Kennedy v State of Queensland

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kennedy v State of Queensland [2025] FCA 836

File number: QUD 29 of 2025
Judgment of: SARAH C DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 23 July 2025
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by respondents for strike out of paragraphs of applicant’s statement of claim or partial dismissal of proceeding – application by applicant to amend statement of claim – where applicant seeks to agitate a common law damages claim for work-related personal injury – whether operation of state legislation prevents applicant from agitating common law damages claim in federal jurisdiction – whether common law applies in pristine form – consideration of ss 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – consideration of modification of common law effected in Queensland by ss 237 and 275 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) – damages claim dismissed; amendments refused
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 79, 80

Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) ss 28AA(1), 28B, 28M, 105, 106, 109

Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) ss 5(2), 10, 237, 275

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 16.21, 16.53, 26.01

Cases cited:

Blunden v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 73; 218 CLR 330

Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471

Goldman Sachs JBWere Services Pty Limited v Nikolich [2007] FCAFC 120; 163 FCR 62

Imobilari Pty Ltd v Opes Prime Stockbroking Ltd [2008] FCA 1920; 252 ALR 41

John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson [2000] HCA 36; 203 CLR 503

Karlsson v Griffith University [2022] FCA 591

Kozarov v Victoria [2022] HCA 12; 273 CLR 115

Leggett v Hawkesbury Race Club Ltd (No 3) [2021] FCA 1658; 317 IR 1

Phipps v Australian Leisure and Hospitality Group Ltd [2007] QCA 130; 2 Qd R 555

Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2012] FCAFC 97; 203 FCR 325

Prior v South West Aboriginal Land and Sea Council Aboriginal Corporation [2020] FCA 808

Rizeq v Western Australia [2017] HCA 23; 262 CLR 1

SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd v Chipman [2002] FCA 674

Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28; 241 CLR 118

Watkin v GRM International Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 382; [2007] 1 Qd R 389

White Industries Aust Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 511; 160 FCR 298

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 42
Date of hearing: 18 July 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Britt
Solicitor for the Applicant: O’Callaghan Workplace Law
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr S Mackie
Solicitor for the Respondents: Crown Law Queensland

 

ORDERS

QUD 29 of 2025
BETWEEN:

BELINDA KENNEDY

Applicant

AND:

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

First Respondent

CHRISTOPHER RUFFIN

Second Respondent

WILLIAM LAWSON

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

SARAH C DERRINGTON J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth),…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 836
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kennedy v State of Queensland involved the applicant bringing various claims against the respondents, including a claim for damages for breach of her contract of employment. The respondents challenged the validity of the Damages Claim, arguing that it was barred by Queensland state legislation prohibiting common law claims for work-related personal injury unless certain criteria were met. The applicant sought to amend her statement of claim to reflect the agreed content of the implied contractual term. The court had to determine whether the operation of state legislation prevented the applicant from agitating her common law damages claim in federal jurisdiction, and whether the common law applied in its pristine form.

The court examined sections 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and sections 237 and 275 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld). The court concluded that the Queensland legislation did not fall within the scope of section 79 of the Judiciary Act, which only applied to laws that bind a court in the exercise of federal jurisdiction. The court further found that the Queensland legislation, by prohibiting common law claims for work-related personal injury, effectively barred the applicant from pursuing her Damages Claim. The court held that the applicant was not entitled to agitate her common law damages claim in federal jurisdiction, given the operation of the Queensland legislation.

The court dismissed the applicant's cause of action for damages for breach of her contract of employment, pursuant to rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The court also dismissed the applicant's interlocutory application seeking to amend her statement of claim. Costs were reserved. The court's decision highlighted the importance of considering the interplay between state and federal legislation when determining the validity of claims brought in federal jurisdiction.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the cause of action purported to be pleaded by paragraphs 6, 60, 61, 63 and 64(e) of the applicant’s statement of claim be dismissed.

