action upon the commission of a relevant offence or the incurring of the requisite number of demerit points.  The obligation on the RMV arose only upon the receipt of a notice under s 93.  By the same amendment, s 93 was recast, in the respects which are material for present purposes, to the form in which it is now.  This meant that s 81B required the RMV to act only when the RMV received notice from the proper officer of a court or the Commissioner that one of the matters specified in that section had occurred.

    [10]   Motor Vehicles Act Amendment Act (No 2) 1985 (SA), s 5.

17. Section 81B was amended again in 1992[11] so as to delete the expression “upon receiving notice under section 93 of the conviction, or the expiation, of the offence” and to insert the clause “on becoming aware of that fact”.  The Minister’s Second Reading Speech relating to the amendment indicates that it was “consequential to the amendment that recognises interstate demerit points for the purposes of the Demerit Points Scheme”.  That recognition is contained in s 98BB of the MVA, also inserted by the 1992 amendment.  Section 98BB provides:

    Where demerit points are incurred or recorded by or in relation to a person under a law of another State or Territory of the Commonwealth declared by the regulations to be a corresponding law for the purposes of this Part, they will be taken to be incurred by that person under this Part.[12]

    [11]   Motor Vehicles (Licences and Demerit Points) Amendment Act 1992 (SA), s 6.

    [12]   Seven enactments have been declared by Regulation to be corresponding laws for the purpose of Part 3B of the MVA.  These are the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT); the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1998 (NSW); the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (NT); the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld); the Vehicle and Traffic Act 1999 (Tas); the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic); the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) as well as the Regulations made under each of those Acts.

18. This history indicates that the insertion of the clause “on becoming aware of that fact” was intended to expand (at least to some extent) beyond notices under s 93 the sources of information on which the RMV would be required to act.  However, it also suggests that the amendment was not intended to alter the requirement of the RMV to act, and only to act, on being informed of the relevant fact.  In other words, the history suggests a construction of s 81B(1) which requires the RMV to give a disqualification notice only on becoming aware of a relevant fact, whether by notice under s 93 or otherwise.  This means that the duty is to be discharged at, or in close proximity to, the time at which the RMV becomes aware of the relevant fact, and not at any other time.

19. It is convenient to address in relation to ss 81D(2) and 98BE(2a) the plaintiffs’ submissions concerning the RMV’s implied obligation to learn of circumstances requiring the giving of disqualification notices. It is sufficient for present purposes to say that, in my opinion, s 81B does not include any such implied obligation. The legislative history of s 81B which I have outlined is inconsistent with the RMV being subject to such a positive obligation. Clearly that was so between 1980 and 1992. The amendment in 1992, and the explanation for the amendment given by the Minister at the time, do not suggest a legislative intention that s 81B should be construed as requiring a proactive role by the RMV in seeking out circumstances in which he or she would be obliged to give the required notices.

20. The RMV acted under s 81B in the case of Messrs Helbers and Sharma.  Whether the obligation on the RMV to issue the disqualification notices in their cases is couched in terms of “after but in close proximity to” the RMV becoming aware of the relevant facts or in terms of “with all convenient speed” once the RMV becomes aware of the relevant facts, the RMV satisfied that obligation.  Accordingly, the notices given to Messrs Helbers and Sharma are not invalid because of the time at which they were issued.

    When is the RMV Obliged to Issue Notices under s 81D?

21. As already seen, s 81D does not include the clause “on becoming aware of that fact”. Instead, it requires the RMV to give a disqualification notice “if [the] person expiates an offence to which this section applies”. Section 81C (which is concerned with certain prescribed concentration of alcohol offences) is expressed in the same way. Like ss 81B, 81BA and 81BB, ss 81C and 81D are both contained in Part 3 of the MVA. Prima facie, this suggests that the obligation imposed on the RMV by those provisions is not qualified in the same way as is the obligation imposed by each of ss 81B(1), 81BA(4) and 81BB(8).

22. That impression is strengthened by reference to the legislative history. Section 81C was inserted into the MVA in 2003 by the Statutes Amendment (Road Safety Reforms) Act 2003. At that time s 81B used the expression “on becoming aware of that fact”, yet the legislature chose not to use that formulation in s 81C which was to follow immediately after it. That suggests that the legislature intended that the RMV should give the notice on the happening of the specified event, rather than at some later time when the RMV happened to become aware of the event.

