K & J Burns Electrical Pty Ltd v GRD Group (NT) Pty Ltd

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K & J Burns Electrical Pty Ltd v GRD Group (NT) Pty Ltd & Anor
[2011] NTCA 1

PARTIES:K & J BURNS ELECTRICAL PTY LTD

(ABN 68 009 633 827)

v

GRD GROUP (NT) PTY LTD

(ABN 42 009 645 498)

AND:

BRIAN GALLAUGHER

TITLE OF COURT:  COURT OF APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  CIVIL APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION

FILE NO:44 of 2010 (21014265)

DELIVERED:  21 January 2011

HEARING DATE:  6 September 2010

JUDGMENT OF:  SOUTHWOOD AND KELLY JJ AND OLSSON AJ

APPEALED FROM:  MILDREN J

CATCHWORDS:

CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS (SECURITY OF PAYMENTS) ACT 2004 (NT) – Determination by adjudicator as to monies payable by contractor to sub-contractor under construction contract – application to single Judge for judicial review – declaration by him that adjudicator jurisdiction not enlivened save as to balance of retention fund payable to appellant under relevant contract – whether impugned summary invoice constituted a payment claim giving rise to a payment dispute under the Act which was properly the subject of adjudication – whether prior invoices rendered constituted valid payment claims under cl 12.2 of contract – consideration of mandatory requirements of that clause – whether, if valid payment dispute did not arise in relation to claims for monies payable in respect of work done, it nevertheless remained open to trial Judge to uphold adjudication for payment of balance of retention monies unpaid.

Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) s 9, s 11, s 13, s 17, s 22
Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2009 (Tas)
Construction Contracts Act 2004 (WA) s 25
Construction Contracts (Security of Payments) Act 2004 (NT) s 4, s 8, s 27, s 28(1), s 29, s 29(2), s 33, s 33(1)(a)(ii), s 33(2), s 33(3)
Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1966 (UK) s 108(1) & s 108(6)

AJ Lucas Operations Pty Ltd v Mac-Attack Equipment Hire Pty Ltd and Another (2009) 25 NTLR 14
Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1968] UKHL 6; [1969] 2 AC 147, 171
Attorney-General (NSW); Ex rel McKellar v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 527
Australian Communications Exchange Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 201 ALR 271
Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485
Brodyn Pty Ltd (t/as Time Cost and Quality) v Davenport (2004) 61 NSWLR 421
Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110
Byrnes v Groote Eylandt Mining Co Pty Ltd (1990) 19 NSWLR 13
R v Carey; Ex parte Exclude Holdings Pty Ltd (2006) 32 WAR 501
Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190
CIB Properties Ltd v Birse Construction Ltd (QBD) [2005] 1 WLR 2252
Clarence Street Pty Ltd v Isis Projects Pty Ltd (2005) NSWLR 448
R v Connell; Ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd (1944) 69 CLR 407
Coordinated Construction Co Pty Ltd v Climatech (Canberra) Pty Ltd (2005) 21 BCL 364
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Ellerine Bros (Pty) Ltd v Klinger [1982] 1…

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Details
Case
[2011] NTCA 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of K & J Burns Electrical Pty Ltd v GRD Group (NT) Pty Ltd, the appellant, K & J Burns Electrical, sought a review of the decision of the single Judge who had determined that the adjudicator's jurisdiction was only enlivened in relation to the balance of the retention fund payable to the appellant. The appellant argued that the adjudicator had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the six unpaid tax invoices submitted by the appellant to the first respondent, which the adjudicator had found were not payment claims under the Construction Contracts (Security of Payments) Act 2004 (NT). The central issue before the court was whether the adjudicator's determination that the unpaid tax invoices did not constitute valid payment claims under the Act, and thus were not subject to adjudication, was correct. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the statutory requirements for a valid payment claim had been met and whether repeat claims were permissible under the contract and the Act.

The court considered the statutory requirements for a valid payment claim under the Act, which include that the claim must be in writing, provide sufficient details to identify the claim, and be made within the time limits prescribed by the Act. The court examined whether the unpaid tax invoices submitted by the appellant met these criteria. It was noted that the unpaid tax invoices did not explicitly state they were payment claims under the Act, nor did they reference the Act or the adjudication provisions of the subcontract. The court held that since the unpaid tax invoices did not satisfy the statutory requirements for a valid payment claim, the adjudicator did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on these claims. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the single Judge that the adjudicator's jurisdiction was only triggered in relation to the balance of the retention fund.

