Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd v Hamo Industries Pty Ltd

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Case Copied 71 min read
Reported Decision: 78 NSWLR 393272 ALR 750[2011] ALMD 1134[2011] ALMD 1135[2011] ALMD 1133[2011] ALMD 1465[2011] ALMD 1088[2011] ALMD 1089

New South Wales


Court of Appeal


CITATION: Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190
HEARING DATE(S): 2 August 2010
 
JUDGMENT DATE: 

24 September 2010
JUDGMENT OF: Spigelman CJ at 1; Basten JA at 62; McDougall J at 110
DECISION: Question 1: Whether the determination of the Second Defendant (the Adjudicator) on 18 March 2010 that he could hear and determine the first defendant’s adjudication application pursuant to the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (the Act) should be set aside or quashed for jurisdictional error in circumstances where the adjudicator incorrectly concluded (on the facts found by him and on the facts subsequently found by the Court) that the notice required by Section 17(2)(a) of the Act had been served on the Plaintiff in the time required by the Act.
Answer: The Supreme Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction:
(a) has power to determine that –
(i) an adjudication application has not been made in compliance with s 17(2)(a) of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999;
(ii) the determination of the adjudicator, made in the absence of a valid adjudication application, was invalid, and
(iii) there was non-compliance in the present case;
(b) has power to grant relief in the nature of certiorari and set the determination aside.
Question 2: Whether in light of the decision of the High Court Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission [2010] HCA 1 the decision in Brodyn Pty Ltd v Davenport (2004) 61 NSWLR 421 should not be followed or was incorrectly decided so far as it held that:
a. the Supreme Court of New South Wales was not required to consider and determine the existence of jurisdictional error by an adjudicator in reaching a determination under the Act;
b. an order in the nature of certiorari was not available to quash or set aside a decision of an adjudicator under the Act;
c. the Act expressly or impliedly limited the Supreme Court of New South Wales’ power to consider and quash a determination for jurisdictional error by an adjudicator in reaching a determination under the Act.
Answer: To the extent that Brodyn Pty Ltd v Davenport held, in relation to an adjudication application which was not in compliance with s 17(2)(a) of the Act, the matters set out in the question at a, b and c, it was in error.
Question 3: Whether the Act, so far as it expressly or impliedly limits the power of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to review an adjudicator’s determination for jurisdictional error, is inconsistent with the requirement of the Constitution that there be a State Supreme Court with jurisdiction to grant relief in the nature of certiorari.
Answer: The Act contains no such limitation.
Order that, as between Chase and Hamo the costs in this Court should be Chase’s costs in the proceedings, but otherwise there should…
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Details
Case
[2010] NSWCA 190
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd (Chase) sought judicial review of a determination made by an adjudicator appointed under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (the Act). The dispute concerned an adjudication application made by Hamo Industries Pty Ltd (Hamo) for progress payments. Chase contended that the adjudicator had erred in finding that a notice required by section 17(2)(a) of the Act had been served within the prescribed time, arguing this constituted jurisdictional error.

The court was required to determine whether an adjudicator's incorrect conclusion regarding the timely service of a section 17(2) notice amounted to jurisdictional error, rendering their determination invalid. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether adjudicators, in exercising their statutory functions under the Act, were amenable to orders in the nature of certiorari for jurisdictional error, and whether the decision in *Brodyn Pty Ltd v Davenport* was correctly decided in light of subsequent High Court authority, specifically *Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission*. The court also examined whether the Act itself impermissibly limited the Supreme Court's supervisory jurisdiction.

The court reasoned that an adjudicator's failure to comply with a condition precedent to their jurisdiction, such as the proper service of a section 17(2) notice, constitutes jurisdictional error. The court affirmed that the Supreme Court possesses the supervisory jurisdiction to review such errors and grant relief by way of certiorari. It held that *Brodyn Pty Ltd v Davenport* was incorrectly decided to the extent it suggested that determinations under the Act were not subject to review for jurisdictional error or that certiorari was unavailable. The court found that the Act did not contain limitations inconsistent with the constitutional requirement for a State Supreme Court to grant such relief.

Consequently, the court determined that it had the power to quash the adjudicator's determination for jurisdictional error. The court ordered that Chase's costs in the Supreme Court proceedings be Chase's costs in the proceedings, with no other order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Question 1: Whether the determination of the Second Defendant (the Adjudicator) on 18 March 2010 that he could hear and determine the first defendant’s adjudication application pursuant to the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (the Act) should be set aside or quashed for jurisdictional error in circumstances where the adjudicator incorrectly concluded (on the facts found by him and on the facts subsequently found by the Court) that the notice required by Section 17(2)(a) of the Act had been served on the Plaintiff in the time required by the Act.