23. The same reasoning applies in relation to s 81D which was inserted in 2005.[13] 

    [13]   Road Traffic (Drug Driving) Amendment Act 2005 (SA), Sch 1, cl 7.

24. Further still, the present s 81BC of the MVA was originally enacted in 2007 as s 81BA.[14] It required the RMV “on becoming aware of [a specified] fact” to give persons notice that they were required to surrender their licences. However, although also amending ss 81C and 81D by the same amending Act, the legislature did not then align the manner of expression in those provisions with ss 81B and 81BA.

    [14]   Motor Vehicles (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2007 (SA), s 7.

25. The repeal and re‑enactment of s 83 by the same amending Act is also significant in the present context. Before that amendment, s 83 required the RMV, when a person’s licence was suspended or the person became disqualified in another State or Territory or overseas, to take specified action in this State in relation to that person. The effect of the amendment in 2007 was to require the RMV instead to take the specified action “if the [RMV] becomes aware” of the circumstance occurring interstate or overseas. This suggests that the legislature gave specific attention to the distinction between the RMV being obliged to take action on the happening of a particular circumstance, on the one hand, and on the RMV becoming aware of that circumstance, on the other. Despite the recognition of the distinction, the legislature retained the existing manner of expression in ss 81C and 81D. Given that history, this Court should be slow to read into s 81D a qualification which the legislature itself has chosen not to use.

26. There is a basis on which a distinction may be drawn between ss 81B(1), 81BA(4) and 81BB(8), on the one hand, and ss 81C(2), 81D(2), 98BD(2) and 98BE(2a), on the other. The latter group of provisions oblige the RMV to issue notices on the expiation of specified offences or the incurring of demerit points. The former group require, in addition, that the RMV take action on the commission of offences of a specified type. In relation to the latter group, the RMV should be able readily to become aware of the circumstances requiring action, but this is not so in the case of the former. This may explain the legislature’s apparent deliberate use of different language in these provisions.

27. There are, however, some countervailing considerations. There is the obvious fact that the RMV can hardly be expected to give the notice required by s 81D unless the RMV is aware of the circumstance enlivening that obligation.

28. Secondly, s 81D of the MVA operates in conjunction with s 47BA of the RTA. Both these provisions were enacted in 2005 by the Road Traffic (Drug Driving) Amendment Act 2005 (SA). Section 47BA(4) contains a requirement for mandatory disqualification by a court in respect of second and subsequent contraventions of the provision. Accordingly, s 81D is concerned only with administrative disqualification by the RMV in the case of those s 47BA offences which are expiated. On the expiation of an s 47BA offence, demerit points are incurred.[15] This means that the obligation of the Commissioner under s 93(3a) of the MVA to give notice to the RMV of the expiation is enlivened. The requirement for such notice to be given in the context of the scheme outlined earlier tends naturally to suggest that it is the receipt of the provided information upon which the RMV is to act. This point applies with equal force to s 81C.

    [15]   Motor Vehicles Regulations 2010 (SA), Sch 4, Pt 2.

29. However, this is not a conclusive consideration because, as pointed out earlier, s 93 may also be understood as merely facilitative of the exercise of the RMV’s obligations, without altering the underlying nature of those obligations. 

30. The possibility that the difference in manner of expression in s 81B, on the one hand, and ss 81C and 81D, on the other, is a consequence of legislative oversight cannot be overlooked. The possibility of oversight is supported to some extent by the absence of any explanation in the Second Reading Speeches for the different choice of language.[16]  However, this Court would not readily attribute an oversight of this kind to the legislature, especially as it has shown itself to be alert to the distinction in question.

    [16]South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 16 October 2002, 1571-6; South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 14 September 2005, 3358-62.

31. If the RMV is obliged by s 81D(2) to give a disqualification notice to a person expiating an offence of driving with a prescribed drug (or on a person expiating an offence of driving with the prescribed concentration of alcohol), then it seems necessarily implicit that the RMV must take steps or put in place arrangements by which he or she will learn of those circumstances. Otherwise the RMV could not discharge the duty imposed by s 81D and s 27(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) in the required manner.

