SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY AND HAYNE JJ

SAAP & ANOR  APPELLANTS

AND

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL
AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS & ANOR  RESPONDENTS

SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

[2005] HCA 24

18 May 2005

A28/2004

ORDER

1.        Appeal allowed with costs.

2.Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 11 December 2002 and, in its place, order:

(a)appeal allowed with costs;

(b)set aside the orders of Mansfield J made on 10 May 2002 and, in their place, order that:

(i)there be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") made on 18 October 2001;

(ii)there be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to review according to law the decision made by a delegate of the Minister on 19 June 2001 to refuse protection visas sought by the applicants;

(iii)     the respondent pay the applicants' costs.

On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia

Representation:

B R M Hayes QC with M S Blumberg for the appellants (instructed by Bourne Lawyers)

J Basten QC with S J Maharaj for the first respondent (instructed by Sparke Helmore)

No appearance for the second respondent

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ. Part 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") provides for administrative review of protection visa decisions by the second respondent, the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal")[1]. The decisions subject to potential review, which include a refusal to grant a protection visa on the ground that a non-citizen is not a refugee within the meaning of the Act and the international instruments by reference to which the Act operates, are commonly made by a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs ("the Minister"). Section 414, which is in Div 2 of Pt 7, provides that, if a valid application for review of a decision is made, the Tribunal must review the decision. Pursuant to s 415, the Tribunal may affirm the decision, vary it, remit it for re-consideration, or set it aside and substitute a new decision. Section 420, which is in Div 3 of Pt 7, deals with the Tribunal's "way of operating", which is to be fair, just, economical, informal and quick. The Tribunal is not bound by legal technicalities and forms, and is to act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case.

    [1]References are to the form of the Act in September 2001, when the Tribunal hearing in the present case occurred.

  2. Division 4 of Pt 7 deals with the conduct of a review. Section 423 prescribes the procedure to be followed after an application for review has been lodged. As a result of the lodging of the application, the Registrar of the Tribunal will have been furnished with…

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Details
Case
[2005] HCA 24
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned the Refugee Review Tribunal's (Tribunal) decision to affirm the refusal of protection visas to the appellants, Iranian citizens and followers of the Sabian-Mandean faith. The primary dispute arose from the Tribunal's procedure in taking evidence from the first appellant's eldest daughter in the first appellant's absence, and subsequently relying on that evidence without fully informing the first appellant or inviting her to comment in writing, as potentially required by section 424A of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). The appellants argued that this constituted a breach of section 424A and general principles of procedural fairness, leading to jurisdictional error.

The High Court was required to determine whether the provisions of Division 4 of Part 7 of the *Migration Act* had a sequential or ambulatory operation, and specifically whether the Tribunal breached section 424A by failing to provide the first appellant with written particulars of information obtained from her daughter and inviting her to comment. Further, the Court had to consider whether such a breach amounted to jurisdictional error that would invalidate the Tribunal's decision, and whether relief should be withheld on discretionary grounds. The Court also considered whether the Tribunal was a necessary party to proceedings brought under section 39B of the *Judiciary Act 1903* (Cth).

The Court reasoned that the provisions of Division 4 of Part 7 of the *Migration Act* did not prescribe a fixed or invariable sequence of procedural steps for the Tribunal. While the division was presented in a logical order, the Act did not compel the Tribunal to follow that order strictly, particularly as the Tribunal exercises executive, not judicial, power and there is no joinder of issue between contesting parties. The Court found that the Tribunal's failure to provide the first appellant with written particulars of her daughter's evidence and invite her to comment, as contemplated by section 424A, did not necessarily mean the Tribunal was bound to invite the appellant to appear before it. However, the Court ultimately allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal's actions did breach the requirements of procedural fairness and section 424A, leading to jurisdictional error.

