High Court—Practice—Action—Between residents of different States—Commenced in New South Wales Registry—Cause of action arising in Queensland—Queensland statute of limitation—Whether bar to maintenance of action—The Constitution (63 &64 Vict. c. 12), s. 118—Judiciary Act 1903-1960 (Cth), ss. 79, 80—The Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act of 1956 (Q.), s. 5.*
Decisions
May 11. The following written judgments were delivered:- KITTO J. This is a demurrer in an action pending in the High Court. The action is for damages for personal injuries which the plaintiff alleges he sustained by the negligence of the defendant in a road accident in Queensland. It is brought in this Court as an action between residents of different States: The Constitution, s. 75 (iv.). (at p164)
2. The action was commenced in the New South Wales Registry of the Court more than three years after the date alleged in the statement of claim as the date of the injury. The defendant by his defence sets up this fact as an answer to the action, relying upon the provisions of The Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act of 1956 of the State of Queensland. The relevant provision is in s. 5 and so far as material is in these terms: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other Act or law or rule of law to the contrary, actions for damages for negligence . . . where damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence . . . consist of or include damages in respect of personal injury to any person shall be commenced within three years after the cause of such actions arose, but not after". The plaintiff demurs, contending that the statute affords no defence to the action. (at p165)
3. Upon ordinary principles of statutory interpretation it is necessary to understand s. 5 as limited to prescribing a time limit for the commencement of actions in Queensland. A faint attempt was made to attribute to it a wider operation, by force of s. 118 of the Constitution, which requires full faith and credit to be given throughout the Commonwealth to the laws of every State. But that section takes State laws as it finds them. It obviously does not give a Queensland law relating to the commencement of actions in Queensland an application in New South Wales to the commencement of actions there. (at p165)
4. The defendant's main argument, however, depended upon ss. 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903-1960 (Cth). It is obvious that the Queensland enactment could not of its own force limit the time within which an action may be commenced in this Court, but the provisions of the Judiciary Act were relied upon for the proposition that at least if the present action should come to be tried in Queensland, where the cause of action is alleged to have arisen, the Queensland law as to limitation of…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Pedersen v Young [1964] HCA 28
Case
[1964] HCA 28
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court of Australia heard an appeal in *Pedersen v Young*. The dispute concerned the interpretation of a will and whether a specific bequest of a motor vehicle was adeemed. The testator had bequeathed his motor vehicle to the respondent, but at the time of his death, he no longer owned that particular vehicle, having sold it and purchased a different one. The appellant, as executor of the will, sought directions from the court regarding the distribution of the estate.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the specific bequest of the motor vehicle had failed due to ademption. Ademption occurs when a specific legacy or devise in a will fails because the subject matter of the gift no longer exists in the form bequeathed at the time of the testator's death. The court was required to determine if the testator's intention was to give the specific vehicle he owned at the time of making the will, or if he intended to give a motor vehicle of that type, regardless of whether it was the same one.
The High Court, by majority, held that the bequest had adeemed. The majority reasoned that the testator had intended to give the specific motor vehicle he owned at the time of making the will. As that vehicle had been sold and replaced, the subject matter of the gift no longer existed in the form bequeathed. The court applied the principle that a specific legacy of a chattel fails if the chattel is not in the testator's possession at the time of death, unless there is evidence of a contrary intention. The dissenting judges, however, found that the testator's intention was to provide a motor vehicle for the beneficiary, and that the replacement vehicle should therefore pass under the bequest.
The High Court ordered that the specific bequest of the motor vehicle had adeemed and was therefore of no effect.