1. Regard should be had to issues of practicality. A construction which would have the effect that the legislature has imposed on the RMV obligations which would, in practice, be difficult to perform may not be appropriate. However, in the case of ss 81C and 81D, no issues of impracticality arise. Each of these provisions imposes a duty on the RMV in the event of expiation by a person of the specified offence. As seen earlier, that expiation my be actual, ie, by payment of the expiation fee in full, or deemed, by reason of the MC Registrar making a hardship order. This means that the RMV should be able to obtain the relevant information quite readily from either the Commissioner of Police or from the MC Registrar. Section 93 facilitates the RMV’s discharge of the implied obligation by requiring that the relevant information be provided to the RMV, even in the absence of any request from the RMV.

2. I acknowledge that the RMV may not be able to obtain from the Commissioner the required information in relation to other provisions, in particular, s 98BC (incurring of 12 or more demerit points) and s 98BE(2a) (incurring two or more demerit points while subject to a licence condition). That is because persons other than police officers may issue expiation notices for offences leading to the incurring of demerit points.

3. Section 6(3) of the Expiation Act provides for the categories of persons other than police officers who may give expiation notices:

   (3)     An expiation notice may only be given by—

   (a)     a member of the police force; or

   (b)     a person who is authorised in writing by—

   (i)the Minister responsible for the administration of the Act against which the offence is alleged to have been committed; or

   (ii)the statutory authority or council responsible for the enforcement of the provision against which the offence is alleged to have been committed,

   to give expiation notices for the alleged offence; or

   (c)     a person who is authorised to give expiation notices for the alleged offence by or under the Act against which the offence is alleged to have been committed.

   Section 6(4) enlarges this class of persons:

   (4)If an officer or employee of a council is authorised by or under an Act to exercise powers as an inspector (or other authorised person) for the purposes of the enforcement of a provision of that Act, the officer or employee—

   (a)     is authorised to give an expiation notice for an alleged offence against that provision; and

   (b)     in giving such a notice, will be taken to be doing so on behalf of the council.

4. Of course, the only expiation notices which these persons may issue which are relevant for present purposes are those for offences which attract demerit points.  It seems that expiation notices of this kind may be issued by, or on behalf of, a Minister, a statutory authority, and a local council, as well as by the Commissioner.[17]

   [17]   Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA), s 35; Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (SA), s 4(1) (definition of issuing authority) and s 6(3)-(4).

5. The scheme described earlier does not provide any means by which the Commissioner will be informed of the expiation or deemed expiation of offences for which an expiation notice was issued by, or on behalf of, a Minister, statutory authority or local council.  In those cases, the expiation fee will be paid to the issuing authority and not to the Commissioner and, if a hardship order is made, notice of that order is sent to the issuing authority, and not to the Commissioner (Expiation Act s 9(9)).

6. Accordingly, in relation to the expiation of some offences, the RMV may have to make enquiries in this State of each local council as well as of the Central Inspection Authority.[18] 

   [18]   Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA), Part 4A.

7. In addition, the RMV may have to make enquiries in the other States and Territories to ascertain whether, in the case of a person holding a South Australian licence, demerit points have been incurred or recorded under a corresponding law of which s 98BB of the MVA requires account to be taken.  It is not possible presently to determine the extent to which such an obligation would be onerous.  It is possible that the corresponding laws themselves contain requirements that the RMV and the RMV’s interstate and territory counterparts be informed of the commission of offences attracting demerit points.

8. Accordingly, at least in relation to ss 98BD(2) and 98BE(2a), the entities or persons to whom the RMV will have to make enquiries or make arrangements for information to be provided will be greater than in the case of ss 81C and 81D. However, it will still be a relatively confined number of authorities and persons. I do not consider that it could be thought to be so onerous as to be impractical.

9. In considering any issue of impracticality, or burden on the RMV, regard should be had to the RMV’s obligations more generally under the MVA and, in particular, under s 73.  That section requires the RMV to keep a register of licences, including details of various orders affecting the currency of licences.  Section 73 provides:

   (1)The Registrar must keep a register of the names and addresses of all licensed drivers, and of all endorsements on, and renewals, suspensions, and cancellations of, licences.

