Erm18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs - [2021] FCCA 740

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ERM18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 740

File number: MLG 2718 of 2018

Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL

Date of judgment: 15 April 2021

Catchwords: MIGRATION – Safe Haven visa – decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether the IAA misapplied s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Secretary did not provide review material – whether IAA misunderstood claims – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), pt 7AA, div 3, ss 5, 5AAA, 36, 46A, 473CA, 473CB, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473FB, 473GA, 473GB, 476

Cases cited:
ADF15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCA 1099

AUS17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2020] HCA 37

CQR17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 61

Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

CSR16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCA 474

DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCA 784

EVS17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 20

Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v MZZMX [2020] FCAFC 175

Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZKRT [2013] FCA 317

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs v BTW17 [2020] FCAFC 159

Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] HCA 16

SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24

SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80

Number of paragraphs: 180

Date of hearing: 8 April 2021

Place: Perth

Applicant: In person

Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G T Johnson

Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs

Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor
ORDERS

MLG 2718 of 2018

BETWEEN:
ERM18

Applicant

AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE KENDALL

DATE OF ORDER:

15 APRIL 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to the “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs”.
2.The application to be dismissed.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE KENDALL

The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia in April 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival (Court Book (“CB”) 127).
On 20 May 2016, the applicant was advised that the first respondent (the “Minister”) had lifted the bar pursuant to s 46A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”) (CB 11-17).
On 19 May 2017, the applicant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (the “visa”) (CB 18-75). In his statement of claims, the applicant stated:
44. If I returned home to Sri Lanka, I would be captured by the Sri Lankan government officials at the airport. I would be handed over to the police.
45. I know that the police are still searching me because they suspect I have links to the LTTE.
…
49. My fear of harm is increased because of the data breach and the fact that the Sri Lankan authorities and likely the police now know that I have fled Sri Lanka to seek asylum in Australia.
50. I also fear harm from the Muslim community because I have left Sri Lanka and because of my marriage to my ex-wife. I would be ostracised by the Muslim community if I returned to Sri Lanka and I fear that I could be harmed.
51. I also fear harm from my ex-wife’s previous husband’s family because it is alleged that I kidnapped my ex-wife and four children. My ex-wife told me this after we were released from detention in Australia and only after we had decided to separate. My ex-wife’s first husband’s family have told people in Sri Lanka that I kidnapped my ex-wife and their four kids and took them to Australia.
52. I also fear harm from the Hindu community in Sri Lanka because of my marriage to my ex-wife.
…
55.In summary, I fear harm throughout the whole of Sri Lanka including abduction, torture and murder at the hands of the police on the basis of my suspected links with the LTTE. I have personally been subject to harassment and assault by my feared persecutors. I cannot rely on the protection of the Sri Lankan state and cannot safely relocate anywhere else in Sri Lanka.
56. I also believe I am now at further risk of being harmed by the Sri Lankan police because I was affected by the Data Breach and they are likely to know that I have sought asylum in Australia.
The applicant attended an interview before the delegate on 17 August 2017 (CB 86-87).
On 15 January 2018, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 127-146). The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance or real risk of harm if he returned to Sri Lanka.
On 19 January 2018, the applicant’s matter was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority (the “IAA”) pursuant to s 473CA of the Act (CB 147-160).
On 9 February 2018, the applicant’s migration agent provided a submission and four supporting documents to the IAA (CB 165-181).
On 30 July 2018, the IAA asked the delegate to provide copies of three documents. The delegate responded on 1 August 2018 advising that two of the documents had been destroyed after the interview as they were not “deemed to be integral to the decision making of the case” and advising further that the other document was available (CB 187).
On 15 August 2018, the IAA affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant the visa (CB 195-214).
On 11 September 2018, the applicant applied to this Court for judicial review of the IAA’s decision. The application is brought pursuant to s 476 of the Act. To obtain assistance, the applicant must show that the IAA has fallen into jurisdictional error.
THE IAA’S DECISION
It is not disputed that the applicant satisfies the criteria in s 5(1) of the Act for a “fast track applicant”. This is important in relation to allegations of jurisdictional error in proceedings before the IAA as the Act limits what this Court can and cannot do when determining whether there is jurisdictional error on the part of the IAA.
Section 473CB(1) of the Act requires the Secretary of the Minister’s Department to give to the IAA certain material, known as the “review material”. This includes:
(a)a statement of the findings of fact made by the decision maker, the evidence relied upon and reasons of the decision maker;
(b)material provided by the “referred applicant” to the delegate before a decision was made;
(c)any other material that is in the Secretary’s “possession or control” and is “considered by the Secretary (at the time the decision is referred to the IAA) to be relevant to the review”; and
(d)the referred applicant’s contact details.
The IAA is generally required to conduct its review of the delegate’s decision on the basis of the material that was before the delegate at the time the decision was made.
The IAA can, however, obtain “new information” - defined as information that was not before the delegate and that the IAA considers “may be relevant”: the Act, s 473DC(1). Applicants may also provide “new information” to the IAA and ask that it take that information into account.
When the IAA does obtain or receive new information, the IAA cannot consider it for the purposes of making a decision on the review unless certain conditions are met. Those conditions are set out in s 473DD of the Act, which provides:
For the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:
(a) the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and
(b) the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:
(i) was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or
(ii) is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims.
Division 3 of Part 7AA of the Act deals with the conduct of reviews by the IAA. Section 473DA(1) of the Act stipulates that this Division, together with ss 473GA and 473GB, is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the IAA.
In this matter the IAA’s decision is 20 pages long and spans 54 paragraphs. Four pages contain the legislative provisions relevant to visas of this sort. Those provisions are summarised at [29]-[30] and [49]-[50] of the IAA’s decision.
The IAA began by identifying the type of visa that the applicant was seeking and provided a detailed summary of the delegate’s decision (at [1]-[2]).
The IAA confirmed that it had had regard to the material given by the Secretary pursuant to s 473CB of the Act.
The IAA noted that, to the extent that the submission dated 12 February 2018 contained argument, the IAA had had regard to it and did not consider it to be “new information” (at [4]).
In relation to the materials attached to or referred to in the submissions dated 12 February 2018, the IAA:
(a)determined that the letter from the applicant’s school was not “new information”. This letter was shown to the delegate at the interview but was not included in the review material (at [5]);
(b)determined that the two media articles could have been provided to the delegate, did not corroborate the applicant’s central claims regarding his links with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the “LTTE”) soccer team and concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information (at [6]);
(c)referred to the submission stating that in or about 2002 the LTTE soccer team put pictures of the applicant by himself as the team captain and with the team around Kilinochichi and it was well publicised in the media that he was the team captain of the LTTE soccer team. The submission also stated that from 2010 to 2012 the applicant played at various clubs in Negombo, Colombo and Trincomalee and he was not resident at one place on all days. The IAA noted that the applicant had not explained why he did not provide these claims earlier, they provided little support for his claimed association with the LTTE and were inconsistent with other evidence and there were no exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new claim (at [7]);
(d)determined that the country information referred to in the submission was new information and was provided in hyperlink form. This did not comply with the IAA’s Practice Direction and the IAA decided not to accept it. In any event, the information pre-dated the delegate’s decision and was general country information. Hence, it did not meet the requirements of s 473DD(b) (at [8]);
(e)noted that the excerpt from the Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Sri Lanka which was provided in full in the submission was new information. The report predated the delegate’s decision and did not contain personal information. Hence, it did not meet s 473DD(b) (at [9]);
(f)found that the applicant’s statutory declaration (which post-dated the delegate’s decision) contained new information about the applicant attending a commemorative ceremony twice per year. The IAA determined that this new claim could have been provided to the delegate, was not credible and that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify its consideration (at [10]);
(g)noted that certain materials that were before the delegate were not provided in the review material. The IAA accepted that the applicant had travelled to Malaysia and that he played soccer professionally in Sri Lanka (which is what the missing documents related to). Accordingly, the IAA did not consider it necessary to request the documents from the applicant (at [11]); and
(h)obtained the updated Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Report as this documented the changing conditions in Sri Lanka (at [12]).
The IAA then summarised the applicant’s claims (at [13]).
The IAA accepted that the applicant was from Sri Lanka and that he had played soccer professionally in Sri Lanka (at [14]).
The IAA noted the applicant’s submission about the issues he faced in the arrival interview (at [15]). The IAA highlighted that, during the arrival interview, the interviewer “probed” the applicant for information and reminded him of claims he had raised earlier. The IAA noted that it did not appear that the applicant was ever told to be brief and the interviewer asked him if he had anything further to add (at [16]).
The IAA also noted that the applicant had the assistance of a migration agent in preparing his application however the applicant stated that his statement of claims was not read out to him although he signed it (at [16]).
The IAA concluded:
…On the totality of the evidence before me I do not accept any significant internal inconsistencies in relation to his central claims to be attributable to the short duration of his arrival interview, a lack of representation, resources or interpretation issues. However, I am willing to accept that these issues may have resulted in less important details being left off or inaccurately recalled such as exact dates.
The IAA noted that that the applicant had claimed that he had been “vigorously” pursued by the Sri Lankan police between 2009 and 2012 because he had previously trained with the LTTE soccer team in 2002. He also claimed that the police had questioned his mother about his whereabouts since he had left and that his family had been threatened (at [17]).
The IAA then detailed the evidence that the applicant had provided about these claims at the arrival interview (where it was briefly mentioned) and in the interview with the delegate (where it was explored in greater detail) (at [18]-[19]).
The IAA noted internal inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence and inconsistency with country information (at [19]).
The IAA then stated:
20. As it has been consistently claimed and given the applicant was a professional soccer player I am willing to accept the applicant may have been forced to train with the LTTE soccer team in 2002 for up to two weeks. Given its late raising I do not accept he was the captain of the LTTE soccer team, that three members of the team disappeared because of their connection with the team or that banners with the applicant’s photo and LTTE were made. The applicant legally travelled to and from Malaysia when playing for a Sri Lankan soccer team in 2006 without having been detained or arrested by the authorities. The applicant’s evidence is that he was not pursued until some seven years after he trained with the LTTE in 2002, seemingly without any contact from the authorities in the intervening years. The country information before me indicates the Sri Lankan authorities had very broad powers of detention and arrest which they used when screening out former LTTE members after the war but the applicant has not said he was ever detained or arrested although I note this is because he claims he escaped or was in hiding. However, the applicant also claims he went to the police station either once or twice to complain about his harassment and the police did not detain and question him then. In fact, the police explicitly told the applicant at that time that they were not interested in him and denied having gone to his home to question him. Given its late raising and inconsistency with his statement in the arrival interview that he worked as a waiter immediately before he came to Australia, I do not accept he was in hiding from 2009 to 2012. There is nothing before me to indicate his older brother, who also lives in Trincomalee, has been harassed or questioned about the applicant by the police or any other groups operating in Sri Lanka since the applicant left Sri Lanka. The country information before me indicates a large number of young Tamil males were harassed and questioned on suspicion of LTTE involvement at the end of the war. Given it has been consistently claimed and the applicant genuinely appeared afraid to return to Sri Lanka in the SHEV interview I am willing to accept there may be a grain of truth in the applicant’s claim he was harassed after the end of the war on suspicion of LTTE involvement, like many other young Tamil males were at that time however I find he has increasingly exaggerated these claims stating he was continuously harassed and pursued but that he was always either not there or able to escape over a three year period. For the reasons detailed above, I do not accept he was harassed or pursued by the police or the authorities. I do not accept the applicant was wanted by the police or the authorities at the end of the war on suspicion of LTTE involvement or that they looked for him and harassed him from 2009 to 2012 or that he was wanted by them in connection with an adverse security profile when he left Sri Lanka in 2012. It follows that I do not accept they continuously harassed and questioned his mother about him in the five years after his departure from Sri Lanka in 2012 or that they threatened to kill his family.
The IAA noted that the applicant had advised that he did not know if his persecutors were the police. The country information indicated that pro-government paramilitary groups operated in the east of Sri Lanka during the relevant time and were reported to have engaged in criminal activities (such as extortion) and would “target anybody with money”. The IAA considered it more plausible (in light of the applicant’s profile as a professional soccer player) that the applicant was targeted and harassed by a paramilitary group acting criminally (at [21]).
The IAA continued:
21However, in the circumstances I consider it implausible that a paramilitary group would continue to vigorously pursue him from 2009 to 2012 without having ever detained, questioned, interrogated, extorted or severely mistreated him and I do not accept he was continuously harassed by a paramilitary group or other groups after 2009 until his departure from Sri Lanka in 2012. It follows that I do not accept a paramilitary group or other groups have continued to visit and harass his mother some 15 times about the applicant’s whereabouts in the five or so years after the applicant has left Sri Lanka. Nor do I accept they threatened to kill the applicant’s family and even if they did, given they have not acted on this in the years that have followed, I consider such threats were hollow.
The IAA noted that the letter from the applicant’s lawyer and a justice of the peace in Sri Lanka did not claim to have had firsthand experience in relation to the applicant’s claims regarding his links to the LTTE. As such, this evidence was given only limited weight by the IAA (at [22]).
The IAA then summarised the applicant’s claims regarding his fear of harm from Muslim and Hindu communities because of his inter-faith marriage, his fear of harm from his ex-partner’s first husband and family and his fear of harm from the authorities who were pursuing his ex-partner’s first husband. The IAA found these claims to be “vague and generalised” (at [23]).