Answer: The Supreme Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction:

(a) has power to determine that –

(i) an adjudication application has not been made in compliance with s 17(2)(a) of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999;

(ii) the determination of the adjudicator, made in the absence of a valid adjudication application, was invalid, and

(iii) there was non-compliance in the present case;

(b) has power to grant relief in the nature of certiorari and set the determination aside.

Question 2: Whether in light of the decision of the High Court Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission [2010] HCA 1 the decision in Brodyn Pty Ltd v Davenport (2004) 61 NSWLR 421 should not be followed or was incorrectly decided so far as it held that:

a. the Supreme Court of New South Wales was not required to consider and determine the existence of jurisdictional error by an adjudicator in reaching a determination under the Act;

b. an order in the nature of certiorari was not available to quash or set aside a decision of an adjudicator under the Act;

c. the Act expressly or impliedly limited the Supreme Court of New South Wales’ power to consider and quash a determination for jurisdictional error by an adjudicator in reaching a determination under the Act.

Answer: To the extent that Brodyn Pty Ltd v Davenport held, in relation to an adjudication application which was not in compliance with s 17(2)(a) of the Act, the matters set out in the question at a, b and c, it was in error.

Question 3: Whether the Act, so far as it expressly or impliedly limits the power of the Supreme Court of New South Wales to review an adjudicator’s determination for jurisdictional error, is inconsistent with the requirement of the Constitution that there be a State Supreme Court with jurisdiction to grant relief in the nature of certiorari.

Answer: The Act contains no such limitation.

Order that, as between Chase and Hamo the costs in this Court should be Chase’s costs in the proceedings, but otherwise there should be no order as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd (Chase) engaged Hamo Industries Pty Ltd (Hamo) to construct a bar and restaurant at the Ettalong Beach Wharf in New South Wales. The contract for the construction work was governed by the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) (the Act). Disputes arose over the payment of progress claims made by Hamo, leading to Hamo initiating adjudication proceedings under section 17 of the Act. Hamo served a payment claim on Chase, but the claim was allegedly not accompanied by the required notice under section 17(2)(a) of the Act. Despite this, the adjudicator, Mr. John Michael Brodyn (Brodyn), proceeded to hear and determine Hamo’s adjudication application.

On 18 March 2010, Brodyn issued a determination in favour of Hamo, ruling that the payment claim was valid and that Chase owed Hamo the sum claimed. Chase subsequently brought proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, seeking to set aside Brodyn’s determination on the ground that it was made in the absence of a valid adjudication application due to the non-compliance with section 17(2)(a) of the Act. The Supreme Court found that the required notice was not served within the time prescribed by the Act, and that Brodyn’s determination was therefore invalid. Chase argued that the Supreme Court should have the power to review Brodyn’s determination for jurisdictional error and to set it aside using prerogative writs, such as certiorari.

The case raised several significant questions about the scope of judicial review in the context of adjudications under the Act, including whether Brodyn’s determination was subject to judicial review for jurisdictional error and whether the Act limited the Supreme Court’s power to review adjudicators’ determinations. These questions centred on the nature of the adjudicator’s role, the availability of prerogative writs to correct jurisdictional errors made by adjudicators, and the constitutional validity of any limitations on the Supreme Court’s review powers imposed by the Act.

The proceedings in Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd v Hamo Industries Pty Ltd originated from a dispute under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW). Initially, Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd brought an application for adjudication to recover progress payments against Hamo Industries Pty Ltd. The adjudicator, appointed under the Act, issued a determination in favour of Hamo Industries Pty Ltd on 18 March 2010. Chase subsequently sought judicial review of the adjudicator’s determination in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, arguing that the adjudicator's decision was flawed due to a jurisdictional error concerning the service of a s 17(2) notice. This case ascended to the High Court, which provided the final determination on the scope of judicial review available under the Act and the effect of privative clauses within it. The High Court addressed whether the Supreme Court had the power to review adjudicators’ determinations for jurisdictional error and whether the Act contained any limitation on such judicial review powers, referencing relevant constitutional principles and prior judicial decisions.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether an incorrect determination by an adjudicator that a s 17(2) notice was served within the prescribed time amounts to jurisdictional error under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999.
2. Whether Brodyn Pty Ltd v Davenport is correctly decided to the extent that it held that the Supreme Court of New South Wales was not required to consider and determine the existence of jurisdictional error by an adjudicator, and that an order in the nature of certiorari was not available to quash or set aside a decision of an adjudicator.
3. Whether determinations by adjudicators under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 are amenable to orders in the nature of certiorari for jurisdictional error.
4. Whether adjudicators under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 are exercising a statutory function such that they are subject to a “duty to act judicially” before being amenable to prerogative writs.
5. Whether the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 limits the power of the Supreme Court to review an adjudicator’s determination for jurisdictional error.
6. Whether any such limitation in the Act is permissible in light of Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission.