   (2)The register will contain such other information as the Registrar thinks necessary for the administration of this Act and will be in a form determined by the Registrar.

   Although s 73(1) does not refer explicitly to disqualifications, it seems probable that it does require the RMV to include on the register details of licence disqualifications as well as details of renewals, suspensions and cancellations.  Even if it does not, the duty imposed on the RMV by s 73(1) seems to require him or her to take active steps to become aware of the matters to be recorded on the register.

10. While the countervailing factors which I have mentioned are of some force, I do not consider that they outweigh the force of the considerations which I mentioned earlier.  The implications to be drawn from the language which the legislature has used and the legislative history are strong. 

11. This means that the obligation of the RMV under s 81D arises at the time when a person expiates a second or subsequent s 47BA(1) offence and not at some later time. Section 27(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) requires the RMV to issue the disqualification notice with all convenient speed from that time.

12. The Solicitor-General, for the RMV, submitted in the alternative that the RMV had in any event discharged the obligation of taking steps to ascertain the circumstances requiring the discharge of the duty imposed on her by s 81D and the other provisions. He referred to the arrangements which the RMV had put in place with the CAA for an electronic transfer of data. The RMV had not been alerted to the fact that the CAA had ceased providing details of hardship orders.

13. I accept the factual basis on which these submissions are made. However, the underlying obligation imposed on the RMV by s 81D(2) remains the same, however reasonable the steps taken by the RMV in an attempt to discharge the duty might be. That duty is to issue a disqualification notice when a second or subsequent s 47BA(1) offence is expiated, and not merely to take reasonable steps to do so.

14. In the case of Mr Vu, the RMV failed to issue the disqualification notice with all convenient speed after the deemed expiation of his offence on 4 August 2009.  I will defer consideration of the effect of this finding for the time being.

    When is the RMV Obliged to Issue Notices Under s 98BE(2a)?

15. Like s 81D, s 98BE(2A) does not include the clause “on becoming aware of that fact”. However, unlike s 81D, s 98BE appears in Part 3B of the MVA. It has, therefore, a different legislative history.

16. The legislative history of s 98BE(2a) is important. It was introduced into the MVA in 2007 by the Motor Vehicles (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2007 (SA), ie, the same amending Act by which the original s 81BA was inserted. This suggests a deliberate choice by the legislature to use different language.

17. For the reasons which I have given in relation to s 81D, I consider that the obligation imposed on the RMV by s 98BE(2a) is to be exercised when a person who has accepted a condition on a licence under that section incurs two or more demerit points, and not later when the RMV happens to learn of that circumstance. This means that s 98BE(2a) also imposes on the RMV an implicit obligation to inform himself or herself of that circumstance.

18. In the case of Mr Abraham, the RMV did not give him a notice under s 98BE(2a) for more than one year and eight months after the deemed expiation of his offence. Accordingly, the RMV did not act with all convenient speed in his case.

    The Source of the RMV’s Knowledge?

19. The plaintiffs’ alternative submission was that, if the RMV is obliged to issue disqualification notices only on becoming aware of the relevant facts, then the source of the RMV’s knowledge is an important element of the legislative scheme.  Section 93 of the MVA should be understood, they submitted, as requiring that the RMV act on a notification under that section, and only on such a notification.  This had the consequence that the RMV had not been entitled to act on the information concerning them provided by the CAA in July and September 2011.

20. The elements of the submission as I understood it were these.  Section 93 provides specifically for the means by which the RMV will be notified of relevant matters.  It contemplates that the RMV will be informed by one or other of two sources.  Those sources are such that it can be expected that there will be integrity in the process by which the information is provided and in the accuracy of that information.  In addition, s 93 contains some built‑in safeguards in the requirement that the proper officer of the courts and the Commissioner, as the case may be, notify the RMV “forthwith” of the occurrence of particular events which may bear upon the requirement for disqualification notices to be issued.  These same safeguards would not exist if the RMV was permitted to act on information provided by other sources.

