ERM18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ERM18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 228

Appeal from: ERM18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 740
File number(s): WAD 124 of 2021
Judgment of: SARAH C DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 20 March 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissal of an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – where Authority affirmed decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa – where Authority not satisfied the appellant is a person in respect of whom Australia owes protection obligations – where appellant alleged primary judge failed to have regard to all evidence which was before the Court – whether jurisdictional error shown – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), pt 7AA, div 3, ss 5, 36, 46A, 473CA, 473CB, 473DD, 476
Cases cited:

ADF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1099

AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37; 269 CLR 494

BHL19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 94; 277 FCR 420

CQR17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 61; 269 FCR 367

Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163

DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784

ERM18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 740

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZZMX [2020] FCAFC 175; 280 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16; 264 CLR 217

Division: General Division
Registry: Western Australia
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 30
Date of hearing: 17 March 2025
Counsel for the Appellant: Appellant was self-represented
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

WAD 124 of 2021
BETWEEN:

ERM18

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

SARAH C DERRINGTON J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 MARCH 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SARAH C DERRINGTON J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 15 April…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 228
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in ERM18 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs concerns the refusal of a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa to the appellant, a Sri Lankan citizen who had arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival. The appellant sought judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority to affirm the delegate’s decision to not grant the visa. The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the appeal, and the appellant now seeks review by this Court.

The key legal issue before the Court was whether the Immigration Assessment Authority had committed a jurisdictional error in its review of the delegate's decision. The appellant argued that the Authority had failed to consider all relevant evidence and did not fully understand his claim. The primary judge had identified two potential arguments: first, that the Authority failed to have regard to relevant information that was not referred to it by the delegate, and second, that the Authority erred in finding that it could not have regard to "new information" provided by the appellant. The primary judge found that the Authority had breached s 473CB of the Migration Act by not providing all relevant materials, but this did not amount to a jurisdictional error sufficient to warrant the grant of judicial review.

The Court, after considering the arguments and the relevant statutory framework, found that while the Authority did indeed fail to provide certain documents to the appellant, this did not constitute a jurisdictional error that would warrant the grant of judicial review. The Court held that the Authority's consideration of the appellant's claims was comprehensive and that the failure to provide certain documents did not impact the overall outcome. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 15 August 2018, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant a SHEV to the appellant, as it was not satisfied that he met the relevant protection criteria under s 36(2) of the Migration Act for either refugee protection or complementary protection. A comprehensive summary of the Authority’s decision and its statutory obligations and powers on review is provided by the primary judge at PJ[11]-[53], which summary need not be restated here. In making its decision, the Authority considered the review material provided by the Secretary, along with the appellant’s submission. While the Authority accepted many of the claims as to the appellant’s background and situation in Sri Lanka, it did not accept that his claims to fear harm on any of the bases he had advanced would amount to “serious harm” or “significant harm” as those terms are defined in the Migration Act. THE PRIMARY JUDGMENT It was uncontroversial that, in his application to the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the Authority’s decision, the appellant was required to show that the Authority had fallen into jurisdictional error to obtain relief. His application advanced two grounds: first, that the Authority erred in failing to take into account relevant information; secondly, that the Authority erred in making a decision “not fully understanding” his claim (PJ[54]). As to the first ground, the appellant was asked by the primary judge at the hearing to clarify what information was said to have not been taken into account by the Authority. In response, the appellant referred to his claim that he feared harm if returned to Sri Lanka on the basis of his religion (PJ[75]). However, as the primary judge noted (PJ[76]), the Authority expressly had regard to the appellant’s religion in considering whether there was a real risk of him suffering significant harm if removed from Australia. Clearly cognizant of the appellant’s self-represented status, the primary judge then looked beyond the claim articulated by the appellant and identified two potential arguments under the umbrella of his overarching “failure to consider relevant material complaint” (see eg, Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163 at 198) (PJ[78]):(a)that the Authority erred in failing to have regard to relevant information as some information was not referred to the Authority by the delegate (“Ground 1A”); and(b)that the Authority erred in finding that it could not have regard to the “new information” that the Appellant had provided in his submission (“Ground 1B”). In respect of Ground 1A, the primary judge referred to evidence that indicated that some documents which had been provided by the appellant to the Minister’s delegate in making the original decision had not been referred to the Authority in conducting the review, despite s 473CB(1)(b) of the Migration Act requiring the Secretary to provide them to the Authority (PJ[81]-[82]). The primary judge, correctly with respect, identified that the Secretary’s explanation that the materials were not provided as they were “not deemed to be integral to the decision making of the case” misconstrued the application of the provision, and as such found that the failure to provide the material constituted a breach of s 473CB (PJ[82]-[84]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant is a Sri Lankan citizen and former professional national soccer team member who arrived in Australia in April 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. The Department advised the appellant on 20 May 2016 that the Minister had “lifted the bar” pursuant to s 46A(2) of the MigrationAct 1958 (Cth), and the appellant was invited to make an application for either a SHEV or a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa. On 19 May 2017, the appellant submitted an application for a SHEV to the Department, in which he stated that he feared harm if forced to return to Sri Lanka on the basis of his being a Tamil Muslim with suspected links with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The claims advanced by the appellant in his statement are summarised at PJ[3]. In particular, the appellant claimed that in October 2009, Sri Lankan police had begun looking for him concerning suspected ties to the LTTE because, for two weeks in 2002, he had trained with a Tamil professional soccer team which the group organised. He also claimed that he feared harm from the Muslim community arising from his relationship with his ex-partner, who is Hindu. The appellant stated that he had been threatened by members of the community in his native Sri Lanka and also feared harm at the hands of the family of his ex-partner’s first husband. On 15 January 2018, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the appellant a SHEV under s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act, finding that the appellant was not a ‘non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations’ because the delegate was not satisfied that he was a refugee, nor that he faced a real risk of suffering significant harm as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned to Sri Lanka. The Department referred the decision to the Authority on 19 January 2018 for merits review pursuant to s 473CA of the Migration Act. The appellant, through a migration agent, sent to the Authority by email on 9 February 2018 a submission and accompanying documents in support of his visa application. The Authority also subsequently sought from the Secretary copies of three documents which had been before the delegate in making the original decision, though only one of the three was provided, as the other two had been destroyed in the intervening period on the basis that “they were not deemed to be integral to the decision making of the case”. On 15 August 2018, the Authority affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant a SHEV to the appellant, as it was not satisfied that he met the relevant protection criteria under s 36(2) of the Migration Act for either refugee protection or complementary protection. A comprehensive summary of the Authority’s decision and its statutory obligations and powers on review is provided by the primary judge at PJ[11]-[53], which summary need not be restated here. In making its decision, the Authority considered the review material provided by the Secretary, along with the appellant’s submission. While the Authority accepted many of the claims as to the appellant’s background and situation in Sri Lanka, it did not accept that his claims to fear harm on any of the bases he had advanced would amount to “serious harm” or “significant harm” as those terms are defined in the Migration Act. THE PRIMARY JUDGMENT