The High Court allowed the appeal with costs, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court. In their place, the Court ordered that the appeal to the Federal Court be allowed with costs, and that the orders of Mansfield J be set aside. The Federal Court was then ordered to grant an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the Tribunal's decision of 18 October 2001, and an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to review the decision according to law. The respondent was ordered to pay the applicants' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 11 December 2002 and, in its place, order:

(a) appeal allowed with costs;

(b) set aside the orders of Mansfield J made on 10 May 2002 and, in their place, order that:

(i) there be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") made on 18 October 2001;

(ii) there be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to review according to law the decision made by a delegate of the Minister on 19 June 2001 to refuse protection visas sought by the applicants;

(iii) the respondent pay the applicants' costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Subsequently, this Court granted the appellants special leave to appeal.The material facts The appellants are Iranian citizens. The first appellant is the mother of the second appellant. The appellants arrived in Australia from Iran in March 2001. The first appellant left her husband, two sons and another daughter in Iran. The first appellant's eldest daughter had arrived in Australia before her mother and sister and was granted a protection visa. The appellants are followers of the ancient, pre-Christian Sabian‑Mandean faith. Sabian-Mandeans form one of the smallest religious minorities in Iran. It is estimated that there are between 5,000 and 25,000 adherents in that country. The first appellant is illiterate and speaks very little English. A migration adviser represented the first appellant at the Tribunal hearing. While the first appellant was in Woomera Hospital, the migration adviser, the interpreter and the Tribunal member were in Sydney. Based upon the submissions of the migration agent, the Tribunal identified three incidents that the first appellant relied on to support her claim that Sabian-Mandeans are subject to harassment and discrimination in Iran. She said that her husband lost the sight of an eye when he was struck by a rock thrown by a group of Muslims during a religious ceremony. On another occasion, the Iranian authorities had attempted to abduct her eldest daughter with a view to forcibly converting her to Islam. Her children were refused admission to school and the second appellant was expelled from school after only six months. When the authorities discovered that the appellant was working as a hairdresser, she was dismissed from that employment and the hairdressing salon was burnt down. She claimed that Sabian-Mandeans were not allowed to work as hairdressers because they might come in contact with Muslims and would be suspected of spying on Muslim clients. When the hearing commenced, the Tribunal member said that he would advise the first appellant of information that he considered might be adverse to her claim and would give her an opportunity to comment on it. The first appellant then called two witnesses to give evidence. Ms Susan Naghdi, the eldest daughter of the first appellant, was present at the hearing in Sydney. The first appellant did not propose to call her to give evidence. After the witnesses had given evidence, the Tribunal member decided to take evidence from the eldest daughter, in the absence of the first appellant. He asked the first appellant to leave the room in Woomera while he took this evidence. The migration adviser and the first appellant did not object to Ms Naghdi giving evidence. At this point, the first appellant had not given evidence but the Tribunal had before it earlier interviews with her. The migration adviser remained in the hearing room in Sydney while Ms Naghdi gave evidence. When the first appellant returned to the video hook-up room in Woomera, the Tribunal member put three aspects of Ms Naghdi's evidence to her. These related to the date when the first appellant's husband lost the sight of his eye, the circumstances of the attempt or attempts to abduct and convert Ms Naghdi to Islam and the attendance of the first appellant's children at school. In relation to the first and third matters (the timing of the incident when the first appellant's husband lost the sight of his eye and the children's attendance at school), the Tribunal member told the first appellant what Ms Naghdi had said and asked for a response. The Tribunal member did not tell the first appellant what Ms Naghdi had said in relation to the attempted abduction, although he questioned her about the matter. The Tribunal member did not explain the relevance to the review of the aspects of Ms Naghdi's evidence that he raised with the first appellant. Indeed, the interpreter suggested at one point that the first appellant would not be able to cope with the Tribunal member's statement that he had just taken evidence from Ms Naghdi and there were "three incidents that have been raised on [the first appellant's] behalf as bases for [her] claim for protection." The Tribunal member's response was: "All right. I'll summarise it. Your daughter has just given evidence to me. There are three matters I wanted to raise with you."