2. The applicant’s interlocutory application filed on 16 June 2025 be dismissed.

3. Costs be reserved.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the cause of action purportedly pleaded by paragraphs 6, 60, 61, 63 and 64(e) of the SOC must be dismissed pursuant to r 26.01 of the Rules. Consequently, there is no utility in allowing the proposed amendments to the SOC.BACKGROUND By her originating application filed on 23 January 2025, the applicant brings various claims against the respondents pursuant to ss 28AA(1), 28B, 28M, 105, 106 and 109 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (SD Act), as well as a claim against the State for damages for breach of her contract of employment (the Damages Claim). In the SOC, the Damages Claim was pleaded at [6] as arising from an implied term of the applicant’s employment contract that the State would ensure the health and safety of the applicant while she was in its employ. It was alleged at [60], [61] and [63] of the SOC that the applicant suffered personal injury as a result of the alleged breaches by the State of that implied term, with damages sought for the alleged breaches at [64(e)] of the SOC. The respondents subsequently, by letter dated 21 May 2025, notified the applicant that they held concerns regarding the formulation of the Damages Claim in the SOC, including because the implied term pleaded at [6] was not an implied contractual or tortious duty known to law. The parties exchanged correspondence on the subject in the weeks that followed. On 10 June 2025, the applicant agreed that she would re-plead [6] and [60] of the SOC in relation to the content of the implied contractual term. The applicant did not, however, concede the respondents’ other objection, namely that the applicant is not entitled to pursue the Damages Claim having regard to ss 237 and 275 of the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003 (Qld) (WCR Act). Those provisions prohibit the commencing of common law claims for damages for work-related personal injury unless the person meets certain criteria. As such, the respondents argue, the Damages Claim will be statute-barred if either of those limitations apply. It was conceded that the applicant does not meet the relevant criteria. The dismissal application has been brought in circumstances where the respondents submit that the presence of the Damages Claim would have a direct impact upon the length and complexity of the matters to be resolved at trial, particularly because it will dictate the evidence that will need to be adduced by the parties. The amendment application has been brought to address the parties’ now-agreed position as to the appropriate content of the implied contractual term. In particular, the applicant seeks to put on an amended statement of claim (ASOC) which amends [6] so as to allege that it was a term of the applicant’s employment contract that the State would take reasonable care to provide the applicant with a safe place of work and a safe system of work while she was in its employ. The applicant also seeks to amend [60] such that the alleged breaches by the State align with the amended wording of the implied term.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Their Honours went on to summarise the position as follows (at [103]):Within the limits of State legislative capacity, State laws apply in federal jurisdiction as valid State laws unless and to the extent that they are rendered invalid by reason of inconsistency with Commonwealth laws. What State laws relevantly cannot do within the limits of State legislative capacity is govern the exercise by a court of federal jurisdiction. A State law can determine neither the powers that a court has in the exercise of federal jurisdiction nor how or in what circumstances those powers are to be exercised. A State law cannot in that sense “bind” a court in the exercise of federal jurisdiction, and that is the sense in which that word is used in s 79 of the Judiciary Act. The operation of s 79 is limited to making the text of the State laws of that nature apply as Commonwealth law to bind a court in the exercise of federal jurisdiction.(Emphasis added.) Writing separately, Edelman J identified, at [123], that:… it is accepted that State laws which do not fall within s 79(1) will usually apply of their own force. Indeed, some decisions simply relied upon the relevant State law operating either by its own force or through the effect of s 79. In Pedersen v Young (1964) 110 CLR 162 at 165, Kitto J said that the “received opinion as to the operation of ss 79 and 80” was that “subject to the Constitution and to the laws of the Commonwealth, all Queensland laws must be treated as binding in this Court, as federal law if not by their own force”.(Emphasis added.) His Honour went on to make important observations as to the operation of s 79 of the Judiciary Act, including the distinction which needs to be drawn between laws which are “binding on a court” and those which are “binding on a person”, saying (at [200]-[204]):[200] The submissions on this appeal did not need to, and did not, address a number of difficult issues which still remain in relation to the operation of s 79(1) … Another issue is the boundaries of laws which regulate an authority to decide. It will not always be a simple exercise to determine whether a State law is one which is binding on a court, involving the regulation of the court’s authority to decide (ie regulation of the court’s exercise of existing powers), or whether the law is one which is binding on a person or persons. However, at the core, some simple examples can be given. Laws concerning procedure, evidence, and the competency of witnesses all regulate the general manner of the court’s authority to decide over its subject matter. In relation to State courts, they are laws which explain how State courts’ powers should be exercised. They are not concerned with the rights or duties of persons. …[201]Another example of a law which regulates the subject matter of a court’s authority to decide is a law which limits the time within which an action can be brought … These laws are expressly recognised in s 79(3)(a) of the Judiciary Act. And the High Court of Australia has given regular recognition of laws which limit the time in which an action can be brought as laws which can fall within s 79(1) of the Judiciary Act. [202]Laws which limit the time in which an action can be brought are an example of laws which concern when a court can adjudicate upon rights falling within a particular subject matter. The limitation laws do not “bar” a person’s rights. Instead, they provide a defence which precludes an effective adjudication upon those rights. …[203]Apart from laws which regulate the subject matter dimension of the court’s authority to decide, s 79(1) will also apply to laws which regulate the personal dimension of the authority to decide such as laws which determine the persons who can appear before the court. So, in Macleod for instance, s 79 was needed to engage the operation of s 206A(2) of the Justices Act 1902 (WA). Section 206A(2) was a law concerned with the persons who could bring an appeal. Similarly, laws giving a court the power to stay proceedings are laws which regulate the authority to decide over the persons before the court.[204]On the other hand, laws which regulate a court’s authority to decide will not usually include the general corpus of law which establishes the rights, privileges, powers, immunities, duties, disabilities, and liabilities of persons. … (Citations omitted.)