The court further held that the statutory framework of the Act was designed to ensure that adjudications are limited to genuine payment disputes that meet specific criteria. The court emphasised that the adjudicator's role was to determine disputes in a fair, rapid, informal, and inexpensive manner, and that this could only be achieved if the criteria for a valid payment claim were met. The court concluded that since the unpaid tax invoices did not constitute valid payment claims, the adjudicator's jurisdiction was correctly limited to the retention fund. The appeal was therefore dismissed, and the decision of the single Judge was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant has appealed against the judgment at first instance. There are three grounds of appeal. (1) The second respondent was right when he determined that the appellant’s six unpaid tax invoices were not payment claims within the meaning of the Construction Contracts (Security of Payments Act 2004 (NT) and the Judge at first instance erred in holding to the contrary. (2) Alternatively, if the second respondent was wrong when he determined that the appellant’s unpaid tax invoices were not payment claims within the meaning of the Construction Contracts (Security of Payments) Act 2004 (NT) then such an error was not a jurisdictional error. (3) Further and alternatively, the Construction Contracts (Security of Payments) Act 2004 (NT) permits repeat claims where a construction contract expressly provides for repeat claims and the Judge at first instance erred in holding to the contrary.The facts The Judge at first instance made the following findings of fact[24]. On 25 February 2009 the appellant entered into a subcontract[25] with the first respondent to undertake electrical works on land situated at Lot 7100 Brewery Lane, Woolner in the Northern Territory of Australia for a lump sum price of $354,860. The Subcontract was a construction contract. Throughout the course of the Subcontract, the appellant submitted 13 tax invoices to the first respondent for progress payments totalling $393,274.51. The total sum included claims for extras or variations totalling $38,414.50. The first respondent paid the progress payments claimed by the appellant in the first seven tax invoices totalling $309,959.47. The first respondent did not pay the last six tax invoices rendered by the appellant leaving a balance allegedly due and payable under the Subcontract of $83,315.04. Under cl 4 of the Subcontract, the first respondent was entitled to retain a portion of the monies payable to the appellant under the Subcontract as security. Relying upon cl 4 of the Subcontract, the first respondent withheld payment of $17,743. Disputes arose between the appellant and the first respondent which resulted in claims being made by the first respondent for back charges for the cost of remedial works and for liquidated damages for late completion. As a result, on 28 February 2010 the appellant served on the first respondent a Summary Invoice No ST4289 dated 25 January 2010 entitled “PAYMENT CLAIM IN ACCORDANCE WITH CLAUSE 12.2 OF THE CONTRACT”. The Summary Invoice listed the 13 tax invoices previously rendered by the appellant, the amount claimed under each invoice, the amount paid in respect of each invoice and the total amount owing. It also set out a summary of the amounts held in retention and how much of the retention monies could be retained under cl 4 of the Subcontract. The Summary Invoice claimed $83,315.04 less retentions of $9,831.86 leaving a balance of $73,483.98. The Summary Invoice did not include any claims for amounts which were not previously the subject of the 13 tax invoices rendered by the appellant nor was it suggested that any further work had been undertaken by the appellant.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In support of the above propositions Mildren J relied on the following passage in the reasons for decision of the majority of the members of the High Court of Australia in Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth[30]:It should be noted at once that, in the passage last quoted, Dixon J was not speaking of reg 17, but of privative clauses generally. Even so, it is important to appreciate that his Honour's observations were confined to "decision[s] ... in fact given". Moreover and as later decisions of this Court have made clear, the expression "reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the body", has been treated as signifying that it must "not on its face go beyond ... power". Thus, even on this general statement, a privative clause cannot protect against a failure to make a decision required by the legislation in which that clause is found or against a decision which, on its face, exceeds jurisdiction [emphasis added]. The above principle has been further confirmed by the decision of the High Court of Australia in Kirk v Industrial Relations Court of New South Wales[31]. The legislative assembly cannot validly take from a Supreme Court the power to grant relief on account of jurisdictional error. In accordance with these principles and based on the decisions of the High Court in a number of cases including Minister for Immigration Affairs v Eshetu[32]; R v Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte WA National Football League[33]; R v Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte Pilkington ACI (Operations) Pty Ltd[34]; Buck v Bavone[35]; and R v Connell; Ex parte Hetton Bellbird Collieries Ltd[36], I held in AJ Lucas Operations Pty Ltd v Mac-Attack Equipment Hire Pty Ltd and Another[37] that:The structure of s 33(1) of the Act is such that the jurisdiction of an adjudicator to embark upon the adjudication of an application on the merits depends upon the adjudicator in fact reaching a state of satisfaction that certain prescribed criteria are met. The prescribed criteria being those set out in s 33(1)(a)(i)-(iv) of the Act. If the criteria are not satisfied, the adjudicator must dismiss the application without making a determination on the merits. The existence of such a state of satisfaction is a condition precedent to an adjudicator embarking upon a consideration of an application on the merits.The statutory criteria set out in s 33(1)(a)(i)-(iv) are of such a nature that the satisfaction of the adjudicator as to whether they have been fulfilled or not must be both reasonable and founded upon a correct understanding of the law. A reasonable and legally correct state of satisfaction is a necessary jurisdictional fact. If such a jurisdictional fact does not exist, an adjudicator would be acting in excess of jurisdiction if he made a determination of an application on the merits. The adjudicator cannot give himself jurisdiction by erroneously deciding that the fact or event exists. Such a construction of s 33(1) of the Act is based in the first instance upon the text of the section. Section 33(1)(a) expressly provides that the adjudicator must dismiss the application without making a determination of its merits if the criteria set out in s 33(1)(a)(i)-(iv) are not fulfilled. The criteria themselves are aimed at ensuring the application to be adjudicated is about a payment dispute in respect of a payment claim made under a construction contract, the application has been commenced reasonably promptly and the subject matter of the application is not too complex and its resolution will not take too long. The express purpose of the Act is confined to promoting the security of payments under construction contracts. The object of the Act is to be achieved by facilitating timely payments between the parties to construction contracts; providing for the rapid resolution of payment disputes arising under construction contracts; and providing mechanisms for the rapid recovery of payments under construction contracts. The object of the adjudication of a payment dispute is to determine the dispute fairly and as rapidly, informally and inexpensively as possible.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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