The IAA accepted that the applicant was engaged to his ex-partner from February 2011 until October 2013 and that the applicant, his ex-partner and his mother may have experienced some societal discrimination because of the applicant’s inter-faith relationship. However, in light of the time that had passed, the IAA found it implausible that the applicant, his ex-partner and his mother would continue to experience societal discrimination in Sri Lanka on this basis (at [24]).
The IAA also noted that the applicant had provided little detail about his claim to fear harm from his ex-partner’s first husband and family. The IAA found it implausible that these people would want to harm the applicant after he had ended contact with his ex-partner and her children in 2013. The IAA did not accept that the applicant’s ex-partner’s first husband or family wanted to harm the applicant (at [25]).
The IAA further considered it implausible that the applicant would be implicated with his ex-partner’s first husband’s activities on the basis of what was a brief relationship with the ex-partner and noted that the applicant did not know what those activities were. The IAA determined that there was a lack of evidence linking his ex-partner’s daughter’s abduction attempt with the applicant. On the basis of the evidence before it, the IAA rejected that claim (at [26]).
The IAA also determined that the applicant’s claims that his family had been visited following the data breach to be “highly vague and generalised”. The IAA did not accept that the applicant was of interest to the police or the Sri Lankan authorities in connection with an adverse security profile when he left Sri Lanka in 2012. Accordingly, it did not accept that the Sri Lankan authorities went to the applicant’s home looking for him and questioned and threatened his mother as a consequence of the data breach in 2014 (at [27]).
The IAA did, however, accept that the applicant had departed Sri Lanka illegally and would be identified as a person who had claimed asylum in Australia (at [28]).
The IAA then summarised its findings as follows:
31. I accept the applicant played professional soccer while in Sri Lanka and that he may have been forced to train with the LTTE soccer team in 2002 but never played with them. I also accept the applicant may have been harassed by a paramilitary group after the end of the war. However I do not accept the authorities questioned, harassed or mistreated the applicant on suspicion of LTTE involvement from 2009 to 2012, that he was wanted by the authorities in connection with an adverse security profile when he left Sri Lanka in 2012 or that the authorities or a paramilitary group have harassed and questioned his mother up until 2017 about the applicant’s whereabouts.
The IAA referred to the country information which indicated that the situation in Sri Lanka changed after the applicant departed in 2012 (at [32]-[36]).
In relation to the applicant’s claims to fear harm on account of his Muslim faith, the IAA noted that violence remains sporadic in Sri Lanka and determined that Sri Lankan Muslims face a low risk of official and societal discrimination and a low risk of violence (at [36]).
In relation to the applicant’s claim to fear harm on the basis of his inter-faith relationship, the IAA noted that the relationship in question had ended five years prior to the IAA’s decision. The IAA explained that the applicant had stated that he had not been in contact with his ex-partner since the relationship ended (which at the time of the IAA’s decision was five years prior). Further, the applicant had departed Sri Lanka some six years previously (at [36]). The IAA noted that in these circumstances (and noting the lack of detail in the claim generally) it was implausible that the applicant’s ex-partner’s first husband and family would want to harm the applicant (at [37]).
Referring to country information regarding the improved situation in Sri Lanka and the profiles of the persons who attract adverse attention, the IAA determined that the applicant’s profile (including his tenuous links to the LTTE some 16 years ago), the lack of interest in him since this time and his lack of a political profile were such that the applicant did not face a real chance of harm for reason of his origin, ethnicity, faith, or past experiences in Sri Lanka (at [38]).
The IAA did accept that the applicant was one of about 10,000 people affected by the 2014 data breach. However, the IAA did not accept that the applicant was wanted by the authorities in connection with an adverse security profile. The IAA noted that it had not accepted that the authorities went to the applicant’s home and questioned and harassed his mother while looking for the applicant after the data breach. Accordingly, and in light of the applicant’s lack of profile and the country information, the IAA did not accept that there was a real chance the applicant would face harm because of the data breach (at [39]).
The IAA further accepted that the applicant might be identified as a returning asylum seeker and noted that the country information suggested that some “issues” arise (such as debt, employment, social stigma and contact by the Criminal Investigation Department) (at [40]).
The IAA then determined:
41. The applicant has family still living in the east of Sri Lanka and has not said he would not go back to living at the family home if he returned to Sri Lanka. The country information before me indicates that those returning to the north may be contacted by the authorities but there is nothing to indicate that this also occurs in the east. I accept the applicant may face initial difficulties finding employment and accommodation (if he does not live at the family home) as well as difficulties paying for or repaying the costs associated with his journey and may suffer the social stigma of being a returning asylum seeker. However, I do not accept this would amount to serious harm.
The IAA also accepted that the applicant had departed Sri Lanka illegally and noted the country information on this issue (at [42]). It was noted that the applicant had committed an offence under the Immigrants and Emigrants Act 1949 and that he might be detained until he could be brought before a court. The IAA also accepted that the applicant would likely be fined if he pleaded guilty and that if he did so he would need a family member to act as guarantor for his bail (at [43]). The IAA also noted that that there was no evidence that the applicant had a criminal background or was involved in people smuggling (at [44]).
The IAA then found as follows:
45. The applicant fears being detained at the airport and handed over to the police. I accept the applicant is likely to be detained at the airport for processing and may be held at the CID’s office at the airport for up to 24 hours, or in a holding cell at the airport for up to two days if a Magistrate is not available, as part of the usual procedures for those returning on a temporary travel document and who had left Sri Lanka illegally. As the applicant is not of interest to the authorities in connection with an adverse security profile he would not be otherwise detained. If the applicant pleads guilty he will be fined and free to leave immediately. Given his family support in Sri Lanka and option to pay a fine in instalments I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that he would not be able to pay a fine, if imposed. If he does not plead guilty he will be immediately granted bail on certain conditions, he may be granted bail on personal surety or guarantee by a family member. There is nothing to suggest his mother or older brother still living in the east of Sri Lanka would be unable or unwilling to act as guarantor, if required.
46. I accept there is a real chance the applicant may suffer harm on his return as a consequence of his illegal departure (interviewed, charged, briefly held, fined, and have to attend court appearances and meet costs associated with this) but I do not accept these experiences would amount to ‘serious harm’. Furthermore, I am not satisfied that these procedures and the penalties that the applicant may face are the consequence of any systematic and discriminatory conduct.
47. I am not satisfied the applicant faces a real chance of persecution for reason of his illegal departure.
The IAA was not satisfied that the applicant met s 36(2)(a) of the Act.
In relation to the complementary protection criterion, the IAA stated:
51. For the reasons already discussed, I accept the applicant may be interviewed, charged, briefly held, fined, and have to attend court appearances and meet costs associated with this. However, I am not satisfied that any of these circumstances would result in the applicant suffering ‘significant harm’ as defined for the purposes of s.36(2A). Based on the country information available and given the applicant is not of interest to the authorities in connection with an adverse security profile, there is not a real risk the applicant would be arbitrarily deprived of his life or subject to the death penalty on his return or be subject to torture. Furthermore, the evidence before me does not support a conclusion that there is an intention by the Sri Lankan authorities to inflict severe pain or suffering, pain or suffering that is cruel or inhuman in nature or to cause extreme humiliation. I am not satisfied the applicant faces a real risk of significant harm as a consequence of his illegal departure.
52. As discussed above I concluded the applicant may face initial difficulties finding employment and accommodation (if he does not live at the family home) as well as difficulties paying for or repaying the costs of his journey and may suffer some social stigma. However, I am not satisfied that any of these circumstances would result in the applicant suffering ‘significant harm’ as defined. I am not satisfied the applicant faces a real risk of significant harm as a consequence of his being a returning asylum seeker.