21. Further, some inferences can be drawn from the nature of a disqualification.  It is itself a significant penalty and one capable of producing hardship for an offender and the dependents of an offender.  In the case of an offence which is prosecuted, the disqualification will result from a formal court order as part of the sentencing of the offender with all the integrity entailed in that process.  It is reasonable to suppose that the legislature intended that there should be similar integrity in the process of “administrative disqualification” and had sought to ensure that integrity by providing that it would be particular persons only who have the responsibility of notifying the RMV of relevant matters. 

22. These are important considerations supporting the construction of the legislative scheme for which the plaintiffs contend.

23. However, again there are countervailing factors.  The plaintiffs’ submission requires the Court to read into ss 81B(1), 81D(2) and 98BE(2a) a requirement that the RMV act only on information provided by a particular source when the legislature has not itself imposed that limitation.  As King J observed in Coombe v Samuels[19] in relation to the former s 91 of the MVA, it is not generally appropriate for courts to interpret statutory provisions in a way amounting to amendment of a statute, even if there are sound reasons for doing so.

    [19] (1975) 12 SASR 342 at 356.

24. Further, the legislative history, at least in the case of s 81B, is inconsistent with the construction for which the plaintiffs contend.  As previously noted, in 1992 the Parliament deleted the reference to receipt of notice under s 93 as a condition of the duty imposed on the RMV.[20]  That deletion cannot be ignored.

    [20]   Motor Vehicles (Licences and Demerit Points) Amendment Act 1992 (SA), s 6.

25. It is also pertinent to note that the legislative scheme contemplates circumstances in which the RMV will act on the basis of information provided otherwise than under s 93.  If, as may well be the case, the obligation of the Commissioner under s 93 is to notify the RMV of expiations resulting from expiation notices issued by police officers only, then the RMV must be authorised to act on information concerning expiations provided to her by a relevant Minister, statutory authority or local council.  Further, and in any event, s 98BB of the MVA requires account to be taken of demerit points incurred in another State or Territory and the Commissioner is not given any role in notifying the RMV of those matters.

26. These considerations militate against the submissions of the plaintiffs as to the source of the information upon which the RMV may act in issuing disqualification notices.

27. In summary, although I consider that the plaintiffs’ submission on this issue has considerable force, I do not consider that it can be accepted.  In the case of s 81B, the submission is inconsistent with the legislative history and, in all cases, acceptance of the submission requires this Court to read in a limitation on the RMV’s duties which the Parliament itself has not imposed.

    Is the Discharge of the RMV’s Duties Conditional on the Commissioner Acting with all Convenient Speed?

28. The requirement to act with all convenient speed applies to the discharge by the MC Registrar of the obligation under s 6(9) of the Expiation Act and to the discharge by the proper officers of the Courts and the Commissioner of the notification obligations under s 93.  For the reasons already given, the Commissioner did not, during the two year period giving rise to these proceedings, discharge that obligation at all, let alone with all convenient speed.

29. This gave rise to some debate at the hearing as to whether the valid performance of the RMV’s duty in issuing disqualification notices was conditional upon the Commissioner having complied, with all convenient speed, with his obligations under s 93.  However, strictly speaking, this issue does not require determination in the present case.  That is because in the plaintiffs’ cases the Commissioner failed to discharge the duty under s 93 at all, so that the degree of expedition of his compliance does not arise.

30. Further, and in any event, there would be some incongruity in holding that, although the RMV may act on information provided otherwise than under s 93, the validity of the RMV’s actions was nevertheless dependent upon the Commissioner, or the proper officers of the courts, as the case may be, discharging their obligations under that section with all convenient speed.

31. Accordingly, I reject the suggestion that the validity of the RMV’s action is conditional on the promptness with which the Commissioner discharges his or her obligations.

32. This means that the claims of Messrs Helbers and Sharma must be dismissed.

    Does the RMV’s Delay Invalidate the Notices to Messrs Vu and Abraham?