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ HUGH J GUMMOW J HAYNE J
First, apart from subsequently revealed information, the issues arising in relation to the decision under review are set at the outset of a review. They may perhaps be refined in the course of the review, but the central issues (apart from any raised by subsequently revealed information) are established at the outset. Secondly, if s 424A is read as being engaged regardless of whether an invitation to appear has been or has to be given to the applicant, the applicant will, under that section, be invited to comment on the relevant information if the information is, for example, specifically about the applicant or another person. (I leave aside whether procedural fairness requires that the applicant be invited to comment on matters of a kind to which s 424A does not apply because it is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member[147].) In these circumstances, the requirement in s 425(1) that the applicant be invited to present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review does not mean that the applicant's appearance is the final point in an otherwise sequential progression of procedural steps.[147]Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57; Muin v Refugee Review Tribunal; Lie v Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) 76 ALJR 966; 190 ALR 601.Review – conclusions Underpinning all of what I have said about the operation of Div 4 of Pt 7 are two fundamental propositions. First and foremost, it must be borne steadily in mind that the Tribunal does not exercise judicial power. It forms part of the Executive, exercising the power given by the Act to the Executive, to grant or refuse to grant "a non‑citizen permission, to be known as a visa"[148], in this case, to remain in Australia. The particular kind of visa sought by the appellants was a protection visa[149]. The Act makes elaborate provision for how applications for visas (including applications for protection visas) are to be dealt with. For example, Pt 2, Div 3, subdiv AA of the Act (ss 44‑51) regulates applications for visas; subdiv AB (ss 52‑64) provides a "[c]ode of procedure for dealing fairly, efficiently and quickly with visa applications"; subdiv AC (ss 65‑69) deals with the grant and refusal of visas; and subdiv AG (ss 77‑84) makes a number of "[o]ther provisions about visas". The process for review of protection visa decisions for which Pt 7 of the Act provides is no more than a further step in the exercise of Executive power.[148]s 29(1).[149]s 36. Secondly, given the nature of the power to be exercised by the Tribunal, there is no reason to read the Act as defining the order in which the Tribunal should set about undertaking its task of reviewing a decision. It may be necessary to read it in that way if the appearance were the point at which issues joined between contesting parties were to be resolved. But there is no joinder of issue between contesting parties. And it is not necessary to read the provisions as providing for an invariable order of events if, as I consider to be the better view of the provisions, the appearance before the Tribunal is no more than one of several different steps to be taken in the course of the review.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, HUGH J, GUMMOW J, HAYNE J

I would answer each of those questions, "No". There are two related reasons for doing so. First, although the language of the Act permits the contrary construction, I consider the better view to be that the provisions of Div 4 of Pt 7 do not establish a sequence of procedural steps from which the Tribunal may not depart. Secondly, given the nature of the task to be undertaken by the Tribunal, the Act should not be construed as binding the Tribunal to follow a particular and invariable sequence of steps, when conducting a review, unless the language of the Act dictates that result. It does not.Textual considerations No provision of the Act states expressly that the Tribunal must follow a particular sequence of steps when conducting a review. Read as a whole, however, does Div 4 of Pt 7 bear that meaning? There is, of course, no doubt that Div 4 of Pt 7 is set out in a logical order. It begins by providing for documents that may be given to the Tribunal, in addition to those which the Secretary to the Department must provide[131]; it deals with the Tribunal seeking additional information[132]; it provides for inviting the applicant to appear[133]; and for the applicant to request the calling of witnesses[134]. Sections at the end of the division then deal with the powers of the Tribunal[135] and its conducting its review in private[136]. A review may, perhaps many reviews would, be conducted in steps that generally follow the order in which Div 4 of Pt 7 deals with these particular subjects. It by no means follows from that fact alone, however, that the Act prescribes the order in which the Tribunal is to go about its task of reviewing the decision that has been made and I did not understand the contrary to be suggested.[131]s 423.[132]s 424.[133]ss 425 and 425A.[134]s 426.[135]s 427.[136]s 429. Rather, emphasis was placed upon the provisions of s 425(2) and (3), which qualify the otherwise imperative requirement of s 425(1) that the Tribunal invite the applicant to appear before it "to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review". One of those qualifications (that provided by s 425(2)(c)) is engaged if the applicant either is invited to give additional information, but does not, or is invited, under s 424A, to comment on information, but does not do so within the time fixed for giving the comments. In any such case, "the applicant is not entitled to appear before the Tribunal". If an applicant's appearance before the Tribunal were to be seen as the focus or the culmination of the process of review, the provisions of s 425(2)(c) would suggest that any invitation to the applicant to give information, and any invitation to the applicant to comment on information, would ordinarily come before the "hearing" contemplated by s 425. Even so, it would be another and much larger step to construe these provisions as neither permitting nor requiring any departure from this order of events. It is necessary to notice that s 425(2)(c) is engaged not only if s 424C(2) applies to the applicant (as it will if s 424A has been invoked) but also if s 424C(1) applies to the applicant. If a person is invited under s 424 to give additional information to the Tribunal, but does not do so before the time for giving it has passed, s 424C(1) permits the Tribunal to make a decision, without taking further action to obtain the additional information. Section 424C may therefore be engaged where, pursuant to s 424, information is sought from the applicant or from another. Section 425(2)(c) deals with the case where information is sought from the applicant, but not provided in time. In such a case, the applicant is not entitled to appear before the Tribunal.