53. In considering the applicant’s refugee status, I concluded that there was no ‘real chance’ the applicant would suffer harm on his return to Sri Lanka for the other reasons claimed. ‘Real chance’ and ‘real risk’ involve the same standard. For the same reasons, I am also not satisfied the applicant would face a ‘real risk’ of significant harm.
The IAA was not satisfied that the applicant met s 36(2)(aa) of the Act (at [54]).
On the basis of the above, the IAA affirmed the decision not to grant the applicant the visa.
PROCEEDINGS IN THIS COURT
In his application for judicial review dated 11 September 2018, the applicant provides two grounds of review, as follows (without alteration):
1. The Second Respondent erred in law by making a decision not taking into relevant information.
2. The Second Respondent erred by making a decision not fully understanding the applicant’s claim.
The applicant was given an opportunity to file an amended application, any affidavit evidence and an outline of written submissions. No further materials were filed.
The materials before the Court thus include the application for judicial review dated 11 September 2018, a Court Book numbering 214 pages (marked as Exhibit 1) and an outline of submissions filed by the Minister on 25 March 2021.
Preliminary matters
The hearing of this matter proceeded by Microsoft Teams. The applicant appeared from Brisbane (as he was unable to return to Perth due to a recent COVID-related lockdown in that city). The applicant appeared before the Court without legal representation. He was assisted by a Tamil interpreter. The interpreter and Mr Johnson, of counsel acting for the Minister, also appeared via Microsoft Teams. The applicant confirmed that he could both see and hear the Court and those attending via video link.
The applicant confirmed that he had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister’s written submissions. He also confirmed that he had a digital copy of the Court Book available to him at the time of the hearing.
The Court is satisfied that the parties were able to effectively participate in the hearing of this matter.
At the commencement of the hearing, the applicant indicated that “[his] lawyer” had advised him “last week” that they “could not appear for [him] at the hearing”. He explained that he had not been able to find another lawyer which is why he “decided that [he] would represent [himself]”.
To the extent that the applicant’s statement could be seen as a request for an adjournment, the Court advised the applicant that the matter would proceed as listed. The Court’s reasons for doing so were as follows.
First, there is no court record of a lawyer ever formally acting for the applicant. It is noted that there is an “other representative” identified on the Court file. This individual appears to have lodged the forms for the applicant but did not act “on his behalf” or in any capacity thereafter. Indeed, all documents filed by the applicant indicate that they were filed by him. The consent orders that were provided to the Court on 23 April 2020 by the parties (and formally entered on 30 April 2020) were signed by the applicant himself. The address for service is the applicant’s own email address.
Second, this matter has been on foot for over two years. In circumstances where no lawyer has formally appeared on the record at any time and it remains unclear if a lawyer can act for the applicant at any time in the near future, the Court did not consider it appropriate to delay the matter further.
Third, the applicant did not indicate that he was unable to act for himself. He confirmed that he had received all of the materials. There is no right to legal representation in migration proceedings: ADF15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCA 1099 at [25].
Finally, as the Court explained to the applicant at the hearing, although Mr Johnson appeared for the Minister he also appeared as “a model litigant”. Further, the Court’s role in relation to self-represented litigants is such that it will remain astute to jurisdictional error – even if not raised by the applicant himself.
Accordingly, the Court proceeded to hear the matter and thanks the applicant for the clarity of his oral submissions.
Noting the remarks of the Federal Court in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [8] that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented party to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review), the Court provided the applicant an opportunity to outline orally what he thought the IAA “did wrong”.
To assist the applicant, the Court explained to him what this Court can and cannot do. The Court explained that its task is limited to assessing whether the IAA fell into jurisdictional error. The Court explained that the possible categories of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and sometimes overlap. For migration decisions of this sort, they most commonly include, but are not limited to:
(a)where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question: Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 (“Craig”) at 198;
(b)where the decision-maker ignores relevant material: Craig at 198;
(c)where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material: Craig at 198;
(d)where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures: SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24 at [207]-[208];
(e)where the decision-maker fails to consider the entirety of an applicant’s claims (or integers of the claims) made: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZKRT [2013] FCA 317 at [111];
(f)where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias: SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2] (“SZRUI”); and
(g)where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 at [131]; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18 at [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1 at [44].
The Court also explained that this Court cannot review the merits of the IAA’s decision or grant him the visa he now seeks. Rather, the role of the Court is restricted to determining if the IAA made a material error in arriving at the decision it arrived at: Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272.
Against this background, the applicant told the Court that “at his first interview” (which the Court believes to be the interview with the delegate), the delegate told the applicant that he “would not be given the visa” and that he “was not credible”. This, the applicant now claims, demonstrates that the Department was “already biased”.
The applicant also explained that his ex-partner (who had arrived in Australia with him) had been granted a visa but he had not been given a visa. He explained that he had been accused of taking his ex-partner’s children and that the IAA had told him that it “could not consider this information”.
The applicant also stressed that the main reason he fears returning to Sri Lanka is because of his religion. He explained that “the problem continues in Sri Lanka” and he “is not able to practise his religious beliefs”.
The Court will address these submissions below.
CONSIDERATION
Ground 1
Ground 1 states:
The Second Respondent erred in law by making a decision not taking into relevant information.
The applicant has not identified what information “was not taken into account”. The Court asked the applicant to clarify. He referred to his claim to fear harm on the basis of his religion.
Contrary to what the applicant now asserts, the IAA did take into account his claim to fear harm because of his religion. Relevantly, the IAA:
(a)accepted that the applicant was a Muslim (at [14]) and concluded that the applicant did not face a risk or chance of harm from violence or discrimination as a Muslim (at [36]); and
(b)noted the applicant’s claim to face harm because of his inter-faith marriage (at [23]) and found the applicant’s evidence in this regard to be “vague and generalised”. The IAA also noted that the applicant had now ended his relationship with his partner and it had been six years since his departure (at [36]).
In the Court’s duty to the applicant as a self-represented litigant, it has attempted to identify the argument that the applicant has sought to advance – notwithstanding that it is poorly expressed or particularised: Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v MZZMX [2020] FCAFC 175 at [14].
The Court has identified two possible arguments:
(a)the IAA erred in failing to have regard to relevant information as some information was not referred to the IAA by the delegate (“Ground 1A”); and
(b)the IAA erred in finding that it could not have regard to the “new information” that the applicant had provided in the February 2018 submissions (“Ground 1B”).
Ground 1A
Relevant to the possible concerns raised here is s 473CB(1) of the Act which provides:
(1) The Secretary must give to the Immigration Assessment Authority the following material (review material) in respect of each fast track reviewable decision referred to the Authority under section 473CA:
…
(b) material provided by the referred applicant to the person making the decision before the decision was made;
(c) any other material that is in the Secretary’s possession or control and is considered by the Secretary (at the time the decision is referred to the Authority) to be relevant to the review;
Here, it is apparent that the Secretary did not provide the IAA with the following documents (CB 182):
(a)a 64 page photocopy of the applicant’s passport which showed that the applicant had legally travelled to and from Malaysia in 2006 (the “passport”); and
(b)a letter from the applicant’s school (the “letter”), his examination results (the “exam results”) and an internet report showing the applicant played soccer in Colombo in 2004 (the “internet report”).