33. All parties referred to the statement of principle in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority:[21]

    An act done in breach of a condition regulating the exercise of a statutory power is not necessarily invalid and of no effect. Whether it is depends upon whether there can be discerned a legislative purpose to invalidate any act that fails to comply with the condition. The existence of the purpose is ascertained by reference to the language of the statute, its subject matter and objects, and the consequences for the parties of holding void every act done in breach of the condition. Unfortunately, a finding of purpose or no purpose in this context often reflects a contestable judgment. The cases show various factors that have proved decisive in various contexts, but they do no more than provide guidance in analogous circumstances. There is no decisive rule that can be applied; there is not even a ranking of relevant factors or categories to give guidance on the issue.[22]

    (Footnote omitted)

    Thus, an act done in breach of a condition regulating the exercise of a statutory power is invalid and of no effect if there is a discernible legislative purpose to that effect.  The legislative purpose is to be ascertained by reference to the language of the statute, its subject matter and the consequences of rendering the act invalid.  Other relevant factors include policy considerations and any public inconvenience.

    [21] [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355.

    [22] Ibid at [91]; 388-9.

34. The RMV submitted that s 27(3) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) could not reasonably be construed as indicating that delay would invalidate the actions to which it referred. This was because it is a provision having application across the entire statute book. If the effect of s 27(3) is to invalidate any action taken in breach of the obligation it imposes, then it would have the effect of invalidating the exercise of a range of statutory duties which had been performed without all convenient speed. It is not readily to be supposed that the legislature intended such a wide‑ranging effect and the inevitable uncertainty which would follow.

35. In my opinion, the question to be considered is rather more confined than this submission of the RMV supposed. Regard is instead to be had to the particular duty which, by virtue of s 27(3), must be discharged with all convenient speed. The question will be whether there is discernible, in the statutory context in which the duty in question is imposed, an intention that the required action will be invalidated by delay.[23]  Accordingly, the question to be addressed is whether there is discernible in s 81B in the case of Mr Vu, and in s 98BE in the case of Mr Abraham, a legislative purpose that delay should invalidate the issue of the disqualification notices to them.

    [23] Ibid at [93]; 390-1.

36. The RMV also submitted that, while a breach of s 27(3) may be relevant to the exercise of discretionary powers, it does not go to invalidity. In support of this submission the RMV referred to Application for Reservation of Question of Law to the Court of Criminal Appeal.[24] In that case the Director of Public Prosecutions had applied to the Full Court under s 350 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) for an order requiring a judge to reserve certain questions for its consideration. Apparently a question arose as to whether the Director had acted with all convenient speed in making the application. Doyle CJ (with whom Matheson and Duggan JJ agreed) referred to s 27(3) and said:

    Even if the DPP has not acted with all convenient speed, in my opinion that does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction to make an order.  Failure to act with all convenient speed is relevant to the exercise of the court’s discretion, but not a matter that deprives the court of the power to exercise the discretion.[25]

    [24] (1997) 69 SASR 550.

    [25] Ibid at 554.

37. In my respectful opinion, this passage is not authority for the proposition that non‑compliance with s 27(3) may only ever be relevant to the exercise of a court’s discretion. As I understand it, Doyle CJ was saying no more than that, in the particular circumstances of that case, the delay by the Director did not affect the invoking of the Court’s jurisdiction, and was relevant only to the exercise of the Court’s discretion in relation to the application. In so holding, Doyle CJ was applying the principle stated by Dixon J in Parisienne Basket Shoes Pty Ltd v Whyte,[26] namely:

    The limitation of time for laying an information is not a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal before whom the charge comes for hearing.  The time bar, like any other statutory limitation, makes the proceedings no longer maintainable, but it is not a restriction upon the power of the court to hear and determine them.  It is not true that because an information is in fact laid out of time, the Court of Petty Sessions is powerless to deal with it.  Whether or not an information was laid too late is a question committed to their decision; it is not a matter of jurisdiction.[27]

    To my mind, the observation of Doyle CJ in Question of Law Reserved on which the RMV relies illustrates the point made earlier that the effect of non‑compliance with s 27(3) is to be considered by reference to the particular statutory provision in question and not as though s 27(3) is a freestanding obligation.

    [26] (1938) 59 CLR 369 at 388.

    [27] Ibid at 388-9.

1. As the passage from Project Blue Sky quoted earlier indicates, the discernment of legislative purpose, or absence of purpose, as the case may be, often reflects a contestable judgment.  That is so in the present cases.  The MVA does not contain any clear signposts pointing definitively in either direction. 

