HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GLEESON CJ,
McHUGH, GUMMOW, KIRBY AND HAYNE JJSAAP & ANOR APPELLANTS
AND
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL
AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS & ANOR RESPONDENTSSAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
[2005] HCA 24
18 May 2005
A28/2004
ORDER
1. Appeal allowed with costs.
2.Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 11 December 2002 and, in its place, order:
(a)appeal allowed with costs;
(b)set aside the orders of Mansfield J made on 10 May 2002 and, in their place, order that:
(i)there be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") made on 18 October 2001;
(ii)there be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to review according to law the decision made by a delegate of the Minister on 19 June 2001 to refuse protection visas sought by the applicants;
(iii) the respondent pay the applicants' costs.
On appeal from the Federal Court of Australia
Representation:
B R M Hayes QC with M S Blumberg for the appellants (instructed by Bourne Lawyers)
J Basten QC with S J Maharaj for the first respondent (instructed by Sparke Helmore)
No appearance for the second respondent
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
GLEESON CJ. Part 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") provides for administrative review of protection visa decisions by the second respondent, the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal")[1]. The decisions subject to potential review, which include a refusal to grant a protection visa on the ground that a non-citizen is not a refugee within the meaning of the Act and the international instruments by reference to which the Act operates, are commonly made by a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs ("the Minister"). Section 414, which is in Div 2 of Pt 7, provides that, if a valid application for review of a decision is made, the Tribunal must review the decision. Pursuant to s 415, the Tribunal may affirm the decision, vary it, remit it for re-consideration, or set it aside and substitute a new decision. Section 420, which is in Div 3 of Pt 7, deals with the Tribunal's "way of operating", which is to be fair, just, economical, informal and quick. The Tribunal is not bound by legal technicalities and forms, and is to act according to substantial justice and the merits of the case.
[1]References are to the form of the Act in September 2001, when the Tribunal hearing in the present case occurred.
Division 4 of Pt 7 deals with the conduct of a review. Section 423 prescribes the procedure to be followed after an application for review has been lodged. As a result of the lodging of the application, the Registrar of the Tribunal will have been furnished with…
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- Case
- [2005] HCA 24
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the provisions of Division 4 of Part 7 of the *Migration Act* had a sequential or ambulatory operation, and specifically whether the Tribunal breached section 424A by failing to provide the first appellant with written particulars of information obtained from her daughter and inviting her to comment. Further, the Court had to consider whether such a breach amounted to jurisdictional error that would invalidate the Tribunal's decision, and whether relief should be withheld on discretionary grounds. The Court also considered whether the Tribunal was a necessary party to proceedings brought under section 39B of the *Judiciary Act 1903* (Cth).
The Court reasoned that the provisions of Division 4 of Part 7 of the *Migration Act* did not prescribe a fixed or invariable sequence of procedural steps for the Tribunal. While the division was presented in a logical order, the Act did not compel the Tribunal to follow that order strictly, particularly as the Tribunal exercises executive, not judicial, power and there is no joinder of issue between contesting parties. The Court found that the Tribunal's failure to provide the first appellant with written particulars of her daughter's evidence and invite her to comment, as contemplated by section 424A, did not necessarily mean the Tribunal was bound to invite the appellant to appear before it. However, the Court ultimately allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal's actions did breach the requirements of procedural fairness and section 424A, leading to jurisdictional error.
The High Court allowed the appeal with costs, setting aside the orders of the Full Court of the Federal Court. In their place, the Court ordered that the appeal to the Federal Court be allowed with costs, and that the orders of Mansfield J be set aside. The Federal Court was then ordered to grant an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the Tribunal's decision of 18 October 2001, and an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to review the decision according to law. The respondent was ordered to pay the applicants' costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed with costs.
2. Set aside the order of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made on 11 December 2002 and, in its place, order:
(a) appeal allowed with costs;
(b) set aside the orders of Mansfield J made on 10 May 2002 and, in their place, order that:
(i) there be an order in the nature of certiorari to quash the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ("the Tribunal") made on 18 October 2001;
(ii) there be an order in the nature of mandamus requiring the Tribunal to review according to law the decision made by a delegate of the Minister on 19 June 2001 to refuse protection visas sought by the applicants;
(iii) the respondent pay the applicants' costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GLEESON CJ, HUGH J, GUMMOW J, HAYNE J
I would answer each of those questions, "No". There are two related reasons for doing so. First, although the language of the Act permits the contrary construction, I consider the better view to be that the provisions of Div 4 of Pt 7 do not establish a sequence of procedural steps from which the Tribunal may not depart. Secondly, given the nature of the task to be undertaken by the Tribunal, the Act should not be construed as binding the Tribunal to follow a particular and invariable sequence of steps, when conducting a review, unless the language of the Act dictates that result. It does not.Textual considerations No provision of the Act states expressly that the Tribunal must follow a particular sequence of steps when conducting a review. Read as a whole, however, does Div 4 of Pt 7 bear that meaning? There is, of course, no doubt that Div 4 of Pt 7 is set out in a logical order. It begins by providing for documents that may be given to the Tribunal, in addition to those which the Secretary to the Department must provide[131]; it deals with the Tribunal seeking additional information[132]; it provides for inviting the applicant to appear[133]; and for the applicant to request the calling of witnesses[134]. Sections at the end of the division then deal with the powers of the Tribunal[135] and its conducting its review in private[136]. A review may, perhaps many reviews would, be conducted in steps that generally follow the order in which Div 4 of Pt 7 deals with these particular subjects. It by no means follows from that fact alone, however, that the Act prescribes the order in which the Tribunal is to go about its task of reviewing the decision that has been made and I did not understand the contrary to be suggested.[131]s 423.[132]s 424.[133]ss 425 and 425A.[134]s 426.[135]s 427.[136]s 429. Rather, emphasis was placed upon the provisions of s 425(2) and (3), which qualify the otherwise imperative requirement of s 425(1) that the Tribunal invite the applicant to appear before it "to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review". One of those qualifications (that provided by s 425(2)(c)) is engaged if the applicant either is invited to give additional information, but does not, or is invited, under s 424A, to comment on information, but does not do so within the time fixed for giving the comments. In any such case, "the applicant is not entitled to appear before the Tribunal". If an applicant's appearance before the Tribunal were to be seen as the focus or the culmination of the process of review, the provisions of s 425(2)(c) would suggest that any invitation to the applicant to give information, and any invitation to the applicant to comment on information, would ordinarily come before the "hearing" contemplated by s 425. Even so, it would be another and much larger step to construe these provisions as neither permitting nor requiring any departure from this order of events. It is necessary to notice that s 425(2)(c) is engaged not only if s 424C(2) applies to the applicant (as it will if s 424A has been invoked) but also if s 424C(1) applies to the applicant. If a person is invited under s 424 to give additional information to the Tribunal, but does not do so before the time for giving it has passed, s 424C(1) permits the Tribunal to make a decision, without taking further action to obtain the additional information. Section 424C may therefore be engaged where, pursuant to s 424, information is sought from the applicant or from another. Section 425(2)(c) deals with the case where information is sought from the applicant, but not provided in time. In such a case, the applicant is not entitled to appear before the Tribunal.