All of these documents were materials provided by the applicant to the delegate before the decision was made. Hence, they were material that should have been provided to the IAA pursuant to s 473CB(1)(b) of the Act. A failure to provide that material constitutes a breach of s 473CB(1): EVS17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 20 (“EVS17”).
The Court notes that after the IAA requested the information from the Secretary, the IAA received the following response as to why the materials were not provided and why they were no longer available:
1. I confirm that 64 pages, in the most part being copies of blank pages from a passport/s, were tabled at interview and that these pages were retained in the applicant’s temporary hard-copy folder. The papers were not saved to TRIM, as they were not deemed to be integral to the decision making of the case. The papers were disposed of via secure-waste-disposal 10 months after date of interview. I can confirm having sighted the short-stay temporary visa issued by Malaysia, enabling the applicant’s lawful travel to and from Malaysia in 2006. It is likely that the applicant would still retain this document and would be able to provide it to the IAA if requested to do so.
…
3. A letter from the school (dated 4 August 2017) previously attended by the applicant, school exam results and a news printout of the applicant playing soccer for a team in Colombo in 2004 were tabled at interview. These copies were retained in the applicant’s temporary hard-copy folder. The papers were not saved to TRIM, as they were not deemed to be integral to the decision making of the case. The papers were disposed of via secure-waste-disposal 10 months after date of interview. It is likely that the applicant would still retain these papers and would be able to provide it to the IAA if requested to do so.
With respect, these explanations misconstrue the application of s 473CB of the Act. The information here did not fall into s 473CB(1)(c). It fell squarely into s 473CB(1)(b). Accordingly, it did not matter how relevant or irrelevant the delegate or Secretary thought these documents were. The Secretary must provide the materials to the IAA. There is no discretion or any relevance test in relation to s 473CB(1)(b).
Accordingly, there has been a breach of s 473CB(1) of the Act. Insofar as this relates to ground 1 as pleaded by the applicant, in the absence of the review materials being provided to the IAA the IAA could not “consider” them.
However, not every breach of s 473CB(1) will amount to jurisdictional error – just as not every failure to consider information will necessarily amount to jurisdictional error. A breach or a failure to have regard to information will only amount to jurisdictional error if the breach or the failure deprived the applicant of the possibility of a successful outcome: CQR17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 61 at [43]. The Court bears in mind the comments in EVS17 that in the context of a pt 7AA review, a lower threshold of materiality for a breach of s 473CB(1) is to be imposed.
Turning first to the passport, the passport was relevant to the review insofar as it corroborated the applicant’s claim that he had travelled to Malaysia in 2006 to play soccer. The IAA accepted that the applicant had travelled to Malaysia in 2006 for this reason (i.e., to play soccer). Accordingly, the failure of the Secretary to refer the applicant’s full passport to the IAA could not have deprived the applicant of the possibility of a successful outcome as the IAA accepted what the passport would have corroborated. Nor did the IAA fail to consider the “relevant information” that the passport contained.
No jurisdictional error arises from the failure to provide the passport in full.
In relation to the letter, as the IAA notes (at [5] and [11]), the applicant provided the letter to the IAA in the February 2018 submissions. The IAA correctly identified that this was not “new information”. The IAA accepted that the applicant had played soccer professionally in Sri Lanka which, relevantly, is what the letter related to. Accordingly, no practical injustice was suffered by the failure to refer the letter to the IAA as the applicant provided it to the IAA in any event. Further, the IAA accepted the claim that the letter pertained to. Accordingly, any error could not have realistically deprived the applicant of a successful outcome.
Turning to the “exam results”, it is unclear what these results were relevant to. The applicant’s schooling and his progress at school does not, in any way, appear to have a connection to the applicant’s claims. The onus is on the applicant to satisfy the Court that the failure to refer the exam results to the IAA was material to the issues in the review. The applicant has advanced no case that it was. The Court is also unable to identify any relevance.
On the evidence, the failure to refer the exam results to the IAA could not, in the Court’s view, have realistically deprived the applicant of a successful outcome. No jurisdictional error arises in this regard.
Finally, in relation to the internet report, the report is described as a “news printout of the applicant playing soccer for a team in Colombo in 2004”.
The IAA summarised the applicant’s claim as follows (at [18]):
He was a professional soccer player in Sri Lanka for the National Sri Lankan soccer team as well as for other professional sports clubs playing in South Korea in 1998 and Malaysia in 2006 and appeared on the news and TV in connection with his soccer and was quite well known because of this…
Clearly, the IAA accepted that the applicant had appeared in the media in connection with his soccer career. That is all that the new printout is said to have indicated. In the absence of any evidence before the Court that suggests that the internet report depicted/said anything more than that, it cannot be said that the Secretary’s failure to refer the internet report to the IAA was material. In circumstances where the breach was not material, the failure to refer the news report does not amount to jurisdictional error.
Ground 1A is not established.
Ground 1B
By ground 1B, the applicant is arguably claiming that the IAA did not have regard to the “new information” he provided and that it erred in not doing so.
The “new information” which the IAA indicated it would not have regard to comprised of:
(a)two media articles about soccer finals which list the applicant as a player for professional soccer clubs and a photo of the applicant with a soccer team wearing shirts stating “FA Cup” (the “articles and photo”);
(b)a new claim that on or around 2002 the LTTE soccer team put pictures of the applicant by himself as the team captain and with the team around Kilinochichi. The applicant says it was well publicised in the media that he was the team captain of the LTTE soccer team and his involvement with the team is still recorded by the government (the “new claim”);
(c)various country information links (the “hyperlinks”);
(d)the Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Sri Lanka (the “UN Report”); and
(e)a further new claim supported by a statutory declaration stating that the applicant attended the “Maaveerar NAAL ceremony commemorating Tamils who lost their life in the civil war” (the “statutory declaration”).
Adopting the same approach as above, the Court will consider the IAA’s assessment of each new piece of information against s 473DD of the Act. Before doing so, however, it is helpful to outline what is required of s 473DD of the Act.
The requirements of s 473DD of the Act are cumulative: Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] HCA 16 at [31]. That is, an applicant must satisfy both s 473DD(a) and s 473DD(b) before the IAA will consider any new information. If the IAA is not satisfied that one of these subsections is met (i.e., s 473DD(b) is not met but s 473DD(a) is met), then the IAA cannot have regard to the information. However, the individual sub-criterion of s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) are not cumulative. Hence, an applicant need only satisfy one of the sub-criterion in s 473DD(b) in order to meet s 473DD(b).
In AUS17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2020] HCA 37 (“AUS17”), the majority of the High Court indicated that the correct approach to determining if s 473DD has been met is as follows:
10. Section 473DD would be at war with itself, and the purpose of s 473DD(b)(ii) would be thwarted, if the circumstance that there was new information from a referred applicant meeting the description in either s 473DD(b)(i) or s 473DD(b)(ii) were able to be ignored by the Authority in assessing the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying consideration of that new information in order to meet the criterion specified in s 473DD(a).
11. Logic and policy therefore demand that the Authority assess such new information as it might obtain from the referred applicant first against the criteria specified in both s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) and only then against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). If neither of the criteria specified in s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) is met, the Authority is prohibited from taking the new information into account in making its decision on the review. Further assessment of the new information against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a) is redundant. If either the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) or the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) is met, that is a circumstance which must be factored into the subsequent assessment of whether the new information meets the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). If both the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) and the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) are met, that too is a circumstance which must be factored into the subsequent assessment of whether the new information meets the criterion specified in s 473DD(a) and which must heighten the prospect of that criterion being met.