2. In so holding, I do not regard s 98BD(5), to which counsel for the plaintiffs referred, as being significant.  Section 98BD(5) provides that a failure by the RMV to give a person written notice that he or she has incurred demerit points equalling or exceeding one half of the number which will result in a liability to be disqualified under s 98BC does not affect the operation of the demerit point scheme.  In my opinion, that provision is so limited and specific that it cannot reasonably be used as the basis for an inference that non‑compliance with other provisions is to have an invalidating effect.

3. The cases indicate that a variety of matters have been considered pertinent to the determination of the validity of an act of a public authority carried out in breach of a condition affecting the performance of that act.  These include:

   1.whether the condition regulates the exercise of a function already conferred on the statutory authority rather than imposing an essential preliminary to the exercise of its function.  Generally a breach of a condition of the former type does not result in invalidity;[28]

   [28]   Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28 at [94]; (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 391.

   2.non‑compliance with a requirement that a power or function be carried out in accordance with matters of policy will not ordinarily result in the invalidity of the exercise of the power or function.  If the condition with which the public official must comply is really a policy about which reasonable minds may differ, it may be unlikely that non‑compliance should result in invalidity;[29]

   [29] Ibid at [95]; 391.

   3.a failure to have regard to matters expressed in general or aspirational terms will not generally be regarded as intended to produce invalidity;[30]

   [30] Ibid at [96]; 391-2.

   4.the consequences of holding that the act done is valid or invalid, as the case may be;[31]

   [31] Ibid at [91]; 389.

   5.the public inconvenience which would result from a declaration of the invalidity of the act in question is a very pertinent consideration, with a statutory purpose to cause such inconvenience generally being considered to be unlikely;[32]

   [32] Ibid at [97]; 392.

   6.the purpose and objects sought to be achieved by the legislation as a whole;[33]

   [33] Ibid at [91], 389; Smith v Wyong Shire Council [2003] NSWCA 322 at [14].

   7.the purpose of the particular power under consideration;[34]

   8.the significance, if any, which the statute itself attaches to non‑compliance, for example, in other provisions of the same Act;[35]

   9.any restriction, including time limits, which the statute may impose on the right to challenge validity.[36]  The imposition of such restrictions may indicate both a legislative purpose that non‑compliance should result in invalidity and also limit the possible adverse consequences of the invalidity;

   10.the ease with which the public official may comply with the obligation in question or rectify a breach;[37]

   11.whether a declaration of the invalidity of non‑complying conduct is necessary or desirable to ensure compliance by the public official with the requirements of the statute;[38]

   12.whether a declaration will invalidate the whole of the public act in question or whether some severance is possible;[39]

   13.whether the subject matter of the power involves an exclusion of a person or class of persons from an entitlement otherwise available, or an abridgment of established liberties;[40]

   14.whether the statute contemplates exemption from compliance with the obligation in particular circumstances.  If exemptions are contemplated, non‑compliance is more likely to be intended to result in invalidity;[41] and

   15.the time in the context of an overall process at which the particular power is to be exercised.[42]

   Some of these considerations are pertinent in the present cases. 

   [34]   Gribbles Pathology (Vic) Pty Ltd v Cassidy [2002] FCA 859 at [136]; (2002) 122 FCR 78 at 103.

   [35]   Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Oke [2007] FCAFC 94 at [33], (2007) 159 FCR 441 at 447; Mikhman v Royal Victorian Aero Club [2012] VSC 42 at [34].

   [36]   Smith v Wyong Shire Council [2003] NSWCA 322 at [28].

   [37]   Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Oke [2007] FCAFC 94 at [34]; (2007) 159 FCR 441 at 447.

   [38]   Smith v Wyong Shire Council [2003] NSWCA 322 at [40].

   [39] Ibid at [30].

   [40]   Epstein and Morton v WorkCover Corporation [2003] SASC 231 at [49], (2003) 85 SASR 561 at 575; Watkins v State of Victoria [2010] VSCA 138 at [67], (2010) 27 VR 543 at 560.

   [41]   Goulburn Murray Rural Water Authority v Rawalpindi Nominees Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 166 at [251].

   [42]   Mikhman v Royal Victorian Aero Club [2012] VSC 42 at [35].

