AXC20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

AXC20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1161

File number(s): ADG 94 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE GERRARD
Date of judgment: 25 July 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal failed to engage with the applicant’s claims – whether the Tribunal made an unreasonable finding – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed – application for Ministerial intervention encouraged.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 424AA, 476
Cases cited:

BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384

Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21

DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784

ERM18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 228

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392

NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10

SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 294

SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 61
Date of last submission/s: 30 May 2025
Date of hearing: 13 June 2025
Place: Adelaide
Applicant: Self-represented with the assistance of a Hindi interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Maria Pappas
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

ADG 94 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

AXC20

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE GERRARD

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JULY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE GERRARD:

INTRODUCTION

  1. The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirming an earlier decision of the first respondent (the Minister) to refuse to grant her a Protection (subclass 866) visa (the visa). As will be explained, for…

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1161
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court was asked to review the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), which upheld the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’s decision to refuse the applicant a protection visa. The applicant, an Indian citizen who had arrived in Australia in 2008 and applied for a protection visa in 2016, claimed that she would be persecuted if she were to return to India due to her association with Dera Sacha Sauda, her separation from her husband, and the threats made against her by her husband’s family and Hindu hardliners. The AAT found that the applicant had not demonstrated that she would be subject to a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to India. The Court was asked to determine whether the AAT erred in its decision, either by failing to properly engage with the applicant’s claims or by making an unreasonable finding.

The Court found that the AAT had not erred in its decision. The Court noted that the AAT had considered the applicant’s claims at length, taking into account the country information provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the applicant’s own submissions and evidence, and other relevant decisions of the Tribunal. The Court found that the AAT had properly considered the applicant’s claims as a single divorced woman and had made a reasoned decision based on the evidence before it. The Court also found that the AAT’s decision was not unreasonable, as the country information did not suggest that the applicant would be targeted because she is single or divorced, and the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant could not, or would not, live with her brother or mother if she returned to India.