12. The result, as has been recognised by the Federal Court in numerous other cases, is that the Authority does not perform the procedural duty imposed on it by s 473DD in its conduct of a review if it determines in the purported application of the criterion in s 473DD(a) that exceptional circumstances justifying consideration of new information obtained from the referred applicant do not exist without first assessing that information against the criteria specified in both s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) and then taking the outcome of that assessment into account in its assessment against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). The nature of the non‑performance of the procedural duty in such a case is not inaccurately characterised as a failure to take account of a mandatory relevant consideration in the purported application of the criterion in s 473DD(a).
Accordingly, the IAA should consider s 473DD(b) before considering s 473DD(a). Further, the criterion in s 473DD(b) are mandatory relevant considerations when considering s 473DD(a).
Against this legislative background (and noting that the principles as to the application and interpretation of the sub-provisions s 473DD are themselves the subject of judicial consideration), the Court will address each new piece of information deemed relevant here.
In relation to the articles and photo, the IAA stated:
6. Both media articles were published before the delegate’s decision and the photo would have been taken before the applicant came to Australia and he has not explained why the information was not provided earlier and or satisfied me that the information could not have been provided earlier. I have accepted the applicant played soccer professionally while in Sri Lanka. I do not consider the new information corroborative of the applicant’s central claims regarding his links with the LTTE soccer team. I am not satisfied there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the information.
Here, while not expressly referencing the provision, the opening sentence in the above paragraph demonstrates that the IAA was not satisfied that s 473DD(b)(i) was met. On their face, the articles and photo pre-dated the delegate’s decision and did not contain an explanation as to why they could not have been provided to the delegate. It was open to the IAA to find that it was not satisfied in relation to s 473DD(b)(i).
The two sentences that follow demonstrate that the IAA was not satisfied that s 473DD(b)(ii) was met. The IAA states that it did not consider the articles and photo to be “corroborative” of the applicant’s central claims. Accordingly, it was not information which “had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims” before the delegate.
The IAA also states that it is not satisfied that there are “exceptional circumstances”. It does not elaborate why that is the case. However, it was unnecessary to do so given that the IAA had determined that s 473DD(b) had not been satisfied.
In relation to the new claim, the IAA states:
7. The submission also states that in or about 2002 the LTTE soccer team put pictures of the applicant by himself as the team captain and with the team, around Kilinochichi and it was well publicised in the media that he was the team captain of the LTTE soccer team and he maintains there is still a record about his LTTE soccer team with the Sri Lankan government. It also states that from 2010 to 2012 the applicant played at various clubs in Negombo, Colombo and Trincomalee and he was not resident at one place on all days. This is new information. The applicant has also not explained why this information was not and could not have been provided earlier. The applicant has not provided any further information in support of his new claims and I consider they add very little in support of the applicant’s claimed association with the LTTE. The authorities’ suspicions the applicant had LTTE links was squarely at issue in the SHEV interview, with the delegate clearly stating he did not consider the applicant had a sufficient profile to be of interest to the authorities because he trained with the LTTE for two weeks in 2002. I also consider the claim the government had records about his LTTE soccer team somewhat inconsistent with his statement in the SHEV interview that the police told him they had insufficient evidence against him. The claim he played soccer around the country from 2010 to 2012 is also somewhat inconsistent with his statement in the SHEV interview that he was in hiding from 2009 to 2012 and did not work during this time and hid at a friend’s restaurant at one point. The applicant had the assistance of a migration agent in preparing his SHEV application. I consider he has had adequate opportunity to put forward his claims and was clearly advised during the SHEV interview that if he did not put forward his complete claims and supporting information in that interview and his application were denied that he may not get another opportunity to do so. I am not satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist to justify consideration of the new information.
Here, the IAA again notes that the applicant has not explained why the new claim was not, and could not have been, provided earlier. The IAA makes reference to the various opportunities that the applicant had to make the claim. Clearly, the IAA determined that s 473DD(b)(i) had not been met.
In relation to s 473DD(b)(ii), the following statements should be noted:
(a)the applicant had not provided any further information in support of the new claim and the IAA considered that it added very little in support of the applicant’s claimed association with the LTTE;
(b)the applicant had the opportunity to provide the new claim and was on notice that he should do so;
(c)the new claim was inconsistent with the evidence the applicant had given to the delegate; and
(d)the new claim was also inconsistent with the applicant’s claim to have been in hiding between 2009 and 2012.
These four statements satisfy the Court that the IAA properly applied s 473DD(b)(ii) and found that the new claim was “evidently not credible” in light of the other information in the review material and was not information which, had it been known, “may have affected the [delegate’s] consideration of the referred applicant’s claims”.
The IAA was entitled to consider the other review material in assessing s 473DD: Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs v BTW17 [2020] FCAFC 159 (“BTW17”).
The new claim “added little” to the applicant’s claimed association and the fact that it was not consistent with other information in the review material meant that it was, at the deliberative stage, not capable of being believed. Nor did it add anything to the applicant’s claims of having an association with the LTTE and, implicitly, it could not have affected the delegate’s decision had it been known.
It is clear from the above that the IAA found that the information did not satisfy the requirements of s 473DD(b)(ii).
Further, the IAA’s consideration of whether there were exceptional circumstances in this case is sound. The IAA notes that the applicant had had numerous opportunities to raise these claims and was advised that he would not get another opportunity to do so. Bearing in mind s 5AAA of the Act, in addition to the IAA’s statements in relation to s 473DD(b), it cannot be said that the IAA misunderstood what was required for there to be “exceptional circumstances”.
No error arises in relation to the new claim.
In relation to the hyperlinks, the IAA states:
8. The submission makes reference to a large number of country information reports and news articles that are new information. With one exception (dealt with below) copies or excerpts were not provided, only hyperlinks. The articles and reports have been provided in support of, broadly, submissions regarding the systemic use of torture in Sri Lanka, the government’s lack of accountability in relation to wartime abuses, the government’s lack of action in relation to promises it made to tackle issues such as the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and land rights when it came into power in 2015, the security forces near total impunity for old and new torture cases, the need for international intervention and that in these circumstances it is unsafe for returning asylum seekers with any association with the LTTE. The IAA Practice Direction relevantly states that in relation to new country information reports and news articles, copies or extracts must be provided, and hyperlinks are not acceptable. The submission was prepared and lodged by the applicant’s representative, a Registered Migration Agent who would be aware of the requirements of the IAA Practice Direction. I have decided not to accept this information. I note as an aside that even if I were to accept it, on the information provided, the information appears to predate the delegate’s decision and is not what may be considered ‘personal information’ in this context and as such s.473DD(b) is not met.
The IAA disposes of the hyperlinks on two bases.
The IAA first determines that the hyperlinks were not provided in accordance with the Practice Direction.
The Practice Direction states:
26. If you provide or refer to new information such as country information reports or media articles, you must provide a copy of that information or extract part(s) of the information on which you rely. You must identify the source of the information. Lists of publicly available documents or hyperlinks to publicly available documents are not acceptable.
Further, s 473FB(5) of the Act states:
The Immigration Assessment Authority is not required to accept new information or documents from a person, or to hear or continue to hear a person at an interview, if the person fails to comply with a relevant direction that applies to the person.