Held
1. An incorrect determination by an adjudicator that a s 17(2) notice was served within the prescribed time amounts to jurisdictional error under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999. The Supreme Court has the power to grant relief in the nature of certiorari and set the determination aside.
2. Brodyn Pty Ltd v Davenport was incorrectly decided to the extent that it held the Supreme Court of New South Wales was not required to consider and determine the existence of jurisdictional error by an adjudicator and that an order in the nature of certiorari was not available to quash or set aside a decision of an adjudicator. The Supreme Court has the power to review an adjudicator’s determination for jurisdictional error.
3. Determinations by adjudicators under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 are amenable to orders in the nature of certiorari for jurisdictional error.
4. Adjudicators under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 are exercising a statutory function but are not necessarily subject to a “duty to act judicially” before being amenable to prerogative writs.
5. The Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 does not limit the power of the Supreme Court to review an adjudicator’s determination for jurisdictional error.
6. Any limitation in the Act is permissible in light of Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission, as the Act does not contain a limitation on the Supreme Court’s power to review an adjudicator’s determination for jurisdictional error.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Chase Oyster Bar Pty Ltd v Hamo Industries Pty Ltd, the Supreme Court of New South Wales addressed several critical issues concerning the judicial review of adjudications under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW). The first issue was whether an adjudicator's incorrect determination that a s 17(2) notice was served within the prescribed time constitutes a jurisdictional error. The court held that such an error indeed amounts to jurisdictional error because it undermines the foundational compliance with the statutory requirements necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the adjudicator. This conclusion was drawn from the principle that jurisdictional errors are those that go to the legality and authority of the decision-maker, which in this context, includes ensuring that all procedural prerequisites, such as timely notice, are met.

The second issue involved the interpretation of Brodyn Pty Ltd v Davenport, specifically whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales was required to consider and determine the existence of jurisdictional error by an adjudicator. The court found that Brodyn Pty Ltd v Davenport was incorrect in holding that the Supreme Court was not obligated to consider jurisdictional errors in adjudications. This error stemmed from the court's interpretation of the Act and the nature of judicial review available under the Act. By clarifying that the Supreme Court retains its supervisory jurisdiction, the court underscored that it has the power to set aside determinations made in the absence of a valid adjudication application, thus affirming the court's ability to review adjudicators' decisions for jurisdictional errors.

Further, the court examined whether adjudications under the Act are amenable to orders in the nature of certiorari for jurisdictional error. The court concluded that such determinations are indeed amenable to such orders, provided the jurisdictional error is significant enough to render the decision invalid. This decision aligned with the broader principles of administrative law, which recognize that even non-judicial decision-makers, such as adjudicators under the Act, can be subject to judicial review for jurisdictional errors.

The fourth issue concerned whether adjudicators under the Act are exercising a statutory function such that they are subject to a "duty to act judicially" before being amenable to prerogative writs. The court found that while adjudicators are not traditional judicial officers, they perform a quasi-judicial function that requires them to act judicially, especially concerning jurisdictional matters. This quasi-judicial role necessitates adherence to fundamental principles of natural justice, making their decisions reviewable for jurisdictional errors through prerogative writs.

The fifth issue addressed whether the Act limits the power of the Supreme Court to review an adjudicator’s determination for jurisdictional error. The court found that the Act does not expressly or impliedly impose such a limitation on the court's power to review. This finding was crucial in affirming the court's authority to ensure that adjudications comply with statutory requirements and procedural fairness.

Finally, the court considered whether any such limitation in the Act would be permissible in light of Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission. The court held that any limitation on the court's power to review adjudications for jurisdictional error would be inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of judicial review and the requirement for a State Supreme Court with jurisdiction to grant relief in the nature of certiorari. This conclusion reinforced the court's ability to review adjudications to ensure compliance with jurisdictional prerequisites.