The Court dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review, finding that no jurisdictional error had been established. The Court encouraged the applicant to consider making an application for Ministerial intervention.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, the Court has not found jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. On that basis, the application cannot succeed. BACKGROUND The applicant is a citizen of India (Court Book (CB) 21, 45). She first arrived in Australia on 8 May 2008 as the dependant of her spouse’s Student (subclass 572) visa (CB 61). On 10 May 2016, the applicant applied for a protection visa (CB 8-44). In her application, the applicant claimed that she came to Australia with her husband but will be harmed if she returns to India because she is a follower of Dera Sacha Sauda (DSS). She claimed that her husband and his family tried to get her to abandon DSS but she is now separated from her husband. She claimed that his family and many Hindu hardliners have threatened to harm her. She said that the authorities cannot protect her because many people in the government are against DSS, and she cannot relocate to another part of India because Hindu hardliners can find her anywhere and it would be impossible for her to safely move by herself (CB 39-41). On 20 July 2016, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 61-71). The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) (CB 70). On 12 August 2016, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision (CB 72-78). On 5 December 2017, the applicant was invited to attend a hearing scheduled for 2 February 2018, which was later postponed and rescheduled for 21 August 2019 (CB 83-84, 89-92). The applicant attended that hearing and was assisted by a Hindi interpreter (CB 94). On 3 February 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa (CB 131-146). On 28 February 2020, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review in this Court. That application seeks review of the Tribunal’s decision pursuant to s 476 of the Act. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is thus useful to outline the Tribunal’s decision in some detail. The Tribunal began by outlining the applicant’s visa history and by identifying the visa decision under review (at [1]-[5]). The Tribunal set out the legislative criteria for the grant of a protection visa, namely, the refugee and complementary protection criteria (at [6]-[14]). The Tribunal confirmed that, in accordance with Ministerial Direction No. 84, made under s 499 of the Act, it also had regard to the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’, as well as a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country information report for India dated 17 October 2018 (at [15]-[16]). The Tribunal set out the applicant’s protection claims as made in her visa application (at [18]-[19]). The Tribunal noted that the applicant came to Australia on a student visa with her husband in 2008, but that she is now separated from him and provided a 2019 divorce order as evidence (at [22]-[24]). The Tribunal noted that since her arrival in 2008, the applicant has returned to India three times for a total of 15 to 16 weeks, her last visit being in 2014 (at [25]).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 28 February 2020, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review in this Court. That application seeks review of the Tribunal’s decision pursuant to s 476 of the Act. THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is thus useful to outline the Tribunal’s decision in some detail. The Tribunal began by outlining the applicant’s visa history and by identifying the visa decision under review (at [1]-[5]). The Tribunal set out the legislative criteria for the grant of a protection visa, namely, the refugee and complementary protection criteria (at [6]-[14]). The Tribunal confirmed that, in accordance with Ministerial Direction No. 84, made under s 499 of the Act, it also had regard to the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’, as well as a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) country information report for India dated 17 October 2018 (at [15]-[16]). The Tribunal set out the applicant’s protection claims as made in her visa application (at [18]-[19]). The Tribunal noted that the applicant came to Australia on a student visa with her husband in 2008, but that she is now separated from him and provided a 2019 divorce order as evidence (at [22]-[24]). The Tribunal noted that since her arrival in 2008, the applicant has returned to India three times for a total of 15 to 16 weeks, her last visit being in 2014 (at [25]). At the Tribunal hearing, the applicant made the following claims (at [26]):·When she visited India, she could not stay with her husband’s family and instead stayed with a friend. Her husband would bring the children to visit her.·In 2014, she called her husband to arrange a meeting with the children and she was told to wait at the Rudra Theatre. The children did not come but two people on motorcycles came along and pushed her over and started hitting her. She did not recognise the assailants but she thought they were trying to kill her.·She did not report the incident to the police because she instead went to Nagpal Hospital to get treatment for injuries to her eye and elbow. She does not have a record of that treatment but said she could obtain it. Her friend advised her not to report the incident because the police do not support DSS. ·She did not mention the incident earlier because her husband told her they were going back to Australia and not to worry about it. She did not make these claims before the hearing because she feels safe in Australia.·She became a DSS follower when she was 14 or 15 years old. She said people in India would know she is a DSS follower because “people who are Dera go to the Ashram”. She said she had been to the ashram five times in five years before she was married but then did not go again. She did not attend the ashram more frequently because she was going to school and could only go during the school holidays, and because they teach meditation and ask followers to meditate at home, so there is no need to return to the ashram. ·The applicant’s mother is a follower of DSS but her father and siblings are not. The applicant does not recall when her mother began following DSS as she was very little. Her mother meditates for two and a half hours a day and talks about a “spiritual way”. The applicant also now meditates for two and a half hours a day as a follower of DSS.·When asked to explain the “spiritual way”, the applicant said the ashram tells people to remember God every day for two and a half hours, to help others always, to encourage people to do good things, and not to show off with prayer.·She identified her religion in the application in as “DSS Hindu” but said she does not believe in any religion because the DSS do not have a particular religion. When asked why she took an oath on the Gita, the applicant said that she was born Hindu but for her any religion is the same. She has not undertaken any DSS activities in Australia and does not attend the Hindu temple.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