The IAA has a discretion about whether to accept new information if it is not provided in accordance with the Practice Direction. Here, the IAA notes that, in circumstances where the information was provided by a Registered Migration Agent who would be aware of the Practice Direction, it will not accept the information. While the applicant himself may not have understood what was required, his agent did understand what was required (or should have). While arguably harsh (at least from the perspective of the applicant), it was within the IAA’s area of decisional freedom not to accept the information on this basis. While this Court might have acted differently, that is not the relevant test on review.
In any event, the IAA also determined that the information did not meet s 473DD(b).
All but one of the “hyperlinks” that the applicant provided are dated 2017 or earlier. Hence, they all predate the delegate’s decision. No explanation was given for why the hyperlinks could not have been provided to the delegate. There is nothing apparent on the face of the hyperlinks (nor any apparent circumstances) that explain why the hyperlinks could not have been provided. In the absence of an explanation, s 473DD(b)(i) was not met.
One hyperlink was not dated (being number 13 in the reference sheet). It is unclear whether this pre-dates the delegate’s decision. Again, the fact that the applicant did not explain why the information could not have been provided to the delegate meant that it was open to the IAA to find that the hyperlink did not meet s 473DD(b)(i) of the Act.
The IAA also determined that the information was not “personal information”. This assessment is correct. The hyperlinks can be classified as generic country information. They are not specifically, and personally, about the applicant. Hence, they do not meet s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act.
Even if the IAA was wrong not to accept the information pursuant to s 473FB(5), the IAA’s alternative finding that the information did not meet s 473DD(b) was sufficient for it to not assess the hyperlinks.
In relation to the UN Report, the IAA states:
9. The submission also contains an excerpt from the Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Sri Lanka broadly stating that the authorities continue to use torture and that the initiatives introduced by the government to combat this are not effective. This is new information. The report was published before the delegate’s decision, the applicant has not explained why the excerpt was not and could not have been provided earlier and I am not satisfied it could not have been provided before the delegate’s decision was made. The submission also states that the outcome of investigations by the Office of Missing Persons was questionable, and recent reports have indicated that sexual and gender-based violence and white van abductions continue to occur and that those opposed to the dominant views of the government were abducted and silenced which is also new information but no source was provided for this statement. In addition the applicant has not explained why the new information was not provided earlier or satisfied me that it could not have been provided earlier. The new information does not contain personal information. The applicant has not satisfied me as to the requirements of s.473DD(b).
The UN Report is dated in 2015. Hence, it was information that could have been provided to the delegate. No explanation was provided as to why it was not provided. Hence, s 473DD(b)(i) was not satisfied.
Again, the IAA also notes that the UN Report is not “personal information”. It was general information. Accordingly, the UN Report did not meet s 473DD(b) of the Act.
The above conclusions are sufficient for a determination that s 473DD was not satisfied and for the information to be excluded from consideration.
The IAA also notes that a statement is made in the submission without any “source cited”. The IAA is referring to the following “statement” in the submissions (CB 171):
•The Conversation reports on March 10,2017Not ‘all is forgiven’ for asylum seekers returned to Sri Lanka.
In his recent visit to Australia, the prime minister of Sri Lanka, Ranil Wickremesinghe, urged Sri Lankan asylum seekers to “come back, all is forgiven”. When asked whether it was safe for asylum seekers to return to Sri Lanka, Wickremesinghe responded:
We just started a missing persons office. It is quite safe for them to come back.
This office was established last year to investigate the disappearance of people – mainly Tamils – during the decades of fighting between the Sri Lankan government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that ended in 2009.The outcomes of the Office of Missing Persons are questionable. There have been 20,000 cases of missing persons recorded, while not a single person listed as missing emerging evidence challenges reconciliation efforts with the Tamil minority community and strongly argues against returning asylum seekers to Sri Lanka – in striking contrast to the views of the Australian government.as been traced since the new government took office. In December 2016, an official UN report on Sri Lanka showed evidence of male and female torture. The report highlights evidence of sexual and gender-based violence and extensive surveillance for anyone deemed to have had any links to the LTTE. It also identified the continued presence of “white van abductions”. This was a method by which gangs linked to the Sri Lankan government military abducted and silenced people suspected of opposing the dominant views of government. The majority of white van abductions occur in Tamil-occupied areas of the north and east of Sri Lanka.
The IAA states that no source is cited. Arguably, the source is “The Conversation” article. The context and structure certainly indicates that this is the case.
Nevertheless, even if the IAA is wrong when it states that there was no “source” for the information, this does not amount to jurisdictional error.
What is important is that the IAA found that the applicant had not explained why the new information was not provided earlier. The IAA could not (as it positively found) be satisfied that s 473DD(b)(i) of the Act was met as it could not be satisfied that the information could not have been provided earlier. The IAA also found that the new information did not contain “personal information”. The information was, again, general country information. Hence, it did not fall within s 473DD(b)(ii).
No error arises in relation to the UN Report.
In relation to the statutory declaration, the IAA states:
10. The submission states that the applicant attended the “Maaveerar NAAL ceremony commemorating Tamils who lost their life in the civil war” which evidences his contact with the local Tamil diaspora in Australia. Attached to the submission was a statutory declaration declared by the applicant on 8 February 2018 (a few weeks after the delegate’s decision was made) in which he states a large number of people in his social group died in the civil war and to commemorate this he attended ceremonies in Perth on 18th of May each year and the 27th of November called the “Maaveerar NAAL” which remembers “those who made the ultimate sacrifice in this struggle”. This claim and the statutory declaration comprise new information. The submission states the applicant was afraid to mention his involvement in this ceremony in the SHEV interview because he thought the information might be shared with the Sri Lankan government. I do not accept this explanation. In the SHEV interview the delegate clearly stated at the outset that none of the applicant’s claims would be shared with the Sri Lankan government and it was stressed that he needed to mention all his claims and supporting information in that interview as he may not get another opportunity to do so if his application were denied. Further, the applicant was put on notice in that interview that the delegate did not consider he had a profile of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities based on his claimed association with the LTTE and interactions with the authorities after the end of the war. The applicant has not previously claimed to have had a political profile or made any mention of friends who were killed during the conflict. The applicant has provided very little detail about this new claim, has not said which years he attended, how many times he attended or provided any other supporting information in relation to this claim. In light of the above, I am not satisfied this new claim is credible. The applicant had the assistance of a Migration Agent when preparing his SHEV application and I consider he has had adequate opportunity to provide his claims and supporting information. I am not satisfied there are exceptional circumstances to justify consideration of the information.
In effect, the statutory declaration contained a further new claim.
While the applicant on this occasion explained why the information in the statutory declaration was not provided earlier, the IAA rejected that explanation. The IAA’s reasons for doing so were based on logical and probative grounds (i.e., the applicant was given reassurance about confidentiality and warned of the consequences of failing to disclose the information).
Section 473DD(b)(i) of the Act requires that the IAA be satisfied that the statutory declaration (and the information within) could not have been provided to the delegate. The IAA rejected the applicant’s reason as to why the statutory declaration could not have been provided to the delegate. Accordingly, the rejection of the explanation has the consequence that the IAA was satisfied that the information could have been provided to the delegate. Therefore, the information did not meet s 473DD(b)(i).
The IAA makes an explicit finding that it did not consider the claim to be credible.
In this regard, the IAA notes that:
(a)the applicant had not previously raised the claim (despite being on notice that his association with the LTTE was not accepted by the delegate);
(b)the applicant had never mentioned anything of this sort (i.e., that he had a political profile or friends who were killed during the conflict with the LTTE); and
(c)the detail the applicant had provided in the statutory declaration (where he had now raised the claim) was limited.
In CSR16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCA 474 (“CSR16”), Justice Bromberg explained what was meant by the term “credible” in the context of s 473DD(b)(ii). His Honour stated:
41. In my view all that the “credible” element of the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria requires is the Authority’s satisfaction that the “new information” is information which is open to be or capable of being accepted by the Authority as truthful (or accurate, or genuine). It is only at the deliberative stage of its review that the Authority will be required to determine whether or not the “new information” is true. The s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria is concerned with an earlier or anterior stage of the review directed at whether “new information” should be received by the Authority so that it may be considered at the deliberative stage.
42. The criteria is a filtering mechanism designed to separate information worthy of consideration at the deliberative stage from that which is not. In that context, the word “credible” is used in relation to information, not in the sense that the information is believed, but in the sense that the information is capable of being believed. It is only information that the Authority is satisfied is “evidently not credible” (VEAL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88 at [17] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ) that fails to meet the credibility requirement imposed by the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria.