4. Section 27(3) is couched in mandatory terms requiring, in the context of this case, that the RMV must act with all convenient speed when circumstances requiring the issue of a disqualification notice occur. That could be said to establish only the occasion for considering the application of the Project Blue Sky question, rather than saying anything about the manner in which that question is to be resolved.  However, the legislature has also circumscribed the discharge of the RMV’s functions in giving notices in other ways:  see the use of the word “must” in s 139BD(1), (2), (3), (4) and (7).  This, together with the fact that disqualification will be the end result of the process, is some indication that non‑compliance with a particular step is to result in invalidity.

5. Having regard to the ease with which the RMV can learn of relevant matters by the transfer of electronic data, it is reasonable to suppose that prompt compliance with the statutory obligation would not be difficult.

6. One consideration pointing against invalidity is the evident purpose of the administrative disqualifications in question.  It is reasonable to infer that the legislature intends that these disqualifications should have a punitive, protective and deterrent effect:  punitive in the sense that the hardship and inconvenience resulting from loss of a licence is part of the punishment for a person’s non‑compliance with the traffic laws; protective in the sense that it will remove from the roads those who are not prepared to drive in conformity with the traffic laws; and deterrent in the sense that it will deter both the particular offender and others from conduct of a like kind.  In other words the disqualifications are intended to serve the public interest.  In this way, it could be said that a declaration that the disqualifications are invalid may frustrate the legislative intention.

7. On the other hand, there is a clear legislative intention that the sanctions for the kinds of traffic offences involved in these cases should be imposed with expedition.  That intention can be seen in a number of statutory provisions.  For example, s 6(1)(e) of the Expiation Act requires expiation notices to be given within six months of the date on which the offence to which it relates is alleged to have been committed.  Section 52 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) requires the prosecution of expiable offences to be commenced either within six months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed or within six months of the expiry of the expiation period specified in an expiation notice, as the case may be. The MVA and the Expiation Act, in conjunction with s 27(3), require the various notifications which will culminate in the issue of disqualification notices to be given with all convenient speed. The requirement that action which will or may result in disqualification be taken promptly is very evident.

8. There would be some incongruity in this context if the RMV could, validly, act without promptness.

9. There is a public interest in having the sanctions imposed by the law applied with reasonable contemporaneity to the offences to which they relate.

10. It is appropriate to keep in mind that the scheme for administrative disqualification is ancillary to court‑ordered disqualification.  There would be some incongruity if a delay in the prosecution of an expiable offence will be met by a statutory time bar, but a delay in the implementation of the administrative scheme will be immaterial.

11. It is obvious that in some cases the late issue of a disqualification notice may result in additional hardship to an offender, that is, a hardship which exceeds that which would have been experienced had the person been required to serve the disqualification in a timely manner.  That is because an offender may have organised his or her life, made commitments, or obtained employment, on the basis of a continued entitlement to drive.  This consideration too underpins the various provisions requiring promptness in the issue of disqualification notices.

12. If delay by the RMV in discharging the obligation did not result in invalidity the RMV could, lawfully, issue a disqualification notice many months, or even years, after a person became liable to disqualification.  The issue of notices in such circumstances would often frustrate the statutory purposes of disqualification.  This suggests that a declaration of invalidity in circumstances such as the present is necessary, or at least desirable, to ensure compliance by the RMV with the statutory duty.

13. Although the position is not entirely clear, I conclude that the failure of the RMV to issue the disqualification notices to Messrs Vu and Abraham with all convenient speed does have the effect of invalidating the notices issued to them.  The considerations which I have mentioned point generally to this conclusion.  I am particularly persuaded by the time limits in s 52 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA).  Those time limits indicate a legislative policy that prompt action is required for action which may lead to disqualification. 

    Conclusion

14. Accordingly, I would make the declarations of invalidity sought by Messrs Vu and Abraham.  The RMV as a public officer can be expected to act in conformity with those declarations so that the injunctions sought by the parties may be unnecessary.  I will hear from the parties on that issue.  For the reasons given earlier, the claims of Messrs Helbers and Sharma are dismissed and the interlocutory injunctions issued in their cases will be discharged.  The parties should bring in minutes of the appropriate orders to give effect to these conclusions.