However, it was also explained to the applicant that this was not an exhaustive list and she should attempt to tell the Court what she said the Tribunal did wrong. CONSIDERATION As outlined above, the application for judicial review contains two grounds asserting jurisdictional error. Noting that the applicant was unrepresented in this matter, the Court has endeavoured to interpret the applicant’s grounds as broadly as possible (as per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 158). Ground one Ground one contends that the Tribunal failed to engage with the applicant’s claims as a single divorced woman. When invited to address the Court about this ground, the applicant said that she feels safe in Australia and is too scared to go back to India as a single woman. She said that the Tribunal did not understand her fear and that they did not understand she would be at risk by going back to India. She said that she thought the Court would understand her perspective and claim better than the Tribunal. The Minister submitted that the Tribunal did, in fact, consider and engage with these claims at length (at [54]-[72]). The Tribunal considered DFAT country information regarding divorced women, and violence and discrimination against women in India, as well as considering the applicant’s own submissions and evidence. In particular, the Tribunal referred explicitly to the applicant’s fears about where she will live, what she will do, and what risks she might be exposed to if she returned to India as a single divorced woman (at [68]). In considering the applicant’s claims, the Tribunal was ultimately not satisfied that her fears as a single divorced woman amounted to a well-founded fear of persecution. The Tribunal found that the country information did not suggest she would be targeted because she is single or divorced. The Tribunal was also not satisfied that the applicant could not, or would not, live with her brother or mother if she returned to India, or that any hardship or lack of opportunity she might experience as a single divorced woman would threaten her capacity to subsist. The Tribunal also considered other decisions of the Tribunal where it was found that a single woman in India would have a well-founded fear of persecution, however those cases involved women who had been victims of domestic violence and who would have had to relocate if returned to India due to the risk in their local area. The Tribunal found that this matter distinguished from the applicant’s circumstances (at [71]). The applicant did not face such a risk, nor did she make any such claim that she would suffer domestic violence if she were to be returned to India. It appears to the Court that the country information referred to by the Tribunal appears to be capable of establishing that the applicant, as a single and divorced woman in India, may have a well-founded fear of persecution. In particular, on the face of the country information cited by the Tribunal, there would seem to be a rational basis to find that single women in India are at risk of sexual assault and gender-based violence. Notably, the DFAT Country Information Report on India dated 17 October 2018, which was before the Tribunal, observed that:3.33 Traditional social practices and the low status of women in many parts of India result in domestic and gender-based violence. Child marriage and sati (widowed women committing suicide on their husband’s funeral pyre) are illegal, but both practices continue in rural areas. The tradition of the bride’s family paying a dowry leads to female infanticide, sex-selective abortions and dowry deaths (women murdered or driven to suicide in the attempt to extort a higher dowry). Over 90 per cent of domestic violence incidents are not reported to any formal agency such as police, social workers or lawyers. 3.34 The gang rape and homicide of a young medical student in December 2012 in New Delhi triggered demonstrations across India. Since then, the issue of violence against women has attracted increased attention among the population. Reports of rape, in Delhi in particular, have sharply increased since 2013, although the conviction rate has declined. In 2015, the Ministry of Home Affairs registered over 34,600 cases of rape and over 4,400 cases of attempted rape. The number of cases that go unreported is likely to be much higher. Some women complain that police refuse to file reports of sexual violence. Marital rape continues to be legal. 3.35 According to Human Rights Watch, many women fail to report violence for fear of retribution. Witness protection programmes are not available to victims outside of the state of Delhi. Women who are victims of assaults by men who are well-connected in politics or who have significant wealth, or in cases where the woman is from a lower socio-economic class or caste, may have particular difficulties in having file or investigate reports of sexual assault (see Police). 3.36 In traditional rural areas, senior community members or village committees have reportedly arranged gang rapes of women as punishment for their families’ perceived misconduct in a number of incidents, according to human rights NGOs. According to the Asia Foundation, almost 400,000 women and girls have been abducted in the past decade. Rates are reportedly much higher in northern states with highly unbalanced child sex ratios, and involve women and girls of low castes, especially Dalits. The offenders (sometimes from higher dominant castes) abduct the women and girls for rape, sexual trafficking and forced marriage. Victims and their families generally remain silent due to shame and fear of reprisal. Sources reported a low incidence of police action in these cases, attributed to police bias towards higher castes and a tendency to dismiss the victims due to their lower caste. 3.37 The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (2005) requires the states to provide shelters, counselling services and legal aid to survivors. Local sources claim that women’s shelters in India are run very strictly and do not always provide a safe environment. Shelters were first established to ‘protect’ vulnerable women from prostitution and trafficking rackets; therefore, women who attend shelters (nari gruh, meaning women’s homes) are seen as ‘immoral’ or ‘deviants’ who deserve to be punished. The quality of counselling services is poor and not always available. Sources report a shortage of data on the facilities available across states, and on the experiences of women in state and NGO-run shelters. 3.38 Women from higher socio-economic backgrounds, particularly urban women, are more likely to use the courts as a means of redress and protection from violence related to dowries, though social stigma can be a deterrent. Women in smaller, rural communities are deterred from such action due to the cost and social stigma. Women with higher standards of education have a better awareness of available services and are better placed to access these services. If working, these women are also more likely to be employed in the formal sector with higher legal protections. 3.39 Although, in general, urban women from higher class and caste backgrounds tend to have better access to legal protections, these women may be pressured by their families to hide family violence against them for fear of maligning their family’s honour and reputation. 3.40 Other factors which may affect the situation for women experience violence include the state in which she lives, her class, caste, ethnicity, religion, education and age. Access to services is typically better in urban areas than in rural regions. In addition to the geographic advantages of urban-based communities, education and the standard of literacy has a significant impact on access to services. 3.41 DFAT assesses that women face a low risk of official discrimination. DFAT assesses that women, particularly in rural areas and from lower castes, face a moderate risk of societal discrimination and violence.