43. The Authority determined that the “new information” that the appellants sought to have it consider did not meet the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria by imposing a higher standard of satisfaction than the criteria requires. The Authority required satisfaction that the “new information” was true when all that the s 473DD(b)(ii) criteria requires is the Authority’s satisfaction that the new information is capable of being believed at the deliberative stage of the Authority’s review. In so doing the Authority misconstrued s 473DD(b)(ii) and misconceived what the exercise of its statutory power entailed. The Authority thereby fell into jurisdictional error: Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; Te Puia v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33 at [68] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle, and Gordon JJ); Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391 at [82] (Gaudron J) and [196] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
In CSR16, the relevant finding which His Honour found to constitute an erroneous application of s 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act was described as follows (emphasis added):
The 17 August 2016 submission and the 16 August 2016 statutory declaration submit that the applicant faces a real chance/risk of being seriously harmed by MQM as the applicant has made complaints against MQM in Australia. This information may be relevant and was not before the delegate when he made his decision. I consider that that this is new information. The applicant’s claim to fear harm from the MQM was squarely at issue at the April 2016 SHEV interview and was addressed in the subsequent 3 May 2016 submission provided by his former representative, a registered migration agent. Also squarely at issue were any concerns relating to the applicant’s returning from Australia and the disclosure of his details as a person who was in Australia immigration detention in 2014 (the 2014 data breach). At no point was it claimed that the applicant feared harm from the MQM because the MQM would know that he had made complaints against the MQM in Australia. I am not satisfied that this information could not have been provided to the delegate before he made his decision. Moreover, I am not satisfied that the applicant does have a genuine fear of this kind and I am therefore not satisfied that it is credible personal information. I am not satisfied s. 473DD(b)(i) or (ii) is met.
In BTW17, the majority of the Full Court of the Federal Court approved what was stated in CSR16 about s 473DD(b)(ii). Justices Mortimer and Jackson found that the IAA in that case, however, did not impose “a higher standard of satisfaction”.
In in BTW17 the IAA found as follows in relation to the “new information”:
In respect of the 2015 newspaper article, there is a mention of the arrest of ‘R’ (the applicant’s nickname) for the shooting of ‘SN’. I accept if true this is personal information. However, that the applicant only provided this document so late in the proceedings leads me to doubt the genuineness of the document. As discussed above, I find it difficult to believe that he would not have such a document in possession earlier given his claims it mentioned him and given it was dated January 2015. Secondly, the article mentioned that R gave the weapon to AJ and it was found in a cupboard. However, this inconsistent with other evidence provided by the applicant, such as the magistrates court document, about who the gun was given to and that it was found under the bed. Further, the applicant statement noted that AJ was shot in 2011, which was inconsistent with the article’s account that AJ was released on bail in 2012 and developed a friendship with SD again at the end of 2013. Further, given the long rambling nature of the account it is odd there is no further mention of what happened to R, the claimed bail or that he fled the country. Thirdly, the country information … indicates the prevalence of fraudulent documents which further reinforces my view that the document is not credible.
The Full Court found that the IAA had not imposed a higher standard and explained:
83. The Minister is correct to contend that the Authority’s reasons in this case should be understood as finding that the 2015 newspaper article was “evidently not credible” or “not capable of being believed”.
84. The second Authority’s invocation of country information about fraudulent documents is one of the indications that, in substance, it was making a finding that this information was not capable of being believed, rather than any final determination that the contents of the 2015 article were not true. The Authority begins and ends [15] of its reasons with findings doubting the genuineness of the document: that was, we find, its primary focus in its reasoning. On the facts and reasoning in this review, the finding that the 2015 newspaper article was not genuine was a finding that the document is not capable of being believed. When the Authority uses the phrase in [15] of its reasons “if true”, it uses the word “if” in the hypothetical sense, to indicate its acceptance of the hypothetical proposition that the contents of the newspaper article would be personal information. It is not using the word “true” in that context as a synonym for credible. When it does turn to consider the criterion in s 473DD(b)(ii), it uses the statutory language by expressing the view that the article “is not credible”.
In this case, the IAA’s reasons (at [10]) begin and end with the IAA expressing concerns as to how, in the surrounding context of the review material, the statutory declaration was capable of being believed. This was the primary focus of the IAA’s reasoning. The IAA’s finding that the claim in the statutory declaration was not “credible” is a finding that the claim is “not capable of being believed”. That view was formed at the preliminary stage and did not impose “a higher standard of satisfaction” than that which is required.
The IAA’s assessment of whether the statutory declaration met either requirement of s 473DD(b) was sound.
While it was not necessary for the IAA to consider s 473DD(a), it did so in any event. In relation to “exceptional circumstances”, the IAA noted that the applicant was at all times represented by a migration agent and had had an adequate opportunity to raise his claim. When considered within the context of the IAA’s findings in relation to s 473DD(b), it can be said that the IAA’s finding that there were no exceptional circumstances was not unduly narrow and included an assessment of the matters in s 473DD(b).
Overall, the IAA’s assessment of, and approach to, all of the new information was in accordance with the High Court’s assessment in AUS17. The IAA first considered s 473DD(b). For each piece of new information, the IAA determined that it was not satisfied that s 473DD(b) was met. This finding was enough for the IAA to conclude that it could not consider the new information and, appropriately, the IAA did not consider that information.
Ground 1B is dismissed.
Ground 2
Ground 2 states:
The Second Respondent erred by making a decision not fully understanding the applicant’s claim.
It is unclear what claim the applicant is referring to when he says that “a claim” was not fully understood.
Before this Court, the applicant indicated that he mainly fears harm “as a result of his religion”.
The IAA summarised the applicant’s claims as follows (at [13]):
•He is a Tamil Muslim born in Trincomalee in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka in [omitted]. His mother and older brother live in Trincomalee.
•He was a professional soccer player in Sri Lanka for the National Sri Lankan soccer team as well as for other professional sports clubs playing in South Korea in 1998 and Malaysia in 2006 and appeared on the news and TV in connection with his soccer and was quite well known because of this. In 2002 the LTTE called him and said they were trying to organise a team to tour the UK. He initially declined because he is Muslim and they were Tamil and also he believed it would cause problems for him. However they called again and threatened his safety and so he decided to go; it was only for two weeks and he had heard people go missing if they do not do what the LTTE asked them to do. He was appointed their team captain and trained with the team for two weeks in Kilinochichi but the trip was cancelled due to the conflict. The LTTE created a banner with the words “LTTE Tamil” (but no mention of soccer) and photos of the team members on it.
•In October 2009 the Sri Lankan police began looking for him because he had trained with the LTTE soccer team in 2002. Other LTTE soccer team members in the same position as him disappeared and have not been seen since and he believes it was because they were questioned by the police about their involvement. He believes his pursuers were the police although he cannot be sure. They were always in civilian clothing. They went to his house almost every night and questioned him and were often drunk. He would hide to avoid being questioned and caught. On one occasion in about October 2010 they saw him and chased him and hit him with a stick but he escaped. He contacted the Sri Lankan police on two occasions to complain. Despite this he continued to be harassed by the police who continued to search for him until he left Sri Lanka in 2012.
•He met his ex-partner in 2010 and they exchanged rings in February 2011 but were not officially married. She is Hindu and marriages between Hindu and Muslims are not accepted by the wider community. He and his mother were subsequently rejected from the Muslim community because of his relationship. The leader of his mosque slapped him and told him not to attend the mosque anymore. In 2011 members of the Muslim community threatened his ex-partner because of their union. She was also threatened by members of the Hindu community. His ex-partner had been harassed by the Sri Lankan army in connection with her first husband. His ex-partner was questioned about five or six times by the army, in 2011, about her first husband. On one occasion she was mistreated by them. The applicant was only present during one of these incidents. He believes he has become implicated in the matter concerning his ex-partner’s first husband because of his relationship with his ex-partner.
•In August 2012, his ex-partner’s eldest daughter was nearly abducted. He believes this could have been by members of the Muslim or Hindu communities who were angered by the applicant and his ex-partner’s union or it could have been by the police due to suspicions they held about his LTTE involvement or it could have been related to issues regarding his ex-partner’s first husband.
•He has been accused by his ex-partner’s first husband and his family of having kidnapped his ex-partner and her children and taking them to Australia and fears they will harm him because of this.
•Since being in Australia the police have repeatedly visited his mother’s home and questioned and harassed her about the applicant. They have also threatened to kill his family. The last visit was in about May 2017.
•His details were released in a 2014 Departmental data breach. He believes that because of this breach the Sri Lankan government went to his home in Sri Lanka to check on his whereabouts and his mother was questioned and threatened in relation to him.
•He fears being captured by Sri Lankan government officials at the airport and handed over to the police. He fears being abducted, tortured and murdered by the police. He fears harm from the Muslim and Hindu communities and his ex-wife’s husband’s family.

The Court has reviewed the applicant’s arrival interview, his visa application and the delegate’s decision. On the evidence before it, the Court is satisfied that the IAA’s summary of the applicant’s claims is accurate. Further, the assessment provided is methodical.
The Court cannot identify any “misunderstanding” in relation to the applicant’s claims.
Here, the IAA made a number of factual findings in relation to the applicant’s claims.
In relation to the applicant’s claim that his involvement with the LTTE soccer team was such that he will be imputed with pro LTTE links, the IAA accepted that the applicant had been forced to play soccer with the LTTE. However, the IAA determined that the authorities were not interested in the applicant “for this reason” and that any “questioning he faced” was of the sort faced by all Tamils at the end of the civil war. The IAA determined that the applicant did not have an adverse profile with the authorities (at [17]-[20]).
The IAA also accepted (at [21]) that the applicant may have been harassed by criminal paramilitary groups because of “his status as a professional soccer player” (but not for any suspected LTTE links).
The IAA also noted that the applicant claimed to fear harm from the Muslim and Hindu communities because of his “inter-faith marriage”. The IAA accepted that the applicant may have faced societal discrimination from these communities because of his relationship (at [23]-[24]). However, the IAA noted that the relationship had ended and it determined that it was implausible that any discrimination would continue.
The IAA also noted that the delegate had asked the applicant about his claim to fear harm from his ex-partner’s ex-husband and his family. The IAA did not accept that the ex-partner’s ex-husband wanted to harm the applicant after the couple separated in 2013. Accordingly, the IAA did not accept the claim (at [25] and [37]).
In relation to the applicant’s claim that he would be implicated in the activities of his ex-partner’s ex-husband (who the police had “sought out”), the IAA considered it implausible that such a connection would be drawn on the basis of the applicant’s brief relationship with the applicant’s ex-partner and a lack of evidence linking the applicant to the ex-partner’s daughter’s abduction (at [26]).
The IAA also accepted that the applicant’s details had been released in the data breach. However, the IAA rejected the claim that the applicant’s mother had been visited and harassed by the authorities following the data breach (at [27]).
The IAA also accepted that the applicant had left Sri Lanka illegally and would be identified as a failed asylum seeker (at [28]).
In relation to the applicant’s claims to fear harm on the basis of his religion, the IAA states as follows:
36. The applicant claims to fear harm on account of his Muslim faith. DFAT notes that while freedom of religion and public and private worship are enshrined in the Constitution and acts intended to insult religion or attacks on places of worship or religious objects are illegal, Buddhism remains the dominant religion in Sri Lanka. There are reports of local authorities seeking to close certain places of worship, questioning the status of religious registration and inconsistently applying relevant laws in a discriminatory manner against non-Buddhists as recently as 2017. Muslims comprise the third largest religious group in Sri Lanka, having grown by over 40 percent from 1981 to 2012. Muslims are well-represented in Sri Lanka’s political system. However, tensions continue between the Sinhala Buddhist majority and Muslims. In the last few years there have been reports of hate speech, discrimination, attempts to desecrate or destroy Muslim religious buildings and vandalism of Muslim-owned residences, homes, shops and mosques. A nationwide State of Emergency was declared by the Sri Lankan government on 6 March 2018 for 12 days, after tensions escalated in the Kandy District, Central Province, and two Muslim and two Sinhalese were killed and dozens were injured. DFAT also notes that the current government is committed to investigating anti-Muslim hate crimes and bringing perpetrators to justice. Another source reports similar observations to DFAT, noting Buddhist extremist groups have maintained a hate-campaign against Muslims, largely targeting their religious and social practises. While there have been a series of incidents targeted toward Muslims DFAT states that violence remains sporadic and assesses that Sri Lankan Muslims face a low risk of official and societal discrimination and a low risk of violence. The applicant’s claims to fear harm on the basis of his faith all related to his inter-faith relationship, however this ended some five years ago and the applicant has said they have not had contact since. Further, the applicant has been away from Sri Lanka for some six years.
Here, the IAA has assessed the applicant’s chance or risk of harm from violence and from any societal discrimination on the basis of his Muslim faith. There was no error in the IAA’s consideration of the applicant’s claims regarding his religion. The IAA addressed the applicant’s chance of harm as a Muslim generally. It also considered the applicant’s more specific claim that he faced harm as a result of his inter-faith relationship.
The IAA relied on country information which was clearly probative of whether the risk or chance of harm met the relevant threshold in combination with its findings as to the applicant’s relevant circumstances (for example, that he was no longer in the inter-faith relationship).
Having regard to the factual findings, and the IAA’s detailed analysis when making its findings, it cannot be said that the IAA misunderstood any of the applicant’s claims. The IAA’s decision is forensic. The IAA’s factual findings in relation to each of the claims demonstrates a thorough understanding of the applicant’s case. The IAA’s engagement with the materials before it is thorough and without error.
Ground 2 is dismissed.
Oral Submissions
In oral submission, the applicant asserted that “the delegate who interviewed him was biased” because he told him that “he would not get a visa” and that he “was not credible”.
The applicant has not produced a transcript of the delegate’s interview. Nevertheless, accepting that the applicant was spoken to as he suggests, this does not amount to jurisdictional error for the reasons that follow:
(a)the delegate’s conduct is not relevant for the purposes of the review before this Court. The IAA conducts a de novo (albeit somewhat limited) review of the applicant’s application. The IAA forms its own assessment of the applicant’s claims and credibility. Accordingly, any prejudgment on the part of the delegate is not transferrable to an independent review conducted by a different person charged with conducting an assessment of the evidence “afresh”; and
(b)noting that the IAA did have a copy of the interview with the delegate and made reference to this in its decision, the Court does not consider that if these statements were made they caused the IAA to be “impartial”. It is clear from the IAA’s detailed and lengthy analysis that the IAA’s reasons for rejecting the applicant’s claims were based on its own assessment of the applicant’s evidence given at the interview with the delegate and the country information (much of which post-dated the delegate’s decision). On the evidence it cannot be said that any statements made by the delegate was had any bearing on the IAA’s decision.
The applicant also told the Court that his ex-partner had been given a protection visa. Insofar as the applicant is claiming that it is unfair that his ex-partner obtained a visa and he did not, the Court notes that each decision is made on its own merits. The fact that another person known by the applicant was granted a visa does not amount to jurisdictional error on the part of the IAA in relation to this matter.
The applicant also stated that he was accused of kidnapping children and this is a police matter. He explained that when he tried to explain this to the IAA, the IAA said “they could not consider the claim”.
The applicant is arguably confused. The IAA expressly acknowledges this claim as follows:
He has been accused by his ex-partner’s first husband and his family of having kidnapped his ex-partner and her children and taking them to Australia and fears they will harm him because of this.
The IAA also found:
25. The delegate pointed out that given the applicant had not been with his ex-partner for some time (almost four years at that time) it seemed implausible that her first husband and his family would want to harm the applicant. The applicant agreed that his ex-partner’s first husband would be able to find out that they had split and the truth about the kidnapping allegations which I consider even more plausible given it has been about six years since they came to Australia and five since they split. The applicant has provided very little detail about the claim he fears his ex-partner’s first husband and family, he has not said how he knows this or what they threatened to do and I find the claim unconvincing. I also find it implausible that they want to harm him after he had split and ceased contact with his ex-partner and her children in 2013. In light of the above, I do not accept the applicant’s ex-partner’s first husband or family wanted to harm the applicant following their split in 2013.
The applicant did raise this claim and it was addressed. To the extent that the applicant is saying that he was told that he could not provide “new information” about this claim, the Court notes that the applicant was represented before the IAA and new information about a number of claims (and two new claims) was provided to the IAA. The applicant clearly had the opportunity to provide new information (and did so). There is nothing in the materials to suggest that he was told not to do so in relation to any one claim in particular or, indeed, at all.
Finally, the applicant made reference to the situation in Sri Lanka and stressed that he cannot return. The applicant repeated his protection claims at various times. While sympathetic, it is not the role of this Court to consider the applicant’s claims afresh and engage in an impermissible merits review.
The applicant’s oral submissions fail to identify any jurisdictional error.
CONCLUSION
The applicant has failed to identify any jurisdictional error in the IAA’s decision. The Court has otherwise been unable to identify any error.
The application is, accordingly, dismissed.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and eighty (180) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Kendall.
Associate:
Dated: 15 April 2021

File number:	MLG 2718 of 2018
Judgment of:	JUDGE KENDALL
Date of judgment:	15 April 2021
Catchwords:	MIGRATION – Safe Haven visa – decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether the IAA misapplied s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Secretary did not provide review material – whether IAA misunderstood claims – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.
Legislation:	Migration Act 1958 (Cth), pt 7AA, div 3, ss 5, 5AAA, 36, 46A, 473CA, 473CB, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473FB, 473GA, 473GB, 476
Cases cited:	ADF15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCA 1099 AUS17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2020] HCA 37 CQR17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 61 Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 CSR16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCA 474 DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 EVS17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 20 Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v MZZMX [2020] FCAFC 175 Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZKRT [2013] FCA 317 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services & Multicultural Affairs v BTW17 [2020] FCAFC 159 Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] HCA 16 SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24 SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
Number of paragraphs:	180
Date of hearing:	8 April 2021
Place:	Perth
Applicant:	In person
Counsel for the First Respondent:	Mr G T Johnson
Second Respondent:	Submitting appearance, save as to costs
Solicitor for the Respondents:	Australian Government Solicitor

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE KENDALL
DATE OF ORDER:	15 APRIL 2021